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INDIA AS I KNEW IT



# INDIA AS I KNEW IT

1885-1925

BY

SIR MICHAEL O'DWYER

WITH TWO MAPS

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TO  
MY WIFE  
WHO APPEARS BUT LITTLE IN THESE PAGES  
BUT WHO  
FOR TWENTY-EIGHT YEARS HAS BEEN  
MY CONSTANT COMPANION AND SUPPORT THROUGHOUT  
THE EVENTS WHICH THEY RELATE



## PREFACE

**I**N the following pages I have attempted to show something of India as I knew it from 1885 to 1925. I left India in 1920, but since then have been in constant communication with many friends there, British and Indian. It is hoped that the earlier chapters which deal with the life and work of an Indian civil servant in the Punjab, the Native States of Rajputana, Hyderabad and Central India, and on the North-West Frontier, may be of some interest to those who desire to know something of the work and responsibilities of a British official in India.

The later chapters deal with wider issues : the administration of a great province during the world war, the revolutionary conspiracies, the Punjab rebellion of 1919 and its sequel, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, the methods by which they were carried through, and the results of their working up to date. The final chapter discusses the issue raised by a notable book last year—is India a Lost Dominion?

I have endeavoured to supplement in many cases the official versions of these matters, where, in my opinion, they are inadequate or inaccurate. In this I have been aided by the fact that for the last thirty years I have kept a fairly full diary, and am also in possession of copies of the various notes and memoranda I addressed to higher authority. Many of the matters I have touched upon are controversial; but in discussing them my sole object has been to place the facts as known to me on record, and to state my own conclusions as based on those facts. The main purpose of the book is to emphasise the responsibility of the people and Parliament of Great Britain "for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples," and to show where that responsibility is being lost sight of or inadequately discharged.



In my time I have done what I could according to my lights to serve the interests of the peoples of India, and particularly of the dumb masses who, in the tumult and the shouting of politics, are least likely to get a hearing. If these pages direct attention to their wants and wishes, which find but little expression in the new Indian legislatures now dominated by a small but very vocal class, my purpose will have been served.

Where I criticise present-day Indian politicians, I do so not from any hostility to them as a class, indeed I have many personal friends amongst them, but because I consider their present policy is inconsistent with the principles laid down by Parliament in the Reforms Act of 1919, and so far from promoting the "welfare and advancement" of the Indian masses, has shown itself to be injurious to both. All of us who desire the progress and prosperity of the Indian Empire would rejoice to see the Indian politicians displaying that sense of responsibility and that spirit of co-operation on which Parliament counted, and which are essential for the attainment of those objects.

M. F. O'DWYER.

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# INDIA AS I KNEW IT

## CHAPTER I

### IRELAND THEN AND NOW. IRELAND AND INDIA

**E**ARLY environment, as a rule, colours all one's subsequent outlook on life.

I was born in 1864 and brought up at Barronstown, some few miles from Tipperary in the heart of the "Golden Vale," under the shadow of the Galtees, in the land of the "blue mountain and the rushing river." The environment was one of green pastures, luxuriant crops, fine cattle and well-bred horses; and my heart has always gone out to those who live by and on the land. The clan had been settled in Tipperary for many centuries, and in the Lord Justice's Report of 1515 to Henry VIII, on "The State of Ireland and plans for its Reform," the O'Dwyers are mentioned as one of the twelve clans constituting the King's "Irish enemies" in Munster and holding North Tipperary. The Report goes on to say: "And every of the said captains (chiefs of clan) maketh war and peace for himself and holdeth by sword and hateth Imperial jurisdiction within his 'room,' and obeyeth to no other person, English or Irish, except only to such persons as may subdue him by the sword." So that four hundred years ago they were an unruly lot.

In the Great Rebellion the clan fought for the King against the Parliament. A Colonel Edmund O'Dwyer held out to the end against Cromwell in Clonmel.\* Given their choice of Hell or Connaught after the Cromwellian conquest, they, i.e. those

\* See note at end of chapter.

who had not gone to France or Spain, chose Connaught. As he looked over the beautiful Golden Vale, which the capture of Clonmel had placed at his disposal, the Protector is said to have exclaimed, "This is a country worth fighting for." His hardy troopers were of the same opinion, for under the Cromwellian Settlement they readily accepted the confiscated lands in lieu of arrears of pay. The lands of the O'Dwyer clan went mainly to the troopers of Maude, a Cornet of Horse, and Maude, then or later, got with his share the old castle of the family, of which the ruins still exist, some six miles from Tipperary. His descendants prospered and rose by successive stages to the rank of Baronet, Viscount (of Hawarden, as the place was renamed), and Earl de Montalt. Meantime some of the expropriated O'Dwyers, like many others, trekked back from Connaught to their old homes, and re-established themselves, on a more or less precarious footing at first, with the connivance or the encouragement of the new conquerors. In the case of our own family, which claimed to be the head of the clan, the situation was accepted as the fortune of war. Forty years later however, they were strong enough, or unwise enough, to take up arms again in a losing cause, the Irish Campaign of James II against William. Two of the family, John and William, were prominent among the defenders of Limerick, and after the capitulation and the Treaty of Limerick, they with many others, were given the opportunity of leaving their country for their country's good. William entered the service of Peter the Great, helped to organise the Russian navy on the Volga and the Don, and is supposed to have died at Rostoff on the Don about 1720. John joined the Austrian service, and was killed at Belgrade fighting against the Turks in 1712.\*

From the Treaty of Limerick down to the end of the eighteenth century many of the old Irish with fighting traditions, in order to better themselves and escape the Penal Laws,

\* Compare Davis's Irish Brigade:

"And they who survived fought and drank as of yore,  
But the land of their hearts' hope they never saw more.  
For in far foreign fields, from Dunkirk to Belgrade,  
Lie the soldiers and chiefs of the Irish Brigade."

steadily migrated to France, then continuously at war, to join the Irish Brigade (Dillon's, O'Brien's and FitzJames's Regiments) in the French Army. The records of the Brigade show many generations of O'Dwyers or Dwyers (the O' was often dropped in the dark days of the Penal Laws), almost up to the Revolution, generally in Berwick's (FitzJames's) regiment. The Revolution was the death-blow to these soldiers of fortune. They were looked on by the revolutionary leaders as tainted; they, too, were unwilling to fight for the new rulers. The services of the Brigade were offered to the British Government when it went to war with the French Republic. This golden opportunity for conciliating Irish sentiment was thrown away by the stupid obstinacy of the British Government, which made it a condition of the transfer that the Brigade, or what was left of it, should not be employed in Europe. The alternative offered of garrisoning Nova Scotia and the West Indies was grudgingly accepted as a *pis aller*, but the historic Brigade of which the proud motto was "Semper et ubique fidelis" soon fell to pieces.

A similar spirit of distrust by the British Government (advised, it is said, by Lord Kitchener) was shown towards John Redmond's offer in 1914-15, to transfer the National Volunteers *en bloc* to the British Army. The transfer, at a time when enthusiasm for the allied cause was still strong in Ireland, might well have altered the subsequent tragic course of events there. The Irish and English temperaments differ so radically that on the rare occasions when a cause arises that appeals to both, as the Great War did for the first year or so, no effort should be spared to bring them and keep them together. Unfortunately, British intuition and foresight have rarely succeeded in grasping the psychological moment, and Irish suspicion once aroused is not easily allayed.

The atmosphere I was brought up in, though essentially Irish, showed no signs of racial or religious feeling. My father had a rich objurgatory vocabulary, and like most southern Irishmen whose ancestors had been crushed under Cromwell's iron heel, the "curse of Cromwell on you" was perhaps the strongest expletive in his armoury. But I

remember only one allusion of his to the results to our family of Cromwell's conquest. That was when, as a child, I was driving with him past the old family place, then still in the possession of the descendants of the victors.

When I was home on leave in 1909-10, the mansion and demesne lands had come into the market. The suggestion was made to me that our family should make an offer for the property. But we did not for various reasons, chiefly financial, take the offer very seriously, and a community of nuns became the purchasers.

We were always on the most friendly terms with our Protestant neighbours. These were generally the descendants of the Cromwellian settlers, improved, as the late Marquis of Dufferin said of the Ulster plantation, by some centuries' residence in Ireland. They were, as a rule, men of fine physique, with strong military traditions and bold horsemen; in horse and cattle-breeding and in agriculture they were able to give a lead which was not always followed by their happy-go-lucky Gaelic neighbours. The "decent (Protestant) church that topped the neighbouring hill," Shronehill, half a mile from where we lived, was one of the most picturesque features in the landscape, and as we drove past on Sundays to our own church, a mile further on, the small waiting group used to chaff my father by inviting him to save himself the longer journey and join them. He would reply that the longer road led to the better place. So friendly were the relations between priest and parson, that my father used to tell us that when the Commissioners were coming round to decide on the churches to be closed down at the Disestablishment, the Parish Priest, Father McGrath, arranged to depute some of his flock to swell Parson White's meagre congregation. But the manœuvre did not succeed; the picturesque little church was marked down for abolition; after a few years it was dismantled, and Shronehill is now shorn of its most pleasing amenity.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 is the earliest event in my recollection. Irish sympathy was strongly on the side of France; Marshal MacMahon, being of Irish descent, was a

popular hero whose exploits formed the theme of many a ballad. Having then just learned to read, I was often called upon to explain the varying fortunes of the campaign of July–September, 1870, to the harvesters, all of whom were then illiterate. That was my first introduction to Welt-Politik. As regards internal politics, all of his nine sons followed the example of my father, who had a dislike for politics and a distrust for politicians, less rare in an Irishman than is commonly thought. He had an admiration for O'Connell, by whose side he had once stood on a platform, and a regard for the lofty ideals\* of the "Young Ireland" group of 1848, but a profound contempt for their revolutionary programme. For the subsequent Fenian movement he had even a stronger aversion, though he extricated a few local hotheads—among them the family tailor—who had got mixed up in it, by giving bail for their future behaviour.

The Home Rule movement was launched by Isaac Butt in 1870 on lines which wisely aimed at uniting all classes and creeds. It had, at least in the south, the support of many of the great territorial magnates, whose influence among the limited electorate, mainly composed of fairly substantial farmers, was still considerable.

At the General Election of 1874, Colonel White of the Annaly family, and Wilfred O'Callaghan, a son of Lord Lismore, both Home Rulers and great landlords, headed the poll for the County, and I remember at the age of ten bringing in half a dozen neighbouring farmers to vote for them.

John Mitchel, the '48 leader, was a bad third. He had antagonised the Catholic clergy by his caustic remark, after the failure of the revolutionary enterprise, that "the Irish would have been free long ago, but for their damned souls." A great clerical dignitary—the Church was not afraid to speak out in those days—retaliated by denouncing the secret

\* These are nobly expressed in Davis's *Celt and Saxon*:

"What matter that at different shrines we pray unto our God,  
What matter that at different times our fathers won the sod.  
In fortune and in name we're bound by stronger links than steel,  
And neither can be safe nor sound, but in the other's weal,"



societies as instruments of Satan, "for whom Hell was not hot enough, nor Eternity long enough!"

Mitchel, whose character and honesty of purpose were above reproach, was, however, successful at a subsequent bye-election, though, as a convicted rebel, he never took his seat.

My father was too much concerned with the problem of bringing up a family of nine sons and five daughters on four or five hundred acres of land to have any time to spare for politics. The land was of the best; a keen eye for the points of a horse and an unerring judgment in the matter of cattle, combined with ready resource and indomitable energy, enabled him to succeed where ninety-nine men out of a hundred would have failed.

It was made clear to his sons that all we could expect was a good education for whatever profession we decided to adopt. We were duly sent, when the time came, to the Jesuit Colleges at Tullabeg or Clongowes. Thence two of my elder brothers went on to Trinity College, Dublin, to study law and medicine; two other brothers, after going through the London and Royal Universities, joined the Jesuit Order; while others took up medicine, business, and farming as their turns came on. It was a point of honour to start on one's own as early as possible and make room for the younger ones. It was this fact, and having an elder brother in the Indian Medical Service, that turned my thoughts to the Indian Civil Service competition, the age for which was then seventeen to nineteen. After a few terms' coaching at Wren's famous establishment I was successful at my first shot in the 1882 examination, and in the following October I entered Balliol as a Probationer for the I.C.S.

Meantime the situation in Ireland had become more and more gloomy. The general failure of the harvest of 1879 had led to serious famine in the poor western districts, and to the fierce land-war which was then launched and which swamped the legitimate movement for Home Rule. The agitation for the reduction of rents in its early stages had much justification, but as so often happens in Ireland, it soon

fell under the control of unscrupulous men who exploited it for seditious and even revolutionary purposes, and before long it developed into a movement for the repudiation of rents.

Though there was no direct connection between them and the Land League, the Clan Na-Gael in America and the Invincibles in Ireland took advantage of the Land League to push their murderous propaganda. The most terrible result of this was the dastardly murder, in May, 1882, of Lord Frederick Cavendish, the newly-joined Chief Secretary, and Mr. Burke, the Under-Secretary, in Phoenix Park, Dublin, in sight of the Lord-Lieutenant. I was at Wren's then, and for the first time felt ashamed of being an Irishman. Curiously enough it fell to my lot, as part of my legal training for the I.C.S., to have to attend and report the police-court proceedings seven months later, when the Invincibles, Brady, Fitzherbert (Skin the Goat), Mullen, and several others were being committed for trial mainly on the evidence of the approver James Carey.

Since then I have had a fairly wide experience of conspirators and informers. But I have never seen such a desperate set of scoundrels as the Invincible gang, or such a canting, cowardly hypocrite as the informer. Some six months later, at the Old Bailey, I witnessed and had to report the last act in the drama of bloodshed, when O'Donnell was convicted of the murder of the informer Carey, whom he had shadowed out to Durban and shot on board ship.

The failure of the authorities in that case to conceal and protect the informer, even though his assassin was brought to justice, was, I believe, one of the chief reasons why the supply of that contemptible but useful class, previously so common in Irish conspiracies, ran dry at the source. As Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, before and during the Great War, I had to deal with many revolutionary conspiracies, in unravelling which the *genus* informer played a considerable rôle, and our precautions were so thorough that in not a single case did an informer come to any injury.

In the winters of 1881 and 1882 terrorism and violent

crime were rampant in the south and west of Ireland. The "village ruffians" were for the time being in the ascendant, and quiet law-abiding people, though then in the vast majority, went about in fear for their lives and property.

My father, who was too honest to conceal his feelings, became a target for the lawless elements. He received threatening letters, and a plot to "hough" his cattle and horses on an outlying farm was discovered in the nick of time by the loyalty of a former servant who was in the counsels of the conspirators. Finally our house was fired into in December, 1882, and my father and sister had a narrow escape. When I came home from Oxford next day, I found we were under police protection. In 1883 there was some improvement; but the strain had told even on the iron constitution of my father. Early in December he had a slight stroke of paralysis from which, however, he seemed to rally. He was so much better on Christmas Day, one of those soft mild winter days the south of Ireland is often favoured with, that he insisted on driving round his fields with me to see the land, the cattle, and the horses he loved so well. It was to be his last look. Soon after his return, he had a fresh seizure and passed away early the next morning. It is no filial exaggeration to say that he possessed the best traits in the Irish character, unselfish devotion to his family, partly concealed by an austere demeanour, loyalty to his friends, fortitude in times of trouble, and a genial spirit of hospitality. On his death the responsibility which he had so gallantly shouldered fell on my dear mother. She was helped in the task by my eldest brother who was already well established in his profession as a lawyer. She kept the family together in her own loving, unobtrusive and efficient manner till all were launched in the world or provided for at home, no easy task in those days of agricultural depression. And eighteen years after my father, in February, 1902, when I was in Peshawar, she too passed to her well-earned rest. Most of us only realise what we owe to a mother when we have lost her, and we then feel bitter regret and remorse that we did so little to return her love and devotion when she was still with us.

In our case my father's great capacity and dominating personality perhaps overshadowed my mother's sweet and loving disposition. None of her nine sons—she would laughingly claim to have 52 feet of them—and five daughters had an extra share of her maternal affection. Her heart was big enough for all.

There was only one occasion when I can recall that she was seriously angry with me. A Jesuit brother, who was then a professor at Clongowes, was coming to pay us a brief visit. I met him at the railway station and brought him on foot across country to Barronstown. A few years before he had been a fine athlete and captain of the college eleven, but he had gone out of training in a sedentary life. Not realising this, I took him a bit too fast over his fences—a tendency of mine which has now and then landed me in difficulty both with men and horses. He arrived in a state of exhaustion, and I was soundly and rightly rated as cruel and unfeeling.

When on leave from India, I used to spend a good deal of my leave in Ireland, especially in the hunting season, with my eldest brother. He was a keen sportsman who, in the words of a friendly critic, had the biggest heart and the ugliest seat of any man that ever rode to hounds in Tipperary or Limerick. His horses were always at my disposal, till I could secure some of my own, and among my few unpleasant recollections is the fact that I let down two of his best hunters and hopelessly blemished them. I still blush for the *faux pas* which I was not skilful enough to check; but my brother received the bad news with sporting sang-froid.

The death of this brother last year, like that of my father forty years earlier, was hastened by the terrible events that had been going on in Ireland since the Easter Day rebellion of 1916. He was also too independent to adapt himself to the new dispensation, or to shut his eyes or his ears to the wild doings and sayings that marked the rebellion and the subsequent Civil War. The disappearance of old friends and the withdrawal of British troops had left the country-side dull and drab, and like many patriotic Irishmen he could not condone the methods by which Ireland's political independence

had been achieved. In this connection he would often quote with feeling the famous lines of Thomas Davis, the poet of the 1848 movement :

“For freedom comes from God’s right hand  
And needs a Godly train,  
And righteous men must make our land  
A Nation once again.”

He looked in vain for these “righteous men.” Let us hope, for Ireland’s sake, that they will be forthcoming.

I revisited Ireland at the end of 1923 after an interval of four and a half tragic years which covered the second phase of the Rebellion, the Truce, the Treaty, the Civil War, and the first two years of the Free State. During a brief stay I met and talked with all classes, the old Loyalists, Irish and Anglo-Irish, the Free Staters, and even some Republicans. The appalling destruction of property, public and private, both in Dublin and the country-side, in the four years of disorder was a saddening and humiliating spectacle, and little was yet being done to repair the devastation. Ireland did not seem to be much nearer to being a nation ; the south was still the cockpit of the various factions of the Republican and Free State parties ; the north was firmly maintaining its separate and independent status till the struggle in the south had been fought to a finish. The Catholic Church, which might have mediated between the warring factions, in politics spoke with two voices—and had unfortunately not only lost the confidence of both but much of its influence for good among the people.

Among the old Loyalists the prevailing feeling was then one of hatred to England for betraying them ; among the Free Staters and Republicans there appeared to be little hatred, but much contempt, and, curiously enough, the betrayal of the Loyalists was one of the causes of this contempt.

On my way back to England I had as solitary companion in the railway compartment for an hour or two a man who appeared to be a well-to-do farmer, on his way to a coursing

match or a race meeting. He took me for an Englishman, and unburdened himself to me more freely than if he had recognised me as a fellow-countryman. The conversation soon drifted into politics, and his views and outlook were unexpected and striking. I gathered from him that he had been by act and conviction a staunch Republican both before and after the Treaty. His faith in the Republic and in de Valera was shaken, however, when, as he put it, the latter showed at Ennis (when he was captured without a blow by the Free State patrol) that he had no "spunk" in him. The substance of what followed is given in the following conversation :

*I.* Clearly there is no use in standing out for the shadow of a Republic when the British Government have given you the substance.

*He.* Divil thank *them* for it. 'Shure we frightened them into giving it.

*I.* But surely you must be grateful to them for having given up the struggle when you were nearly down and out, and letting you have almost all you asked for.

*He.* And who could have any regard for a Government that let down its own people ?

*I.* Isn't that a strange argument for you to use when *you* were fighting those people ?

*He.* It was *our* business to down them, we had taken our Gospel oath to do so. But it wasn't for their own Government to let them down. Didn't we know all the time that Lloyd George and Greenwood were talking big in Parliament about having rebellion by the throat, that they were negotiating secretly with Michael Collins and planning a surrender ?

I do not claim historical accuracy for the statements of my Republican fellow-traveller. But they are interesting as showing his point of view and they help to explain the attitude of the old Loyalists. The parting impression left on me was that if this spirit was fairly general, then there was still some hope for the future of Ireland. The Irish, in north and south, have more failings than they like to be told of. But desertion of friends is not one of them.

Politics have in many ways been the curse of Ireland, because, like Aaron's serpent, they have swallowed all the rest. Their predominance in a land where there are so many to talk, so few to act, has elbowed out or vitiated all the other factors indispensable to the ordered growth of a people in civilisation and prosperity—law and order, social and educational progress, industrial and agricultural development.

The various movements in these directions have nearly all at one time or another been killed by political or sectarian strife. One alone survives and thrives—the Co-operative movement initiated and fostered by Sir Horace Plunkett, who wisely kept it clear of politics.

In India, to please a small but ambitious English-educated Intelligentsia—less than 1 per cent of the population—we have, in callous disregard of the welfare of the masses, in recent years let loose the demon of discord in the form of Western democratic institutions. And after a few years we are astonished and pained to find that our panacea of "self-determination," a bomb loaded with dynamite, so far from bringing about peace and harmony, has revived and exacerbated all the latent feuds and hatreds among 320 millions of heterogeneous races, sharply separated into innumerable divisions of race, religion, and caste, and groping blindly through all stages of civilisation from the fifth to the twentieth century.

One wonders if our statesmen have ever realised how great an influence the growth and success of the separatist movement in Ireland have exerted on the similar movements in India and Egypt.

Mrs. Besant's Home Rule Movement in India, which was afterwards adopted and amplified by the Indian extremists, was started in 1916 soon after the Easter Monday rebellion in Ireland. At the same time the two notorious agitators, B. G. Tilak of Bombay and B. C. Pal of Bengal, were selected to push the Home Rule propaganda in the Punjab, of which I was then in charge. We were in the middle of the War. A violent agitation against the existing form of government would have produced disastrous results in the province which

was the home of the best fighting races, and was supplying more fighting men to the Army than all the rest of India. I at once issued orders prohibiting Messrs. Tilak and Pal from entering the Punjab. I would have issued similar orders as regards Mrs. Besant, had not the Government of India undertaken that she would make no attempt to come there. My action was violently attacked by the Nationalists in India and their sympathisers in England. I justified it in a speech to the Punjab Legislative Council in April, 1916, from which I quote the following extract as showing my attitude then—which has changed but little since—towards the Home Rule Movement in India and Ireland:

“Honourable Members will remember that some two months ago, my Government passed orders forbidding two gentlemen who were prominently identified with the Home Rule propaganda from entering the province. I took that action not because I desire to stop or repress any reasonable political discussion, but because I was, and am, convinced that an agitation for Home Rule in this province on the lines advocated by the leaders of the Movement, and as it would be interpreted by those to whom it would be addressed, would stir up the dying embers of the revolutionary fires which we have almost succeeded in extinguishing, and set parts of the Province in a blaze once more. . . . Government recognises that among a large section of the community, there is a growing desire, and a natural desire, for an increased measure of self-government. . . .

But the increasing measure of self-government by steady and orderly change for which this country will fit itself, as causes of disunion diminish, as education spreads, and as large numbers of the vast population gain some political experience, is something very different from the sudden upheaval and transfer of political authority into ignorant and inexperienced hands which the protagonists of Home Rule contemplate in their extravagant demands. . . .

What we have to consider is not the ideal of the political philosopher in his arm-chair, or of the journalist at his desk, but the ideal conveyed to the average man; and we have had positive proof based on the judicial findings of several



experienced tribunals, that of the thousands of Punjabis to whom the Swaraj or Home Rule doctrine was preached in America, some hundreds at least set themselves as early as possible (on their return to the Punjab) to realise that ideal by the sword, the pistol, and the bomb. . . .

. . . The case of Home Rule for Ireland is often cited as an argument in their favour by those who advocate Home Rule for India. *At the risk of entering the thorny field of Irish politics I may say there is no real analogy between the two cases.*

*The Home Rule movement in Ireland aimed at the restoration of the status—a separate legislature and a separate executive, though with limited powers—which Ireland had enjoyed for centuries down to the Union of 1800.*

The great majority of the Irish people supported the movement, and many of those who wished well to Ireland, even if they did not count upon any material advantages from Home Rule, were inclined to favour the scheme on sentimental and historical grounds. They looked forward to the time when the softening of racial and religious asperities would enable all classes to combine for the restoration and the successful working of the system of self-government, which in one form or another Ireland had for centuries enjoyed.

That was a lofty and generous ideal. Unfortunately the nearer it came to realisation the greater became the practical difficulties; the old feuds and factions were revived with increasing bitterness and threatened Civil War. A year ago one section of the supporters of Irish *Swaraj*, following in the footsteps of our Punjabi *Swarajists*, allied themselves with the King's enemies and brought about an abortive rebellion. That was speedily suppressed; but it has left a fatal legacy of distrust and ill-feeling which all good Irishmen deplore; for it has prevented Ireland from bearing her full share in the defence of the Empire.

*Well, gentlemen, the conclusion I would ask you to draw is this. If the Home Rule Movement after a hundred years of agitation, has so far produced no better results among a people fairly enlightened and homogeneous, in a country no larger or more populous than a single one of the five divisions of the Punjab, what results can we expect from it in this vast continent of 315 millions, with its infinite variety of races, creeds, and traditions, and its appalling inequalities in social and political develop-*

*ment? What results could we expect from it even in our own Province? In the matter of Home Rule, I fear the case of Ireland, in so far as it is analogous at all, conveys to us a lesson and a warning."*

Those views were expressed before the Indian Reform Scheme was announced in Mr. Montagu's declaration of August 20, 1917, and before the recrudescence of rebellion in Ireland which led to the Treaty of 1921 and the grant of Dominion Status to the twenty-six counties. I do not think they have been falsified by the subsequent course of events in either India or Ireland.

Even now the so-called Moderates in an India which, as a result of the antagonisms revived or aroused by the Reforms, is being torn more and more by racial and sectarian hatreds, have the hardihood to argue that the remedy is to grant at once to India—a geographical expression—the full Dominion Status that has been granted to Southern Ireland. She has, at least, the traditions and many of the elements of a nation, though her government to-day is not a national one but that of a successful faction. Both Southern and Northern Ireland are too small for party government on English lines: India on the other hand is immeasurably too great and too divided for it.

*Notes.*—Hugh O'Neil, who had brought an Ulster contingent, was in chief command. Carlyle quotes Whitlocke's account, "That they found in Clonmel the stoutest enemy this Army had ever met in Ireland; and that there was never so hot a storm of so long continuance, and so gallantly defended, either in England or Ireland."

Edmund O'Dwyer, Hugh O'Neill and the other defeated Irish leaders were allowed to take themselves and their armed followers to any country not at war with England. Edmund was given a licence later (1654) to raise 4000 men in Ireland for Conde's army in France. Others of the clan went to Spain, where Don Phelipe Alferes O'Dwyer was serving in 1663.

This was one of Cromwell's methods for clearing Ireland of armed men, known later as Rapparees, and was the beginning of the Irish Brigades in France, Spain, etc.

After the Stuart Restoration Edward O'Dwyer and Philip O'Dwyer (who had seized Cashel in December, 1641, and held it during the Civil War against the Parliament) appear in the list of those who under the Act of Settlement were to receive back part of their confiscated lands for their loyalty to the Stuart Cause. But in these, as in many other cases, the grants did not materialise. The newly vested interests were already too strong, and most of the clan had already been "transplanted" to Connaught. (See O'Hart's *Irish Landed Gentry when Cromwell Came to Ireland*—Dublin, 1884.)

## CHAPTER II

SCHOOLDAYS AND OXFORD. OXFORD AND THE INDIAN SERVICES

THE Jesuits' method of teaching English and languages—ancient and modern—was sound and thorough. It was a tradition of theirs to encourage wide reading and composition, especially in English, for which a special prize was yearly given. This had been won by at least two of my elder brothers, and was regarded as the academic blue ribbon. In mathematics and science they were less proficient, but they were wise enough to employ for mathematics qualified men from Trinity College or the English Universities. At that time only a small proportion of the boys went on to the University. Trinity College, Dublin, with its strong Protestant atmosphere, was regarded by Catholics rather with pride than with favour, though two of my elder brothers went on there to take their degrees in Law and Medicine. The colleges at Cork, Belfast, and Galway, forming the Queen's University, being purely undenominational, were regarded as "Godless" institutions. The Jesuits, therefore, aimed at giving a fairly complete education in their secondary schools, and at the same time prepared some boys for the University. But just when I joined St. Stanislaus, the newly-formed Intermediate Board of Education had started its operations, which involved annual competitive examinations in the three grades, Junior, Middle, and Senior, between all the Irish secondary schools.

This system gave a much-needed stimulus to the less efficient institutions, for the schools got grants and the boys got prizes and exhibitions according to the examination results. But in my time it tended to encourage cramming and the taking-up of too many subjects. I well remember

Dr. Mahaffy, then a famous professor and subsequently Provost of Trinity College, pointing out this defect when he came down to the College with a cricket team and went round the classes with our Rector, the equally famous Dr. Delaney. He frankly said, "This system will never make a scholar"; and he was right. Most of us who heard him valued his opinion, not so much as that of a cultured scholar, but as that of a dashing cricketer who often made his century.

One evil result of the change was that the summer term was made to end in June when the examinations were held, and there was less time left for cricket and other games. Anyhow, from that time games did not bulk so large and fewer days could be afforded for "out-matches" against the famous Phoenix Park and Leinster teams, the Past, the Curragh, King's County, and other colleges, which had been the red-letter days of the summer term.

In my last year at St. Stanislaus I had hoped to be Captain of the Eleven, but was not a *persona grata* with the Prefect of the Higher Line, a German Jesuit, and was passed over in favour of a junior. The latter, however, justified his selection by just defeating me in the batting averages and thus winning the bat for the year.

One hears much criticism of the Jesuit system of education, which is supposed to be based largely on suspicion and espionage. Apart from my German *bête noire*—in regard to whom my judgment is perhaps not impartial—I found no ground for these insinuations. The discipline erred perhaps on the side of over-strictness, though it was steadily relaxed as one got into the higher classes, especially those which were preparing for the University. Much was done *for* the boys even in the organisation of games, which might well have been left to them; and the strict discipline, while it prevented "bullying," "ragging," and other abuses incidental to English Public Schools, had a tendency to keep boys too long in leading strings. Hence, when they left school and got more liberty than they had been taught to use wisely, there was often a violent reaction in which many fine young

fellows came to grief. That, however, may be as much the result of the Irish impatience of discipline as of the Jesuit Fathers' too insistent attempts to enforce it.

Similarly, of religious intolerance, or of the so-called Jesuitical doctrine that the end justifies the means, I never found the slightest trace. I am not, of course, in the inner councils of the Order, of which in my way I have been a rather severe critic. But I should think it had too wide an outlook to be intolerant, and whatever may be their other faults, religious bigotry is foreign to the southern Irish. Till the unfortunate revulsion of feeling that followed the Easter rebellion of 1916, the Jesuit schools prided themselves on the numbers they passed into the service of the Crown, in the Army and the Civil Service. This was, of course, good business, but it was also based on a spirit of loyal support of constituted authority. The Roll of Honour of Clongowes College (with which my "Alma Mater," St. Stanislaus, was amalgamated in the 'eighties) in the Great War, perhaps, surpassed that of any Irish School, Catholic or Protestant, and for the first two years of the War the spirit was admirable.

To what extent the subsequent anti-British feeling among the Catholic clergy and religious orders in Ireland was due to the mishandling of the 1916 rebellion by the British Government, or to the growing terrorism of the Sinn Fein party, or, as has also been suggested, to the influence of the Vatican being cast on the side of the Central Powers, is an interesting speculation. In 1916 the feeling was steadily gaining ground that Germany was bound to win; the influence of the Catholic Church in Ireland began to turn in her direction, and from the middle of 1916, the attitude, as a whole, became anti-British. This change gave an enormous impetus to the growth of Sinn Fein and other secret societies of which the Catholic Church in Ireland had previously been the stoutest opponent. Whoever may have gained by the change, the Church in Ireland certainly has not. Its influence for good was never less than to-day.

From St. Stanislaus I went on to Wren's towards the end of 1881, and passed as a probationer for the I.C.S. in

the examination of June, 1882. Wren, who never minced his words, used to say that our batch of thirty was the rottenest that had ever passed through his hands, and we were often contrasted unfavourably with the brilliant stars of the following year. Among those were J. S. (now Lord) Meston, (Sir) E. D. Maclagan, (Sir) B. Robertson, who became respectively proconsuls of the United Provinces, the Punjab, and Central Provinces, and (Sir) H. J. Maynard, who in my early days was known as the "‘brains’ of the Punjab." We were a more humdrum lot, and perhaps did better in administration—the rôle for which the I.C.S. is best suited—than in politics, a comparatively new and exotic cult in India, which has still to justify itself by results. (Sir) F. W. Duke and (Sir) A. E. Gait, (Sir) R. H. Craddock and myself became respectively Lieutenant-Governors of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, Burma, and the Punjab, while (Sir) S. M. Fraser finished as Resident in Hyderabad—the blue ribbon of the Indian Political Department—(Sir) H. V. Lovett rose to be Head of the Revenue Board in the United Provinces, and (Sir) D. H. Twomey (a contemporary of mine at St. Stanislaus) to be Chief Judge of the Chief Court of Lower Burma.

In addition, Sir F. W. Duke and Sir E. Gait on leaving India were appointed to the India Council, and Duke later became Under-Secretary of State. So that Wren's harsh criticism was hardly justified by results.

Most of our batch went to Oxford for the two years' probation, and the majority of us entered Balliol; for Jowett, with his wide outlook, had always shown a most sympathetic interest in the I.C.S., and had, I believe, been largely responsible for the rules and syllabus of the examination.

Balliol under Jowett, who was also Vice-Chancellor from 1882 to 1885, was then in the zenith of its fame. Asquith, Milner, Curzon had indeed gone, but the glamour of their names and achievements had remained—and there were many in the College in 1882 who were even then marked out for brilliant careers, such as the present Lord Grey of Falloden, Lang (now Archbishop of York), Anthony Hope (Hawkins)

F. W. Pember (now Warden of All Souls), etc. The I.C.S. probationers, having their own curriculum of Indian languages, Law, and Political Economy, were exempt from the College and University examinations, and in a large College, where the tone was then rather "highbrow" and "cliquey," there was a tendency, natural enough, to regard us as birds of passage. Personally I had more friends in other colleges than in my own.

But I had the good fortune at the start to have as Tutor Arnold Toynbee, one of the most brilliant exponents of the new humanitarian school of thought in economics, which was then battling against the frigid materialism of the Manchester School. To my mind Toynbee's inspiring lectures and essays, which were ably followed up by his successor at Balliol, Professor A. P. Marshall (and Mrs. Marshall), were great factors in revolutionising the outlook on economic questions.

Unfortunately a career of brilliant promise was cut off by Toynbee's premature death. But his memory is entwined in the hearts of all those with whom he came in contact, and is suitably perpetuated in the Toynbee Hall in the East End—the first University Settlement, I believe, of the kind.

At the end of the two years of probation in 1884, I passed out fourth into the I.C.S., but as my father had recently died, I obtained the permission of the India Office to remain a third year at Oxford on condition that I took a degree in honours. This meant doing the whole University course in my last year. I took up Jurisprudence, having already covered some of the ground for the I.C.S. examinations. That school then had a most brilliant group of University Professors—among them Dicey, Holland, and Anson (the Warden of All Souls). I worked fairly hard, and the Master put me down for a probable Third and a possible Second Class. He was, perhaps, unaware that Sir William Anson, on whom I had no claim beyond attending his lectures, seeing my difficulty in covering the course in a few terms, had taken me in hand, and with characteristic kindness and self-sacrifice, coached me privately two evenings a week. I was more pleased for his sake than for my own that, when the lists came out, my name

was among the five Firsts. His delight when I came up to take my degree was even greater than my gratitude.

Among the distinguished men who were given honorary degrees on that occasion was a well-known French savant. He was painfully shy, and while the Public Orator extolled his great achievements in sonorous Latin, he became more and more confused. He looked this way and that to hide his nervousness. Whereon a ribald wit in the gallery shouted to him, "Monsieur—Hold your head up, and look straight at the Vice-Chancellor. He isn't a very pretty object to look at, but it's your duty to face him!" The joke was perhaps lost on the victim, but it was now the Vice-Chancellor's turn to look uncomfortable.

I had stayed up at Oxford during the Easter vacation of 1885 to put in some extra work, and the Master asked me to spend a week with him in his country house some five or six miles out towards Abingdon. Abbott, the Bursar, was the only other guest. The prospect was rather alarming for one who had heard so many tales of how Jowett by a chilling remark would freeze up the springs of conversation in an indiscreetly talkative undergraduate. So the first evening at dinner I was an eloquent listener. After dinner the Master dropped off into a dose, and when I saw him well off I stole out to have a smoke. The next evening things were more lively. It was a Friday, and having helped myself freely to fish, I passed the joint. Jowett noticed this with approval. It reminded him (he said) of another Irishman—Scully, I think, by name—who had been at Balliol some years before. Scully never came to Hall on Fridays, telling his friends that he dined on fast-days on bread and water. His festive appearance rather belied this asceticism, and one Friday a group of his friends burst into his rooms as he was sitting down to his frugal repast. To their astonishment they found a fine "spread" of salmon mayonnaise, pastry, fruit, and a bottle of white wine—far more appetising than the plain but useful dinners in Hall. They reproached Scully as a humbug and a fraud. Scully was equal to the occasion and, with a majestic wave of his hand over the table, he turned to his friends,



saying, "Me dear Bhoys, 'shure I'd give all that for one little mutton chop!" The Master reproduced the brogue admirably. This encouraged me to cap his tale by a similar one, then going the round of the House of Commons, of which the hero was The O'Gorman Mahon. This fine old veteran had first been elected with O'Connell after the removal of the Catholic disabilities in 1829. But he found even the violent politics of those days rather tame, and became a soldier of fortune in many lands—fighting innumerable duels, taking a hand in revolutions in Mexico or South America, and on one occasion, after being taken out to be shot, he was rescued or reprieved just as the firing party had raised their rifles to the ready. He had returned to the House of Commons in the 'eighties when the Irish members were making things a bit lively. He used often to lunch at the House, being waited on by an Irish waiter from his own County Clare. One day he ordered his usual lunch—a steak and a pint of claret. The waiter reminded him that it was a Friday, but was told to mind his own business. He went away grumbling and soon returned with the steak, setting it down with a deprecating look as if to say, "Much good may it do you!" The O'Gorman was getting well under way, when Pat reappeared with a visiting card, "From your Parish Priest, sir," and a malicious twinkle in his eye. The old warrior looked up, pushed away his plate, and turning to Pat gave the word of command, "Take away the Devil now, and show in the Priest!"

This broke the ice between the Master and myself. I followed it up by another tale of the same old hero. Hearing that some *soi-disant* descendant of Irish kings had prefixed "The" to his name, he snorted at the parvenu's audacity, and claimed that there were only three powers in the universe entitled to the distinction—*The* Pope, *The* Devil, and *The* O'Gorman Mahon!

When Sunday came round, the Master said he was going in to Oxford to the service at St. Mary's and asked what I meant to do. Being outside the statutory distance (five miles, I believe) from my church I was thinking of staying at home.

Jowett said, "Surely if I can walk five miles you can, and the Jesuits expect you to come to Mass." He insisted that I should join him. On the way back we discussed the respective sermons we had heard, and the qualities of Newman and Manning, of whom he expressed more regard for the latter. Since then I have been less disposed to plead distance as a ground for staying away from Mass.

Jowett's extraordinary influence was no doubt largely due to the fact that with all his great intellectual power he never forgot to be human. I may perhaps cite an instance. The I.C.S. men wished to give a dance in the "Commem." week of 1885, and the sanction of Jowett as Vice-Chancellor was necessary. Additions to the already long list of dances were looked on with disapproval. I was one of the deputation. When we explained what we wanted, Jowett, so far from throwing cold water on the proposal, gave it his blessing. He did not stop at that, but gave us a generous contribution towards the cost. Encouraged by this we thought it right to ask him if he would honour us by looking in at the dance at the Randolph. He readily consented, came for an hour or so, and it was not entirely a happy accident that he sat out with the prettiest girl in the ball-room. The management saw to that.

The Derby of 1885 aroused more than usual interest, as those two great horses, Melton and Paradox, were to meet in it. Hugh O'Beirne, also an I.C.S. probationer at Balliol, and I determined to see the race and take our chance of escaping the Proctors. We saw a great race; Melton, ridden by Fred Archer, just pulled it off. After a comfortable dinner in town we came back by the last train, and got out at the far side of the station to escape the Proctor's myrmidons. But we fell into their clutches under the bridge, and next day had to pay the penalty.

One of my last visits to Balliol was in 1923 for the unveiling of the memorial tablet in the Chapel to those who had fallen in the War. The first name on the list was that of my old friend, O'Beirne, who had quitted the I.C.S. for the Diplomatic Service, had been Minister in Sofia in 1915, and went down in the *Hampshire* with Lord Kitchener on his

way to Russia in May, 1916. He was one of the many "*qui ante diem periit. Sed miles, sed pro patria.*"

Whenever I came home on leave from India, I paid a visit to Oxford, and always received a hearty welcome from the successive Masters of Balliol, but especially from Strachan-Davidson and A. L. Smith, both of whom had been young "Dons" in my undergraduate days, and both, alas! now passed away.

Coming back for good after the War, one found most things at home changed, and often for the worse. But Oxford is certainly not among the latter. The War experience seems to have infused into all the "Dons," but especially the young and middle-aged who took such an active and honourable part in it, a more robust spirit and a broader outlook.

But there is one saddening feature for those of us who went from Oxford to take up our life-work in India. We see practically no one now coming forward to take our places. When there were twenty or thirty I.C.S. probationers (as in my time), or fifty or sixty enterprising young fellows preparing for the I.C.S. and other Indian Services (as was the case from 1889 when the age limit was raised), there are now only a few British candidates for an Indian career. This year, of the eleven candidates selected in England only three are British, and two of these are from Oxford. The loss to Oxford is serious, to India it is grievous; for in the last two generations it was Oxford men who played the greatest part in building up and developing the high standards of British administration. That splendid work, the envy of other countries and the glory of our own, is being steadily sapped by our politicians' rash and short-sighted experiments. To-day it is tottering to its ruin. The steel-frame of the British Services—to quote Mr. Lloyd George's apt metaphor—which alone held it together, is becoming so bent and broken as to be unequal to the strain. The word has gone round in Oxford and elsewhere that the conditions of service in India have become so altered, that a British official finds it difficult to serve there with honour and self-respect. The Civil Servant of to-day finds himself poorly paid, the target of virulent

abuse, and too often feebly supported or openly disavowed by the Government which he is so loyally serving.

For years some of us, who have the welfare of the Indian peoples at heart, and the authorities at Oxford have been endeavouring to bring this cardinal fact home to those in authority in Whitehall. The warnings had remained unheeded till the sources of British recruitment almost completely dried up. Then, a year ago, Lord Lee of Fareham's Commission—half British, half Indian—was appointed to investigate the grievances of the Services and the method of attracting recruits of the right stamp. The Commission produced a unanimous report in May, 1924, which, though it does not go to the root of the matter, if given effect to promptly and thoroughly may stop the rot, and if backed by Parliamentary guarantees may in time—for a Service once discredited takes years to recover its reputation—restore confidence and attract suitable British recruits, at least to the Indian Civil and Police Services. The remaining great all-India Services—Forests, Public Works, Medical, Agriculture, Education, etc.—are to be provincialised, and will rapidly lose their British character and personnel. For the Provincial Councils make no secret of their desire to oust the British officials as early as possible. With them will go the splendid efficiency and the great development of India's resources which have been the pride and the justification of our administration. Many of the best elements among educated Indians view this prospect with dismal forebodings, but they are afraid to express their views. The Indian masses regard the steady disappearance of the British officials—the “protectors of the poor,” to use their own expression—with amazement and despair. They happen to be 98 per cent of the population, but as they have no votes—only 2 per cent of the 250 millions in British India possess, and only one-half per cent use the vote—they are of no account with the politicians here or in India. Thus not only the “placid pathetic contentment,” but the peace, security, good government, and orderly progress of 320 millions of people are being sacrificed to the travesty of democratic institutions we have set up.

That system has been described as "a spider's web spun out of the brain of a doctrinaire pedant." Anarcharsis, Plutarch tells us, compared Solon's laws to a spider's web which would catch and imprison the weak and the poor, but could easily be broken through by the strong and the wealthy. The simile is apt in India to-day. The first constructive measure of the Indian oligarchy has been to impose a prohibitive tariff which fleeces the poor Indian consumer and especially the rural classes—90 per cent of the population—for the benefit of a few thousand mill and factory owners. The pose of a patriot is useful when it enables you to boycott British goods as "satanic," and sell your own at your own price to your own countrymen. This perhaps explains why the Bombay mill-owners a few years ago contributed nearly 50 lakhs to Gandhi's boycott movement. Such are the first results of the "fiscal autonomy" which the Montagu-Chelmsford scheme granted to India or rather to the Indian oligarchy. Unfortunately there was no Anarcharsis in the British Parliament in 1919, or if there was, he was not heeded.

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## CHAPTER III

SHAHPUR—WESTERN PUNJAB (1887-89)

I ARRIVED in India in November, 1885, and was posted to Lahore, the capital of the Punjab. I left Lahore and the Punjab for good in May, 1919. Lahore Civil Station had in 1885 few of the amenities which make it to-day one of the finest stations in India. It was still in the stage so vividly described a few years earlier in the *Chronicles of Dustypore*, and a few years later in Kipling's *City of Dreadful Night*. There was a pervading sense of dust and disorder, relics of the rough Sikh dominion. But it was a more cheerful place to live in than the Lahore of to-day. Anglo-Indian social life was in those spacious days, prior to the fall in the rupee and the rise of political unrest, breezy, friendly, and optimistic.

Lord Dufferin had succeeded Lord Ripon as Viceroy at the end of 1884. The controversy over Lord Ripon's first experiment in the direction of self-government, and the ill-fated Ilbert Bill, intended to give Indian magistrates jurisdiction over European offenders, had no doubt stirred up the dawning political consciousness of the small but growing English-educated class. This led to the first meeting of the National Congress in December, 1885, at Bombay. But it was a small affair of less than a hundred delegates, of whom only two were Mohammedans. The movement for many years found little or no support in the politically backward Punjab. The Central and Provincial Governments were at that time strong, but not as yet unduly centralised. In the Punjab, which had been then only thirty-six years under our rule, there was still ample scope for the individual effort and initiative of the British officials, who had built up the fabric

maintained by the pilgrims' offerings and by a precarious income from the thousands of acres of dry and waste land surrounding the shrine, which the British Government, following the example of previous rulers, had assigned for its maintenance. We got a hearty welcome from the priests, presented our offerings of a few rupees at the shrine, and received the customary *parshad* or sweetmeats. That was Nankana in 1886.

When I next visited it as Lieutenant-Governor in 1917, the barren jungles had been transformed by the Lower Chenab Canal into a fertile plain of rich cultivation; the railway ran through it and brought in tens of thousands of Sikh pilgrims from all parts of the Punjab; a prosperous town and market had sprung up; the humble little shrine had become one of the largest and richest foundations in Northern India; the offerings of the faithful and the income of the revenue-free lands had risen from a few hundreds of pounds to tens of thousands annually. Sometime before my visit the old abbot had died, and his successor, whom I think he nominated, had to be approved by me as Head of the Government from whom he held the lands revenue-free. The approval was only a formality; but the new incumbent made a favourable impression on me, and out of regard for the shrine and the valiant Sikh worshippers I stretched a point to present him with some 30,000 rupees which were in dispute between the shrine and the Government. He undertook to spend it on improving the pilgrims' quarters and fulfilled his promise. I little foresaw then the appalling tragedy which was impending.

The agitation for the reform of the Sikh shrines became serious in 1919 after I had left the Punjab. Like the similar movement for the confiscation of the monasteries in England at the Reformation, it was based originally on genuine religious feeling, but later was strongly reinforced by self-seeking cupidity. If abuses did not exist to justify interference, they could and were easily invented in a form to excite the credulous and tempt the greedy: religious zeal cloaking their unworthy motives. The Sikh reformers soon turned their eyes on Nankana, alleging that the abbot was an evil-liver and kept a

Mohammedan mistress. Instead of appealing to the Courts for redress, they decided to take the law into their own hands, and encouraged by the supine attitude of the authorities in allowing them to seize other shrines, they planned to take forcible possession of Nankana, its lands, treasures, and endowments. The Mahunt appealed to the authorities for special police to protect his legal rights. His appeal was in vain, and he decided to take his own measures of defence. He laid in a supply of arms and ammunition, strengthened the outer walls of the Monastery, loopholed the inner, and added to his tenants and retainers certain Pathan bravados and retired Sikh soldiers. Then, when one fine morning in February, 1921, the expected band of Akali "reformers" arrived on the scene under pretext of worshipping at the shrine, they were readily admitted. The great gates were closed, a murderous fire was opened upon them from all sides, and in half an hour the place was a shambles with 131 corpses. When the British District Magistrate arrived in hot haste an hour or two later, some of the bodies were already being cremated in lime. He was a man of fine physique and great courage, but the appalling spectacle of carnage gave him a nervous shock from which he took long to recover. The ghastly outrage inflamed all the fanatical frenzy of the Akalis and their sympathisers. Bands of lawless Sikhs started from all sides to march on Nankana and avenge their murdered brethren. They terrorised the country-side, and even the Governor of the Province and his colleagues were menaced on their visit to Nankana. Finally, some semblance of order was restored by drafting large bodies of police and troops into the disturbed area. The Mahunt and his chief accomplices in the crime were sentenced to death; but on appeal to the High Court the sentence on the Mahunt was reduced to transportation for life on the ground, I believe, that he was to some extent acting in self-defence. The new Mahunt has recently been murdered. Since then the Akali Movement has steadily gained in force; it is now almost purely political in its objects, and in close alliance with the extreme Congress party, which rejoices to find such virile support in its anti-British campaign. But the Akali



leaders have their own objects in view and are using the cry of the Sikh religion in danger to enrol the militant Sikhs in the struggle to re-establish Sikh rule. The revenues of the rich shrines forcibly seized by them form their war-chest.

This ideal of restoring Sikh rule has been in the minds of many Sikhs ever since the *khálsa* (Sikh brotherhood) was laid in the dust by Lord Gough's crowning victory at Gujrat in January, 1849. Even in my first tour in 1886 it was brought to my notice.

The ex-Maharaja Dalip Singh, who had lived in England as an honoured guest on a generous allowance since 1849, had resented the refusal of the British Government to go on paying his debts, had made a bold attempt to return to India, and when headed off at Aden had found a temporary asylum in Russia, which, since the Penjdeh aggression of March, 1885, had been very hostile to us. The news of the possible return of the son of "the Lion of the Punjab," had revived the national feeling of some of the older Sikhs. I remember, near Chunian in Lahore, a gruff old Sikh asking Clark, almost insolently, whether we were going to give back his own to the ex-Maharaja. A sharp rebuke from Clark and a hint that wild talk of this kind would soon land the speaker in jail were quite effective. The word went round that the Sirkar would stand no nonsense, and the agitation was still-born.

To-day, or rather up to June, 1924, when Sir Malcolm Hailey became Governor, such talk would have received no check, and would have probably been translated into seditious action; the old Sikh would have been found heading a *jatha* of five hundred and marching on Jaitu to demand the restoration of the tyrannical ex-Maharaja of Nabha. How appropriate are Sadi's lines :

" Sar-i-Chashma ba bayad giriftan bá mil  
Chi pur shud na shayad guzashtan ba fil."

(" You can stop a spring with a twig. Let it flow unchecked, and an elephant cannot cross it.")

Every British administrator has learnt this lesson, but how few of our politicians know it, *or if they know it act on it.*

My month's tour gave me some knowledge of and a genuine interest in the rural people and rural matters. It also gave me a sharp attack of enteric fever, which laid me low for some weeks. This was happily my only serious illness—for a few broken collar bones do not count—during thirty years in India. When I was able to get about again, I was moved on to Amritsar, where I formed a closer acquaintance with the Sikhs and their problems. In July, having passed my examinations in law and languages, and thus become of some use, I was transferred to Mooltan, justly famous according to a satirical couplet for :

“ Gard, Garmi, Gadha wa Goristan.”  
 (“ Dust, heat, beggars, and graveyards.”)

It was the height of the leave season, and I found myself for most of the hot weather saddled with the duties of Cantonment Magistrate, Superintendent of the Jail (with five hundred prisoners), Treasury Officer, Magistrate, and Civil Judge with limited powers. This meant a full day's work for one who had not been a year in the country and was still struggling with the local vernacular. I began at 6 a.m., drove round the cantonment bazaars with the sergeant in charge, settling petty disputes and summarily trying petty cases. Thence on to the jail which took me another hour or so. By 8 a.m. I tried to arrive at the Treasury and supervise the payments and receipts, at the same time going on with the petty civil and criminal cases awaiting disposal. By 1 p.m., working in a temperature well over 100 in the shade, one had had enough of it. The Treasury was locked up, the Court closed, and one drove home to a combined breakfast and lunch. This was followed by a siesta, after which one wrote orders on cases, and about 5 or 6 p.m., according to the season and the temperature, sallied forth to join one's friends in cantonments—there were three regiments, British and Indian, and a Battery of Artillery—at polo, tennis, or racquets. A plunge in the swimming-bath carried one on till a late dinner in one's own house or at the Mess. From June till well on in October one slept on the roof, and on the hottest nights one's servant

poured cold (?) water on the hot dry sheets, which rapidly dried up in that furnace-like atmosphere, but were left for a time fairly cool and slightly moist.

This latter feature was, I believe, peculiar to Mooltan and a few such stations in the hottest zones. The rest of the above description of life in the hot weather applies to most Punjab stations at that time.

The only break for me that year was a ten days' visit to Simla to see a dentist. Mr. O'Meara did his work so well that I have not been near a dentist since.

The cold weather found me free from the drudgery of headquarters and on the march again. I had now full powers as a Magistrate, and my Deputy-Commissioner (Lt.-Col. Hutchinson) set me to check the trade in stolen cattle for which certain tracts of Mooltan were notorious.

The immortal Jorrocks said of ladies in the hunting-field, "they fears nothing because they knows nothing," and that was my position *vis-à-vis* the great receivers of stolen property. Most people knew who they were, but their local influence was great and the Indian Police and Magistrates were chary of tackling them. I had no such fears in those days, and in the course of a few weeks created general consternation by demanding heavy security from the biggest men in the business. The Indian Magistrates followed my lead; the police, seeing that we were no respecters of persons, no longer hesitated to go for the tall poppies, and the necessary evidence of bad repute, which is the basis of security proceedings, was soon forthcoming in abundance. The result of these preventive measures was an immediate, though I fear only temporary, falling off in cattle-theft, which was only profitable so long as there were influential men to act as receivers.

After eight or nine months spent busily but pleasantly in Mooltan, I was again moved on. My new district was Shahpur in the Western Punjab, with a population of about half a million and an area of some five thousand square miles. East to west it stretched from the River Chenab (the Hyphasis of the Greeks) across the Jhelum ("famosus Hydaspes") to the Indus desert and the picturesque Salt Range, culminating in

the Sakesir Peak, some five thousand feet high, on the north-west. The headquarters, Shahpur, were then thirty miles from the railway at Bhera. The district had the reputation of being both very "jungly" and very factious. But the Salt Range, with its bold outlines, picturesque valleys, blue (but salt) lakes, sweet springs, above all its pleasant little hill station at Sakesir, was a delightful change from the monotony of the Punjab plains; and the factions which divided every town and almost every village, while they added to the difficulties, also heightened the interest of the work.

Mr. (now Sir) James Wilson was then Deputy-Commissioner in general charge of the civil, criminal, and revenue administration. He was, in addition, carrying out the revision of the land-revenue settlement. That operation will be described later on. It is one of the most engrossing and responsible which a British officer (he is known as the Settlement Officer) has to perform. The resettlement of a district usually takes four or five years. It is, as I have reason to know, quite as much as an average member of the I.C.S. can carry through to a satisfactory ending. But Wilson, in capacity and industry and above all in the power of infusing into his subordinates something of his own lofty standards of work and duty, was far above the common level. In my long Indian service I never came across a man more unselfishly devoted to his work and to the interests of the people, nor animated with a higher sense of justice.

In the two years that I lived with and worked under him, I was able to acquire an understanding of the people who live on the land, a knowledge of administration generally, and especially of land-revenue settlement, which were invaluable in after years. Besides Wilson and myself the only other British officials were the Civil Surgeon, in charge of the Medical administration and the jail, and the Superintendent of Police. The latter was responsible for maintaining order among half a million virile and lawless people, prone to violent crime and the more common pastimes of stealing their neighbour's womenfolk and cattle, with some four hundred Indian policemen. There were no troops, British or Indian, nearer

than Jhelum, some eighty miles off. But there was never then, or since, any need to call in troops ; for the *ikbal* (prestige) of the Sirkar was worth many battalions, and the Shahpur people, however divided among themselves, were and still are noted for their active loyalty. They have given signal proof of it in every crisis and in the Great War.

The great landholding tribes, the cultivators, and the village menials were almost exclusively Mohammedans of a strict orthodox type, but without any shadow of intolerance, at least towards Christians. Now and again there was bad blood between them and the Hindus, who predominated in the towns, and in particular towards the Hindu traders and moneylenders in the villages, who considered that they were entitled to exploit the peasantry for their own benefit. This clash of interests was, however, more economic than religious.

The expropriation, through the agency of our Courts and a rigid judicial system, of the Mohammedan peasantry in the West and North Punjab by their astute Hindu creditors of the towns and villages was already assuming serious dimensions, leading often to brutal acts of retaliation by the former, and threatening to become a serious political danger. Even then the late Mr. S. S. Thorburn of the I.C.S., to whom the Mohammedan peasantry owe so much, had in his book, *Mussulmans and Moneylenders*, diagnosed the evil and put forward the remedy. Nearly every British official in contact with the peasantry supported Thorburn's scheme, and pressed for legislation. But the *laissez-faire* doctrines of the rigid economic school were still in the ascendant, and educated India was, and is, strongly on the side of the Hindus of the trading and professional classes from whom it is chiefly recruited.

It was not till 1900, when the process of expropriation had gone to dangerous lengths, and fierce reprisals by the Mohammedan and even the Hindu peasantry made the situation grave beyond dispute, that Lord Curzon's Government carried through the Punjab Alienation of Land Act.

That beneficent measure was up to the end bitterly opposed by educated Indians, in the Press, on the platform, and in the

Council. It is now regarded by hereditary landowners of all religions and castes as their "Magna Charta." Its main feature is that while allowing free transfer within the agricultural tribe or group of tribes, it prohibits permanent alienation of the land of members of those tribes to non-agriculturists, except for necessity proved to the satisfaction of the revenue authorities ; while it allows leases up to seven years and mortgages with possession up to twenty.

Since that measure was passed into law, not only has the sale value of agricultural land in the Punjab, a slump in which was predicted by its opponents, nearly trebled, but the process of expropriation has been arrested and the peasantry have been able to redeem or repurchase a considerable share of the hereditary acres which they had mortgaged or sold.

To Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy, and Sir C. Rivaz, then Home Member and afterwards Lieutenant-Governor, is due the main credit of this salutary legislation. As a result of the Act the Punjab landowners, the finest body of peasantry in the East, who but for it would now be largely a landless discontented proletariat, eager for any change that might help them to get back their own, have been staunchly loyal to the British Government. The best proof of this is that we were able to raise from them three hundred and sixty thousand fighting men (one-half Mohammedans, one-fourth Sikhs, one-fourth Hindus) in the four years of the Great War.

But the Hindu middle classes of the towns, who now dominate Indian politics, have never forgiven the British Government for this effective check to their steady self-aggrandisement. Legislation of this nature would stand no chance of being enacted in the "representative" all-India Legislature of to-day or in any Provincial Council outside the Punjab. There, fortunately, the Act of 1900 supplemented by the rural co-operation credit movement—also bitterly opposed by the Hindu urban classes—has so strengthened the rural classes as to enable them to exercise on legislation an influence substantial, though by no means commensurate with their numerical and economic preponderance.

Life among the sturdy landowners of Shahpur was full of

interest. The tribal divisions were well marked, and in many tribes the hereditary heads had still much influence. The most prominent was the Tiwana clan, famous for its fine horsemen and brave soldiers. Among them were Maliks Fateh Sher Khan and Sher Muhamed Khan, both gallant fighting men in the past, and both violently contesting with one another the leadership of the tribe. Their factions were to be found in nearly every village in the district. Other notable men of the older generation were Maliks Jahan Khan and Fateh Khan, Tiwana, and Hakim Khan, Noon, whose descendants are now so prominent in the administration. Another great Tiwana Malik, Sahib Khan, C.S.I., had died some years before this, and his even more distinguished son, Colonel Sir Umar Haiyat Khan, was then a minor under the Court of Wards.

Nearly all the older men of my time had done splendid service in the Mutiny thirty years before; they had raised and taken down to Hindustan their own Risalas of Irregular Horse; and they were never tired of repeating their exploits in those dark, but for them glorious days, under such gallant leaders as John Nicholson, Herbert Edwardes, Richard Lawrence, Reynell Taylor, Abbott, and others. Their sons and nephews were brought up on those traditions. The Government after the Mutiny had liberally rewarded their services by grants of waste land, subsequently developed by the private canals, which their enterprise had constructed, into valuable estates. Hence in every subsequent campaign, the Tiwana Chiefs were the first to come forward. In the Great War Lt.-Col. Sir Umar Haiyat Khan was perhaps the most distinguished Indian soldier—one who served on every front from Flanders to Mesopotamia, and by his influence and example raised thousands of fighting men in the North Punjab. Nawab Mobariz Khan (now alas, dead), a fine soldier himself and the son of the veteran Jahan Khan (for many years the chief Indian officer of the Tiwana Lancers), was also a tower of strength. Nawab Sir Khuda Bakhsh Khan, then a Minister in the Bahawulpur State, was recalled by me to the Punjab in 1916, to help in a great emergency, and

raised, in and around his native district, six thousand mule- and camel-drivers for Mesopotamia in a few weeks.

All these were young men when I was in Shahpur (1887-89), and we became fast friends, hunting, shooting, and hawking together when one could get away from the strain of work.

The manly standard set by the Tiwana Chiefs and their kinsmen the Noons, was followed by the other tribes of the Jhelum Valley and the Salt Range—the Baluchs, Janjuhas, Saiyids, Kureshis, Mekans, Awans, etc. Of these perhaps the most interesting were the Awans of the Salt Range. They were men of small possessions but inured to hardship, and of high though often misdirected spirit, which manifested itself in riots and bloodshed. There were even then too many of them for the land; for they were rather a home-loving race, and the valleys of the Salt Range, unlike the rest of the district, gave little scope for extending cultivation.

It occurred to Wilson and me, who spent much time among them and every year had to send hundreds of them to prison for violent breaches of the peace, that it would be for their good and ours to open a career for the young "bloods" in the Army. A new battalion was then being raised. We induced the Commandant to come down to the great Horse Fair in 1888 or 1889, and persuaded the Awan greybeards to bring in some hundreds of their young men—preferably the wilder spirits. Recruiting caught on like wild-fire, and in twenty years the Awan soldier had made his name and was to be found in nearly every Mohammedan company or squadron recruited in the Punjab. The material benefits were of no small value to a poor and frugal tribe; but they valued even more the increased *izzat* (honour) which military service confers in the Punjab. In the Great War nearly every fit man of military age came forward from these Awan villages, and an inspiring sight was to see the batches of young recruits escorted for miles on their way by their mothers, wives, and sisters, singing songs of the brave deeds of their forefathers and urging the young men to emulate them. Though strict Mohammedans, they showed no hesitation to fight against the Turks, and many of them told me on their return from Palestine



and Mesopotamia that, while the Turk might be a good soldier, he was a very indifferent Mussulman—*be-parhez* and *be-namaz*—i.e. having no regard for prayer or fasting.

While the Awan would never forgive the "enemy" who brought him to justice, he had no resentment against the judge or magistrate inflicting the punishment.

A case came before me in 1889, when I was acting as District Magistrate for Wilson, in which a young Awan, jealous of his young wife, who was a local beauty, had in a moment of passion cut off her nose with a razor so that she might not be able to attract other men again. Having done the cruel deed he ran away in fright, and the poor girl died of shock. The husband gave himself up soon after, admitting his guilt, expressing his penitence, and explaining that evil tongues had made bad blood between him and his dead wife, who had really been quite innocent. I tried him, believed his story, and finding him guilty of manslaughter, not murder, sentenced him to seven years' transportation to the Andamans. The case made some noise in our little hill station of Sakesir, and the few English ladies there for some time regarded me coldly as one who took a light view of wife murder!

Some six years later when I was in Gujranwala, one hundred and fifty miles off, my orderly announced one morning that an Awan from Shahpur wished to see me. I often had visits from old Shahpur friends and expected to meet one. But the man ushered in was quite unknown to me. When I asked who he was, he looked disappointed and said, "Don't you remember whom you were so kind to? You only gave me seven years when I expected to be hanged for killing my wife."

He explained that he had got a year's remission for good conduct, and since his release had been seeking me out to thank me. He had brought for me some Andaman souvenirs—a beautiful sea-shell on which he had carved his name and "Port Blair," and an enormous coco-nut shell which he had worked into the likeness of an Andamanese native, also a shark's tail!

When as Lieutenant-Governor I visited the Salt Range at

the end of 1913, among the many who came up to renew old acquaintance were several, now grown old, whom I had "put away" for rioting or manslaughter over a quarter of a century before. They seemed to think that this fact established a personal bond of friendship between us! One sturdy old fellow of Kufri used it as a basis for a claim to a grant of land. I had committed him to the sessions, twenty-five years before, on a charge of murder. He had been sentenced to death, but the penalty was commuted to transportation for life, and he had been released after twenty years in the Andamans. He urged that in those years of enforced retirement, the people of his congested village had got a block of Government waste land in a new canal colony. He had been unable to participate in this good luck, and it was therefore for me, who was responsible, to prove my *shabana mizaj* (royal disposition) by now making the loss up to him! One could not but be drawn to such people, and I asked the Deputy-Commissioner to bear him in mind at the next distribution of land.

A case of a different type may be quoted as showing the highly-developed aptitudes of the Shahpur people in concocting false evidence. The Baluch tribe owns the lands of Khushab town and many adjoining villages. Their Chief was a man of splendid physique and great courage, but prone to litigation and not over-scrupulous in prosecuting it. He had a life-long feud with an influential Hindu money-lender and landowner of the town, a man even more subtle and unscrupulous. The feud, which was embittered by Hindu-Mohammedan feeling, led to frequent breaches of the peace and cases in Court. One hot day in July, 1888, the Baluch appeared in my Court, and stated that his Hindu rival and his followers were contriving to murder him. He asked that they should be put on heavy security to be of the peace. Knowing, as I thought, both parties well, I said to him, "Surely you, a Baluch, are not afraid of a Hindu *kirar* (shop-keeper)," and I rejected the application, thinking his fears were imaginary. A week later the Baluch Chief, while prostrating himself in the sunset prayer in his own mosque, was

stabbed through the neck by a dagger and died without a word or a struggle. The alarm was at once raised ; the police were called in ; the local Indian Magistrate was on the spot within an hour ; the enquiry was begun without delay. Four or five witnesses, apparently disinterested, *at once* came forward and deposed that just before the murder they had seen a group of seven or eight men assembled in the porch of the Hindu leader's house ; the group moved out in the direction of the Baluch's mosque ; the Hindu leader and some of his friends turned aside and waited in a lane ; the three Mohammedans of the group (hired assassins) stepped quickly into the mosque where the Baluch was at prayer ; they emerged almost at once, one of them brandishing a dagger, and after signalling to the waiting Hindus disappeared in the growing darkness. This evidence was at once taken down in writing. I arrived on the scene early next morning, was informed of the above depositions, called up the witnesses, made them repeat their evidence in full detail, went over the ground with each of them separately, but found not a shadow of a discrepancy in their statements.

The Hindu plotters and their Mohammedan agents in the crime were at once arrested (except one who absconded to the Frontier). They, of course, alleged that the whole case was a concoction—hurriedly fabricated in the interval between the murder and the arrival of the Magistrate.

The evidence of their guilt seemed to me overwhelming, and I committed the case to the sessions. When it came up for trial two months later, the Sessions Judge, a man of great experience and judicial acumen, acquitted or discharged the lot, refusing, and rightly, to believe the evidence of the so-called eye-witnesses. He told me later that his theory was that the Baluch Chief, knowing that his life was in danger, had arranged the evidence and the whole *mise en scène* some time before his death, so that there should be no hitch or difficulty about bringing to the scaffold the men who he thought were encompassing it. It is quite possible that this theory was correct ; but at any rate my own subsequent enquiries showed that the actual assassin was the man who had escaped to the Frontier,

and that the evidence of the eye-witnesses (as to the other accused persons) was entirely fabricated. No one, however, had any doubt that the Hindu leader had contrived and brought off the murder by one or more hired assassins ; and the acquittal of the lot because, owing to our British legal system, the evidence necessary to establish their guilt had to be invented, was regarded in the district as a grave failure of justice.

Years later in Peshawar I came into close touch with the working of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which wisely provides that where legal proof sufficient to satisfy a British Court of justice is not forthcoming, the finding of a Council of Elders, after due local enquiry by indigenous methods, may be accepted as proof of guilt by the District Magistrate. He can, in such cases, impose a sentence up to fourteen years' imprisonment. That extra-judicial procedure is suited to the wild state of society in which the hired assassin and the murder of the victim when sleeping or at his prayers are not uncommon incidents.

The case illustrates the extraordinary difficulty of accepting the evidence of Indian witnesses, even when they appear to be rude, simple, and unsophisticated. But, by experience and observation, one acquires in course of time a certain intuition which enables one to judge fairly accurately whether a witness is lying or not.

The eye-witness that has baffled me up to this day is the simple Irish rustic of whom you enquire which way the fox (which he swears he has seen a few minutes ago and describes vividly) has gone ! *He is a real artist.*

Rioting, homicide, and the abduction of women were the favourite crimes in the western half of Shahpur. In the eastern half, known as the Bar (then uncultivated waste or rough pasture land, but now transformed by the Lower Jhelum Canal into rich cultivation growing half a million acres of wheat, maize, and cotton yearly), cattle-theft was still regarded as a legitimate occupation. It was the hereditary calling of many of the semi-nomad tribes, Gondals, Ranjhas, Lakhs, and it was still a tradition that no young fellow could

ask for a wife till he had proved his manhood by a successful cattle-theft.

Wilson had initiated against this pastime a vigorous campaign which I followed up. Many of the big men in the tract were deeply implicated as protectors of the actual thieves and receivers of the stolen goods. Encouraged by my success in Mooltan I decided to go for *them*. I spent a day or two at Kot Moman police station in demanding security from the smaller fry, who were put up by the police, and against whom the men of influence gave *pro forma* evidence readily enough, at the same time arranging for the necessary security of their protégés. Having noted this and made my own enquiries, on the third day I threw my bomb by putting Kalu—who was one of the biggest landowners and most notorious “receivers” in the locality—in the dock and demanding from him Rs.20,000 security to be of good behaviour. The result was immediate. There was general relief among those who had suffered from his terrorism, and evidence was promptly forthcoming against him and his influential associates.

Steady pressure of this kind, applied for two years, broke down, at least for the time being, the central organisation, and brought about a great reduction in cattle-theft.

Wilson in this connection tells a story against me. I was on tour, trying cases in my tent. A man accused of cattle-theft was waiting outside in police custody, and took advantage of the interval to prostrate himself in prayer. An acquaintance coming up asked him why he was praying at such a time. He said, “That the Almighty may soften the heart of the Sahib.” The acquaintance remarked, “You are wasting your prayers here; better reserve them for the Appeal Court.”

Among the pleasantest features of Shahpur were the love of horses and skill in horsemanship. All the Tiwana and Noon Chiefs and many of the Saiyids, Kureshis, Baluchis, and Mekans bred horses on a big scale, and every little landholder had a mare or two in his stable. Riding was almost the only form of locomotion. To sit in a vehicle of any kind was regarded as effeminate. Starting on the morning march of

twelve or fifteen miles with half a dozen mounted companions, the number often swelled to fifty or one hundred *en route*, and in the afternoon there would be a contest between village and village or tribe and tribe in tent-pegging. These attracted immense crowds and the winner was a popular hero.

The fastest thing in my stable was a Baluchi mare. I called her "Harni" (the doe) from her colour; but the Shahpur folk named her "Bijli" (lightning) for her speed. She and I made our reputation by once beating the mail-train, which runs by the roadside, in a ten-mile race from Miani to Bhera, which we completed in a few minutes under the half-hour. We won by fifty yards, with tremendous applause from the passengers and the waiting crowd. Bijli had a mouth and legs of iron, and over the hard flint paths of the Salt Range, it was not easy to keep up with her. After a few tours I was asked by my Awan friends to leave Bijli behind as the wear and tear on *their* horse-flesh was becoming more than they could stand.

There were only four or five British officials in the district and our work took us in different directions. I sometimes did not meet another European or speak a word of English for months on end. But this had the advantage of strengthening one's intimacy with Indian friends and increasing one's knowledge of the people. The man from whom I learned most in Shahpur town was Lala (afterwards Rai Bahadar) Ram Das, the head of the local Bar, which then consisted of only three or four members—there are now fifty or sixty.

Though a very able pleader (he appeared for the defence in nearly all the big cases), he did not know a word of English. But he was well read in Oriental literature, especially Persian, and had a rich fund of anecdote combined with a rare sense of humour. Moreover, he was one of the most loyal and honourable men I have met in his profession. We remained close friends for thirty years, and up to the end, though stricken with years and almost blind, he used often to come to see me at Lahore. He represented the orthodox Hindu of the best type, and I always found his knowledge and advice helpful. He died a few years ago, but has left worthy

descendants. He is only one of the many hundred Shahpur friends whose memory I cherish.

After two very busy but delightful years in Shahpur, I was called to headquarters to act as Under-Secretary to Government. Sir James Lyall was then Lieutenant-Governor. C. L. (afterwards Sir Lewis) Tupper and H. C. Fanshawe were respectively Chief Secretary and Secretary. Tupper was a man of towering intellect, a brilliant Secretary, but rather lacking in administrative knowledge and in the human side of his work. Fanshawe, though cast in a sterner mould, was more human :

“ A man severe he was and stern to view,  
I knew him well and every truant knew.

. . . . .  
Yet he was kind or if severe in ought  
The love he bore to learning\* was in fault.”

Under these two heads, who for many years were the mouth-pieces of Government, the Secretariat struck terror into the hearts of the rough-and-ready district official, who cared more for getting the work done than for sending up a punctual and polished report of how he had done it. But Lyall, with his intuitive knowledge of and sympathy with the difficulties of the man on the spot, checked any tendency to over-centralisation or harsh criticism. Tupper was a demon for work. I remember how he gazed at me in “ wild surprise ” when I asked him if I could leave the office at noon on Saturdays for a cricket match. However, he gave a dubious assent.

Among the cases I had to handle was a very complex one regarding the powers of the Government in the management of the famous Golden Temple of the Sikhs at Amritsar (now in the forcible possession of the Akali “ reformers ”) which derived a large share of its endowments from the British as from the preceding Sikh Government. I spent much time in the investigation and sent up, as I thought, a very complete note which would serve as the basis of the orders to be issued. Tupper, under whom I worked, was quite satisfied with the note and sent it on with his initials to the Lieutenant-Governor.

\* Accuracy in work.

Lyall probably had as much personal knowledge of every important matter in the Province as any of the local officers. He accepted my conclusions, but arrived at them by a different and, to my mind, less convincing method of reasoning which he explained in a lengthy Memorandum. In drafting the orders I repeated my own notes which I prided myself put the case more clearly than the Lieutenant-Governor had.

The draft, being an important one, went to the Lieutenant-Governor for approval. It came back with the pithy but scathing comment :

“ Under-Secretary’s English is doubtless better than mine. Still I prefer my own.”

In a chastened spirit I recast the draft, reproducing Lyall’s *ipsissima verba*, and leaving the “ man on the spot ” to puzzle out the meaning.

But time brings its revenge. Twenty-five years later as Lieutenant-Governor, my secretaries and myself, as well as the local officers, had to spend laborious days in endeavouring to interpret and apply many of Lyall’s orders, especially those relating to the intricate questions of the villagers’ rights in the various classes of State forests in Kangra, which Lyall had defined forty years before. *He* no doubt had good reasons for his orders and he knew what they meant ; but none of us did, and the labour involved in trying to give effect to them in a practical way was enormous.

One of the few things in my official career which I pride myself on is that, while only a privileged few can read my atrocious handwriting, once it is deciphered no one can fail to understand the meaning. Another is that I was one of the few Lieutenant-Governors who had never been a Secretary or Under-Secretary—for my brief term as acting Under-Secretary in 1889 came to a speedy end. The two things were inter-connected as explained in the following quotation from a valedictory notice in the *Civil and Military Gazette* of 27th May, 1919, a day after I had laid down my office.

“ An accident, a fortunate one, kept Mr. O’Dwyer entirely outside the Secretariat, we think, throughout his career. A vivid and effective writer, he was a bad penman. No Chief



Secretary and no head of a department wanted to read more of that accursed thing than was inevitable, and Mr. O'Dwyer was saved from the desk to play the part that suited him among men and the works of men. . . . Never was disability more serviceable."

In these remarks the valedictory notice did not "lie like an epitaph," as the French put it. My bad handwriting was for me, at least, a blessing in disguise. In September, 1889, before I had completed four years' service, it led to my being "kicked upstairs" into the very post I coveted—that of independent charge of a Settlement. H. N. Maude of the I.C.S. who had recently begun the Settlement of Gujranwala was anxious to return to the Secretariat, for which he had all the requisite qualifications, including penmanship, and Sir James Lyall selected me to take his place.

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## CHAPTER IV

GUJRANWALA, 1889-95. CENTRAL PUNJAB

I THUS found myself, at twenty-five, in independent charge of the settlement of a district with an area of some three thousand square miles, and a population approaching three-quarters of a million. I had a house of my own, the historic Barah-darri (twelve doors), once the residence of the great Sikh General—Hari Singh Nalwa—and, as I discovered later, still haunted by the ghost of a favourite young wife said to have been poisoned by a superseded rival. There was a pleasant garden, a tennis court, and ample accommodation for my dozen servants. There was also stabling for a dozen horses. But I limited myself to half a dozen.

Two years ago, when discoursing to some of the boys at Eton on an Indian career, I roused their enthusiasm by telling them that at twenty-five I kept a stable of six horses. [They were really only ponies and cost me only some £200 to purchase and £120 a year to keep.] But I fear this was discounted when I had to tell them that twenty-five years later, as Lieutenant-Governor, I could not run to more than five horses, and that as a humble annuitant of £1000 a year (three-fourths of which are represented by my own contributions during thirty-three years' service) I could not afford even one.

However, in Gujranwala I was able to find employment for the six in work and play. Gujranwala is only some forty miles from Lahore on the main line to Rawal Pindi and Peshawar. There was at headquarters the usual official hierarchy: a Deputy-Commissioner, who was changed two or three times a year to the great detriment of the district administration, a British Police Officer, a Canal Engineer, a Civil Surgeon (British or Indian), and a swimming-bath.

There was a strong colony of the American Presbyterian Mission, of whom the head, Dr. Mackee, deservedly enjoyed the confidence of the British and Indian communities. He was for many years secretary to the Municipality, and the trusted adviser of us officials in all matters of local politics. The district itself, lying in the flat Central Punjab plain, lacked the variety of the North-West Punjab, in which the Salt Range and its interesting tribes play so large a part.

The Gujranwala peasantry and landed gentry were, on the whole, better agriculturists, but less virile and spirited than their neighbours beyond the Chenab in Shahpur. They were chiefly Jats, that sturdy plodding race of hereditary agriculturists (whom ethnologists identify with the Getae or Scythians) whose industry has built up the rural prosperity of the Punjab, and who are as handy with the sword and the bayonet as with the plough and the water-lift.

Among them the tribal bond was weaker than in the Western Punjab, while the village bond was generally stronger. Originally all Hindus, the majority had been converted to Islam from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, while a powerful minority had at the same time embraced Sikhism. The only great Sikh ruler, Maharaja Ranjit Singh, was born in Gujranwala, to which his family belonged, and several of the great Sikh Sirdars had their homes or their lands in the district.

It was not uncommon to find a village or estate divided into three sections, Hindu, Mohammedan, and Sikh, all deriving their descent from a common Hindu ancestor, twelve to fifteen generations back, and all living and working side by side in perfect amity. Indeed sectarian feeling was then almost unknown in rural India, except when stirred up by their more advanced (?) co-religionists in the towns, generally for some personal or political object.

In writing about Shahpur I have said something as to the duties of a Settlement Officer. For a civilian the post offers the best life and the most fascinating work to be found in India. It is the basis of all real knowledge of the rural masses. For six or eight months in the year he lives and works among them,

almost exclusively. He learns their inner life, their trials and hardships, their joys and their sorrows. He deals with them in their fields and their villages, where they are at their best, rather than in the law courts, where they are at their worst ; for they are then endeavouring to circumvent, often by fraud or false evidence, the various obstacles in the shape of legal formalities which, to their minds, we have placed between them and justice. When an Indian rustic comes into the atmosphere of a Court he has his mind made up to swear to anything that he thinks will suit his purpose, and it is no light task to get the truth out of him. Put the same man in the same cause in the village *chauk* (square) or under the village tree among his own people, and he will hesitate to lie even in a good cause. That is why the peripatetic justice, to which the Indian lawyer and the Indian politician so strongly object, as wanting in legal formalities, is so much more speedy and satisfactory.

My assistants (all Indians and ignorant of English) and myself in the course of the Settlement summarily disposed of some sixty thousand cases of disputes as to inheritance, shares, transfers, mortgages, redemptions of mortgage, sales, leases, boundaries, revenue-free grants, tenancies, village offices, generally on the spot in the presence of the parties and their friends and without the intervention of legal practitioners. This was done in one-tenth of the time it would have taken at headquarters, and in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred I think we got at the truth, for not one decision in a hundred was appealed against. All this work was subsidiary to the framing of an accurate survey and record of rights in the land, field by field, holding by holding, and village by village. This, in turn, was a step towards the preparation of full and accurate statistics of soils, crops, rents, prices, for the reassessment and distribution of the Government land revenue.

Each *tahsil*, or sub-division of two hundred to four hundred estates, was taken in turn. Every estate was inspected in detail at least once, and often two or three times, by the Settlement Officer, who discussed the statistics, the crops, out-turn, rents, etc., with the owners and tenants, and heard their side of the

case. Having completed his village-to-village inspections and made rough notes of what he thought each might reasonably be asked to pay for the next term of twenty or thirty years, he then framed proposals for the sub-division as a whole, giving a succinct account of its fiscal history, agriculture, and revenue capacity, supported by statistics. In these operations a trained special staff of several hundred officials was employed, all being Indians.

These proposals were examined by his superiors, the Commissioner and Financial Commissioner, both men of wide Settlement experience, and were submitted with their views to the local Government for orders. The Government sanctioned a gross total (sometimes differing substantially from the Settlement Officer's proposals), and it was the business of the latter to distribute this total among the two hundred to four hundred villages, announce the new demand, and arrange for its distribution within the village over each holding.

All this sounds dull and formal, savouring of the rigid methods of that haughty bureaucrat, the assessor of income-tax. In practice it was a very human proceeding. One was in personal contact at every stage with the rural population in the district—over half a million of people. They, like all rural folk, put on the poor mouth, dwelt with force and pathos on the vagaries of the rains, the low prices, the damage by hail, the murrain among the cattle, their indebtedness to the village moneylenders, the growing tale of mortgages. To which I would reply, quoting the statistics, that the cultivated area, on which alone they were assessed, had increased from (say) 1,500 to 2,000 acres since the last assessment thirty years before, that the prices of their produce had meantime doubled, that they were growing more of the valuable crops, wheat, sugarcane, cotton, that they had sunk half a dozen new irrigation wells with the money lent by Government at a nominal rate, that a new Government Canal had enlarged the area of cultivation and secured the crops against drought, that they kept more cattle, had built fine brick houses in place of the old mud ones, that their wives and daughters were wearing

silver armlets and anklets—a thing unknown in the old Sikh days—that many of them were now earning “good money” in the Army or other Government Service, and that the debt and mortgages were due to their love of litigation or love of drink in Sikh villages, their extravagance on marriages, and so on.

Then we would go round the village lands—say one thousand acres of cultivation for an average village of one hundred peasant proprietors—to see the crops. The headmen would, of course, wish to take me to the worst lands. I had a big black Turcoman horse known as “Death.” He had killed a wounded boar, that unwisely attacked him in the jungle, by a well-aimed right and left from his hind legs, and thereafter was thought highly of. I would leave the selection to “Death,” who for his own selfish aims would invariably make for the fields where the crops were thickest and highest. This would draw a laugh from the crowd who said the horse was not “Death” but “*Shaitan*” (Satan) from his uncanny knowledge.

This playful contest of wits would be renewed most mornings for the five or six months of the cold weather, from 7 a.m. till noon. In that time three or four villages were covered daily. The group of villagers was then assembled outside my tent in the afternoon, and in the general pow-wow further facts were elicited, if not from the village concerned at least from its neighbours, for each would magnify its neighbour’s resources while minimising its own.

The notes based on personal observation, the study of the statistics of cultivation, assessments, arrears, remissions, going back to annexation and embodied in the village Note Book, the opinions of one’s Indian assistants, and the friendly discussion with the people enabled one to make a fairly accurate estimate of what the new assessment should be. When it was announced, the village community had the right first to petition the Settlement Officer (i.e. myself) to revise his order, and, if still dissatisfied, they had the right of appeal to the Commissioner, and a further petition for revision to the Financial Commissioner, the highest revenue authority.

One would expect that, given such facilities in a matter of such importance, and with a people so litigious, there would be innumerable objections and appeals. As a matter of fact, out of over one thousand two hundred estates assessed for twenty or thirty years to about £100,000 per annum, including rates and cesses, only fifty-two thought it necessary to prefer an objection to me, and only sixteen appealed to higher authority. I mention this not to claim any special merit for my own work, for other districts could show better results, but to show how reasonable is the Indian peasant when his side of the case is heard and he receives fair treatment. In the Punjab at least, the "placid pathetic contentment" of the peasantry, which highly-placed British politicians thought right to disturb, is not due to dull apathy, but to a consciousness that they are being fairly dealt with. When they had reason to think otherwise they were quick enough to show their discontent and insist on redress.

As a matter of fact our standards of assessment are extraordinarily mild, especially in the Punjab, and rightly so, as compared with those of preceding rulers or those now prevailing in Native States.

The great and broad-minded Mogul Emperor, Akbar, was the first to prescribe in India a regular and scientific assessment of the land-revenue, then the basis of Imperial finance. His system was, curiously enough, based roughly on the standards of measurement and assessment laid down by Julius Cæsar to secure a reasonable revenue from the public lands which had steadily been annexed by profiteering patricians. Cæsar's just but bold reforms probably led to the conspiracy which cost him his life. But his work remained. His standards were later adopted in the Eastern (Byzantine) Empire, and thence spread into pre-Moslem Persia, where they were promulgated by the famous Naushirwan of the Sassanian dynasty, whose name is still cited all over the East as the "Mirror of Justice." The great Khalif, Umar, was wise enough to maintain Naushirwan's standards for the assessment of the conquered territories of which the "infidels" were allowed to retain possession. Akbar realised the advantage of supporting his reforms by citing Naushirwan

and Umar as his models, and he even brings in Julius Cæsar in his reference to the *kaisari gaz* (yard), or standard of length. The British in India adopted and improved upon Akbar's reforms, and through him the present system goes back to Imperial Rome, the source of so much that is great and permanent in administration. Akbar prided himself on lightening the excessive burdens of the peasantry by reducing the State demand, previously one-half the produce in theory but, as he admits, much more in practice, to one-third of the produce or of its estimated cash value. This relief undoubtedly led to a great extension of cultivation and of agricultural prosperity under his beneficent rule. But after him the system steadily deteriorated, and the local collectors of revenue, or those to whom they farmed out their rights, and the various local rulers who rose on the ruins of the Mogul Empire, squeezed all they could out of the unfortunate tillers of the soil, leaving them only a bare subsistence. This was the position when the British Government came on the scene; it was crystallised in the pathetic saying, "The peasant has no one to look to but God, and God is far off." I heard the same wail in Russia.

The British Government—in India at least—was wise enough to realise that the well-being of the peasant and the protection of agriculture are the foundations of the prosperity of the State. Accordingly the excessive revenue demands of the preceding rulers were progressively lowered; new and more liberal standards of assessment were generally adopted as each new Province was added. Finally, in Northern India the principle was accepted that half of the economic rent, that which a reasonable landlord levied or would expect, should be the limit of the State demand. This would generally vary from one-fifth to one-eighth of the crop. But in fact the actual assessment is very much less, and in my experience, which covers nearly every district of the Punjab and North-West Frontier and part of the United Provinces, the Government does not exact more than from one-eighth to one-twelfth of the value of the produce. In the Native States of which I have knowledge, and several of which I have personally



assessed, the standard is from 50 to 150 per cent higher than in adjoining British districts.

In the Punjab even to-day, notwithstanding the great increase in prices and in the selling value of land, the Government demand on the land does not average more than half-a-crown per cultivated acre, while the average sale value is over £20 per acre. It is this consideration for the peasant and his dependents (90 per cent of the population)—

“ Whose life is a long-drawn question  
Between a crop and a crop ”

—that has been, and is, the greatest asset of the British Government in India and the strongest argument for the permanence of our rule. The town-bred Intelligentsia, whom we are now putting in power, have no sympathy for the peasant, and as in the past would suck him dry if allowed to do so.

One of the first constructive acts of the all-India Legislative Assembly has been, in spite of the protests of the few rural representatives, to impose for the benefit of a small capitalist class and to spite the British trader, a heavy protective tariff on imports, admittedly most injurious to rural interests and one which, if they could make their voices heard or their influence felt in the Legislature, would not have even been admitted to discussion. Yet the Governments in India and here, both of whom claim to be the champions of the weak and oppressed, feebly acquiesced in this selfish proceeding as being the natural result of the new democratic (?) institutions in India. Those of us who have been working all our lives for the Indian peasantry view with dismay this betrayal of their interests in the name of democracy. The only satisfaction left to us is that on their behalf we gave the warning of what was likely to happen, and recorded our protest when our fears were realised.

Life in Gujranwala, as in Shahpur, had its lighter side. The shooting was poor; but along the Chenab there were wild pig in many places, which caused much damage to the crops.

After some thirty years I revived pig-sticking, which had

been the favourite sport of a former Settlement Officer, Mr. J. H. Morris, afterwards Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces. Wazirabad, where the railway to the north crosses the Chenab, was the chief centre, and friends from the Queen's Bays or the 11th Hussars at Sialkot used to join us there or across the river on the Gujrat side—where the cheery Deputy-Commissioner, Baron Bentinck, was always ready to welcome us for a week-end meet.

The going was bad and the jungle dense. So our operations were not very successful. Often I used to go out alone with a party of local notables. One Sunday morning we put up a fine boar; after a long chase he charged and I speared him, not very seriously. He retreated into a dry ravine. I pursued him, mounted on "Death." With an angry grunt he again came straight at me; "Death" for the first time shied wildly. I was flung at the feet of the angry boar, holding on to the reins with one hand and to my spear with the other. Being slightly stunned, I lay flat and motionless. That fact and the shouts of my companions coming up from behind saved me. The boar jumped over me, gored the horse, and bolted further down the ravine. I remounted, gave chase, caught him up again, and after a stiff fight finished him off and returned triumphant. The involuntary lesson I then learned, to remain flat on the ground and motionless, served me well in subsequent emergencies of the same kind.

But the best sport I had was some fifty miles down the river, near Wanike. The Bár or western portion of the district was then largely pastoral, though now, like the Shahpur Bár, a rich plain of cultivation irrigated from the Lower Chenab Canal which was then under construction. The Bár tribes kept great herds of cattle in those broad pastures, and cattle-thieving was rife. The business was carried on under the protection of the great "receivers" on both sides of the river, in Gujranwala and Shahpur. The key position on the river-bank was held by the famous Rahim known for fifty years as the Rob Roy of the Bár.

Rahim was perhaps the last survivor of an interesting type, which has steadily disappeared as the primeval jungles have

given way to the civilising influences of canal cultivation. He told me once that for years he never slept peacefully unless he had at least a dozen stolen cattle, hidden away in his sheds or jungle fastnesses, awaiting removal to his confederates in the interior. I think it was the sport of the game rather than the profits that appealed to him, for he was lord of several villages and of thousands of acres of rich cultivation. He had built himself a fine house and a stately mosque, for he was a strict Mussulman, and even had some reputation for sanctity of life. But he was also, even in his old age when I came to know him, a fearless rider and a keen pig-sticker, and it was these qualities that made him and me friends ; for as Settlement Officer, it was no affair of mine to pry into his less innocent pursuits.

Rahim had the knowledge of where the pig could be found, and could command the agency (generally Sansis or hereditary hunters and thieves) necessary to push them out of their lairs. He was my Chief of the Staff for pig-sticking, and never failed me. One glorious day with him stands out in my memory as vividly as that on which (in April, 1912) I got three tigers in the Rewa jungles, or that (in February, 1910), on which I was one of the few in at the death, after one of the greatest hunts in the annals of the Limerick fox-hounds. Soon after sunrise we got on to an island in the Chenab, a mile long and up to half a mile broad, which held three stout boar. I had three good horses, and carried the only spear ; for Rahim insisted that I should have all the sport. By five o'clock that afternoon the three boar had died a glorious death ; my three ponies had only two sound legs between them ; I was none the worse but for a damaged rib. The first boar, after a run of a mile or so, charged home. I made a drive at him with my spear, which by a happy chance went right through him. He fell stone dead, though I did not know it at first. Rahim and his following shouted " wah, wah " ; Rahim threw himself off his horse in spite of my warnings that the boar might charge, and danced a war-dance over the fallen foe. The occasion he thought called for some special recognition. I had a pull at my flask, but could not

offer him, a strict Mohammedan, a drink from it. I lit a cigar. Rahim asked me for it, took a couple of puffs himself and passed it on to his followers, who puffed it vigorously to the bitter end. When the great day was over I took the tusks and the Sansis had a grand feast on the three boars.

These Sansis are a curious race, perhaps aboriginal, with an hereditary aversion to honest labour, a marked aptitude for petty theft, for hunting and trapping wild animals. They have none of the scruples of the Hindu or the Mohammedan as to what it is lawful to eat or drink. They take to carrion when other food is scarce, and they certainly like their meat very "high." One day when waiting for the pig to break, I got into a discussion with my Sansi *shikari* (hunter) as to the relative values of the different kinds of flesh. He summed up his views thus: "The flesh of cows, sheep, goats, may fill a man's belly, but it is insipid stuff. Even the flesh of the deer is poor and tasteless; a boar's flesh is tasteful if the boar is full grown and the meat kept for days. But for a real satisfying meal, give me the flesh of a fat jackal."

I cross-examined him as to the special merits of this delicacy, and he explained, "If you have a good meal of jackal's meat at the beginning of the winter, you will find it so heating, that you won't need to wear a blanket for the rest of the winter." He smacked his lips as he repeated: "Gidar nāl kuch nahin"—"Nothing like jackal."

The Sansis and other such tribes, Chuhras, Bairupias, Kanjars, Mahtams, are outside the pale of Hinduism and Islam, with some obscure cult of their own. Islam, being still a proselytising creed, is ready to admit even the lowest out-castes into its fold, provided they recite the *kalima* (confession of faith), abjure forbidden (*harām*) food, and restrict themselves to what is lawful (*halāl*). Hence, in seasons of plenty I have found some of them accepting these restrictions and raising their status by becoming qualified to share, in theory at least, the tobacco-pipe and the drinking-bowl (*bukka pani*) with their brother Mohammedans. I fancy, however, they rather chafe at the restrictions. Anyhow, in the Gujranwala Bár, when a season of drought or scarcity came on, I heard

of them reverting to their own debased cult and greedily returning to their own unlawful fleshpots.

Years later, when I was Lieutenant-Governor, we made systematic and on the whole successful efforts to rescue these criminal tribes from their inherited predatory habits, to teach them an honest livelihood, and to raise them in the social scale. Among other methods, with the help of the Christian Missions, notably the Franciscan Fathers and the Salvation Army, and later on of the various Indian religious communities who had previously despise them as outsiders, we endeavoured to settle them on the land as tillers of the soil. I set aside some twenty thousand acres of fertile land on one of the new irrigation canals for the purpose. But before they could reach the promised land, they had to go through some preliminary training and discipline in reformatory and industrial settlements. Many of them accepted these irksome restraints as a step towards the ultimate goal. But they did not readily give up their abominations. One very hot morning in May, 1918, I went round the new reformatory in Amritsar where some hundreds had been more or less willingly collected. Among them was a group of Mahtams from the banks of the Rávi. They had brought in with them the carcass of a crocodile in a high state of decomposition, and while this delicacy was "on cut," they refused to do any of the labour prescribed as the condition for the supply of legitimate food. They were deaf to the remonstrances of the staff and even the complaints of their fellow-criminals, and it was only when the supply of unhallowed alligator was exhausted that, under the stimulus of hunger, they consented to conform to the rules.

A notable feature of all these people, men, women, and children, was their deftness of hand. They were like our gipsies, essentially "light-fingered gentry." Before leaving them I must tell a tale of how they fared on the land. I had given Mr. Booth-Tucker of the Salvation Army about one thousand acres for one of their settlements in the Mooltan district; and when I went to see it a year or two later I found a flourishing village of eighty well-built houses with a

village hall, school, and church, in the middle of a well-tilled plain of fine crops. On all sides there were evidences of what can be accomplished even with the most unpromising material by true missionary effort, when aided by the regenerative influence of the land. Later on I had an opportunity of congratulating Mr. Booth-Tucker on the success of his efforts and then he unfolded this tale.

The new settlement of people with an hereditary tendency to prey on their neighbours was, not unnaturally, regarded with disfavour by the existing villages, chiefly Mohammedans. In fact they tried to "freeze out" the new-comers by stealing their cattle or turning their own cattle loose to trespass on the crops. One Christmas Day—perhaps in 1916—when the "converted" settlers after church had settled down to their Christmas dinner, they heard that their neighbours had let loose their cattle on the young wheat crops. The settlers sallied forth with their cudgels, rounded up the cattle, and began driving them off towards the pound. A rescue-party of Mohammedans attacked them. There was a free fight, several people were injured on both sides, and one of the Mohammedan party was killed by a casual blow. The case came into Court in due course; some five or six of the Salvation Army colonists were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

But the curious result was, as I learned later from an influential Mohammedan of the locality, that the fact that the hitherto despised Christian converts had not displayed Christian meekness, but had killed their man, raised them at once in the estimation of their neighbours, and secured their immunity from further petty annoyances.

After a year or two, when amicable relations were re-established, I was glad to accede to Mr. Booth-Tucker's representation on behalf of the imprisoned men, for the killing was an unfortunate accident, and ordered their release.

The latest accounts show that these land settlements of the various Christian Missions, and especially those of the Belgian Franciscan Fathers and of the Salvation Army, who were the first to undertake what was then regarded as an almost hope-

less task, continue to flourish, and that at least the rising generation of what was officially known as the "criminal tribes" is taking kindly to a life of honest work on the land.

Up to the time I left India my efforts to interest educated Indians, whether Hindu, Mohammedan, or Sikh, in work of this kind met with little success. The idea of social service for the uplift of one's fellow-men is still foreign to the Indian mind. That is probably a result of the caste system, which limits his outlook to the community enclosed within his own particular compartment. It teaches him to disregard all outside it as individuals, worthy perhaps in their way, with whom he can have no social relations, and whose social elevation or degradation does not therefore concern him.

The Arya Samáj Reform Movement, which has taken such deep root among the educated Hindus in the Punjab, recognises this defect in the Hindu social system, especially as it is a bar to that political advance that so many of them contemplate. Hence they have, in theory at least, advocated the abolition of caste as being an ugly and unjustifiable accretion to the pure tenets of the Vedas. In pursuance of that theory, they have in recent years begun proselytising work to bring the lower castes and out-castes into their fold, and even to win back by the *skuddhi* or purification process those weak brethren who have drifted into Islam. This policy has aroused the stubborn opposition of the orthodox Hindus, to whom caste is even dearer than the Vedas, and the violent hostility of militant Islam, which resents any attempts of the "sons of burnt fathers" to invade its domain. Hence the extraordinary revival of sectarian hatred in its most intense form among even the educated and politically advanced followers of the rival religions. Gandhi's personal ascendancy for a few years obscured this great rift which divides India from Peshawar to Cape Comorin, from Karachi to Calcutta. But the devices which he used, with temporary success, to conceal the rift and unite Hindus, Mohammedans, and Sikhs against the foreign oppressor, viz. the fictitious Khilafat agitation, the boycott of the "Satanic" Government and of all its activities, have now worn thin. Gandhi, to maintain his ascendancy over the

orthodox Hindus, has had to commit himself to the maintenance of the caste system ; to meet the views of the more advanced reformers (who see that the denial of elementary social rights to the 50 million out-castes is a fatal exposure of the hollowness of their democratic pose) he has had to advocate the removal of the disabilities of the "untouchables." The two positions are, of course, like so many of Gandhi's "brain-waves," mutually antagonistic. Pressed by one section or the other, Gandhi has floundered deeper and deeper. Lately, under the influence, doubtless, of the orthodox Hindus or the remnant of the Khilafat party, he has said and written things about the Arya Samáj—the Hindu reformers—which have infuriated them. While the violent attempts of his Swaraj followers, for political purposes, to force a free passage for the "untouchables" to the sacred Hindu shrines at Vaikom in Travancore and other places in Southern India, have compromised them seriously with those orthodox Hindus who would die rather than be polluted by rubbing shoulders with an "untouchable." For the poor and the oppressed Gandhi has accomplished nothing, and he has now hitched himself to the Juggernaut car of C. R. Das and the Bengal reactionaries. The latest phase is the denunciation of the Mahatma by a great Hindu conference at Bombay and the threat to lynch him for insulting the orthodox Hindu religion.

Truly the path of a "Mahatma" is difficult, and it is not surprising that Gandhi has recently tried to repudiate the title—and its responsibilities. His influence in India is steadily waning, but his ascetic pose and the vague impracticable Tolstoyan theories which he so skilfully enunciates as great moral truths, seem to have deluded many well-meaning but weak-minded people in sentimental England and some even in logical France who are on the look-out for a new light from the East.

But I must return to Rahim and the Sansis. I have already said there were a lot of wild pig near Wazirabad ; but the people, while clamouring to have them thinned down, were timid in beating them out. I mentioned this to Rahim who said contemptuously, "What can you expect from soft town-



folk? I and my men will undertake the job." Accordingly one week-end Rahim and his merry men came up fifty miles to Wazirabad. They did their work well. We killed some good boars, and I fed and rewarded the beaters. A few days after they had gone back, the Wazirabad people represented to me that in future they would undertake to get the pig out without extraneous help. This they said had cost them dear. Rahim's men had gone, but apparently two buffaloes and a pair of oxen had gone with them! But Rahim I am sure had nothing to do with it.

Rahim's great reputation was in part due to his never having been *proved* guilty. I asked him how he had so long and successfully evaded justice. He said mainly by bribes. I asked, "Whom did you bribe?" He replied, "Whom did I not bribe? It has cost me from start to finish Rs.30,000. I bribed the local petty officials, the police, and even the magistrates." I then asked him, "Did you ever bribe a Sahib (British official)?" He said, "Once, but he was a Kirani (Eurasian), and he gave me timely information of an intended round-up by the police. When the police came they found nothing." I said to him, "If I had been a magistrate here, I'd have had you in jail in a month." His reply was, "It was the mercy of God that you were not a magistrate here in *those* days. Now I no longer thief. I fast and pray." There was some truth in this, if not all the truth.

In 1894, towards the end of the Settlement, I was also given charge of the district and the criminal administration for about a year. The knowledge I had acquired in my four and a half years' touring included a wide acquaintance with the ways of the thieves, bribe-takers, and other criminals. I made use of that knowledge to clear things up. The thieving fraternity and their friends thought that this was not playing the game; that I was making use of confidences reposed in me when I was not a magistrate.

Bribe-taking among the officials is perhaps the worst evil in Oriental administration and the most difficult to combat. I have always tried to fight it, but not always with success; for when it comes to the point one gets little or no assistance

from the public who complain so bitterly in private. One may even find, as I did as Lieutenant-Governor, opposition from the highly-placed officers of the department one is attempting to cleanse. A misplaced confidence in their subordinates or an undue *esprit de corps* led one great department to obstruct, though not with success, my efforts to bring influential bribe-takers to justice. But I never had to complain of such obstruction in the Judicial, Police, or Land-Revenue Departments.

As Settlement Officer I was well placed to learn of the bribe-taking of the various departments, including my own, and the Oriental method of imparting this information was most artistic. Once, riding along with some village elders and a few peasants, when talking of various things, one of the latter, quite a simple rustic, asked me, "What's your pay, Sahib?" I said, "I don't know why that should interest you; but it happens to be Rs.1,200 (£80) per month." He exclaimed, "Is that all? Why even our sub-inspector of police makes more than that."

The western half of the district was coming under canal irrigation from the newly-constructed Lower Chenab Canal (now the greatest irrigation system in the world and watering two and a half million acres of crops annually) while the Settlement was in progress.

This meant a revolutionary change in the whole system of rural economy, the ultimate results of which it was at the time impossible to forecast. To cover the transition period, I had to frame assessment proposals of an elastic nature, workable, as I thought, though not quite logical. Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, as Lieutenant-Governor, had to deal with them. He had an exceptionally clear and logical mind. He did not like my rough-and-ready proposals and sent for me to explain them. I stayed a few days at Government House for the purpose. The first morning he called me into his office, showed me an elaborate alternative scheme which he had evolved, asked me to consider it and discuss it with him next day. Next morning he asked me what I thought of his plan. I said, "The only flaw I can find in it is that it won't work,

and can't be made to work!" This blunt criticism rather amused him, for he had an Irish contempt for official conventions. We went for a two-hours' ride in which he subjected me to a severe cross-examination. In the end he sent me off with his approval of and blessing on my proposals. I may perhaps say here that I made the same criticism of their scheme to the authors of the ill-fated Diarchy (before it was embodied in the Reforms Act), but with less success. They had not the knowledge of practical administration in the East that Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick had.

The Opium Commission, of which Lord Brassey was President, was then sitting at Lahore, and Lord Brassey and his son (the late T. A. Brassey), with whom I had been at Balliol, were staying at Government House. I drove down with them one afternoon to a sitting of the Commission. On the way we ran into a pedestrian who was a bit shaken. Lord Brassey was much concerned and asked what remedy could be applied. A burly Punjabi policeman who had come to our aid gave his opinion very decidedly in broad patois. Lord Brassey asked me to translate. The advice was "give him a pill or two of opium, it never harmed man or beast."

On the same occasion, to my great confusion, my faithful body-servant, who had been too hospitably entertained by his friends at Lahore, showed himself the worse for liquor and was rather noisy in the verandah of the "Lat Sahib" (Lieutenant-Governor). I told my Sikh orderly to get him out of the way till he was sober. This he did, but he whispered confidentially, "This disgrace would have been avoided if the fool would only take opium instead of strong drink." I have always regarded opium-eating, and still more opium-smoking, as much more harmful than drink. But I must acknowledge that in some of the appalling epidemics (one was in 1894) I found that the Sikh peasantry, who habitually take a small dose of opium in the malarial season, were generally immune, and brisk and active, while their Hindu and Mohammedan neighbours, who eschewed opium, were prostrate almost to a man. I related my experience to Lord Brassey, but do not know if he attached any weight to it in his report.

Work in the district was so absorbing that it left little leisure for mixing closely with the people of Gujranwala, the headquarters town, or of the other towns in the district.

They were generally officials of the various departments, legal practitioners, traders, etc., with whom as Settlement Officer I had not much to do. Now and again I had to interfere on behalf of the rural population—whom, prior to the passing of the Land Alienation Act, the moneyed classes in the town regarded as theirs to exploit and expropriate. But as Deputy-Commissioner I was brought into closer touch with them. Among other offices I held was that of President of the Municipal Committee, and I had often to hold the scales between the Hindu and Mohammedan elements which were pretty evenly balanced. This fact leads to my story.

Gujranwala is a walled city with gates, and while I was away on short leave in 1894, the Municipal Committee thought they would pay me a compliment by naming a new gate after me. On my return I was confronted with the *fait accompli*, which I did not want, but which it would have been then churlish to disavow. The "O'Dwyer Gate" was in a prominent place close to and facing the railway station. It was the occasion of a good deal of banter from my European friends. However, I left Gujranwala in 1895 and the Punjab in 1897, not returning till 1913. Meantime municipal interest in the "O'Dwyer Gate" languished, and it gradually sank into a state of dilapidation and decay, which my friends did not fail to chaff me about.

When my appointment as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab was notified in 1913, the City Fathers became suddenly alive to the evil condition of the gate, hastily rebuilt it on more pretentious lines, and worthily maintained it all the time I was in the Province.

Unfortunately in April, 1919, a seditious section of the urban folk in Gujranwala and various other towns, inspired by the example of Amritsar and Lahore, drifted into rebellion. One fine morning, 14th April, 1919, seditious mobs in Gujranwala, stirred up by men of influence who kept in the background, set on fire the railway station, goods shed (with

property valued at £50,000), Post Office, Judicial and Revenue Buildings, the English Church, and all the other Government buildings within their reach. They also set on fire the railway bridges on both sides and cut the telegraph and telephone wires, thus for a time completely isolating the city and rendering prompt military aid impossible. There was no British Magistrate on the spot.

The conspirators had chosen their time well ; and the two British police officers with the small force of armed Indian police at their disposal were unable to check the sudden rising. The Indian Magistrate in charge, a very worthy man but unused to responsibility, would not authorise the police to fire till the rebellious mobs had got complete mastery of the situation, and then the firing only further enraged them. Fortunately, the few English women and children had been hastily collected in the fortified Treasury building, and the large American Mission colony had hastily left the night before, after being warned of the impending trouble by some of their Indian co-workers. About 1 p.m. at Lahore, forty miles off, on the top of reports of rebellious outbreaks at half a dozen places in the Central Punjab, I got word of the situation at Gujranwala in a telegram from the Indian Magistrate dispatched from a station eight miles out. He added that the police force was inadequate and that military arrangements were necessary. Knowing that at Amritsar and Kasur a few days before similar mobs had murdered every European they could lay hands on, I realised the danger to the small British community at Gujranwala, and at once asked the general (Sir William Beynon) at Lahore cantonment to send troops. He said he had none to send and, even if he had, could not get them there in time. I then suggested he should send an aeroplane—a few had fortunately arrived two or three days before—to try and save the situation by bombing the rebellious mobs engaged in arson and outrage.

An aeroplane was at once dispatched and arrived in the nick of time, when the police (who had, under the fearless direction of their Superintendent, Mr. Heron, made a gallant effort to cope with the situation) were worn out by their efforts

and the rebels were attacking the jail and threatening the Treasury building in which the English women and children had taken refuge. Eight bombs were dropped, four exploded, some twelve or sixteen of the crowd, including unfortunately a few boys who had no business to be there, were killed. The mobs at once dispersed and the situation was saved. That was at 3 p.m. Some troops from the north arrived at ten o'clock that night. Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien, the late Deputy-Commissioner, who had been hurriedly recalled and sent back by me that afternoon, then took charge of the situation. Next day eighteen of the ringleaders of the rebellious movement were arrested. They included many prominent agitators of the Hindu Intelligentsia class, legal practitioners (including two barristers, one of whom became an approver), traders, etc. After due enquiry they were sent up for trial before a tribunal of three Civil Judges, two British and one Indian. The President was a Judge of the Punjab High Court.

Eight of these leaders were eventually convicted of rebellion, conspiracy to wage war, commit arson, etc., and sentenced to various terms of transportation or imprisonment. By that time I had left the Province. My successor considerably reduced the sentences a few months after; but six months later, in December, 1919, all got the benefit of the general amnesty advised by Mr. Montagu to create a favourable atmosphere for his Reforms Scheme which had just gone through Parliament. This premature clemency, as might have been expected, completely failed to produce the hoped-for result. The amnestied criminals of Gujranwala, as of Lahore, Amritsar, etc., posed as martyrs, became heroes among the seditious element, and hastened to prove themselves more hostile than ever to the Government which had shown itself so lenient. Hence it happened that in Gujranwala these "martyrs" soon got control of local politics; for in the local view who could stand up against men of whom the once powerful British Government had shown itself to be afraid? One of them became President and another Secretary of the Municipal Committee. They marked their displeasure with me by passing a solemn resolution that the "O'Dwyer

Gate" was to be called by a less odious name, and that my photograph was no longer to darken the walls of the Municipal Hall. I believe the Deputy-Commissioner, O'Brien, came in for similar censure, and I trust he has survived it.

When, after leaving India, I came to know of the action of the Municipal Committee, I asked the then Deputy-Commissioner to convey to them my acknowledgments for having anticipated my wish that my name should not continue to be in any way associated with a city that had disgraced itself by rebellion and outrage.

But my goodwill to and friendship with the landed gentry and sturdy peasantry of the district, who with few exceptions proved themselves loyal and law-abiding, are still maintained; and now and again I am in a position to help and advise the sons and grandsons of my old friends, who come to England for study or training.

The "O'Dwyer Gate," after a chequered existence of a quarter of a century, has ceased to exist. But it has served, I hope, to "point a moral and adorn a tale." The moral remains.

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## CHAPTER V

LEAVE HOME. RUSSIA. CENTRAL ASIA (1895-96)

IN March, 1895, having completed my work in Gujranwala, I took long leave (twenty-one months) home. I had previously run home twice on three months' leave in 1891 and 1894. Such flying visits, described by a cynical friend of mine as sentences of three months' imprisonment and three thousand rupees' fine, are "snatching a fearful joy," for one's work is piling up against one's return to duty.

Long leave has no such drawbacks. It gives one the delight of a well-earned rest, and the exhilaration of freedom from official worries. Most people hurry straight home from India drawn by family or business affairs. Having no pressing ties, I decided with two other friends to spend a few months on the way and see something of the countries *en route*.

We began by Cairo, where we saw the great Cromer (then Sir Evelyn Baring) in the zenith of his power, having just made the young Khedive, Abbas, withdraw a premeditated insult to the British troops in the Soudan—where Kitchener was still patiently working out his plans for the overthrowing of the Dervishes.

The British Colony was then (April, 1895) boycotted by all the other foreign elements—except the Dutch—but was strong enough to keep the flag flying. I remember with what suspicion an officer of the Queen's Bays and myself—the only two British guests—were regarded at a ball in the Opera House, till the wife of the Netherlands Minister took us under her wing.

We went on to Greece, then in the throes of a general election, in which the protagonists were Delyannis and Tricoupis, filling the respective rôles of Disraeli and Gladstone



in English politics. At Athens, through the influence of the friendly hall-porter of the Hotel de Grande Bretagne, we found ourselves one night on a public platform, supporting one of the two—I forget which; but whoever it was, he got the credit of having the moral support of England at his back! This hall-porter was said to be the most powerful politician in Athens, as he controlled the party caucus. He was a most intelligent man and one morning devoted half an hour to describing for my benefit the Greek constitution, methods of election, powers of the single Chamber, of the Ministers, etc.

At the end I said to him, "You have said nothing about the King. Where does he come in?" He shrugged his shoulders and, pointing to the Royal Palace across the square, said, "Oh! the King over there—what does he do? He draws his screw!"

Then as now, and as in the ages from Solon to Demosthenes, everyone in Athens seemed to be mad on politics—a marked contrast to the picturesque and dignified peasantry we met in our rambles through the Peloponnesus.

We went on to Constantinople, saw the Sultan Abdul Hamid driving in state to the Selamlık, attended by Ghazi Usman Pasha—the hero of Plevna. I never saw a sadder face than Abdul Hamid's—except perhaps that of the late unhappy Tsar on the day of his coronation. Both Sultan and Tsar seemed to show in their faces the consciousness of impending misfortune. Even then the atmosphere of change was in the air. The German Emperor had begun the "Drang nach Osten" policy and had paid a recent visit to the Sultan. The custodian of the museum in which the beautiful tinted marble sarcophagi of Greek workmanship, recently discovered in Asia Minor, were kept, told us that he had been careful to remove them before the Emperor came round, knowing that he would express admiration for them and that the Sultan would at once present them to him!

One could not help admiring the Turk, except the petty official, and even he showed a haughty condescension in his way of exacting the indispensable *bakhshish*. The upper

classes had the ease and dignity of men accustomed to rule—whether ill or well was of small account; the peasantry had the cheery independence of men accustomed to fight—and to fight well. I remember an old-time Pasha telling me confidentially that Turkey was going to the dogs since the movement for the emancipation of women had set in. He explained that while women were not only veiled but confined to the harem, there was no temptation to spend much money on clothes; now that they had begun to gad about, visit one another for tea parties, etc., they were vying with one another in copying the ever-changing Paris fashions and this rivalry was reducing him and his kind to bankruptcy.

“*Varium et mutabile semper femina*” was true even in Turkey.

We passed on through the Black Sea and Varna, across the Danube to Bucharest, where the proprietress of the very fine Hotel Angleterre, having learned her business at Brighton, took special pains that we never had to ask twice for a whisky and soda—then an almost unknown luxury in the Balkans.

In those good times before standardised motors took away more than half the interest in locomotion, Bucharest prided itself on the quality and speed of its carriage horses. They were, I believe, of a famous Hungarian breed, coal-black, with long manes, coats as glossy as silk, and were beautifully groomed and kept by their picturesque drivers who were said to be imported from Russia. Our Jehu drove his fine pair at headlong speed down the splendid *Chaussée* for a mile or so, then stopped opposite a place of refreshment and made signs to us to enjoy ourselves while he rubbed down his smoking steeds and burnished up his equipage. This manœuvre he repeated again and again. The *Chaussée* was crowded with the rank and fashion of Bucharest—similarly disporting themselves. Coming from the East the dark languid type of Rumanian beauty did not appeal to us. Suddenly down an alley came walking briskly a smart young officer in uniform with a lady as fair and bright as the dawn. We exclaimed, “How lovely! how English she looks!” The lady and her companion turned our way; they evidently knew English

and had heard our remarks. On enquiring we found it was the Princess Marie and the Crown Prince—now the King and Queen of Rumania. I hope our involuntary tribute was not resented.

We continued our journey to Orsova on the Danube, famous for its nightingales, its caviare, and its Tzigan minstrels, where our request for a bath was met with the derisive reply that Father Danube was only half a mile off. Thence on to Belgrade, which interested me. A member of our family, the subject of one of the most touching Irish laments, corresponding to the Scotch "Lochaber No More," "Shaun O'Deira Glanna" (John O'Dwyer of the Glen), who had gone into exile and joined the Austrian Army after the siege of Limerick, had been killed there fighting against the Turks in 1712. There was a tradition that a monument had been erected to him in one of the Belgrade churches, but I could find no trace of it. Belgrade was also interesting because, as in Ireland, the pig was the basis of rural economy. Indeed in Serbia it was then the great political factor. Serbian finances depended mainly on the export of swine, and her powerful neighbour, Austria, whenever she thought Serbia was becoming too independent, would put on the screw by prohibiting this import, and thus teaching Serbia her place.

At Buda-Pesth and Vienna we were fortunate in hitting off the Hungarian and Viennese "Derbies," run on successive Sundays. Vienna was then certainly the most beautiful and the most delightful city in Europe. Goldsmith's lines—

"Gay, sprightly land of mirth and social ease,  
Pleased with thyself whom all the world can please"

—were written of France, but are even more applicable to Vienna under the Empire. We saw the Emperor, Franz Josef, at the races. The Grand Military, a great race, brought out twenty-three officers in uniform riding their own horses. The winner belonged to the Emperor's old regiment, and the Emperor congratulated him with a kiss.

When the horses for the Derby cantered past, we were uncertain which to back. While discussing their merits among

ourselves, a friendly voice behind us said in English, "You can't do better than back Tokio." We asked him his reasons, and he replied, "I should know something about the horse as I trained him."

That was good enough for us. Tokio carried our money, and won me more than I have ever won on a race.

At that time nearly all the trainers and most of the jockeys in Vienna and Buda-Pesth were English. Some Austrian friends explained that they preferred this as the Englishmen were a separate colony and perfectly straight. One remembers how well they were treated as prisoners of war later, even to the extent of being released for the day when the races were on.

After a run through the Austrian Tyrol, a short stay in Munich where I saw the insane ex-King at Mass one Sunday, a trip up the Rhine to Cologne, we arrived in Paris via Brussels in time to see the Grand Prix, and to lose our money by backing an English horse.

The middle of June found us in London in time for Ascot, after three months' delightful rambling.

I spent the summer with my people in Ireland, which was then prosperous and comparatively peaceful, though still divided by the Parnellite split. Ireland indeed without some such split would not be Ireland.

Before leaving India I had got permission to spend nine months—which would count as Indian service—in Russia to qualify as interpreter in Russian.

In November, 1895, I went to Russia with a soldier friend bent on the same object. We spent a week in St. Petersburg, where an Oxford acquaintance who was tutor to the Grand Dukes Boris and Cyril (now the claimant to the Romanoff throne), sons of the Grand Duke Vladimir, showed me round and gave me some useful introductions.

I met with a most friendly reception from General Annenkoff, the celebrated irrigation and railway engineer, who was responsible for the construction of the Trans-Caspian Railway through Askabad, Merv, and Bokhara to Samarkand. At his suggestion I decided to traverse that route when I had acquired some knowledge of the language. For this purpose I settled

down with two other friends from India, a soldier and a civilian, in Moscow, with the well-known instructress, Marya Karlevna von Kotz (she had been married to a Hungarian). I never met a more capable and successful teacher of languages. I do not think any of her numerous English pupils failed in the very searching interpreter's test. She took much more delight than I did in the fact that a year later I broke all previous records in the way of marks.

Winter life in Moscow with skating, sledging, ski-ing, was very fascinating. Russians are quick to make friends, and are hospitable almost to a fault. There was also a considerable English colony. It was then full of vigour and very prosperous, but is now in exile and reduced to want by the cruel confiscations of the Soviet Government. Many of my friends are dragging out an exiguous existence in England, while pressing their claims for compensation and hoping for the day when they may be able to return and restart their enterprises. Marya Karlevna discouraged association with the English-speaking people. But one feels drawn to one's own folk in a foreign country. In my own case this led to my engagement and marriage—after my return to England—the source of all my subsequent happiness.

After four months' hard work at the language, I thought I had acquired enough to enable me to see something of the country. So at Easter time in 1896 two Anglo-Indian colleagues, E. D. Maclagan (afterwards my successor as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab) and H. J. Maynard (afterwards Maclagan's colleague in the Punjab Government) and myself set forth from Moscow for Samarkand and Tashkent via Baku, the Caspian, Uzun Ada, Merv, and Bokhara.

Here I need only mention a few episodes of that very interesting journey. At Uzun Ada we boarded the comfortable *train de luxe*, which ran twice a week to Samarkand—a fifty-hours' journey. In those days British travellers on the Trans-Caspian line were regarded with some suspicion; but we had obtained the necessary authorisation from the Russian Foreign Office and also from Baron Rostofftseff, the Governor of Samarkand, to whom we had letters of introduction. All

went well till we had passed Askabad, the capital of Trans-Caspia, of which General Kuropatkin, by repute a strong Anglophobe, was Governor-General. Then at a small station in the desert, a courteous military officer (corresponding to a C.I.D. official) demanded to see our papers. We showed him the Foreign Office permit and General Rostofftseff's telegram. These did not satisfy him, as we had no permit from General Kuropatkin. We pointed out that we had permission to visit Samarkand, and that necessarily involved passing through Trans-Caspia. He replied that it might be so, but we could not be allowed to proceed further till the matter was referred to General Kuropatkin and the Foreign and War Offices at St. Petersburg. The prospect of being held up for three or four days, and possibly longer, at this wayside station was not pleasant. So I asked the officer to come into the train with us and discuss the matter over a cup of tea. No Russian ever refuses an offer of hospitality. We sat down to tea; the train moved on, and we began to talk over other matters with our officer. He was glad to hear news of the outer world, the latest production at the Moscow Imperial Opera House, etc. I then suggested he should dine with us in the restaurant car which had an excellent *cuisine*. He again consented, and a venerable Russian missionary who had spent years among the Buddhist Buriats of Eastern Siberia also joined the party. I asked my Russian friend to select the wines. He did so—Caucasian wines of great potency. The dinner was a great success. The wine flowed freely and we had all forgotten we were under arrest, when at ten o'clock my two British companions calmly got up to retire for the night! This re-awakened all the official suspicions of our officer, which a good dinner and strong wine had laid to rest. I inwardly cursed the Scotch stolidity and the English rigidity which had led them to desert me in a critical situation. To the officer's enquiries as to the strange conduct of my friends, I replied that I had their passports in my pocket and would make them over to him. This to some extent mollified him. The kindly old Padre came to the rescue with "tales of far Cathay," we called for another bottle of Caucasian wine, and I succeeded

in keeping things going smoothly till midnight when we reached Charjui on the Oxus, beyond the point where, I knew, the jurisdiction of General Kuropatkin and my military friend came to an end. The latter there left the train very much the better for liquor, kissed me an affectionate good-bye, said he hoped to see us again on our return journey, and disappeared into the night, much to my relief. But he had taken the precaution of taking the visiting cards of all three with full particulars. I woke next morning in Bukharan territory with a bad head, the result of my single-handed efforts to drink fair with a seasoned Russian officer. Only those who have been in Russia know what that means. But if my head was hot, my manner to my companions was the reverse of warm.

At Samarkand we met with a most courteous reception from Baron Rostofftseff, who put us in the way of seeing how the Russian administrative machine worked among the native peoples of Central Asia—Sarts, Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc. At the same time he was most anxious to learn how we dealt with similar problems in India. The policy of the Russians in Central Asia at that time was in many respects a wise and tolerant one. The criminal law was administered strictly on Russian lines; but otherwise they interfered as little as possible with the indigenous system, and allowed all civil—and of course religious—matters to be dealt with by the native procedure, which generally followed the law of the Kuran. Both the Governor at Samarkand and the Deputy-Governor-General at Tashkent told us that this was done advisedly to throw on the people themselves the odium attaching to decisions which might be largely based on false evidence and influenced by bribery. As a matter of fact, in the Kazi's Court which we attended the cases were disposed of promptly and sensibly. The British Government in India attempted a somewhat similar system in its early stages; but was later compelled by the force of circumstances and public opinion to assume full judicial control.

The Russian system was generally more primitive than our system in India, and offered fewer points of contact and collision with the native population which was exclusively

Mohammedan, and in the towns, as in parts of India, inclined to be fanatical. By far the finest race in Central Asia appeared to be the Turcomans. In their freedom from bigotry, their love of horses, and their genial hospitality, they remind one of the Baluchis of the Indian frontier. Two other marked features are summed up in their proud boast : " The Turcoman needs not the shade of a tree, nor the shade of authority."

The main defect of the Russian system was that it had not made any serious attempt to promote agriculture by means of irrigation. This struck me particularly in traversing the great desert plain known as the " Hungry Steppe " between Samarkand and Tashkent. They are now connected by railway, but we had to do the one hundred and eighty miles in a *tarantass* or rough springless cart. There were millions of acres of splendid land lying waste for want of water, while two great rivers, the Oxus and Sir Darya, were emptying themselves uselessly into the inland Sea of Aral. I believe a year or two before our visit the Russian authorities had invited Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff, the irrigation expert of Egyptian fame, to advise them on irrigation projects. But I doubt if there was any result.

At Bokhara, Samarkand, and Tashkent there were even then fairly large colonies of Indian traders—Mohammedans from Peshawar and Rawal Pindi, Hindus from Bhera and Shikarpur in Sind, with the inevitable mixture of Sikhs. One of these Sikhs admitted to me under cross-examination that he had run away from Amritsar over twenty years before, being " wanted " by the police in connection with the murder of several Mohammedan butchers by fanatical Kuka Sikhs. He asked me anxiously if " Warburton " (the famous detective) was still in Amritsar. Warburton was much flattered when I told him this at Simla several years after.

The only serious complaint these Indians had to make was that they were not allowed to acquire agricultural land by sale or mortgage in satisfaction of debts. Knowing the evils that the absence of such restrictions had created in the Punjab, I felt that the Russian officials had adopted a wise policy and even ventured to tell them so.



After some three weeks in Central Asia we got back to the Caspian at Uzun Ada. The train from Samarkand to the Caspian was crowded with officials and others going to Moscow for the Tsar's Coronation, and our efforts to shave daily and wash frequently *en route* caused some amusement to our fellow-travellers, who regarded washing on a train journey as pure waste of time and energy. The first thing we did on getting on board the ship was to have a much-needed bath and a shave. When we came on deck I heard a big travel-stained Russian officer remark ironically in Russian, "A wonderful people these English—even on board ship they shave." But an hour later I saw him too emerge from below, newly shaven and in resplendent uniform, with a look in his eye between a wink and a challenge!

On our return journey the most interesting event was a few days' halt at Tiflis in the Caucasus. I had a letter of introduction to the general commanding the artillery there, and he introduced me to the then famous General Alikhanoff, who had led the Russian forces at Penjdeh in March, 1885, when they put to flight the Afghans and the British political officers with them. Alikhanoff was the typical soldier of fortune, who would have been leader of a band of *condottieri* in the Middle Ages, and would have carved out for himself a principality in eighteenth-century India.

A man of splendid physique; fair as a Northern European, he claimed to be by race an Avarski of the Caucasus—one of the Hungarian tribes left on the way in their irruption into Europe. He dined with us one night at the Hotel de Londres—surely the best hostelry in Asia. When his tongue was loosed by the generous Caucasian wine, for though a Mohammedan he—like Omar—did not abjure wine, he spoke with the greatest freedom on many matters. Now and again he looked round the room to see if the waiters were listening, for though then Head of the Police in the Caucasus, he said he had had to be careful of spies. He gloried in his exploits at Geok Tepe, where he had helped Skobelev to exterminate the Turcoman tribes, and at Penjdeh, where the credit for the Russian aggressive action was all his own. For the behaviour of the Afghan

cavalry on that occasion he expressed the greatest contempt; the infantry, he said, stood their ground like men at first, but with the wind and rain in their faces and their powder damp, they had not a chance against his Cossacks. He told us of the hurried retreat of the British officers, so hurried that some of them had left their boots behind (he had shown us these earlier in the Military Museum). He alleged that after the battle, the Afghans were so enraged with their British advisers that he sent the latter a message offering to take them under Russian protection, and he finished his account of Penjdeh by saying: "On that day the British prestige in Asia suffered not a little"—which was true. But at heart he professed to be a true Caucasian, proud of their long resistance to the Russians, and no great lover of the Russians or their methods, which he said were inspired by a jealousy of and a desire to keep down Caucasian ideals. Later, as he warmed more and more to the subject, I discovered one reason for this attitude. After Penjdeh, Alikhanoff was lionised as a popular hero, rewarded with honours and high military rank and appointed Governor of Trans-Caspia. There he kept open house, and entertained many guests, including foreigners, at shooting parties, etc. This aroused the jealousy of some of his Russian colleagues. A cabal (according to him) was started against him. He was accused of bribery and tried by a court-martial which reported against him. The case came up to the Tsar (Alexander III) who wrote, "This man has deserved well of the State and must not be disgraced." Accordingly he was transferred to the Caucasus as Inspector-General of Police.

Alikhanoff had a wide knowledge not only of European but of Asiatic politics. He was much interested in our Indian administration, and quick to see its strong as well as its weak points. Contrasting the (then) liberal scale on which the Indian Government paid its administrators with the parsimony of the Russian, he said bitterly: "They give us a splendid uniform, high office, wide powers, and the pay—of a coolie! Is it a wonder if many of us take (bribes)? I myself am not innocent (*Ya sam vinovat*)."

It was a frank but astounding statement, and might be

commended to the notice of the Viceroy and Secretary of State for India.

Alikhanoff had married a wealthy Circassian lady, and had a fine country-house in one of the Caucasus valleys, some forty miles out of Tiflis, where he wished to take us; but time did not allow. For next day we had to undertake the two and a half days' drive over the Caucasus from Tiflis to Vladikavkaz—perhaps the most wonderful drive in the world.

We left with the pleasantest memories of Alikhanoff. A man of his courage and personality could not be kept back. He rose to be Governor-General of the Caucasus—one of the greatest posts of the Russian Empire—and was murdered by a bomb in the streets of Tiflis, some ten or twelve years later. That was the sad fate of many of the outstanding men of the old regime whom I had met, including the Grand Duke Serge, then Governor-General of Moscow, who, whatever his faults, was uniformly courteous in receiving British officials on leave in Moscow.

We got back to Moscow in May, 1896, in time for the Coronation of the Young Tsar, Nicholas. No other Empire in the world, except our own, could have shown such a gathering of nations or such a combination of European splendour with Oriental magnificence. It was most thrilling to stand in the Red Square outside the Kremlin and watch the representatives of the various Powers file in and out. I remember seeing the Chinese and Japanese Missions arrive simultaneously from different sides at the Saviour's Gate. They were headed respectively by the great Li Hung Chang and I think Marshal Kamagatu. While Li seemed to glare at his rival for disputing priority, the latter quickly slipped in first. At the time I and others thought this was a score for the Japanese. But later I remembered that according to Oriental etiquette—at least as observed in India—the junior in rank goes in *before* the senior; so Li may have gained his point after all.

The Coronation Procession I witnessed from a window of the temporary British Embassy in the Tverskaya, almost opposite to the Grand Duke's Palace. It was a wonderful sight and paralleled only by the similar functions at Delhi in

1903 and 1911 to celebrate the Coronations of the King-Emperor Edward VII and of their present Majesties.

The late Tsar rode by on a white horse, looking very pale and nervous. He well might, for our Ambassador, Sir Nicholas O'Conner, told me later that only the day before had a mine, intended to blow up the Emperor as he passed, been discovered under the street, close to the Grand Duke's Palace and the British Embassy. Anyhow, with all the good-will in the world towards one who had succeeded to such an inheritance and such responsibilities, one could not help feeling that he did not look the man to shoulder them. I still preserve a specimen of the beautifully-illuminated proclamation of the Coronation, copies of which were scattered to the crowds that day by mounted heralds. The high-sounding recital of the titles and territories of the "Tsar Camoderxhabetz" or "self-empowered Tsar," is, in the light of the subsequent tragic end, a sad commentary on the vanity of human wishes.

"His fall was destined to a foreign strand,  
A petty fortress and an unknown hand;  
He left a name at which the world grew pale,  
To point a moral or adorn a tale."

The terrible catastrophe of the Hodinski Polé on the morrow of the Coronation—when four thousand of the populace were crushed to death in their struggle to receive the Tsar's simple gifts to his people—cast a gloom over the rejoicings and caused the superstitious among his subjects—and they were many—to regard the newly-crowned Emperor as unlucky. This feeling that the Fates were against him seems to have persisted to the end.

I had a seat for the great popular gathering at the Hodinski Polé, but I decided to skip it and run back to England for a week or two, chiefly to see the Derby of that year. It was a great Derby, memorable for the victory of the Prince of Wales's Persimmon, ridden by Watts. As the Prince led in his horse amid the applause of hundreds of thousands, one could not help feeling how much more secure was the foundation of our constitutional monarchy, "broad based upon the

people's will," than the autocracy of the Tsar of All the Russias, whose Coronation I had witnessed a few days before. But at that time even the unwilling subjects of Russia—such as the now liberated Poles—took a pride in the greatness of the Empire to which they belonged.

On my way through Poland I got into conversation with a Polish Catholic priest. Finding I was a foreigner and of his persuasion, he spoke freely and feelingly of the ill-treatment of his countrymen by an allied but (as he put it) intellectually and morally inferior race; of the severe restrictions imposed on their language and the exercise of their religion; of the fact that, while murderers and robbers had been freely released on the occasion of the Coronation, none of the thousands of Poles deported to Siberia for their political opinions had been set at liberty. And so he continued to discourse bitterly of what were undoubtedly real present-day grievances—not of the sentimental or fictitious type which respectively bulk so large in Irish and Indian oratory. Indeed, he went on to contrast the liberal policy of the British Government towards "another conquered nation" with the cruel persecution the Poles were experiencing. And yet at the end of all this he changed his note and said: "But one cannot but be proud to belong to such a great and mighty Empire."

I think it was on the same journey that I had as fellow-traveller a Polish Count then well known in the sporting world. He had brought a big string of horses to the early meetings at St. Petersburg and Moscow, and had—as he said—swept the board, and avenged some of Poland's wrongs on his Russian competitors. He was on his way back to a big meeting at Warsaw which was to take place on the following Sunday, and pressed me hard to stay with him and see it—but gave way when I said I could not miss the Derby. The particular attraction he dangled before me was a ten-verst (seven-mile) race which he hoped to win. I had never heard of a race of such a length, except among the Baluchis, and thought he was exaggerating. Later on, in the corridor of the train, I got into conversation with a man who seemed to be the Count's English trainer, but who turned out to be his Irish jockey—

O'Driscoll, I think, by name. I asked him if the seven-mile race was a fact. His reply was, "Begor it is, and it's meself that has to ride it."

But as the gift of—I will call it—imagination is as strong in the Irish as in the Poles, I still want further evidence as to the distance.

I returned finally from Russia in September, passed as Russian interpreter in October, got married in November, and returned to India and my old haunts at Lahore in December, 1896.

## CHAPTER VI

PUNJAB AND RAJPUTANA (1897-1901)

ON my return to Lahore at the end of 1896 Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick was near the end of his term as Lieutenant-Governor. His rather stern judicial outlook on men and things had softened under the influence of wide administrative responsibilities, and in spite of certain laudable but not easily workable orders regarding supplies to officers on tour which he had issued at the outset, both the services and the people had come to esteem him as a high-minded, able and, at heart, kindly Governor.

In the spring of 1897 he was succeeded by Sir W. M. Young, who had served in almost every executive, administrative, and secretarial office, and had also had experience of the Government of India and of the Political Department. He was a man of charming personality and acute intellect ; but as he said when he laid down his office five years later, he was spared none of the great calamities, war, famine, and pestilence, which scourge a people. The frontier from Chitral to Waziristan was in a blaze from May, 1897, to well on into 1898, and one result of the conflagration was the bitter controversy over the capacity of the Punjab Government to administer the frontier districts and the relations of the frontier tribes on our side of the Durand line. The upshot was the decision of Lord Curzon's Government in 1901 to separate these areas from the Punjab, and form them into a separate administration under a Chief Commissioner at Peshawar, directly under the Government of India.

The failure of the winter rains in 1896-97, and again three years later, led to severe scarcity in parts of the Punjab ; but happily the great extension of canal irrigation and the excellent

and timely arrangements to cope with local distress averted a famine. Plague, imported from China, which had first shown itself in Bombay in 1896, broke out in epidemic form in the Punjab in the succeeding years, and the drastic measures taken to cope with it caused some local outbreaks and severely tried the resources of the Punjab Government. Mackworth-Young faced all these difficulties with a gallant spirit. But he deeply resented the manner in which the separation of the North-West Frontier from the Punjab had been carried through; unfortunately I had been chosen by the Government of India to act as one of their representatives in working out the separation and the new scheme of administration.

That was not, however, till 1901. From July, 1897, to March, 1901, I was employed as Commissioner to carry out the land-revenue settlements of the Alwar and Bharatpur States in Rajputana. This experience gave me an insight into indigenous Indian administration and an opportunity of comparing it with that of the adjoining British Provinces. Each of these States had an area of two thousand to three thousand square miles, the size of two average British counties, and a population of about three-quarters of a million. In each case over 80 per cent of the population was rural, and the main source of the State revenues was the land—the State demand on which it was my duty to reassess.

The two States had much in common as regards natural features, system of agriculture, soil, rainfall, cultivating classes—mainly Hindus of the Rajput, Brahmin, Jat, Ahir, and Gujar castes or tribes, with a strong minority of Mohammedans, chiefly Meos, in the northern tracts bordering on British territory. But the economic conditions differed widely, not only from the adjoining British districts, where the population and agricultural conditions were almost identical, but also from one another. The origin of these differences was instructive.

First, as between the two States. In Alwar the ruling race was Rajput. The State was an offshoot of its powerful neighbour Jaipur, from which it had broken away about 1775. But it maintained its strong Rajput traditions under a series



of forceful rulers, and consolidated its position by the assistance it gave to Lord Lake (in 1803-5) in breaking down the Mahratta power in Northern India. The rulers had nearly always been wise enough to realise that their interests depended on having a peasantry strong enough to bear the burden of the State revenue demand, but not so strong as to be able to press undue demands or defy the State authority. Hence in the frequently recurring years of agricultural distress the Alwar State had generally taken measures, though not always timely or adequate, to ease the burden and keep the people on the land. This policy had been impressed on successive rulers by the British Political Agents representing the paramount power. The State had also been fortunate in having its land-revenue system put on a sound basis by a British Settlement Officer twenty years before I was deputed to revise the work. Indeed, one may lay it down as a general principle, that wherever an Indian State is found to be well organised and well administered, the foundations have been well and truly laid by some capable British administrator.

This usually happened when the paramount power had to assume a general supervision of the State in the interests of a minor Ruler, who, on his investiture with ruling powers, found a full treasury and a smooth-running administrative machine. Alwar had been through more than one of such minorities. The young Maharaja, who last year was one of India's representatives at the League of Nations, and a very competent one, was a minor in 1897, and the administration was being carried on by a capable State Council under the general control of the British Political Agent. My work as Settlement Commissioner was therefore on much the same lines as in Gujranwala. The chief differences were :

(1) That I had to import most of the subordinate staff from the Punjab to prepare the maps, records, and assessment data, and train the inefficient local agency to carry on the work.

(2) That my assessments had to be approved, not only by the State authorities, but also by the Government of India as guardian of the minor Maharaja.

In Bharatpur the state of affairs was very different. The ruling caste were Jats of the same sturdy peasant race as the mass of the Punjab agriculturists. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, as the Mogul power grew weak, they had carved out for themselves semi-independent principalities to the west of Agra. The Jats, though stalwart fighters and mighty builders of strong forts and noble palaces—arts which they had copied from the great Mogul masterpieces at Agra and Delhi—had not the traditions of a ruling race and were poor administrators. Bharatpur had taken the wrong side in the Mahratta war, and after two historic sieges succumbed to the second British attack in 1825. The State thereafter declined in power and territory; but the successive rulers endeavoured to maintain their old-time pomp and armed forces by tightening the screw on the inhabitants of the territories still left to them.

A series of famines, culminating in the disastrous year 1877-78, in which the State authorities did little to help the people, broke down even the marvellous staying-powers of the Bharatpur peasants, brought many to a premature grave, and drove tens of thousands to abandon the lands they could no longer work. The State was compelled to endeavour to adjust its oppressive demands to the reduced capacity of the people by a series of makeshift revisions.

There had been no less than six of these so-called settlements in the forty years before I assumed charge. But none of them was based on the only sound foundation—the preparation of an accurate survey and record of rights in the land, and the guarantee of a reasonable State demand. All of them had in consequence hopelessly broken down. When I took over the work from Mr. (afterwards Sir) Elliot Colvin in 1897, the peasantry of the greater part of this once prosperous State were in a shocking condition of misery and demoralisation. Hundreds of villages had been deserted by their old owners; those who remained often refused to accept any liability for the payment of the State demand or the arrears, which had piled up to the extent of £500,000; land over most of the State was unsaleable, because the State demand was excessive

and there was no security for the future. To friends who asked me why I was venturing on a task so hopeless, I replied that things were so bad anything I did could not make them worse, and might make them better. And so it proved. After all, one had two great assets in a frugal and industrious peasantry, though much thinned by death, desertion, and emigration, and a fertile country. All that was wanted was to restore confidence; attract back those who had run away from their land and its burdens by reducing those burdens to an extent which they could bear; wipe off the arrears which hung like a mill-stone round their necks and placed them at the mercy of rapacious State officials; equitably adjust their rights and liabilities to one another, to their subordinate tenants and to the State; and, above all, give them the guarantee of the British Government that the new settlement would be maintained for a reasonable term of twenty or thirty years—as was usual in British districts—and would be administered with reasonable elasticity.

By working steadily on these lines, confidence was gradually restored, cultivation increased by leaps and bounds, the absconding owners began to reappear, the deserted villages were reinhabited, and scores of new villages were founded in the lands which had been abandoned owing to the impoverishment of the old owners or the depredations of the thousands of wild cattle in the central areas. This latter scourge deserves a word of explanation.

A pious Maharaja over a hundred years before had, according to Hindu custom, dedicated to the gods and turned loose a few cattle as sacred. These had established themselves in certain dense jungles around Bharatpur City which afforded pasture, shade, and water. They gradually reverted to the wild state and increased and multiplied—for the Brahmins, who dominated the State policy, would allow no interference with the sacred animals—till they numbered some ten thousand. These herds sallied forth at night, roamed over the country, and either trampled down or ate up the crops on hundreds of square miles. The wretched cultivators could find no redress. They built with much labour great walls of mud round their

little fields to try and keep out the trespassers; while all night long could be heard, even in my time, the shouting of those whose turn it was to keep vigil and scare them away. The evil now began to spread to the adjoining British districts of Agra and Muttra. Complaints and appeals to the then Bharatpur Maharaja having yielded no result, the British authorities, to protect their people, posted men on the border with instructions to shoot down the invading herds. The threat of this outrage to the sacred animals at once brought the then Maharaja to reason. A great fence of barbed wire, forty miles long and ten feet high, was erected along the British boundary. This protected the British cultivators, but concentrated the evil in Bharatpur, and the Political Agent wrote in 1896, "There is not a single Hindu of the upper classes in the Bharatpur State that does not place the interests of the cattle above those of the cultivator." This was the situation as I found it.

Happily at this time the State came under the direct administration of the British Government. The young Maharaja had been deposed for shooting one of his servants (unfortunately for him) in British territory—and his son, the present capable and loyal ruler, was an infant in arms. The Council of Regency, which had a trained Indian administrator at its head, realised the necessity of action; the protests of Brahmins against any interference with the sacred cattle were met by the reply that the State had also a duty to its human subjects. This view was pressed by the Political Agent and myself. A compromise was finally come to as the result of which the wild cattle were rounded up and enclosed in a great park, fenced in by barbed wire, some ten square miles in area, which was ample for their maintenance. At the same time measures were taken to separate off and endeavour to tame the young. Anyhow, the situation was adequately dealt with, and a great menace to the agricultural stability of one-third of the State was removed.

But this result would not have been secured but for the steady pressure of the British officials both in the State itself and in its vicinity.

I have never worked harder than during those four years in Rajputana. To satisfy oneself and the people whose welfare one was responsible for, it was almost essential personally to inspect every one of the three thousand estates or villages scattered over an area of five thousand square miles, often among remote hills and difficult of access. This inspection had to be made when the crops were still on the ground. From the middle of October, when the autumn harvest was maturing, up to the beginning of April, when the harvesting of the spring crops was nearly complete, I rarely saw another white face. I had to be continually on tour, and in the saddle at least five days a week from dawn till afternoon. In that time one covered twenty-five to thirty miles and was able to ride round the lands of five or six villages with the leading men, see the crops, test the reports and statistics of one's Indian assistants as to the condition and capacity of the estate, and form a rough estimate of one's own. By two in the afternoon one sat down in the shade with the groups representing each village and, with their help and that of one's Indian assistants and the local State officials, went through the revenue history and statistics of the village in detail, at the same time disposing as far as possible of all pending disputes as to title, shares, rights of absentees and absconders, boundaries, revenue-free grants, village officers, partitions of common land, landlord and tenant.

The settlement in public of tens of thousands of such disputes, which often had been going on for generations, in the presence of the parties, and after personal enquiry on the spot by my assistants and myself was, I think, more appreciated than anything else.

Nothing gives more confidence to the Indian peasant than the feeling that he has had a fair hearing, and I think ninety-nine out of a hundred of our decisions, whether original or on appeal from the orders of my Indian assistants, were accepted as a final settlement without demur or appeal. The ordinary State Courts, many of whose functions we took over for the time being, may have suffered, but the saving to the people was immense.

All this carried one on till well after dark. But though the hours were long and the physical strain severe, there were pleasant interludes for sport. Game of all kinds abounded over the two States and was rigidly preserved. In the course of a morning's ride it was not uncommon to collect a bag containing a black buck or two, and half a dozen brace of partridge and sand-grouse, without going out of one's way. When one had leisure there were panthers to be shot, boar and hyæna to be speared. But there was a real pleasure in working for these simple, kindly, and trusting rustics, who one felt had in the past, in Bharatpur at least, been treated less well than their own "patient oxen," and certainly with less consideration than the pampered "sacred cattle." Above all there was the growing satisfaction that the results of one's endeavours were beginning to show to the advantage of the State as well as of the people. In most of Bharatpur and parts of Alwar, land, which had little or no value when I began the operations, steadily rose in value as the people realised that they were being fairly dealt with; competition for land steadily increased; and towards the end of my four years, even in Bharatpur, tenant-right began to acquire a value, and over ten thousand claims for such rights were brought forward and, as a rule, amicably settled.

A comparison of the Native State and British Indian land-revenue systems by one who has seen much of both, may not be without interest. Both start from the same principle which is defined in the British Regulation XXXI of 1803 as follows :

"By the ancient law of the country the ruling power is entitled to a certain proportion of the annual produce of every *bigha* (acre) of land."

The Punjab Act of 1871 adds that the Government share of the produce of the land in the Punjab shall be "from time to time fixed by itself."

The Emperor Akbar's statesman-like regulations to limit the State share to one-third—though this would in many cases represent the full economic rent—became a dead letter

after his time. In practice the Oriental ruler aimed at taking all the rental or surplus produce, leaving only to the actual cultivator sufficient for his maintenance and the cost of cultivation. This was the practice which the British found in existence when they acquired the *dewani*, or revenue rights, of Bengal in 1765. But by that time the right to collect had been leased out by the native rulers to certain farmers of the revenue who agreed to pay during the term of the lease a fixed sum, and were allowed in return to deal as they pleased with the actual cultivators of the soil. The recognition by Lord Cornwallis of these middlemen as *zamindars*, or proprietors, of the estates of which they were but temporary lessees, and the grant to them of a Permanent Settlement on payment of 90 per cent of the estimated rental, were perhaps the greatest administrative blunder perpetrated in the early stages of our rule. Such temporary farms of the right to collect to outsiders were not uncommon even in the Punjab in the early days, and were very common incidents in Alwar and Bharatpur. But I hardly ever came across a case in which the lessee was given proprietary rights over those who, if any, had the best claim to the ownership of the soil.

The British authorities, however, even in those early days, recognised the advantage of steadily reducing the State demand so as to leave an increasing share of the rental, actual or assumed, to those whom it recognised as proprietors. The Bengal Regulations of 1812 reduced the State share to five-sixths. In Thomason's *Directions to Settlement Officers* of the United Provinces, issued in 1844, the share was further reduced to two-thirds; and finally, in the same Provinces, the principle was enunciated in 1855 that it should be limited to one-half of the average economic rental. This was followed as a guiding principle in the regular settlements of the recently annexed Punjab, and it is in force throughout the British provinces of Northern India to-day. But in practice the one-half rental is taken as the *limit*, not the *standard*, of assessment. The Settlement Officer makes such liberal allowances for possible error in estimating (1) the average yield, (2) the average price of the produce, and (3) the variation

in the competitive cash rents, that the assessment rarely exceeds one-third of the actual rental or (say) one-eighth of the estimated value of the produce. Hence the growth in British India of a property of enormous value in the land ; for as stated in Thomason's *Directions*, "The first step towards the creation of a private proprietary right in the land, was to place such a limit on the demand of the Government as to leave to the proprietor a profit which would constitute a valuable property."

But in the Native States no such limit was imposed, and in most of them which have not come under the direct influence of British administrators or British Settlement Officers, the State tenaciously clings to its right to the full rental. This in the long run is a short-sighted policy, for it discourages the enterprise and the application of capital necessary to improve existing cultivation and bring waste lands under the plough. That is why agriculture is, as a rule, much more backward in the Native States than in adjoining British districts. Even in Alwar and Bharatpur I experienced some difficulty in getting the State authorities to agree to my limiting the State share to two-thirds or three-fourths of the estimated rental, or one-fourth of the value of the produce ; and in practice to meet their wishes I had sometimes to adopt an even higher standard. The result was that in these States I imposed an assessment about double of what I should have imposed on them if they had been British districts. And yet my assessments were welcomed by the people, and were regarded as decidedly moderate in comparison with other Native States. On the face of it the position of a landholder in a British district is infinitely superior to that of his equivalent in a Native State, and is steadily improving.

In the Punjab after annexation, the average sale value of land was about five shillings per acre ; now it is almost £20 per acre, and represents one hundred and eighty years' purchase of the State demand. In most Native States that I know of—and I have personal knowledge of more than half of them—land would not fetch more than a few years' purchase of the State demand, or less than £1 per acre ; though where



the settlements have been made by a British officer, or an Indian official trained in the British system, it might run as high as £3 to £5 per acre. But the advantage is not all on our side. It is true that in a British district the State demand is much lighter, there is more freedom of transfer, more encouragement for energy and enterprise, more security, and a higher standard of comfort. On the other hand, the assessments, though lenient, are more rigidly collected; the freedom of transfer often leads to the disintegration of the community and enables a strong and unscrupulous member to aggrandise himself at the expense of his weaker brethren; while the wider margin of profit left to the landholder attracts the moneylender and the speculator, who often secure for themselves what the State has forgone for the benefit of the landholder. The Native State system tends to keep all members of the landholding classes, except such of the higher castes, Rajputs, Brahmins, etc., as receive special exemptions, on a common level, little above the margin of subsistence. This may, and often does, lead to stagnation; but stagnation tends towards equality and that "placid pathetic contentment" which is still to be found in the Native States.

It is significant that agrarian discontent is much more frequent and more easily aroused in British India than in the States. The main reason is that while we have created proprietary rights of immense value—often, as in Bengal, and parts of Madras and the United Provinces, in favour of classes who had only a temporary connection with the land—we have not taken adequate measures to secure the peasant proprietors (the capitalists can look after themselves) against ruthless expropriation by usurers and capitalists who knew how to take advantage of our rigid legal system. Moreover, while we granted full proprietary rights to the big landlords, we did not take timely or adequate measures to secure the tenantry against the evils of rack-renting and eviction.

In certain provinces we have within the last generation introduced legislation, such as the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900, the Deccan Relief Act, and the Tenancy Acts of Bengal and the United Provinces, to remedy these defects. But the legis-

latures are now, under the Reforms Scheme, so dominated by the big landlords or the capitalists of the towns, or by a combination of both, that it has already become almost impossible—as the whittling away of the recently proposed “Tenants Protection Bill” in the United Provinces shows—to put through measures giving adequate protection to the tenants. This result was foreseen by many of us when the Reforms Scheme was under discussion in 1918–19, and was one of the main reasons for our objecting to the transfer of such wide powers to a small class of politicians, mainly urban, who were not in any sense either representative of the rural masses or sympathetic to their needs and interests. Though those masses compose nine-tenths of the population of British India and contribute to the State revenue out of all proportion to their means, they are as much ignored by the politicians in power as the agricultural classes in England, who, however, number only one-fifth of the population.

The pressure of work in Alwar and Bharatpur was lightened by many incidents, and I may quote a few as illustrating the habits of the people. The strongest agricultural tribe in both States was the Meos. They were converts to Islam, but Islam sat lightly on them, and they retained many Hindu customs. When asked to describe their religious tenets the best description I could give was that they kept the feasts of both religions and the fasts of neither !

Rather quarrelsome and obstinate at first, if one knew how to handle them they soon relaxed and had quite a sense of humour. They had a liking for their neighbour's cattle, but were proverbially late in paying up their revenue to the State, and when it was my duty to press them, the old greybeards would reply with a twinkle of the eye, “It has been high moon of late ; wait till the nights are darker, and we'll find the means to pay.”

The Rajputs in Alwar, being of the same stock as the ruling family, often held much of their lands revenue-free, and were given privileged rates on the lands that were assessed. Even so, they were slack cultivators, for, as they put it, owing to their women being in *purdah* (seclusion) the men had to do

the work of drawing water, chopping wood, binding the sheaves which, in the case of ordinary agricultural tribes, was performed by the women. This, no doubt, was a serious handicap, but they made the most of it.

They were notoriously dilatory in paying their dues. Once I had to threaten a petty Rajput Chief with attachment of his property if he did not pay up. He begged for a respite till the marriage season, and when I asked how that would help him, he explained that he would then be able to sell half a dozen of his female slaves ("dependents" would perhaps be the more accurate word).

I have referred to the consideration shown to the "sacred cattle" in Bharatpur. In Alwar this was extended to all wild animals which were looked on as legitimate "sport," i.e. not only tigers, panthers, wild pig, deer, etc., but also peacocks and even pigeons. These latter two were protected as a religious duty; the others as the "sport of kings."

The game-laws were indeed enforced with a severity worthy of William Rufus, and I had many a struggle with the Shikar (Game) Department before I could get them to see that tigers and peasants could not co-exist side by side, and that, if either had to give way, it should be the tiger, whose proper place was in the State preserves, not in village lands. The disappearance one night of a messenger carrying my mail-bag through the area invaded by a "man-eater," and the smile on the face of the tiger, gave an opportune support to my argument.

Only a few of the chief officials and leading nobles were allowed to possess fire-arms or to shoot game of any kind. I once asked an old Rajput notable, whose only amusement was opium-eating, why he did not go in for sport. His explanation was, "My grandfather shot a wild boar and the Maharaja had his hand cut off. My father killed a deer and was fined Rs.500. Is it likely that I should run a similar risk?"

One morning on tour I met a policeman carrying a fine panther skin. He explained that a few nights before, the panther had broken into the sheepfold of an adjoining village. The shepherd had rushed to the rescue of his flock, seized the

panther round the neck and clung to it tightly, in spite of being mauled, till his friends came to his aid, and after a great struggle killed the panther with their clubs. I remarked that the shepherd was a very brave man and deserved a reward. The policeman smiled and said, "This is his reward," pointing to a figure in chains who proved to be no other than my hero. He had broken the State laws by killing a wild animal, and was being sent in for trial with the *corpus delicti*. The poor fellow only complained of his bad luck. He would doubtless have been acquitted in the long run; but I was glad to be able to expedite his release and secure for him a reward.

One of my own experiences in shooting panthers was so unfortunate that I hesitate to tell it. I had been out after tiger with the young Maharaja, and he being a first-rate shot had bagged one. When we returned to camp we heard that a panther had been raiding the village flocks and decided to sit up for him when it became dark. A young goat was tied up as a kill. We took our places on the *machán* (platform) and His Highness generously insisted that when the panther appeared I should have the first shot. During the long wait we both dozed off. I was awakened by a nudge from the Maharaja who whispered "Shoot." I could see nothing in the darkness. The whisper was repeated. Then the unfortunate goat began to bleat, there was a scuffle, and I fired twice in the direction of a dark mass which I thought must be the panther. The Maharaja fired almost simultaneously. There was a roar and a spring, and we thought we had done our work. Soon after people came hurrying up from the village with torches, and we found—not the panther but the poor goat lying dead with at least two bullets in him!

We returned to camp thoroughly ashamed of our night's work.

One day I was busy settling a boundary dispute close to one of the great shooting preserves of Alwar. It was a very picturesque spot—and my wife had come out to see it with my little daughter. While I was looking through maps and going over the ground, she wandered along a pleasant shady stream. When my work was finished she was not to be found.

After some search the tracks were found leading up-stream, and the people were horror-stricken as they told me they led up into the favourite haunts of the local tigers. We hurried after them, and after some anxious minutes caught them up. My wife explained that she had come across the "pug" marks of a tiger in the sand by the stream, and was following them up to see where they led to! On the way she had seen a crocodile basking on a rock, and to amuse our little girl had thrown a stone at it which made it move, but fortunately in the right direction!

Of Bharatpur I have only space to relate one incident which throws a grim light on the custom of female infanticide—once so common among the higher Hindu castes, but now fortunately becoming "unfashionable" and almost extinct, as a result of Western ideas and British legislation.

The sister of the Maharaja was to be married to a great Punjab Sirdar. The family pressed for the lavish expenditure usual on those occasions—£30,000 to £40,000—and the local members of the State Council supported their view. The Political Agent—the State being then under British supervision—and I strongly protested against such extravagance in a year of severe scarcity and distress. Finally, the matter was discussed in full Council. I asked the oldest member of the Council to quote precedents—how much had been sanctioned on similar marriages of the daughter or sister of a Maharaja in the past. He shook his head and said there was no precedent. I said, "How can that be?—the State has been in existence for over two hundred years, and there have been eleven successions without adoption, from father to son; do you mean to tell me that there were never any daughters?" The old man hesitated a little, and then said, "Sahib, you know our customs, surely you know the reason. There were daughters born, but till this generation they were not allowed to grow up." And it was so.

In Rajputana one was indeed living in what is still a microcosm of mediæval India with its ancient customs, its picturesque feudal organisation, its innate conservatism, its loyal and sporting Princes and nobles, its simple and kindly races.

I brought away pleasant memories of all these, and the feeling of having been able to do something to improve the indigenous system without any radical alterations or innovations. If I found it necessary to introduce a reform I was generally able to dig out the necessary authority in some forgotten edict or counsel of perfection of an old Maharaja, and I generally avoided quoting a British-Indian authority. This appeal to the past was almost invariably successful.

But above all I was fortunate in having as my Indian assistants men of rare capacity, tact, and powers of organisation. They were Sirdars Amár Singh and Hira Singh, both sturdy Sikhs, Lalas Rallia Ram and Gauri Shankar. All were Punjabis and had been trained in that best of all schools, the Punjab Settlement Department.

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## CHAPTER VII

### NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (1901-8)

**L**ORD CURZON came out as Viceroy in 1899. He had by many years' Asiatic travel, and by his experience as Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, acquired a knowledge, unique in a Viceroy, of those Frontier, Afghan, and Central Asian questions which, since the advance of Russia in Central Asia, have bulked so large in Indian politics. One of his first official acts was to take up the question, which the Frontier campaigns of 1897-98 had revived, of separating the North-West Frontier districts and the adjoining tribal areas up to the Durand line (fixed in Kabul in 1894 between Sir Mortimer Durand, Foreign Secretary, and the Amir Abdur Rahmán, to delimit the British and Afghan spheres of influence) from the control of the Punjab Government.

The object was to bring them under the direct control of a Chief Commissioner at Peshawar, directly subordinate to the Foreign Department of the Government of India. In a Minute of characteristic vigour and cogency, Lord Curzon pointed out that the Punjab Government was called upon to carry out a Frontier policy for which it was not in the last resort responsible and with which it was not specially qualified to deal; while the Government of India was responsible for a Frontier policy that was not carried out by its own agents, and was to a large extent removed from its direct supervision. Labour without responsibility was the experience of the Punjab Government; responsibility without control that of the Government of India.

The project for separating the Frontier areas from the Punjab, and bringing them under the direct control of the

Government of India, was outlined in Lord Curzon's Minute in great detail. It was sanctioned in principle by the Secretary of State at the end of 1900, without any previous reference to the Punjab Government. This was, not unnaturally, resented as a slight to a Government which for over fifty years had borne (and not unsuccessfully having regard to the very difficult conditions) the brunt of Frontier administration. The skilful dialectics which Lord Curzon used to establish his case were regarded in the Punjab as savouring rather of the brilliant advocate than of the impartial statesman, and his imputing the blame for past blunders to the Punjab Government and its methods caused further irritation to an Administration which was both proud and sensitive.

The scheme itself was no doubt sound in principle. But the experience of the last twenty-three years has shown that it has fallen far short of the results then prophesied. However, the Punjab Government loyally set itself early in 1901 to work out the details of the boundaries, system of administration, cadre of officers, etc., in communication with Colonel (afterwards Sir) H. A. Deane who was the Chief Commissioner designate of the new province. As Deane could not spare much time from his duties as Resident in Kashmir, I was deputed by the Government of India, on the conclusion of my work in Rajputana, to assist him. Similarly, Mr. C. E. Bunbury, I.C.S., the Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar, was delegated by the Punjab Government. Bunbury and I were old friends, having started life together in Lahore fifteen years before, and he had a unique knowledge of the details of Frontier administration of which I was then wholly ignorant. The organisation of a new system of administration in a tract with such varied local conditions was not a simple matter. But Lord Curzon was eager to have the new system introduced in the autumn. Between April and August, 1901, working in constant consultation with the Punjab Government and the Government of India, we evolved a scheme which met with the approval of both and of the Home Government. The new Province was started auspiciously on King Edward's birthday, 9th November, 1901, with Deane as Chief



Commissioner, and Bunbury and I (I had meantime run home on short leave) as Judicial and Revenue Commissioners respectively. Deane, Bunbury, and myself were all Punjab officers, and loyal to our old Province. We therefore strove hard to retain in or attract to the new Province some of the pick of the younger officers of the Punjab Commission, and I think we succeeded. There were already in the Province a few members of the Government of India Political Department, chiefly in trans-border posts, such as the Khaibar and Malakand Agencies. Of these Roos-Keppel (afterwards Chief Commissioner, 1908-19), who was already noted for his skilful handling of the Turis of the Kurram and the Khaibar Afridis, was the most distinguished. To administer the five settled districts—Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan—with an area of fourteen thousand square miles, and a population of two and a quarter millions, and the five trans-border Agencies—Malakand, Khaibar, Kurram, North and South Waziristan—we had a cadre of some thirty-five British officers. Roughly two-thirds were civilians and one-third soldiers who had been selected from the Indian Army and trained in civil and political work.

I doubt if anywhere in the East one could have got together a finer body of officers; many have since risen to the highest administrative rank open to them. Lt.-Col. Roos-Keppel, A. H. Grant, I.C.S., J. L. Maffey, I.C.S., and H. N. Bolton, I.C.S., have, in the order named, risen to be Chief Commissioner in the Frontier Province; F. W. Johnston, I.C.S., to be Chief Commissioner in Baluchistan; Lt.-Col. Blakeway, W. P. Barton, I.C.S., R. I. Glancy, I.C.S., S. E. Pears, I.C.S., Hyderabad, to be Residents of the 1st Class in Central India and Mysore; D. de S. Bray, I.C.S., to be Foreign Secretary; E. B. Howell, I.C.S., came to the front as head of the Revenue Department in Mesopotamia, while Major (now Sir) F. Humphreys, then the youngest of the lot, is now British Minister in Kabul, and Major St. John Agent to the Governor-General in the Punjab States.

Personally I have always held that a mixed body of civilians and soldiers (i.e. men who had a good military training before

their selection for civil or political work) is best fitted for the administration of not only the Foreign and Political Departments of the Government of India, but also for Provinces, like the Punjab, with a virile and martial population. On that ground I strongly, but unsuccessfully, advised against the proposal of Sir W. Mackworth-Young to abandon recruitment of military officers to the Punjab Commission after the separation of the Frontier. Many of the greatest administrators and most popular officers in the Punjab have been soldiers to start with, e.g. Colonel Sir Henry Durand, Colonel Sir William Davis, Colonels Wace, MacMahon (father and son), Massey, Davies, Montgomery, Nisbet, and Sir F. Popham Young.

The political sphere Deane himself directed; the judicial side was in Bunbury's charge. It fell to me as Revenue Commissioner to supervise, under Deane, practically all other branches of the administration. The land-revenue work was, of course, the most important; for all the settled districts, except Peshawar, were under resettlement, and the trans-border Kurram and Tochi Valleys were being settled for the first time. The supervision of operations which were being carried out by competent British officers was a much lighter task than having to do the work oneself, but it involved a wider field and heavy responsibility. Some of the questions to be solved as regards the varying local systems of tribal tenure and irrigation rights, especially of Dera Ismail Khan, were among the most complex I have ever had to handle. I believe that there have been only six people in the world, two Indian and four British, who succeeded in fathoming the Dera Ismail Khan tenures. The effort killed two of them prematurely. I claim to be one of the three surviving British, the other two being Mr. H. Tucker of the I.C.S. (now nearly ninety) who made the first settlement, and Mr. H. N. Bolton (now Chief Commissioner) who, under my guidance, completed the last. The sole surviving Indian who "knows about it all" is Khan Bahadur Chaudhri Muhamed Din, now a Minister in the Bahawalpur State.

Deane, who was an officer of rare administrative ability, looked to me to maintain, in my sphere, as far as possible, the

Punjab standards of administration, and to prevent any loss of efficiency which might result if officers came to regard the administrative side of their work as less important than the political. Sir W. Mackworth-Young had warned us that there would be an inevitable tendency in a small Frontier Province, directly subordinate to the Foreign Department of the Government of India, for officers to scamp the more humdrum duties and play to the political gallery. This, he said, would ere long lead to inefficiency and a general down-grading of the standards of civil administration.

In the recent agitation, largely organised by Hindu lawyers and their urban *clientèle* of shopkeepers and moneylenders, for the restoration of the settled Frontier districts to the Punjab, it has been freely alleged that this deterioration has already taken place. Of that I am not in a position to judge, having left the Province in 1908. But I am confident that while Deane was Chief Commissioner (i.e. down to 1908) there was no foundation for it. Of the many Chiefs I have worked under, I have most admiration for Deane. He was a marvellous judge of character, combined firmness and directness in action with shrewd common sense and a strict sense of justice, and would never subordinate the practical work of administration to those so-called "political considerations" which some political officers are inclined to fall back upon in default of practical arguments. He was an ideal man to serve *under*, for he trusted his officers after he had once tried them, and so got the best out of them. But, as I used laughingly to say to him, he must have been a very difficult man to serve *over*—and I think Simla sometimes found him so. Their ways were not always his ways, and he preferred his own. Possibly Simla had the same complaint to make of me in the Punjab.

My work from 1901 to 1908 took me constantly up and down the whole length of the Frontier—from the Black Mountain in the north of Hazara, to Kajuri Kach in the Gumal on the borders of Baluchistan. In those days British prestige was high. I travelled within our border without an escort and rarely carried a revolver. It was rough touring for a lady; but my wife used sometimes to join me, travelling alone and

unescorted to distant places ; she even rode with me without an escort up to Parachinar. Such was then the respect for the British on that Frontier, where, in the last few years, English ladies have been abducted by hostile tribesmen, even from within the great military centres of Peshawar and Kohat, and where it has become a question of allowing English women to remain at all.

Very startling was the change from the picturesque old-world feudalism of Rajputana to the grim realities of life on a Frontier—

“Where a clan must keep its borders  
And a man must keep his head.”

There, murders and blood-feuds were everyday incidents ; the hired assassin a recognised trade ; the midnight foray, with the abduction and holding to ransom of rich Hindus by trans-border bandits, a familiar occurrence ; the blockade of the offending tribe or the wholesale arrest of all its members who happened to be in British territory, ordinary methods of retaliation. But among all these disturbing incidents the ordinary work of civil administration went steadily on. Indeed in no part of India were the relations between the people on the land and their British officers closer than on the Frontier in those days, and on our side of the border one was always met with a welcome, and one which was nearly always genuine.

The Pathan hospitality is so profuse as to be often embarrassing. One could, without giving offence, return the fat-tailed sheep, which the Maliks often produced for one's larder, by telling them to fatten it up for one's next visit. But it was not so easy to avoid the hard-boiled eggs and the cup of green tea, sweetened with a lump of sugar which one's host produced from the folds of a picturesque but not over clean *pugri*, and did not hesitate to stir up with his finger.

The Pathan, with a natural gift of oratory improved by long practice in his *jirgas* or tribal gatherings, is a ready and fluent speaker, and to get on with him a good knowledge of his vernacular (*Pushu*) is desirable. I set about acquiring it with the help of an excellent *munshi*. At the same time it was my official duty to appoint the examiners for the half-

yearly examination and certify and publish the results. I appointed Roos-Keppel, who spoke the language like a Pathan, as President of the Board, with instructions to set the written papers and arrange for the oral examination. Two days before the examination he sent the papers round to me for approval. I returned them unopened, with the remark that as I was myself a candidate I had better not see the papers in advance. I went up and failed—the first time I had ever been “ploughed” in an examination! Thus is virtue rewarded! After another six months of strenuous effort I succeeded. But on that occasion I was not under the disadvantage of receiving the papers in advance.

A very pleasant feature of Frontier life was the close and constant contact with the soldier and his work. In November, 1902, I had the pleasure of taking part—unofficially—in a typical Frontier “scrap.” I was dining at the Station Mess in Bannu, and I sat between Colonel V. C. Tonnochy, the Officer Commanding the 53rd Sikhs, and Captain White, the Adjutant (both were killed next day). I discovered that Tonnochy was taking up a column early next morning to attack and blow up the trans-border fort of Gumatti, for many years the headquarters of a desperate band of outlaws who, led by the notorious Sailgi, had committed many murders and dacoities within our border. Donald (now Sir John), the Deputy-Commissioner, was going with them as Political Officer, and I decided to accompany him.

The column consisted of five hundred men of the 53rd and 54th Sikhs, eighty sabres of the 21st (Punjab) Cavalry, and two mountain guns, not howitzers unfortunately. We started about 2 a.m. and advanced cautiously through the Gumatti Pass under cover of pickets thrown out on the hills on both sides. Fortunately we met with no resistance in this Thermopylæ where a dozen men could have held up a brigade. We got into the open ground surrounding the bandit's fort about nine o'clock, and the cavalry scoured the plain to round up possible enemies. Some “friendlies” told us that Sailgi was in the fort with some half-dozen comrades, but would never surrender. We wished, if possible, to effect our object

without bloodshed. Donald, under a flag of truce, went to parley with the outlaws, pointing out the futility of resistance, and promising them a fair trial by a British officer (they asked that it should be Donald himself) if they gave themselves up. The negotiations broke down because they insisted *inter alia* that their stronghold should be spared and that they should not be submitted to the indignity of being handcuffed! We were not prepared to take any risks, as there was every likelihood of our being followed up and attacked on our way back by hostile bands who, from the hills around, were watching our movements. After due warning the two guns began to play on the fort at 11.30 from one thousand yards. I well remember the old Subadar-Major of the 53rd Sikhs, when he heard them begin, shouting to his men in Punjabi, "Hoorah, boys! here's a chance of a medal!" Unfortunately the Viceroy decided that the operations were only a blockade. The little mountain guns made little impression on the massive mud walls of the fort, and the outlaws now and again appeared on the parapet shouting menaces or derision.

The guns were brought up to one hundred yards into a well-protected position, and there was another parley with Sailgi, who was, however, still obdurate. The troops then closed in on all sides, taking such cover as they could find, and directed a steady fire on the loopholes to check the outlaws' fire while awaiting a breach in the walls by the guns. At this stage the outlaws located the guns. A Sikh gunner was killed and another wounded, while serving them. Donald had a narrow escape. I was with Tonnochy, and we moved forward to see if a breach just then made in the bastion was feasible. Bullets came whistling around us. Tonnochy was shot through the abdomen and fell mortally wounded. I hastily threw myself under the shelter of a *bhusa* (chopped straw) stack and fell among the protecting circle of thorns. The Sikhs, under cover in the ravine just below, roared with laughter at my predicament. Then, recovering from my fright, I helped Donald and a party of Sikhs to bring the stricken Commandant to a place of safety. A Major of the 53rd Sikhs took command. The situation was an anxious one. The guns had failed us.

To storm the fort before a feasible breach had been made would involve very heavy losses. A withdrawal to Bannu, which some suggested, would be a confession of defeat, and we should certainly have severe casualties in returning through the pass in the approaching darkness. We held a Council of War. I supported Donald and others in pressing for the attack, and this was decided on. Lieutenant Brown, R.E., with a party of Sappers, made a dash for the fort under cover of a strong fire from our side, threw himself into the ditch, laid two time-fuses to explode the gun-cotton, and by a miracle all got back unharmed. It was a gallant act, and won him the D.S.O., for he had to run the risk twice, as the first fuses failed to work. The second attempt was successful; there was a tremendous explosion, and a great hole was blown in the side of the bastion. The storming-party, under White, made a rush for this and, though the Sikh Subadar was shot down, they got into the bastion. The outlaws driven out of the bastion took cover under a traverse in the enclosure and kept up a brisk fire on our men. White, the Adjutant, a cheery and gallant fellow, had made a bet that he would avenge his Colonel and get Sailgi that day. He raised his head just over the parapet to take aim, and his skull was shattered by a bullet. Meantime other breaches had been effected; troops poured in on all sides, and soon finished off the few remaining outlaws. When we entered all were lying dead; some were buried deep beneath the debris of the explosions, and among these was Sailgi, with his teeth clenched and his hands gripping his Martini-Metford so tightly that it took two men to unloose it.

His wife—one of the most beautiful women I have ever seen—and his mother were in the fort and fortunately unharmed. They were made over to some “friendlies,” who were relations of Sailgi, and told an interesting story. When the parley with Donald had broken down early in the day, owing to Sailgi’s refusal to be handcuffed in the presence of his women-folk, and Donald had turned his back on the fort, Sailgi raised his rifle and took aim at Donald, saying, “I have got to die to-day, I may as well have another Faringhi (he probably said Kafir) to my credit.” His mother struck down

the rifle, saying, "No, Sailgi. The Sahib has given you no cause. He has spoken you fair." And Sailgi obeyed. He was a brave man and not without his own sense of honour.

Our success at Gumatti was fortunately completed just before darkness set in. Otherwise our position would have been very precarious; as we should have been sniped all night by Sailgi's sympathisers outside, and he and his band would probably have slipped through our cordon in the darkness.

We encamped in and around the fort during the night and even then were sniped. Davis of the 53rd Sikhs was wounded. Next morning at five o'clock I started off for Bannu with the convoy, bringing in the dead and wounded, including the gallant Tonnochy. He was still conscious, but said no word and died soon after I had left him at Colonel O'Malley's house. As I bicycled up towards Kohat that afternoon I heard the noise of a terrific explosion which sent Gumatti fort "sky high," and announced all along that border that the hand of the Sirkar was as strong as it was long.

As I rode through a hamlet some miles out of Bannu, a fanatical Mullah (priest) shouted to his companion in *Pushtu*—perhaps thinking that I would not hear or understand—"There goes another of the cursed Kafirs (unbelievers)." I was not then in the mood to stand that sort of talk. I swung round, got off my bicycle, and told the Mullah that he must eat his words and put his *pugri* at my feet as an Oriental mark of repentance (doubtless Mr. Montagu would term this "racial humiliation"). The Mullah was defiant, though his companion begged him to ask for forgiveness. He had probably noticed that I was unarmed, having rashly left my revolver behind. I now had to see the thing through at all costs. The Mullah began fumbling in his loose clothes for the long knife that a Bannuchi generally has at hand. I was meditating how to get my blow in first, when fortunately my Pathan police orderly, whom I had outstripped on my bicycle, came galloping up. Seeing the situation, he had drawn his sword. I stopped him from using it, but told him to hold it drawn over the Mullah till the latter had complied with my terms. The Mullah yielded to *force majeure*, put his head on the ground and his *pugri* at my feet



and was relieved that I was content with this sign of repentance and took no further action.

In Bannu, a British official had to be very much on his guard against fanatics and outlaws. Two years later F. P. Rennie, the Deputy-Commissioner, and I were riding through the Marwat tract. Rennie found we were close to the village of a notorious outlaw named Situm, and thought it would be well to make enquiries about him as, while having his headquarters beyond the border, he was supposed to visit his village now and again by stealth. He had in fact recently broken through a cordon of the Border Police and escaped back to the hills. We made a surprise visit to the village. The headmen told us Situm had not been there for weeks and that they had arranged to ambush him and give him up on his next visit. They took us round to see Situm's house, but, fortunately for us, we did not enter, for Situm was inside, armed to the teeth and prepared to sell his life dearly. Two days later we heard that the night after our visit the Border Police had surrounded the house and called on him to surrender. He put up a brave fight, wounded several of them, and finally, when his rifle ammunition had given out and he was driven into the inner courtyard, he dug himself in and defended himself with a dagger and a revolver till he was shot down. His dead body was brought into Bannu while I was still there, for there was a price on his head.

Settlement operations were, for the first time, being carried out in the Tochi Valley, west of Bannu, among the prosperous Dauri tribe, by the Political Agent under my directions. The detailed survey of their rich lands, and the systematic investigation into their resources, were not popular among this tribe—one of the most sullen and fanatical on the Frontier. But we had undertaken not to take more than one-tenth of the produce, a small enough price to pay for the protection afforded against their more martial neighbours. The land is all irrigated from the Tochi River and very valuable. The Hindu shopkeepers and moneylenders under the protection of our regime—the valley was outside the administrative boundary—had begun to acquire rights by mortgage and even

by purchase. This was undesirable for many reasons, and a great tribal *jirga* was held at Idak, to discuss the question whether the sale and mortgage of tribal lands to outsiders should be restricted, as in the Punjab. The Dauris were for some reasons inclined to favour unrestricted transfer, as land was their only form of capital; and if a man wanted to buy a wife or a rifle (the latter was much the more costly) he sold or mortgaged part of his land. I asked the Political Agent to explain to them publicly, in their local *patois*, the evils that had in other places resulted from unrestricted transfer. He dwelt on these in glowing and forcible language. Then, applying his arguments to the particular case, he went on to predict what would happen to the Dauris if they did not impose a restriction. At this point he crashed. He wished to say, "I will play the rôle of prophet and tell you what will happen." But his knowledge of *Pushtu* was not so accurate as I had hoped, and he began: "*Zah paighambar yam*," i.e. "I am *the* Prophet" (Muhammed). The blasphemous words fell like a thunderbolt on the assembly. I believe they expected fire to fall from heaven to consume the impious speaker. I hastily intervened, got him to make a fresh start and renounce the rôle of prophet, true or false. If he were not so well known to and popular with those bigoted Dauris, the effect would have been disastrous.

A year later, when the work was approaching completion, the same Political Agent and I had been spending a morning in going round the rich irrigated lands about the Miranshah Fort. On our way back I proposed that we should ride through the large village of Tappi. The Mohammedan Assistant who was riding with us tried to put us off, saying the village was dirty. I said I had been through many evil-smelling villages in my time and was not going to be put off by this one. The Tahsildar became so insistent that, knowing him well and not wishing to hurt his feelings, I decided to ride round and not through the village. Perhaps it was better so.

Having got into the fort and finished my work, I drove down to Bannu—some forty miles off—that afternoon. Late that evening we heard that a party of *ghazis* (fanatics) from

the evil-smelling village had attacked a party of British officers playing golf outside the fort, had wounded one with a dagger, but had been rounded up by some Dogra sepoy and were laid out by some well-directed blows from a "mashie" before they could carry out their murderous design. There was reason to believe that they had been lying up in the village that morning, and if we had ridden through it we might have met the fate which has befallen so many British officers in the Tochi Valley. Two or three of the fanatics were promptly tried and executed under the Murderous Outrages Regulation. The leader, who had been brought down by a blow from Captain Langhorne, R.A., a man of magnificent physique, explained at his trial, "I thought I was attacking a human being (*insàn*), I did not expect to find myself up against an elephant!"

The settlement work in the beautiful Kurram Valley—also outside British India—proceeded much more smoothly. The Turis, who are the predominant tribe, are Shiah by religion. They are by no means fanatical, and very well disposed to the British Political and Militia officers, who help them to hold their borders against hostile Sunni tribes on two sides and the Amir's subjects on the third. In that grim and generally sterile borderland of harsh rocks and almost impassable mountain ranges, the Kurram Valley nestling under the majestic snow-clad Sufaid Koh (as high as its synonym Mt. Blanc) with its wooded glens, its crystal-clear streams, its luxuriant fruits, and broad expanses of rich cultivation, is regarded as an earthly paradise rivalling Kashmir.

Lord Roberts drove out the Afghan conquerors in 1879, and had his headquarters here for some months while preparing for his famous march on Kabul over the Peiwar Kotal. The site of his temporary house is still pointed out.

Having no British officer available for the settlement work, and knowing how difficult it would be for a Mohammedan official to keep clear of the local factions, I decided to appoint a Brahmin from the Punjab, Pandit Ganga Sahai, in whose judgment and integrity I had full confidence. The appointment, though much criticised at the time, proved to be a

complete success. The Pandit acquired an enormous influence over the people by reason of his straightness and impartiality, and though our first survey-parties were fired upon in some of the remote glens, the work was thereafter carried out without a hitch.

One morning, being in camp with the Pandit at the foot of the Peiwar Kotal—the pass leading into Afghanistan—I decided to scale it and see how Roberts had fought his way through. We started off with a few men of the Kurram Militia as guides and escort. I was quicker up hill than the Pandit and got to the top alone. While wandering round and trying to pick out the topography with a map, I suddenly found myself surrounded by a party of Afghan soldiers. They told me I was their prisoner, having trespassed over the boundary. My remonstrances and plea that the violation of the boundary, which was not marked, was a pure accident, produced no effect. They talked of taking me away to an Afghan fort some miles off, where I should await orders from Kabul—an affair of weeks. I said to them, “You and your people come across *our* border every day into Parachinar and other places without let or hindrance, and yet if a British official steps across *your* boundary it is a crime! and the Amir is proud to call himself our ally!” This line of argument did more harm than good. Fortunately at this stage the Pandit and my Militia escort came on the scene. We then made it clear to the Afghans, who would have been quite reasonable but for a Persian-speaking Kabuli of the Effendi type, that if they made any more fuss every Afghan within the Kurram Valley—and there were many—would at once be put under arrest. This argument, backed by my armed Turi escort, prevailed, and I was released from Afghan custody.

The incident is trivial, but the moral is clear, namely, that in dealing with bullies the threat of effective retaliation is more effective than the arguments of high diplomacy. I bore this in mind in dealing with the Afghan immigrants, who were terrorising the North Punjab in 1915 and 1916. Taking advantage of the absence of the local manhood, who had flocked to the colours, these bands, who come down annually

in tens of thousands ostensibly for honest purposes, such as trading in cloth and cattle, or taking contracts for earth-work, began to plunder and rob on a wholesale scale. We had to devise prompt and drastic measures for dealing with this terrorism. The first was to post guards on the bridges and main ferries across the Indus to prevent the entrance into the Punjab of any Afghans who could not prove that they had legitimate business; the next was to round up all the suspicious bands in the Punjab, to call on them to show that they were pursuing only legitimate objects, and to deport across the Indus all those who could not do so or furnish satisfactory security. The third was to make it known that if any section committed a serious offence, not only would they be severely punished, but in future years all members of that section would be excluded from the hospitality of the Punjab. The result of these measures was to bring about a hasty exodus of most of the Afghans from the Province. This created difficulties for the Frontier Province, and the Chief Commissioner represented that my action was irritating the Afghans and would antagonise the Amir.

My reply was that my first duty was to protect the people of my own Province, especially the relatives of those who had come forward in tens of thousands to fight for us, and that I was sure our loyal ally, the Amir Habibullah, would not resent measures taken against any evildoers among his subjects. There the matter ended. In the following winter such Afghans as were admitted behaved, not as swashbuckling bullies—a favourite *pose* of theirs in British India and often used to inspire fear and levy blackmail on a timid people—but in a chastened spirit, befitting outsiders allowed to enjoy the amenities of a friendly neighbour on condition of good behaviour.

I am afraid the anxiety of the Simla Foreign Office to conciliate Afghan sentiment led in a few years to the resumption of our old-time attitude of fawning on the Afghans. This feeling culminated in the Treaty of 1921, which weakly condoned the treacherous Afghan aggression of May, 1919—intended to synchronise with the Indian rebellion of April,

1919—and enabled the vainglorious Afghans to boast, and with some reason, all over Asia, that it was they, not we, who had won the last Afghan War.

Much of my time on the Frontier was taken up with irrigation schemes. Those divided themselves into two categories—the rough but fairly efficient indigenous systems, constructed by the tribes or the Afghan Governors prior to our rule and worked by the people themselves under official supervision, and the great irrigation works, such as the Swat and Kabul River Canals in Peshawar and the Paharpur Canal from the Indus in Dera Ismail Khan, constructed by our irrigation officers within the present generation and worked entirely by Government agency. There was great room for the improvement of the indigenous and the extension of the State Canals. The bold scheme for the construction of the Upper Swat Canal by tapping the Swat River near Chakdarra in the Swat Valley, and bringing the water on to the northern half of the Peshawar district by a tunnel, over a mile long, through the Malakand Range, was then being worked out by that great irrigation expert, Sir John Benton. It was an ambitious and costly project (the estimate was, I think, about one and a half millions sterling) and I was responsible for the forecast of revenue results, on which superior authority had to decide whether the scheme would be a paying proposition. This work entailed many visits to the Swat Valley, where I came into close touch with the Yusufzai Maliks of Aladand, Thana, and Chakdarra, and found the tribal system working with full vigour. Generally speaking, under the rather loose tribal organisations along the Frontier, there being no strong central authority to punish murder, robbery, and lesser breaches of the tribal law by death or imprisonment (for there are no gaols), every offence can be compounded for by a money payment. Thus, for killing a man there is a scale of blood-money (like the *wehrgelt* of the Anglo-Saxons), varying from tribe to tribe, but generally between six hundred and two thousand Kabuli rupees. The life of a woman is, as a rule, worth half that of a man. But the Yusufzais of Swat had such a strong tribal organisation, that their *jirgas* (tribal councils) after trial and conviction did

not hesitate to impose and carry out the death sentence for murder, and even for lesser offences in very heinous cases.

In Swat, there was an interesting survival of a naked form of Communism, in fact the capital levy in an extreme form. All the cultivated lands, and even the habitations, were thrown into the melting-pot once in a generation and redistributed among all the adult males, the tribal headmen (Maliks) receiving an extra share. This was to prevent individuals from enriching themselves unduly at the expense of their weaker brethren, and thus to maintain the Pathan idea of democratic equality.

But the system (known as the Vesh) was fatal to all improvement. In the great village of Thana, with its rich soil and abundant irrigation, there was not a single fruit tree or a tree of any size on the cultivated lands, and the Maliks explained that no man would plant a tree on his land or improve his dwelling because, at the next redistribution, he would have to give up both his fields and his house.

In fact they had themselves come to recognise that the old custom was fatal to any material improvement and had decided to abolish it *in toto*, in favour of the system of full and separate proprietary rights universal among their neighbours on both sides of the border.

Another survival of this system of "shifting severalty" I met with among a section of the Marwat tribe in Bannu. They held several thousands of acres of dry but fertile sandy land, which it was impossible to irrigate from wells or canals, and in which no trees of any value would grow. But with a well-distributed rainfall of eight to ten inches yearly, it yielded excellent crops of wheat, barley, and gram. They also had adhered to an old tribal custom of redistribution, with the consent of the majority of the shareholders, once in a generation. Such a redistribution had been decided upon in 1905 when the settlement was in progress, and they asked that our agency should carry it out. The matter was simple enough except in one respect.

The principle of division was *kbula vesh*, or by mouths; that is an equal share for every mouth—man, woman, or child,

even the child in the womb being taken into account ! One result of this was that for a few years before the redistribution every man married all the wives he could purchase and there was an abnormal increase in the birth-rate. But delicate questions arose over claims on behalf of the unborn child, and I am not quite clear whether these were adjudicated upon by a *jirga* of Marwat matrons. However, we carried out the division with complete success among over two thousand "mouths." The people spoke with a certain affection of their quaint old custom. But here, too, it was significant that, having completed the redistribution, they decided unanimously that it should be the last. One might commend these instances of the repudiation of Communist principles in favour of the New Economic Policy, now found inevitable even in Communist Russia, to the Fabian Society and the advocates of Communism.

One of the new projects I had to examine was that for the irrigation from the Kaitu River of the Sheratala Plain around Spinwam in tribal territory between Thal and Idak. The route is even now dangerous for a British officer, though I believe a military road has been constructed along it to connect the Tochi and Kurram Agencies. I was offered a guard of Kohat Border Police, but thought I would be safer under an escort of local tribesmen. One Kipit, a noted Wazir outlaw, offered his services for the journey of some thirty miles, involving a halt for the night at that very "hot" spot Spinwam, where I was to have a parley with the tribes interested in the scheme. After crossing the Kurram at Thal into tribal areas we rode for some miles parallel with the river on our left. When we came close to some hamlets near the river, Kipit shifted his position from my left to my right. I asked him why. He replied with a twinkle in his eye, "There are people in those hamlets none too friendly to me ; they may even now be lying up for me. But if I put you between me and them, they may think twice about firing and perhaps killing a sahib." This was not encouraging for me, but his argument was doubtless sound. Anyhow, we got to Spinwam safely, and after a protracted and rather heated discussion



with the tribesmen that night and next morning, I arrived in Idak, much to the relief of the Political Agent there. The scheme did not then materialise, because some of the tribesmen looked on it with suspicion as intended not so much to benefit them, as it undoubtedly would, as to give the Sirkar a *locus standi* in their midst. They were encouraged in this belief by the Bannu people lower down, who feared that any extension of irrigation beyond the border would reduce their supply. It was the Sudan and Egypt on a small scale. The next time I met my friend Kipit was a year later. He was then in the lock-up at Thal charged with raiding and dacoity, and I fear got a sentence of transportation on the finding of a *jirga*.

In a state of society where the hereditary blood-feud was an accepted institution and violent crime prevalent, but where the criminal could often count on immunity because—though most people could point him out—no one would dare to give evidence openly, the *jirga* system was a most valuable adjunct to the more formal processes of the regular courts. It worked roughly as follows. When the police, for one reason or another, failed in the case of a serious crime to obtain evidence that would satisfy a regular court, the District Magistrate could make over the enquiry to a Council of Elders (*jirga*), composed of the leading men of the locality, or from outside if local feeling ran high. This Council made a local enquiry in their own way, partly secret, partly public, recorded statements without being bound by the strict rules of evidence, heard what the accused and his witnesses had to say, and, like a British jury, came to a definite finding as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. It was then open to the District Magistrate, who in this respect had a wider discretion than the British Judge, after hearing the accused, to accept the *jirga*'s finding, and if this meant conviction to pass a sentence up to fourteen years' imprisonment in very heinous cases. If he disagreed, he could discharge the accused, or order further enquiry by the same *jirga* or by a new *jirga*. The system was very elastic and on the whole worked successfully, provided that the District Magistrate knew his men, and the *jirga* did

their work thoroughly and honestly. For they could often tap sources of information not available to the police. The accused if convicted had a right of appeal to the Chief Commissioner.

A case came before me, when acting as Chief Commissioner, which well illustrates the merits and defects of the system. A man, whom I will call "Z," had been found murdered on a mountain-side just inside the British boundary. The police could get no clue and the case was made over to a *jirga*. They made a careful local enquiry which proved to the satisfaction of themselves and of the District Magistrate that the actual murderer was "A." They found that "A" had been paid Rs.100 to kill "Z," had laid up for him close to the boundary, intending to shoot him when he had crossed into the tribal area (where British writs did not run), but, finding a good target on our side of the boundary, had been tempted to shoot. He killed his man, but, unwisely for him, did not move the body across the border line. "A" was sentenced to fourteen years' transportation, and in rejecting his appeal I directed that endeavours should be made to trace the man who had hired him for the murder. That enquiry was taken up by the same *jirga*, but they apparently thought they had done enough, and reported that they could get no further clue. The District Magistrate appointed a new and stronger *jirga*. They brought fresh energy into the enquiry and, after much delay, found that a man "B" had hired "A" to murder "Z." "B," it appeared, had taken a contract from some third party unknown to murder "Z" for Rs.300, but he sublet the contract to "A" for Rs. 100, and had himself stood out. "B" was in turn duly convicted and sentenced. Neither "A" nor "B" had any personal motive to murder "Z." I then ordered that the unknown party who had hired "B" to murder "Z" and who probably had a blood feud with "Z" should be traced. The *jirga* tried again but reported failure. Another and even stronger *jirga* was appointed, but with the same result. It was now clear that we were up against some very powerful local influence screening the unknown party, whom I will call "C." Anyhow, the *jirga's*

investigations were fruitless, and the police enquiry had already been ruled out of court. So the matter ended.

But a year later when out shooting in that locality, as the result of a few casual enquiries and subtle hints, I was able to make a shrewd guess as to "C's" identity. He was one of the biggest men in the locality. Under the ordinary law none of the three criminals could have been brought to justice. The *jirga* system enabled us to punish severely, if not adequately, two of them.

A great feature in the Frontier districts was, and is, the tribal aristocracy of local Chiefs, known as Nawabs, Khans, Arbabs (lords), Maliks, Tumandars, beginning with the Saiyids of Kaghan and the Nawab of Amb in the extreme north, and ending with the Nawabs of Dera and the Tumandars of the Usterana (Baluch) tribe on the extreme south. They were, on the whole, a splendid body of men, of strong character and proved loyalty. They held large grants of land revenue-free in return for their services, and supplied many excellent officials to the civil administration, the police, the Border Police, and the various Militia Corps. They had been a great source of strength to the Administration from the days of Edwards, Nicholson, the Lawrences, and Abbott, when their loyal support not only kept the Frontier quiet, but sent forth thousands of hardy tribesmen in the famous Corps of Guides and other new military formations to recapture Delhi and reconquer Hindustan. They were, like the Tiwana Chiefs of Shahpur, proud of their fine record in the Mutiny, in the Afghan wars and the Frontier campaigns, and one could not but sympathise with their frequent complaint that their influence was steadily diminishing under a system of administration which dealt more and more with the individual tribesman direct rather than through the tribal Chief. The process may have been inevitable—though I think we hastened it unduly—but it has certainly increased the difficulties of Frontier administration. In Baluchistan, which came under our rule thirty years later, we have continued to work through the tribal Chiefs or Tumandars, whose position among a people of marked feudal traditions has always been stronger than that

of the Khans of the more democratic Pathans. But the Baluchistan or Sandeman system (from the name of its most brilliant exponent) has undoubtedly been a great success in Baluchistan. Whether that method could have been applied with success to the Pathans of the North-West Frontier is a question on which the rival schools of thought will always differ.

The frequent interviews (*mulakât*) with the Frontier notables took up a great part of one's time. But one learned much from them. An hour's talk with a few Frontier Khans gave a clearer vision of the realities of Indian life and administration than a day's listening to the platitudes of down-country orators in the Assembly. The Brahmin or Kayasth, with his advocate's training, may make a brilliant speech in faultless English. But it is purely critical and barren of any constructive proposal, for he has behind him neither traditions of rule nor administrative experience. The Frontier Chief (though, as a rule, he does not know a word of English) and his Punjab compeer have both; and if and when the opportunity comes, the down-country orator will learn this to his cost. But there is one point in common. In each case the speaker generally has an *arz*, an axe of his own to grind; but even allowing for that the frank courtesy, *bonhomie*, and hospitality of these Frontier Chiefs were very attractive.

One of the greatest was the late Nawab of Amb who, like a Colossus, bestrode the mighty Indus. On the extreme north he was an independent Chief fighting for existence or aggrandisement with his turbulent neighbours, the Chagharzais, Amazais, etc.; on the south he was a great feudal Chief, under British sovereignty, of a tract as large as a small British county.

I visited him at Darband on the Indus in the early summer of 1905, having worked my way up along the tortuous mountain paths with an armed escort. The old man was then stricken with the paralysis which killed him a few years later, but he had the keen eye and the clear brain of a man accustomed to rule. He asked me to breakfast. We discussed Frontier matters generally and especially his own affairs. While we were there his son, the present Nawab, came in hot-foot

from the other side of the river where a pitched battle was raging between the Nawab's men and (I think) the Amazais. He came for reinforcements and went off with them. A little later the Nawab suggested delicately that it would help matters if my armed escort were to show themselves on the other side of the river. From an Oriental standpoint the request was not unreasonable, for the Nawab was our loyal feudatory and in a way entitled to our support. At the same time it was not desirable that we should be drawn into inter-tribal feuds trans-border, and I had politely to decline on the ground that I had not the necessary authority, which was true. Before I left for my own tents a tray of sweetmeats was brought in for my delectation. I rarely touch sweets, but from curiosity took up one of some twenty slabs of what appeared to be butter-scotch, wrapped in gold-foil instead of the ordinary silver-foil. The slab was unusually heavy, and on looking at it more closely I saw that it was a solid bar of gold, stamped, I think, as of the value of twenty sovereigns. I told the Nawab that I had no use for sweetmeats of any kind, least of all of this kind. Probably it was meant as a *nazar* (ceremonial gift) to be touched and remitted. For I do not think the Nawab was so foolish as to believe that any British official would have been open to an "illegal gratification" (the Anglo-Indian legal euphemism for a bribe). But not one Oriental in a thousand even to-day regards bribery in the same light as we do.

The Frontier Chiefs, as a rule, exercised a large measure of independent jurisdiction in pre-British days. Under our administration they are often invested in certain areas with civil, criminal, and revenue powers, proportionate to their capacity and influence. In the exercise of those powers some of them are apt to revert to the old traditions.

One old Nawab of high lineage was reputed to be particularly disposed to stand on the ancient ways. It was my duty to explain to him delicately, but effectively, that he must mend his ways. The old gentleman, however, made no attempt to beat about the bush. In effect he said frankly, "My ancestors were independent rulers here. When litigants

wished then to adjudicate upon a dispute, both parties put down a certain sum as *Mibnatàna* or *Nazarana*, i.e. fees for service or offerings to a superior. The dispute was enquired into and a just decision given. Is it for me to depart from the ways of my fathers? I take a fee for my labour from both sides and then decide according to the merits." That argument, though specious, hardly conforms to the Indian popular idea of the just judge as one who takes a "fee" from both sides, decides the case honestly, and returns the "fee" to the unsuccessful party.

I once knew an Indian Judge—also of high family—who even according to Indian notions was notoriously corrupt. His *modus operandi* was this. He took money from both sides, but, when the case was decided, refused to return the money to the unsuccessful party. When pressed by the latter the Judge replied, "You too have received value in exchange. It is true I have decided against you—but I have written such a judgment that if you appeal the decision will surely be in *your* favour."

Nearly all of the Frontier Chiefs were keen riders, and many of them stout sportsmen. There were wild pig in the Indus jungles north of Dera Ismail Khan, and that fine old soldier, the late Nawab Hafiz Mahomed Khan, Honorary Colonel of the Mooltani (15th) Lancers, and Nawab Allah Dadkhan would now and again arrange a "pig-stick" for me. The going was difficult, the jungles were dense, the blind ditches were many, and even when you got well on to your pig, there was always the chance that he would dodge you by taking to the river.

One day we pushed a stout boar into the open, hunted him across the sands and quicksands into a spit of high land with scrub jungle on the banks of the river. I was close on him and gaining steadily, when he disappeared like a flash into a patch of jungle giving on to the river. Galloping on to head him off, I found a man holding on to him by the hind legs. I shouted, "Let him go, he will rip you up." The man let go cleverly and slipped back into the bush. The pig came at me. I speared him and passed on to turn and come at him

again. Meantime Captain —, a young Political Officer who was new to the game, came cantering up leisurely. I shouted to him to put on the pace as the pig was about to charge. It was too late. The pig got in, gored the horse badly, and brought both to the ground. We dispatched the pig after a struggle, and then I turned round to enquire for the brave fellow who had seized and held the pig. He was not to be found for a few minutes. Being a pious Moham-medan, as well as a keen sportsman, he had gone down to the river to wash himself after touching the unclean animal. I gave him a few rupees, but he thought little of what was one of the pluckiest acts I have come across.

In March, 1907, the late Amir of Afghanistan (whose murder at Jelalabad in February, 1919, was probably motived by his staunch adherence to his treaty with us in the Great War) stayed for a few days in Peshawar on his way back from his first and only visit to India. He was a most attractive personality, talked freely of his enjoyment of his visit, and of his desire to repeat it. At the farewell banquet to him at Government House on the eve of his departure he showed no wish to leave and kept us all up till two in the morning. I had a long talk with him. He spoke in Persian while I replied in *Pushtu*, and he laughingly gave his opinion that my attempts at Persian were worse than his in *Pushtu*, which is now, I believe, becoming the State language in Afghanistan. I think it was at this banquet that he showed the keen Afghan sense of humour.

The famous pipers of the Black Watch played during dinner. In the approved fashion they marched round the table, sixteen in number, and almost raised the roof by their volume of sound. Finally as the time came for the loyal toasts, they formed up behind the Amir's chair, and redoubled their efforts as a special compliment to him. Then they slowly filed out. As the stirring strains died away, Sir Harold Deane turned to the Amir and said, "I hope Your Highness liked the pipers. We are very proud of them." The Amir's reply was, "Splendid, magnificent ! but *one* would have been sufficient."

Next morning I left Peshawar for Hyderabad to act as Resident in place of Sir Charles Bayley. I returned to the Frontier from Hyderabad in the summer of 1907, and remained there till I was again appointed to Hyderabad in May, 1908. The spring and summer of 1907 had marked the beginning of serious seditious agitation in the Punjab. The pretext was the passing in the Punjab Legislature, against the advice of most of the Indian Members, of the Colony Bill of 1907, towards the close of Sir Charles Rivaz's term of office. The Bill, though intended to safeguard the respective interests of the Crown and the colonists of Crown lands in Lyallpur, was regarded, and with some reason, as unduly restrictive in some of its provisions. Two notorious agitators, Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh, thought the opportunity a good one to spread their seditious propaganda among the rural classes interested in the Colony, especially the Sikhs, and this led to menacing demonstrations and riots in Lahore, Lyallpur, and Rawal Pindi.

The situation was promptly and firmly dealt with by the new Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Denzil Ibbetson, and Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh were deported to Burma under Regulation III of 1818. This firm action and the prosecution of the "Punjabi" newspaper for sedition knocked the bottom out of the agitation. The Viceroy, Lord Minto, withheld his sanction to the Colony Bill and the agitation died away. It showed, however, how the rural classes, especially the Sikhs, could be worked up into a dangerous ferment by urban agitators who had no real sympathy with them, but desired to antagonise them with the Government. Ibbetson made this clear in a memorable Minute, in which he also showed what a large part members of the Arya Samáj had played in fomenting the trouble.

We stayed with Ibbetson at Lahore during the Christmas holidays of 1907. He was then in the throes of the fell disease which brought him to the grave a few months later; but he showed to the end the same high courage and the same brilliant intellect which had marked him throughout his career.



The spring of 1908 was marked on the Frontier by General Sir James Willcocks's "week end" (Lord Morley had so limited it) expedition against the Zakha Khels of the Khaibar in February, and the more serious operations against the Mohmands in April and May. Under Afghan instigation and the incitements of fanatical Mullahs, the trans-border Mohmands invaded the Peshawar district north of the Swat and Kabul Rivers. They were undoubtedly being assisted by the Mohmand settlers on our side of the border, and threatened Shabkadr and Michni, within twenty miles of Peshawar itself. They were driven back with heavy losses after some fierce fighting close to Matta; but for some days and nights there was considerable though groundless anxiety in Peshawar itself, where the sound of our guns could be clearly heard.

This led to an amusing incident. On the night of 25th April the sound of firing close by was heard. Two of the leading political officials sallied forth in their pyjamas, armed with revolvers, and in a state of serious agitation woke up the Assistant Adjutant-General and asked him to call out the garrison to protect the station. The officer in question told them curtly to go back to bed; the noise, which they thought to be the guns of our force falling back on Peshawar, proceeded from the crackers of a native wedding party!

The next day I was sent out by Deane to the front to see Generals Willcocks and Anderson, and make enquiries as to the assistance being given to the enemy from our side. By that time we had the Mohmands on the run, but my visit obtained for me the Mohmand Medal some years later, through the good offices of Sir James Willcocks.

I left Peshawar early in May to act a second time as Resident in Hyderabad—never to return. A month later, on opening the Indian Reuter's telegrams one morning at Ootacamund, I read that Deane, whom I had left in apparent good health, had had a stroke of paralysis and was compelled to take leave at once. I offered to return and act for him, but was told that Colonel (afterwards Sir George) Roos-Keppel had been appointed; and he held the post with distinction till his retirement in 1919. I had hoped to succeed Deane in the

North-West Frontier in 1909 when he was due to retire; and the selection of Roos-Keppel—a comparatively junior but very able Political Officer—caused some heartburnings to me and others. Deane, like Ibbetson, died within a month or two of getting home. Thus within a few months the Government of India lost the services of two men that could ill be spared, while I lost the two friends for whose character and abilities I had the highest regard. Deane was, in my opinion, the best Frontier officer and Ibbetson the greatest Indian administrator of my official generation.

### *Frontier Policy*

Perhaps before closing this chapter I may offer my views, for what they are worth, on some aspects of the everlasting Frontier problem.

During six and a half years' service on the Frontier I had been brought into close touch with Frontier politics. In 1906 I acted as Chief Commissioner for some months. That gave me a closer knowledge of our methods in dealing with the tribes and of the "political" side of the Administration.

The position then was that the tribes in the northern section of the Frontier from Chitral down to the Kurram, with the exception of the Mohmands whose hostile action in 1907 was the result of Afghan influence and fanatical incitements, were generally peaceful and well disposed. Deane had intimate knowledge of and great personal influence with most of them, and was prompt to take notice of any misconduct on their part. South of the Kurram, down to the Baluchistan border, the Wazir and Mahsud tribes, owing largely to the fanatical influence of certain Mullahs, especially the Mullah Powinda, and the incitements of our Afghan allies, were often hostile. They raided frequently into British territory, and had been guilty of many treacherous and murderous attacks on British officers. The question of how we were to deal with these semi-barbarous and fanatical tribes had, from the time we established our rule trans-Indus, given rise to great diversity of opinion and violent changes of policy. In fact we had not worked out any systematic policy, and had

attempted to "carry on" by a series of makeshift expedients which varied with the character and outlook of the local Political Officers in charge.

All of them rightly recognised that one cause of the Mahsud and Wazir attacks on British territory was the fact that they could not make an honest livelihood in their own barren hills. Hence one Political Officer would press for the grant of lands to them within our border. The land was given, but the Mahsuds made no serious attempt to work it. Another would urge the enrolment of Mahsuds and Wazirs in the local Militia Corps for the protection of the lines of communication, etc. This too was tried; but the Mahsuds and Wazirs sometimes murdered their British officers, or, at the first sign of trouble elsewhere, deserted *en masse*, took away their rifles and became our most dangerous enemies. These wholesale desertions in April-May, 1919, when the Afghan aggression was maturing, have, I believe, done much to stiffen the resistance which in the subsequent Waziristan campaigns cost us so dear.

A new Political Agent would advocate the creation of strong local Chiefs on the Baluchistan model, by granting liberal allowances to certain leading Maliks and thus enabling them to extend their influence. Large sums were granted for these allowances; but the Mahsud democracy resented any attempt to force Chiefs on them, and the latter were soon frozen out.

The next Political Officer, benefiting by the lesson of that failure, would say, "We must deal with the Mahsuds as a tribal democracy and give allowances to every man, or at least every one who carries a rifle." This, too, was tried, but the tribe remained hostile. Another counsel of despair—few expedients were left by now—was to conciliate the Mullah Powinda by appealing to his cupidity. He took our money and bought more rifles to use against us!

Finally came the present policy, which is perhaps more intelligible than any of the above and certainly more costly to start with, but which, if *steadily pursued*, is the most likely to succeed. This is to open up Waziristan by a series of great

military roads, suitable for motor transport, connecting with our military bases at Kohat, Bannu, and Tank ; to establish in the heart of the country a British Cantonment with a strong striking force of regulars, including a considerable Air Force, and to offer the Mahsuds and Wazirs remunerative occupation on road-making and as a local irregular militia for watch-and-ward and maintenance of communications, they and not we providing the arms and equipment.

This policy, though not yet complete, has already succeeded in reducing considerably the Mahsud and Wazir raids into British territory. But it necessarily provokes determined opposition at the start from the malcontent sections of these loosely-organised tribes ; and the danger is that the frequent casualties we are bound to suffer for the first few years may lead to another violent change of policy and the abandonment of what we have gained. It is on this that the malcontent sections, knowing our past vacillation, are counting. They are also undoubtedly receiving support and encouragement, if not from the Afghan Government at Kabul, at least from its local agents, and probably from the Bolshevik emissaries who, since 1919, have been active among the Frontier tribes.

I can now lay claim to no inside knowledge, but I have followed Frontier developments closely for over twenty years. It has always appeared to me that the root difficulty, which we have never squarely faced, is the fact that the Waziristan, and indeed the whole Frontier, question is mainly an Afghan question. The Mahsuds and Wazirs are in closer touch with the adjoining Afghan authorities than the tribes further north ; their hostility to us is largely the result of incitement and support from that side, and when pressed by us they have an easy line of retreat into Afghanistan.

The Afghans, in the past at least, have, regardless of the Durand line, used the Frontier tribes as a lever to raise up troubles for us by working on their ignorance, their fanaticism, and their cupidity ; and the extraordinary peace terms we settled with the Amir after the 1919 campaign have led the tribes to think that our power is on the wane and that of the Amir in the ascendant. Till we succeed in eliminating Afghan

intrigue among the tribes on our side of the Durand line, and especially among the Mahsuds and Wazirs, we shall have no real peace on the Frontier and least of all in Waziristan. But if we put a stop to that intrigue, and to the dangerous Bolshevik propaganda which is often behind it, as we can and should, by pursuing a firm, open, and consistent policy with Afghanistan and the tribes, our present method of pacifying Waziristan, *if steadily pursued*, must succeed as surely as Russia, fifty years ago, succeeded in pacifying the Caucasus by her great military roads and well-placed garrisons. The measure is not one of annexation or Imperial expansion, but one essential for the protection of our Indian fellow-subjects on both sides of the Indus, who have been the chief sufferers from our past blunders.

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## CHAPTER VIII

HYDERABAD, DECCAN (1907-9)

THE transfer from Peshawar to Hyderabad involved a journey of some two thousand miles to the other end of India, roughly about the distance from Petrograd to Rome; the difference in climate, social and political conditions was equally marked.

I had no previous experience as representative of the British Government in a Native State—and Hyderabad is by far the greatest—for in Rajputana I was a British official lent to the States to do State work.

I was therefore poorly equipped for my new duties. But the kindly advice and instruction I received from Sir Charles Bayley, the recognised *doyen* of the Political Department, for whom I was acting during my two years in Hyderabad, and from his First Assistant Major (now Col. Sir) T. W. Haig, gave me a good start. These were supplemented by the admirable memoranda of Colonel Sir David Barr, the most distinguished Political Officer of that generation. He had been Resident at Hyderabad from 1900 to 1905, and had been most successful in cultivating friendly relations with the late Nizam and his Government, and in paving the way for the settlement by Lord Curzon and the Nizam of the big outstanding question of the Berars, which after twenty years is now being reopened. Above all, I found the late Nizam and his Ministers, and his invaluable Political Secretary, Nawab Sir Faridun Jang, most courteous and considerate in all official matters. Socially, Faridun Jang and Colonel Sir Afsur-ul-Mulk, the Military Secretary, and his capable and sporting sons, did much to promote those happy relations between the Hyderabad aristocracy and officials and the large British element, including

the garrison of Secunderabad, the largest cantonment in India, which have generally been such a pleasing feature in Hyderabad.

The late Nizam, His Highness Mahbub Ali Khan, was of a shy and retiring disposition, small in stature but erect and dignified, a true and honourable gentleman, slow to make a promise or a decision, but, once made, unflinching in adhering to it.

After I had got over his natural reserve the Nizam was friendly and communicative. I saw a good deal of him apart from official interviews and entertainments; he liked the society of Europeans whom he knew and in conversation showed both insight and humour. Once after a big dinner at the Palace the discussion turned on the new quasi-democratic constitution in Persia. Persia had a special interest for Hyderabad, as several of the great nobles were Shiahs by religion, like the Persians, and there was an aroma of Persian culture still lingering in Hyderabad society. Indeed the Nizam himself used to write *ghazals* (odes) in Persian as well as in Urdu.

On this occasion I asked him his opinion of the new Persian Parliament or Majlis. He promptly replied, "It will be a *majlis* (gathering) of *mainas* (chattering birds); they will do nothing but chatter."

Later, when the Committee of Union and Progress, under Enver Pasha, set to work to curtail Abdul Hamid's autocracy and establish a reformed Turkey in which *their* will should prevail, we were discussing the future results freely at a dinner at the Residency. Some of the Hyderabad nobles and officials, like most people in England at the time, saw in the movement the possible regeneration of Turkey. The Nizam, who was naturally conservative, when appealed to by me to express his view, said with great deliberation, "Those people (the Committee of Union and Progress) will begin by ruining the Sultan, then they will ruin Turkey; and they may end (God forbid) by injuring Islam." These words made a deep impression on me. Many will say that they were prophetic; but all will agree that the present Nizam has shown a gracious and kindly feeling in recently granting a liberal allowance of £4000 yearly to the last of the Sultan Khalifas, who has been

driven like a criminal by the present Turkish Republic from the land of his fathers, despoiled and disinherited.

Though Islam was the State religion in Hyderabad, the Government showed the greatest toleration for and extended its support to all creeds. Nine-tenths of the population of 13 millions being Hindus, many Hindu temples and shrines naturally benefited by State endowments ; but many Christian churches and institutions were also subsidised. The chaplain of the Anglican Church in Hyderabad received a salary from the State, and a most deserving institution which the " Little Sisters of the Poor " maintained for the aged poor of all denominations in Secunderabad also received substantial support. In the State service no distinction was made, racial or religious.

In my time the Prime Minister, Maharaja Sir Kishan Parshad, a most courteous, kindly, and cultivated gentleman, was a Hindu, but I think one of his wives was a Mohammedan ; the Political Secretary was a Parsee ; the two Ministers were Mohammedans, both I think Shiah ; while the ruling family was Sunni. The heads of the Finance, Revenue, and Police Departments were European experts who had served in or been lent from the British service.

At that time the post of Director of Public Instruction fell vacant owing to the retirement of that cultured scholar Sir Sayad Hosain, afterwards a member of the India Council in London. The Nizam asked me to make enquiries from adjoining British Provinces, and suggest a man for the post. I suggested that a Mohammedan would be preferable, but asked what manner of man His Highness desired. The Nizam replied with some spirit : " Sahib ! the man I want is the man who will serve me and my Government best. I care not whether he be Mohammedan, Hindu, or European." It was a fine broad expression of policy. The man whom I finally suggested, and who was appointed, was a British Educational Officer from an adjoining Province.

The following episode illustrates that old-fashioned courtesy once so characteristic of India, but now, alas ! under the vulgarising influence of politics and racial or sectarian strife,



becoming a thing of the past, except in the highest or among the lowest.

The finals of a polo tournament were being played in the Fateh Maidan (Plain of Victory) between the famous Golconda team and the 13th Hussars. The Grand Stand was packed with spectators. I was sitting next to the Nizam, and one of his high officials was on the other side. An English lady, the wife of a State official of no great importance, entered and looked round for a seat. No one moved. The Nizam saw her, and with a bow, at once invited her to a seat next his own.

It was this natural courtesy, even when there were differences as regards policy, that made the transaction of business between the Residency and the Nizam's Government so smooth. One had sometimes to complain of the delays inherent in every Oriental administration, sometimes of inadequate information, but never of the tone or temper of the correspondence. There was only one exception in my time. There was a long-standing controversy over some financial adjustments regarding the revenue of Secunderabad town and Cantonment which the British Government held from the Nizam under some form of perpetual lease.

I received a letter from the Nizam's Government which seemed to question the *bonâ fides* of the British Government, and in doing so used language quite different from the traditional courteous form of expression. I kept the letter till the Political Secretary who had signed it came to see me.

I showed it to him, remarking, "Your Government seems to be starting a new tone in correspondence. It would be easy for me to demolish your arguments in even stronger language, but *cui bono*?" I knew the letter could not have been drafted by the suave and courtly Faridun Jang, though signed by him, and wished to elicit who was responsible for the intemperate language. Faridun Jang, very rightly, would not give this away and took the responsibility on himself. But eventually I was satisfied that a British official in the service of the Nizam's Government, more Mogul than the Moguls, was responsible for the wording, that the Political Secretary had

endeavoured to tone it down, that the British official was insistent, and so the offending letter went through. However, Faridun Jang was only too glad to take it back and substitute for it one which lost nothing by being temperately expressed.

A few years later, as Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, I was able to make use of my Hyderabad experience. A letter from an important Mahratta State was forwarded by the Political Officer, of which the tone and language appeared to me most offensive. I returned it to the Political Officer, who should not have sent it on, to be sent back to the State office with the remark that I had never received a letter couched in such terms from the premier State in British India, and was not prepared to receive one from a lesser State. Within a week I had a visit from the Ruler, who honourably took all responsibility on himself, though he probably had not seen through the subtle innuendoes of his Mahratta Brahmin secretary. I agreed that the letter should be treated as a "dead" one, and an unobjectionable one sent in its place.

The Resident at Hyderabad had to administer the area under British jurisdiction, with a population of about one hundred and fifty thousand, embracing Secunderabad Cantonment and the crowded bazaars which hemmed in the Residency on three sides. For these areas there were separate Regulations and separate officials. In the hot weather most people slept in the open, and sleep was impossible till long past midnight, owing to the continuous noise of musical (!) instruments and the singing from temples and festive gatherings. When I suggested that these should cease at 11 p.m., the Magistrate and the Police Officer said they were afraid they had no power to pass such an order. Though no lawyer, I pride myself on knowing enough law to avoid breaking it (though not enough to know how to break it with impunity), and I told them that the Regulation, if they studied it carefully, gave them the necessary power. They soon found that it was so, and the midnight noises ceased in our area, though there was at first some grumbling at the restriction.

This quiet on our side, however, only made more audible the intermittent bursts of sound from the city side. I discovered that the chief offender was one of the great nobles, who carried his feudal traditions so far, that throughout the night his family bards every two hours used to proclaim *urbi et orbi* in stentorian tones with full musical accompaniment his honours, titles, and the great deeds of himself and his ancestors. It was a delicate matter to suggest any limitation to this quaint old custom. But after a few sleepless nights, I managed to convey a hint to the city Commissioner of Police, and the feudal magnate, with true Mogul courtesy, sacrificed the strident recital of his greatness on the altar of sleep.

In 1908-9 motoring had come into favour in India, and the Nizam had a fleet of some thirty cars. The head chauffeur was an Englishman and an expert driver. To please his master's desire for rapid movement, he now and then outrageously exceeded all speed limits, not realising how Orientals prefer to walk in the middle of the road, and how slow they are to move out of it. An old Indian woman, who was slow to hear or to move, was run over and killed one day by the Nizam's car. His Highness was much distressed and sent a generous gift to the family.

According to the local wits, whenever the Nizam drove out thereafter there was much difficulty in clearing the roads of the aged poor, who had been put in the way by their relatives. That was in the Nizam's territory.

In British jurisdiction I received several complaints from the military authorities of the dangerous pace at which the Nizam's motor was driven through cantonments, especially at dusk. It was a delicate matter to handle. I dropped a few hints to the Nizam that motoring ceases to be a pleasure when the pace exceeded twenty or twenty-five miles. Still the complaints continued.

I then decided to tackle the trouble at the source. One day at some function I saw the Nizam's car and the English chauffeur. I called the latter aside, complimented him on his skill, and said I hoped he had not had any more casualties.

I then told him that I had many complaints of the pace at which he drove through cantonments, and I ended :

“ It’s no affair of mine whether you kill people in the Nizam’s territory. But if you kill anyone in my jurisdiction—by heavens ! I’ll hang you.”

Thereafter the complaints ceased.

Communal tension was unknown in Hyderabad, and generally in Native States, in those days ; for the political agitator who stirs up creed against creed, class against class, and incites his ignorant dupes to defiance of authority, was not tolerated at all, or not to the same extent as in British India.

But, as the Indian Princes are now realising, the habitual appeals to sectarian and class feeling, which have in recent years caused so much bloodshed in British India, must have inevitable reactions in their States. It is therefore with regret, if not with surprise, one reads of the serious riots (August, 1924) at the important city of Gulbarga in the Nizam’s Dominions.

This is a strong Hindu centre and under the influence of the powerful Brahmins of Sholapur and Poona. The Hindus apparently were led to believe that the Nizam’s subordinate Mohammedan officials, especially in the police, were encouraging the low-caste or out-caste Hindus to embrace Islam. Sectarian feeling blazed up. The Mohammedan Inspector of Police was murdered by a mob of fanatical Hindus, some of them armed. The Mohammedans fiercely retaliated ; every one of the fifty Hindu temples in Gulbarga was attacked and many wrecked or burned, while all the idols were broken. There was much bloodshed until State troops and machine-guns hastily dispatched from headquarters arrived on the scene and repressed the disorder, which each side now accuses the other of fomenting. It is significant that both parties desired an investigation by a British official.

On the 27th and 28th September, 1908, occurred at Hyderabad the disastrous flood in the Moosi River, which laid low over twenty thousand houses adjoining the river, and claimed some ten thousand victims.

Fourteen inches of rain had fallen on the 26th and 27th. The great irrigation tanks, intended to hold up the precious water, nearly all burst, and their floods poured down into and choked the already swollen Moosi. It overflowed its banks both on the Residency and the city sides, swept away or seriously damaged all the bridges connecting the two, flooded at least half of Hyderabad City causing immense damage to life and property, but left the Residency area, which is higher, comparatively unharmed.

I was twelve miles away at the Bolarum Residency when the news arrived early on the morning of the 28th, and at once started to motor down to the Chaddar-ghat Residency, which lies close to the river bank. Half-way down where the road runs over the dam of the great Hosain Sagar tank (which if it gave way, as was feared, would have completed the ruin of Hyderabad) we were held up by the floods; the water was dashing in great waves over the dam, and if this continued for long the dam must inevitably give way. We got on to a railway engine and made our way to the Residency with difficulty. The scene that met one there is almost indescribable. A roaring torrent, nearly a mile wide, was sweeping over part of the Residency area and what had once been the city of Hyderabad. Thousands of houses had been swept away, part of the great city wall had gone, and houses were still falling in every direction.

Human beings clinging to their belongings, cattle, carts, were being swept down by the ruthless flood. All communication with the city side had been cut off. We organised relief parties as quickly as possible, and rescued many people in boats and punts, though in mid-stream no boat could live. The water was five feet above the Chaddar-ghat Bridge, and had risen to ten feet up the Empress Gate of the Residency. The offices and the escort lines were flooded, the inner walls of the Assistant Resident's house had collapsed, several of the most confidential records were swept away, but were recovered later. An ox and cart had been deposited half-way up a high tree in the Residency park.

Fortunately, by this time the flood had begun to recede

and rapidly went down. We were able with some difficulty to rescue the servants from the Assistant Resident's house by joining hands and forming a line through the flood.

Among them was an old woman, the mother of a *syce* (groom), who had clung on to her little possessions to the last. When brought to a place of safety she wept bitterly, saying, "What was the good of rescuing me when you left my shoes behind?"

Late that night I went back to the Bolarum Residency as Chaddar-ghat was uninhabitable. Next morning, in the course of my ride, it occurred to me to have a look at the Jedi Mutla Dam—the embankment which holds up the waters of a great artificial lake for the water supply of Secunderabad. To my horror I found that three leaks had started and were rapidly extending. The breach of this dam would precipitate an enormous volume of water into the still greater Hosain Sagar Lake, probably cause the dam to burst, and thus complete the destruction of Hyderabad City and a large portion of Secunderabad—with a total population of half a million. A loyal little Hindu sub-overseer—Durga Parshad by name—with a dozen coolies was trying to stop the breaches! It had not occurred to him to ask for help. I galloped back to Bolarum Cantonment, found Major Harbord, a Staff Officer, on his way to office, and asked him to turn out all the Sappers and other troops available to tackle the breaches. Within an hour, Colonel Hardy of the 97th Deccan Infantry had all his battalion under way; Sappers and other units followed. General Sir F. Campbell, commanding the station, with Colonel Hardy, spent the day on the dam with a couple of thousand men; expert engineers were called in; tens of thousands of sandbags were crammed into the breaches; thousands of tons of stone were dropped in to strengthen the weak places; the troops worked like Trojans, and at the end of three days the breaches were closed and the dam made secure, at least for the time being.

Next day, 30th, I went over some of the devastated areas—an appalling scene of misery and desolation. The stench from the dead animals and rotting grain was overpowering; seven

hundred human corpses had already been dug out of the ruins, and many who had been immured by the collapse of their houses were still being rescued. I had heard that the Nizam and his Government were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the catastrophe. It was essential to start organised relief measures at once for the houseless and starving population. Communication with the city by boat had by this time been restored, and I wanted to see the Nizam as soon as possible. He was at first reluctant to see anyone; but when he heard that I wished to convey a message of sympathy and an offer of assistance from the Viceroy—Lord Minto—he at once assented.

I saw him that afternoon. When I arrived he was booted and spurred, ready, as he put it, to ride round and see the state of his people. I gave him the Viceroy's message, which cheered him, and also offered him the services of the British troops in clearing the debris, extricating corpses, rescuing those who were still alive, and protecting the property which was lying exposed and unclaimed. He was most grateful for this offer, and at once accepted it. At the same time, in view of the appalling extent of the catastrophe I obtained his sanction to my appealing to the Sheriffs of Bombay and Calcutta to start Relief Funds, and to my holding a meeting for the same purpose jointly with his leading officials and the British Civil and Military Authorities in Secunderabad. All these appeals met with a prompt and generous response, the Viceroy and Countess of Minto being among the first to show their practical sympathy.

Within a few days, relief measures were organised on an efficient basis; as many as twenty thousand destitute people were fed at the relief kitchens, while tens of thousands were assisted in their homes. The Nizam's Government were most generous in their grants of relief; but the prompt assistance received from British India was of enormous value in stimulating their efforts.

For the next few weeks I used often to accompany the Minister, and occasionally the Nizam himself, in their visits to the scenes of desolation. The stricken people bore their sufferings with pathetic resignation. They were heartened by the

practical sympathy shown to them and the prompt measures taken for their temporary accommodation—over one hundred thousand were homeless—pending the clearing of the ruins and rebuilding of their houses.

The calamity showed how strong is the tie that binds together the British Government and its “faithful ally”—the Nizam. Never was this made clearer than when Turkey joined our enemies in November, 1914. The present Nizam, the leading Mohammedan and the Ruler of the Premier State in India, issued a most timely manifesto exhorting all Indian Mohammedans not to be shaken in their allegiance to the King-Emperor and his Government.

The months of October and November following the floods were very unhealthy, though we escaped the threatened epidemic. By the end of November I was fairly worn out. I began, for the first time, to suffer from malaria, and was glad, when Sir Charles Bayley came back, to run home on leave early in December.

A winter in Tipperary, with three days' hunting a week, soon set me up. While at home I had an interview with Lord Morley, then Secretary of State for India, at the India Office. He discussed Indian and other affairs very freely. He regarded the prosecution of Tilak in the previous autumn by Lord Sydenham's Government in Bombay (which ended in his conviction and a sentence of six years' imprisonment) as a mistake and likely to make Tilak a martyr. I ventured to differ with him, pointing out that it was a question whether Tilak or the British Government was to rule in the Deccan. Knowing Lord Morley's acquaintance with Irish politics, I likened Tilak's power to Parnell's in his zenith, only Tilak was infinitely more anti-British. Morley said he had found Parnell a splendid man of business, whose word once given could be trusted, and he quoted Parnell as having once said to him, “Either give us Home Rule or govern us as a Crown Colony.” Morley, however, went on to say that there was no parallel between India and Ireland as regards political claims and capacity. But in some ways he appeared surprisingly ignorant of Indian conditions.



Thus like most British politicians who have never been to India, he showed no real understanding of the caste question ; and he believed that the Mohammedans of the Punjab were Shiah, though nearly all are Sunnis. Talking of Hyderabad, he asked if the great Salar Jang, the far-sighted Minister who gave us such valuable help in the mutiny, was not a Hindu !

This ignorance was, however, surpassed by a subsequent Liberal Secretary of State (Mr. Montagu) who, having brought about the appointment of an Indian barrister, whose name at once proclaimed him to be a Hindu, to a high judicial office, asked a visitor if the appointment had not given general satisfaction to the Mohammedans of the Province !

Lord Morley also remarked how satisfactory it was that the North-West Frontier was now so peaceful. I retorted that you could only call it peace by shutting your eyes to facts. This roused him into saying, " I see you belong to the forward school of Political Officers." To which I replied that I did not belong to any school ; that it was my business on the Frontier to look after the revenue administration. In doing so I went up and down the Frontier at least twice a year, and was met by complaints of frequent raids with murder and dacoity by the Mahsuds and other trans-border tribes. Our subjects paid revenue to us as the price of protection, and they complained that we did not protect them, or allow them to protect themselves ; for we had taken away their arms. I said to Lord Morley, " When this is said to me, I cannot honestly look those men in the face." Lord Morley did not pursue the subject, but I may note here that our own people are now allowed arms for self-defence. He was very friendly and asked me to see him again. Next year when I came home on leave from Hyderabad I asked more than once for an interview, but he was unable to fit it in.

Perhaps I may say here, quite apart from my own case, that the aloofness of the India Office from officers home on leave has hitherto been one of the causes of the surprising ignorance which Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State often display in Indian affairs. Their doors are usually open to any Indian politician, however extreme in his views and even though he

may have been convicted of serious political offences or have otherwise shown himself to be untrustworthy. But they are in practice barred to their own trusted and experienced officials. It is true that there is a general invitation to civil officials on leave to call at the India Office. But the reception they meet with there, if they are received at all by anyone in authority, is generally such as to discourage further visits.

The following quotation from a letter of a high official in the Punjab makes this clear. He writes :

“It may interest you to know that about 15th May last year (1919) I called at the India Office, waited for half an hour, but was told the Under-Secretary had not then come, so I left an address. That was the first time in my service that I had called at the India Office, where it seems to be nobody's business to receive Indian officials. I called because I had left Lahore on 15th April, 1919, immediately after the disorders, and thought that no person in England had fresher first-hand knowledge of the events in Lahore, and that therefore the India Office would jump at the opportunity of seeing and hearing me. Though I remained in town for a fortnight, the India Office never asked me to call again ! Yet we are asked to call at the India Office—on whom ? ”

An exception must be made as regards the successive Political A.D.C.'s to the Secretary of State. They retain the high traditions of the Indian Political Department, in which all of them have served, for courtesy and accessibility.

In April, 1909, I was back in Hyderabad for the third time ; but this time with my wife and eleven-year-old daughter.

The Nizam and his officials gave me a warm welcome. There had been a good deal of subterranean intrigue going on since the previous October, but this had been cleared away and the work of reorganisation and reconstruction was being steadily pushed on. As in the previous year, I spent part of the hot weather at Ootacamund, the summer headquarters of the Madras Government.

To one accustomed to the direct methods of the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, the contrast with the leisurely procedure of the oldest Presidency was interesting.

Madras seemed to have elaborate rules and regulations to meet every phase of an old-established and well-defined Administration and to insist on a scrupulous adherence to them, which would have been impossible in Provinces where new and unexpected problems were constantly coming up for decision.

I may not have been an impartial observer, but the attention to detail struck me as meticulous, and the caution before taking action as excessive. At that time a wave of sedition, originating from the revolutionary movement of 1907-8 in Bengal, was sweeping down the east coast. The chief propagandists were B. C. Pal, a Bengali, and one Siva, a local agitator, and they held inflammatory meetings at many of the chief centres which led to subsequent riots and seditious manifestations. In one district the Collector (Ashe), or head of the local administration, was murdered. B. C. Pal was, however, allowed to pursue his meteoric career through Madras unchecked. It was not till much later that he was brought to book and imprisoned for defiance of the law in another Province. Compare this with Ibbetson's prompt action against Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh in the Punjab in 1907.

In the Hyderabad Residency area we had a similar attempt to stir up trouble by a Mahratta Brahmin pleader from British India. I at once ordered his removal. He attempted to take refuge close by in the Nizam's jurisdiction. But the Nizam's Government, with that spirit of loyal co-operation which has always characterised them in dealing with sedition, promptly excluded him, and the movement at once collapsed.

Social life in Ootacamund was pleasant enough. There was first-rate hunting, admirably organised, of which the Governor, Sir Arthur Lawley, and his sporting family were the keenest followers, till his son, a young officer in the 13th Hussars, was killed in the hunting field by the horse falling over him in one of those treacherous bogs so common in the valleys of the Nilgiris. The tragedy cast a gloom over Ootacamund.

In July I returned to Hyderabad. The Nizam had two beautiful residences in "Ooty," but rarely made use of them, preferring his palace at Hyderabad. I saw a good deal of him

in those months, as the Viceroy had asked for his views and those of the Indian Princes generally in regard to the policy in dealing with the growth of the seditious movement, and he was most anxious to give us all the help in his power.

At that time, too, an intrigue had been set afoot to oust certain British officials from the Nizam's Government. His Highness took speedy and effective action to show that he was master in his own house. He told me then that it was his business to protect officers who served him well, and that it was his policy (quoting a Persian proverb) to purchase his goods in the best shop.

Towards the end of November, 1909, the Nizam came to say good-bye to us, as we were soon to start home. He brought his younger children, to whom he was devoted, and also his *satar* (a musical instrument rather like a mandolin). He played some very beautiful Persian melodies, while two Court musicians in gorgeous costumes accompanied him. He had a fine taste in Oriental music and literature, and was very pleased with an illustrated copy of *Omar Khayyám* in Persian, with FitzGerald's translation, which my wife gave him. A few days later when I went to pay my farewell visit to him, he repeated his desire to see us back in Hyderabad and ended by saying that I and my wife had been very helpful to him and his State. Finally he asked me, if the occasion offered, to convey his dutiful respects to His Majesty.

Next day I started for home, carrying with me pleasing memories of Hyderabad, its Ruler, and his nobles and officials. I never saw the Nizam again, for I was posted to Central India on my return to India, and the Nizam died a few years later.

But I remember him as a true friend, an honourable gentleman, and in the fullest sense worthy of his proud title of "faithful ally of the British Government."

## CHAPTER IX

### CENTRAL INDIA (1910-13)

WHILE on leave home, I was offered and accepted the appointment of Acting-Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, vice Colonel Sir Hugh Daly transferred to Mysore.

I took up the appointment in August, 1910, and held it, with an interval of six months' leave in 1912, till I was transferred to the Punjab in May, 1913.

The work in Central India was much more varied and interesting than in Hyderabad. There, one had only to conduct the political relations with a single great State. In Central India one had to deal with one hundred and fourteen States, several of which were, from one cause or another, temporarily under British administration and therefore under the direct control of the Agent to the Governor-General. The States covered an area of over one hundred thousand square miles, stretching from the Nerbudda on the south to the Chambal and the Jamnā on the north, with a population of about fourteen millions. Among the rulers were Rajput Princes of the bluest blood claiming descent from the sun and the moon, Mohammedan Nawabs tracing their title back to the Mogul Empire, parts of which had fallen to them as military adventurers or successful commanders, and Mahratta conquerors of the eighteenth century from the Deccan. Excepting the Rajputs, the ruling families were of recent origin, having little or no hereditary connection with the areas or the peoples over whom they ruled. These were mainly composed of the great mass of Hindu (Sudra) cultivators who recognised and paid taxes to the Ruler of the time being, whatever his race, religion, or

right, and the aboriginal Bhils and Gonds passing from the primitive hunting and pastoral stages towards the first crude beginnings of agriculture. The administrations of the Central India States showed variations almost as wide as the races they ruled.

At the top was Gwalior with an area equal to that of Scotland, a population of three millions, a considerable army, a highly-organised and on the whole efficient civil administration, directed by a Prince whose devotion to the interests of his people was as marked as his active loyalty to the King-Emperor. At the other end of the scale were petty Rajput lordlings with a few square miles of territory and a few thousand subjects, but with a pedigree which went back many centuries B.C., and a pride of race which would have made the thought of a marriage alliance with the greatest Mahratta Prince an abomination. In the seventeenth century, the heyday of the Mogul Empire, the Rajput Princes, who up to then had ruled all this country, became more or less willing feudatories of the Delhi Emperor. He ruled through his Mohammedan Deputy, the Subadar of Malwa. But the Rajputs under Akbar, Jahangir, and Shah Jahan were treated with tolerance and consideration. They had to pay tribute or supply military contingents, as circumstances demanded, and many of them rose to high office in the Imperial armies. The ill-timed bigotry of Aurangzib steadily alienated their loyalty towards the end of his reign, and some at least made overtures to their Mahratta co-religionists in the Deccan, who under Sivaji had successfully rebelled against Aurangzib, to come and help them to throw off the now oppressive yoke of the Mohammedans. The Mahratta invasions began early in the eighteenth century; the invaders were received with enthusiasm by the Rajputs of Malwa and Bundelkand, whom they treated with great consideration at first. Taking advantage of this, and of the weakness of the decaying Mogul Empire under Aurangzib's feeble successors, the Mahrattas had succeeded by 1742 in establishing themselves so firmly that the Peishwa, or Brahmin head of the Mahratta Confederacy, was able to secure from Delhi a *sanad* or deed of grant appointing

him the Emperor's Deputy in Malwa. Their position being thus legalised, the Peishwa's generals, who gave him but a nominal allegiance, Scindia (Gwalior), Holkar (Indore), Puar (Dhar), the Bhonsla (Nagpur), and others proceeded to carve out principalities for themselves.

The old Rajput Princes, who had hoped to recover their own, now found themselves reduced to be the feudatories or vassals of a new master, often harsher than the Mogul Emperor whom the Mahrattas had displaced, but in whose name they still professed to govern. The tide of Mahratta conquest overran, but fortunately never swamped, that great belt of Rajput States which, under the names of Bundelkand and Baghelkand, stretch right across the north of Central India from Jhansi to the western limits of Bengal. In these picturesque groups of States are to be found some of the most interesting survivals of old-world India.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century the Mahrattas had raided on the east as far as Calcutta, where the Mahratta Ditch still bears testimony to the fear they inspired, and were even threatening the heart of the Mogul Empire at Delhi. The crushing defeat of the Mahratta Confederacy by Ahmad Shah and his Afghans at Panipat in 1761, gave a blow for the time being to their bold bid for the supremacy of Hindustan. When the scheme was revived later, the British power had penetrated from the coast settlements into the interior and north of India, and soon came into collision with the aggressive Mahrattas. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the great Wellesley, in a series of brilliant campaigns, broke the Mahratta power in the Deccan. At the same time Lord Lake's masterful strategy, in which British cavalry played so great a rôle, swept the Mahratta Chiefs out of Rajputana, thus saving the oldest Rajput States from the fate of their brethren in Central India.

Lake took Agra, pushed on to Delhi, drove out Scindia's forces, and rescued the Empire from Mahratta domination.

The immediate results were that the Emperor came under British protection; most of the territories now forming the United Provinces, from which the Mahrattas had been expelled,

came under British authority ; and Bundelkand, like Rajputana, was restored to its Native Princes under British suzerainty.

Scindia, Holkar, and the other Mahratta Chiefs were, however, allowed to retain their earlier conquests in Central India.

The period 1800-18 was one of steadily growing disorder and anarchy in Central India, and is still known as the *Gardikaka wakt* (time of trouble). The Mahratta Chiefs were often fighting with one another or with their Suzerain at Poona ; the predatory bands of Pindaris were overrunning the country ; and the old Rajput Rulers were striving to regain their lost possessions.

In 1817-18, the Mahratta Confederacy reunited its forces under the Peishwa at Poona, and backed by Holkar, the Bhonsla of Nagpur and others—Scindia standing aloof—made another bold and well-organised attempt to challenge the growing British power throughout Central and Western India. This, too, ended in disaster.

The Peishwa was routed at Kirki, near Poona ; his capital was captured and his territories annexed. The Rajah of Nagpur was defeated at Sitabaldi, and Holkar at Mehidpur. The Mahratta Chiefs were compelled to cede part of their conquered territories in Central India, including Ajmir and the districts now forming the Central Provinces, and to relax their hold on Southern Rajputana.

These campaigns had brought the British into the very heart of Central India, where they were welcomed by the Rajputs as their deliverers from the Mahrattas and by the peasantry as their rescuers from grinding tyranny. The necessity of asserting British supremacy and of carrying out the post-war settlement with the Mahratta and other States, and between the Mahratta Chiefs and their Rajput, Mohammedan, and Bhil feudatories, kept them there.

This complex work was entrusted to General Sir John Malcolm (afterwards Governor of Bombay), a great soldier and an even greater administrator. His account of the work in the *Memoirs of Central India and Malwa* is a masterpiece. The principles on which he acted were to maintain existing



possession of all parties in the territories which had been left to them by the Treaty of Mandsaur (1820), to ease the burden of the Rajput States and Estates which had fallen under Mahratta sway by reducing and defining their obligations to their Mahratta overlords, and, finally, to secure them against future aggression by giving them *sanads*, or guarantees, from the Paramount Power. This task was carried out by Malcolm and his assistants with extraordinary skill, tact, and knowledge of local conditions. The best proof of its worth is that it has stood the test of a century's working. Doubtless, the stereotyping of the conditions which were found in existence in 1818-20 to some extent interfered with the natural development, under which a few great Mahratta States would probably have swallowed all the rest, and gave rise to certain anomalies and inconveniences. The most serious of these is the perplexing manner in which many States, instead of being a compact whole, are split up into fragments (sometimes over a dozen) often widely apart, representing the areas in their effective possession when the settlement took place. It would have led to infinite confusion and delay, at a time when, above all things, the land wanted rest, to endeavour by exchanges to bring the territories of each State within a ring-fence; and fortunately the formula of "self-determination" had not then been evolved. This settlement was the beginning of an era of peace and prosperity in the sorely-ravaged and harassed land.

It was, however, inevitable that the great Mahratta States, as they recovered from the shock of defeat, should endeavour, and often on reasonable or at least plausible grounds, to extend their authority and jurisdiction over their feudatories by encroaching on the status guaranteed to the latter by Malcolm's settlement. This fact furnishes the key to most of the political history of Central India for the last hundred years. It has given rise to two distinct schools of thought among Political Officers. The pro-Durbar (State) section argue that it will conduce to good administration if the rights of independent civil and criminal jurisdiction, escheat, excise, customs, etc., guaranteed by us to the feudatories (generally the old Rajput Rulers) are absorbed by the Mahratta overlord, who would

then be prepared to make a fresh grant, *from himself*, of such rights as were considered reasonable, to those feudatories.

On the other hand, the pro-Thakur (Rajput Noble) section contend that while the guarantees of the British Government exist and the feudatories look to us to enforce them, we are bound by our pledged word to do so, and cannot treat them as "scraps of paper." Of my predecessors, some were supposed to lean to the pro-Durbar view; but the majority were, I think, inclined to the pro-Thakur view. The view I took was that until the feudatories showed sufficient confidence in their overlords as *voluntarily* to renounce the British guarantee in return for a fresh guarantee or other concessions from the overlord—which some of the Rajput Chiefs under the liberal and enlightened policy of the Maharaja of Dhar in my time consented to do—we could not renounce our solemn and written obligation to protect the weak against the strong. That policy was accepted by the Government of India and held the field till the Reforms Scheme of 1919. The authors of that Scheme realised the advantage of winning for it the support of the Indian Princes. Most of those viewed with some alarm the probable reactions in their areas of the new "democratic" institutions set up in British India. They were, however, won over by the general relaxation of the control of the Paramount Power over the Native States, which was formulated in Chapter X of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. That policy was evolved without any previous reference to or consultation with the local governments, who were the political authorities for many of the Native States, e.g. in Bombay, Madras, and the Punjab; and their subsequent protests were disregarded. Some relaxation of control, especially in the case of many large States with well-organised systems of administration and efficient agencies to work it, was certainly desirable. But this might have been done on its own merits after due investigation of Treaties and Agreements, which are the basis of our relations with the States, rather than as a hasty measure of political expediency to secure the support of the Indian Princes for the Reforms Scheme in British India.

The result has been what might have been expected. The more the British Government loosened its control of the Indian States, the more they, as a body, tightened their grip on their own feudatories and subjects. There have in recent years been many alarming indications that neither the Princes themselves nor their subjects have benefited by our wholesale relaxation of control. A bad Ruler now, and unfortunately there are not a few such, can carry tyranny and oppression over his own feudatories and subjects to almost any lengths before the British Government as Paramount Power will think of checking him.

He can even, as the Nabha case shows, treat British subjects who are unfortunate enough to come into his power with the most flagrant injustice and indignity, and the British Government looks on unmoved. It is only when, encouraged by long immunity, he adopts similar tactics towards subjects of a neighbouring State, and the latter rightly threatens reprisals, that the British Government summons up courage and orders an investigation, as the result of which it is compelled to find the charges of oppression and organised injustice proved to the hilt. Even then, having tied its own hands by the new rules, the British Government is unable or unwilling to exercise its recognised rights as the supreme power to set aside a Ruler found guilty of gross maladministration. It arranges for a voluntary abdication by the offending Ruler—on condition that his proved misdeeds are not made public. The Ruler abdicates, becomes a political martyr with the malcontent Sikhs from outside (his own Sikhs having rejoiced over their release), and his grievances are used by the revolutionary Akalis and their Swaraj allies in the Congress to fan the fires of sedition and revolt. Such are some of the “boons” conferred on Indian States by the Reforms Scheme. The last people to be considered are the State subjects whom we are bound by our Treaty engagements to protect from maladministration.

To return to our Central Indian Rajputs, one fears that they too, though many of them gave us valuable help in the struggles with the Mahrattas, will be sacrificed to a political expediency

which is inclined to regard the conciliation of the strong and the clamorous as more important than the observance of our pledges to the weak and the silent. However, while I was in Central India this new policy had not been initiated, and I was still able to assume that the British Government would continue to regard its word as its bond.

Difficult questions often arose as to the interpretation of our "guarantees" to the petty Rajput States and Thakurs.

In this respect the Mahratta States, with their careful records and astute Deccani Brahmin officials, had a decided advantage over the rude unlettered Thakur, and one had to see that the case for the latter was not overlooked. I have never come across a body of men so skilful in dialectics, and at the same time so inefficient in the ordinary work of administration, as the Mahratta Brahmins who dominated the councils of most of the Mahratta States. Their characteristics have been admirably described in Malcolm's *Memoirs*, from which I quote the following extract :

"The Mahratta Brahmin is from diet, habit, and education, keen, active, and intelligent; but generally avaricious and often treacherous. His life, if in public business, must, from the system of his government, be passed in efforts to deceive, and to detect others in deceiving. -Such occupations raise cunning to the plane of wisdom, and debar, by giving a mean and interested bent to the mind, all those claims to respect and attachment, upon which great and despotic power can alone have any permanent foundation.

The history of the Mahratta nation abounds with instances of Brahmins rising from the lowest stations to be Ministers, and sometimes Rulers, of a State; but their character undergoes little change from advancement and, in general, all its meanest features remain.

Though often leading armies, the Mahratta Brahmins have not, with some remarkable exceptions, gained a high reputation for courage; and if not arrogant or cruel, they have often merited the charge of being unfeeling and oppressive."

Malcolm then goes on to describe the Mahratta of the lower castes, *Sudra* (peasant), or soi-disant *Kshatriya* (warrior),

from whom the fighting men and the Mahratta Chiefs in Central India are drawn :

“ The plain Mahratta Sudra or Kshatriya enters upon his career as a soldier in the same dress and with the same habits, with which he tills his fields or attends his flocks ; and he has, generally speaking, preserved throughout revolutions, that have at one time raised him to the highest consideration and power, and again cast him back to his former occupations, the same simplicity of character. . . .

That the Mahratta soldier was more distinguished by art than by valour ; that he gloried as much in rapid flight as in daring attack, is not denied by the warmest panegyrist of his own tribe. . . . Few could claim superiority to him in patience under fatigue, hunger, and thirst, and in that plain manliness of character which remained unchanged by success or adversity.”

The justice of this last remark was established in the Great War, when the Mahratta battalions—whom it had become the fashion to belittle—in Mesopotamia and Palestine won for themselves a reputation for steady courage equal to that of the northern martial races. Those battalions are, however, recruited from the original home of the Mahratta in the Bombay districts of the Konkan or the Deccan, and not from the Mahratta States of Central India, where the Mahrattas are only a small community of conquerors descended from the military adventurers of the eighteenth century, and their Brahmin officials.

The cleavage between the Mahratta Brahmins on one side, and on the other the Mahratta Princes and peasantry, both of whom their status and intellectual superiority has hitherto enabled the Brahmins to exploit, is rapidly becoming more acute. Tilak, the typical Mahratta Brahmin (who might well be the prototype of “ Panditji ” in the *Lost Dominion*) brought matters to a head twenty years ago by his attempt to out-caste and ostracise the Maharaja of Kolhapur—the descendant of Sivaji, the hero of Mahratta independence—because the Maharaja stoutly opposed his propaganda. Since then the Mahrattas have been striving to shake off Brahmin

domination, and the movement has been hastened by the Reforms Scheme, which gives undue power to the Brahmin *literati* in Bombay and elsewhere, a power which they are accused of using for their own selfish ends. Even in Central India in my time the Ruling Chiefs, while realising the value of the Brahmin in their offices, had been struck by his general failure in an executive capacity.

In several States a struggle was then going on between the Decanni Brahmins, strongly entrenched behind their hereditary social and religious pretensions, and the north-country Hindu, Khatri, Kayasth, or Baniya, who outside the office was generally the better man. In the State forces and higher police posts the Mohammedans with their traditions of rule and authority were generally prominent.

The growing hostility of the other castes to Brahmin, and especially Mahratta Brahmin, domination is well brought out in the following summary quoted from *The Times*, of the evidence given before the Reforms Committee in Simla in August, 1924, by Mr. A. N. Sarvi, a Mahratta lawyer representing the Mahratta and other non-Brahmin castes in the Bombay Legislature :

“He maintained that the existence of separate representation for the backward classes was essential, as without it Brahmin ascendancy would be reasserted, *but the Brahmins, having obtained privileges in the name of the masses in the past, had not allowed the masses to share in them.*

Had the Brahmins dealt fairly with the masses, the illiteracy and backwardness, now so prevalent, would have disappeared generations ago. When Sir S. Aiyar (a Madras Brahmin) suggested that it was the Government and not the Brahmins who were to blame the witness refused to accept the suggestion. He pointed out that Local Boards have long been in existence, and that the Brahmin majorities in these bodies had built schools in Brahmin areas and none in the non-Brahmin areas. Moreover, the Brahmins had dominated the public services to the exclusion of the other castes. He considered that the time was far distant when it would be reasonable to talk of India as a ‘Nation,’ for neither the Hindus nor the Mohammedans had sufficient cohesion to form one. The

present attempts to adopt an unmeaning phrase like 'one Nation,' would hamper the efforts of the backward classes to improve themselves, for the advanced classes were entirely self-interested, and obstructed the efforts of the backward to advance themselves. *On the other hand, Mr. Sarvi declared that the Government usually has identical interests with the masses.*"

*The Times* Simla correspondent adds that—as might be expected—Mr. Sarvi was severely heckled by the Brahmin members of the committee, of whom there were three (this in itself shows how even the Government unduly favours this privileged class), but on the whole he maintained his position.

Mr. Sarvi was only stating notorious facts, patent to every honest observer in India, though apparently hidden from the Government of India and the India Office. Nevertheless, much as the scales have been weighted in favour of the Brahmin, it is becoming clear that, even as between him and the non-privileged Hindu class, he is not going to have things all his own way—at least in Bombay.

It would be hard to say how the struggle will end. The Mahratta Brahmin is the only class among the Hindu Intelligentsia that has behind it the tradition of two centuries of almost independent rule. That gives him an experience and an outlook on politics far more real than that of the subtle but shallow Madrasi, the fervid but frothy Bengali, the eloquent but unconvincing Pandit of the Ganges Valley, none of whom have behind them any tradition of the Swaraj which they so glibly claim as their "birthright." The reason for the undoubted pre-eminence of the Mahratta Brahmins in the political movements of the last thirty years, whether a moderate such as Gokhale or an extremist such as Tilak, is to be found in their history.

They have by actual experience learned what it is to rule ; the others have, for at least nine centuries, been under successive conquerors ; and with all their forensic ability show so far no indications of any capacity for organising a government of their own. You cannot exclude from politics history and

the human nature which goes to make history ; if you try to do so history will make you, and unfortunately others as well, pay the penalty. Nor can you solve political problems by eliminating history and human nature and (to conceal your ignorance of both) catching at the specious but empty formula of "self-determination." Those who have chosen to follow that "will-o'-the-wisp" are already sinking in the bog to which it leads.

The work at Indore was arduous, for a political post, but full of interest and variety. The climate of the Central Indian plateau is fairly temperate, and the sport is perhaps the best in India. Apart from the big game, tigers, panthers, bears, and deer of many varieties, there was, in my time, a flourishing Tent Club maintained by the garrison at Mhow and the Politicals at Indore. In the three or four months before the rains we were able to account for a good many stout boar in the jungles which the Indore Durbar kindly allowed us to beat.

The proximity of Mhow, the headquarters of the 6th Division, with a considerable garrison, added much to the amenities of the Indore Residency. At Indore itself we had a flourishing club well supported by the Ruling Chiefs, the Daly College for the instruction of the young Chiefs and State nobles, and ample facilities for games of every kind.

The Daly College was admirably managed by a Committee of Ruling Chiefs, many of whom had been educated there, presided over by the Agent to the Governor-General ; and this brought him into close and frequent contact with the Ruling Chiefs and the aristocracy of the States.

But the greatest asset in Central India was the touring among the various States, for which an admirable—for India—system of metalled roads gave excellent facilities.

When a new Agent takes up his appointment, the Princes and Chiefs pay him formal visits as representative of the Viceroy. Those visits have to be returned in the various States as opportunity offers, with due pomp and ceremony.

A Durbar in the Great Hall of the Gwalior Palace—



constructed by Sir Michael Filose after an Italian model—with hundreds of Mahratta nobles and the State officials in their brilliant Court dress, a chorus of singing girls chanting soft melodies to the accompaniment of weird music, and concluding with the Maharaja placing garlands of sweet-scented flowers on the visitor's neck and wrists, while the guns thundered a salute and the caged lions in the garden close by roared in dissonance, was a ceremony as picturesque as impressive.

But some of the remoter Chiefs in their mountain fastnesses of Bundelkand and Baghelkand, were at first inclined to regard such visits as likely to "molest their ancient solitary reign." But in the end they all received one—and with a hospitality that was sometimes embarrassing.

There was a certain Maharaja, more famous for his literary efforts than for his skill in administration. Among other works he had written (in Hindi) a treatise on cookery; he prided himself more on his skill as a "chef" than as a "Chief," and after the formal ceremonies were over, invited me and my staff to the lunch he had specially prepared.

In culinary matters I am a strong Conservative, almost a "Die Hard," and, as usual, had brought a luncheon basket. The question was how to utilise its contents without wounding our host's feelings. Being an orthodox Hindu he could not sit and eat with us; so the chicken and ham were skilfully disposed among his innumerable dishes.

Unfortunately His Highness came in and sat down at some distance during the meal to see how we enjoyed *his* dishes, and to save our faces we had to make a pretence of partaking of the latter.

Our host, if he saw through the fraud, was too courteous to comment on it.

Another Maharaja was a famous shot, and after the Durbar I pressed him to give us an exhibition of his skill. He took us on to the roof of his palace. An attendant threw coco-nuts high into the air and, shooting with a small-bore rifle, he smashed one after the other. Then half a dozen oranges were thrown up in succession. He never missed one. This was

only a preliminary to get his eye in. The next step was to throw up a rupee. He hit it every time; the same thing happened with the eight-anna piece, the size of a shilling. He wished to stop there, but I pressed him to go on. A four-anna piece was thrown up and he hit it three times out of four. Finally, he got down to the smallest silver coin, two annas, the size of a threepenny piece. He hesitated about this as there was a breeze blowing, but hit it once in three shots. I was so struck by the performance, which would have made him a star at the Coliseum, that I got him to repeat it a week later before a larger gathering at Nowgong Cantonment and he was equally successful.

It was in the course of this tour that I had to visit the Ruler of a remote but picturesque and well-governed State. The fine old Maharaja, a man most loyal to the Government and idolised by his people, had been toothless for some years; but to make himself more intelligible to me, had provided himself with a splendid set of new teeth for the occasion. He kept them in his mouth during the official ceremonies, but evidently was not happy with them. Driving round with him to see the palaces, lakes, and gardens, I noticed that he was carrying them in his hand! But when I addressed him he hastily crammed them into his mouth before venturing to reply. I parted from this charming and courteous old gentleman with great regret, but he, I fancy, must have experienced some relief. As they say in Ireland, "An impty house is better than a bad tinant."

Some of the more primitive States in the Vindhya Range were under direct Government superintendence owing to the minority of the Chiefs or financial difficulties, and these required special attention. A large part of the population were Bhil aborigines, a primitive and simple race, still semi-nomadic. They are great hunters, their favourite weapon being the bow and arrow, with which they will attack a tiger or a panther.

In 1911-12, the Bhils were suffering from *malaise*. The harvests had failed, the pastures were burned up, and above all, some of the smaller States, at our suggestion, partly to

restrain excessive drinking, so common among all primitive tribes in India who have local facilities, partly to increase their revenues, had prohibited the private distillation of liquor from the *mabua* fruit, and directed that the Bhils should obtain their supplies from the State Central Distillery—at a price. This “pussyfoot” policy was most unpopular with the Bhils.

On going into their country to look into famine relief measures, I was surrounded by an angry and howling mob of thousands. I got them to select half a dozen men to explain their grievances. To them I said I was sorry to find they were having such a bad time; we would do what we could to help them, but it was the will of God. This reference to the Deity gave them their opening. They said in effect, “Why are the Gods angry, and why have they scourged us with famine? They are angry because we have not made them the usual offerings—the libations of strong liquor.” I interposed, “Surely strong liquor is not necessary for libations to the Gods? They can be placated by offerings of sugar, butter, and milk.” At this the Bhils snorted contemptuously. “Offerings of sugar, butter, and milk may satisfy the Gods of the Hindus. *Our* Gods are strong and self-respecting Gods—they demand strong liquor, and this famine will not cease till they get it. Look you to it.” It was useless to argue further with men in this frame of mind. After consultation with the State people, we decided on a compromise—to allow the Bhils the right of free distillation, up to a certain limit per house, at the two great festivals, when “*les dieux ont soif*” and have to be propitiated with liquor. A few centuries ago they would have demanded human sacrifices.

The Bhils blessed me for this concession and gave me an exhibition of their skill with the bow. It is to be hoped that their Gods got their due share and were duly grateful. Anyhow, the following year gave a bumper harvest.

Later on, some Bhils came to see me in Indore about a rather complicated question of forest rights. They began their petition by pleading that they were rude, illiterate folk—so unenlightened that they had not yet learnt the civilised art of lying! They spoke of this with regret, as if it were a

serious defect which they were most eager to remove. They certainly regarded it as a handicap in the battle against subtler antagonists.

We had a Bhil Corps at Indore, active, hardy, cheery little men, reminding one of the Gurkhas; and, like the latter, most devoted to their few British officers. In fact the British officer, civil or military, is seen at his best in dealing with these primitive races. The high-caste Indian and the Intelligentsia have a lofty contempt for the Bhil. But the British officer takes a paternal interest in these unsophisticated children of nature, learns their language and their ways, tries to wean them from their vices of theft and drink, admires their courage, joins them in the chase; while they on their part give him, for he too is frank, courageous, fond of sport, their affection and devotion. One trembles to think how they and other aboriginal races will fare when India enjoys the blessings of full Swaraj. They will be regarded, and perhaps treated, in the way the Spartans treated the Helots. This is well expressed in the classic description of the Bhils by a Bengali Babu: "The Bhil is a black man, but more hairy. When he meets you in his jungle, he shoots you in the back with an arrow, and throws your body into the ditch. Thus you may know the Bhil!"

The Bhils, men and women, are great dancers, and when the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, came to Indore in November, 1912, the Bhil Corps offered to give an exhibition of Bhil dances after dinner at the Residency. I was given to understand that they would not put their heart into the performance unless stimulated by some of their favourite *mahua* spirit. This was provided for the men. The men and women formed separate circles, and the men danced after the manner of the Khattaks and Wazirs of the North-West Frontier, going through the most elaborate steps with great spirit and precision to the delight of the spectators. Some of the older Rajput Maharajas were critical and appreciative onlookers, for they took an interest in the Bhils as being the aboriginals from whom they had taken the country. So strong is this tradition that in at least one very ancient State, the affixing

of the *tika* (forehead mark) by a Bhil is an essential ceremony in the investiture of the Rajput Chief.

Malwa is a fertile land with a good rainfall. But certain tracts on the verge of the plateau suffer from frequent droughts and famine. The Rulers of some of these States were of the old school, whose view, like that of Lyall's old Pindari, was :

“ While I am lord of the ryot  
He'll starve ere I grow lean,”

and it was difficult to get them to curtail expenditure on their own pleasures. Others showed a ready and practical sympathy with their distressed people.

The State of Bhopal, famous for its fine capital, its splendid palaces and mosque, its picturesque lakes, and above all for the series of capable Princesses who have ruled it efficiently for nearly one hundred years, is one of the most important in Central India. It is the largest Mohammedan State, having been founded about the time of Aurangzib's death by one of the many Afghan military adventurers who then came to the front. For one hundred years, exposed to the constant attacks of aggressive Mahratta neighbours, it had a precarious existence, but succeeded in maintaining its independence till it finally came under British protection about 1816. Since then its record has been one of unwavering loyalty. Her Highness Sultan Jahan, the present Begum, is known throughout the Empire, not only as a wise ruler, but for her efforts in the cause of female education and social reform.

The family prides itself on maintaining its blood connection with the original Afghan strain. Curiously enough, when I was in Peshawar in 1906 I assisted Sir Harold Deane in suggesting to Her Highness a young lady from a high family which formerly ruled in Kabul to be betrothed to one of her sons. Five years later when I went to Central India, Her Highness congratulated me on having chosen so happily.

A visit to Bhopal was always a pleasure. There one found the hospitality and courtesy of the East at its best.

I think I was once able to make Her Highness some small return. It happened in this way. The Viceroy, Lord Hardinge,

was coming on a ceremonial visit to Bhopal in December, 1912. The Begum, deeply veiled as usual, and the various Ruling Chiefs of the Agency, with myself and the Political Agent, were waiting on the platform to receive His Excellency. Among them was the Raja of Rajgarh. Her Highness happened to say that she and the Raja were very good friends and good neighbours, and were also of the same age. I asked what that age might be (Indian ladies are not so reticent in these matters as English). Her Highness told me her age was  $x$  (let us say). I said, "Pardon me, Your Highness. You are exaggerating your age by two years! Your correct age is  $x-2$ ." She asked me to explain, and I pointed out that she was calculating her age by the Mohammedan calendar in which the year (lunar) had only 353 days. Thus, by our reckoning, Her Highness was two years younger than she thought. The Begum, who has a ready sense of humour, told me that I had worked a miracle—I had given her two more years of life.

Then the Viceroy's train arrived.

It was during this visit that Lord Hardinge informed me privately, a week in advance of the public announcement, that His Majesty had been pleased to sanction my appointment as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

A few weeks later, in passing through Delhi City in the State procession, a bomb was thrown into the howdah of the elephant on which the Viceroy and Lady Hardinge were riding, killing the attendant and seriously wounding the Viceroy.

Probably this shocking outrage was facilitated by the fact that Lord Hardinge, being courageous and trusting, had directed that no special precautions should be taken for his protection. But while he was on tour in my jurisdiction, I saw no reason to interfere with the special arrangements which the various States very properly made, and I even went so far as to supplement them. When His Excellency commented on this, I replied that I could not interfere with the measures which the States thought necessary.

## CHAPTER X

### THE PUNJAB BEFORE THE WAR (1913-14)

**S**IMLA'S fondness for official gossip and devious methods of worming out official secrets have been satirised in Kipling's lines :

“Delilah Aberystwith was a lady—none too young,  
With a perfect taste in dresses and a badly bitted  
tongue;  
With a thirst for information, and a greater thirst  
for praise,  
And a little house in Simla in the Prehistoric  
days.”

I believe Simla was much intrigued in 1912 over the appointment of a successor to Sir L. Dane as Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The choice, according to local wits, lay between the two “Macs,” Sir Henry MacMahon, Foreign Secretary, and Sir Edward Maclagan, also a Secretary to the Government of India, and two “Micks,” Sir Michael Fenton, Financial Commissioner in the Punjab, and myself. There were others who “also ran.” In the Simla Club odds were laid on the favourite; books were made on the event. Personally I took little interest in the result, being quite happy in Central India, and I believe my indifference to the appointment was one of the reasons for my getting it.

In informing me of my selection the Viceroy made it clear that the Punjab was the Province about which the Government were then most concerned; that there was much inflammable material lying about, which required very careful handling if an explosion were to be averted. That was on the 4th December, 1912, and I was not to take up the appointment till the following May. But His Excellency's forecast

was speedily proved to be correct, for, on the 23rd December, at the State Entry into the new Capital, the diabolical attempt was made on his life.

Delhi had been, till a year before, part of the Punjab, and in the revolutionary conspiracies it was the link between the Bengal anarchists, who had since 1907 been increasingly active, and their Punjab allies. The attempt at Delhi on the Viceroy's life by a bomb was one of the first results of this unholy union.

The killing of a *chaprassi* (messenger) in the Lawrence Gardens, Lahore, by an exactly similar bomb, which was meant for the British officials who gather in the gardens of an evening, in the following May, two days before I took over from Sir Louis Dane, was the second. It was subsequently proved that the two outrages were the work of the same gang of anarchists, and that the secret organisation had wide ramifications in the most unexpected quarters. In the general movement were the notorious Har Dayal, a Punjabi, who subsequently worked up the Ghadr movement in America, and an equally dangerous plotter—Rash Bihari Bose—a Bengali head clerk in a Government office at Dera Dun. These had brought into the conspiracy several others, chiefly of the student type, but including some men of position and mature age.

The most prominent member in Delhi was Amir Chand, a senior and trusted Hindu teacher in the Cambridge Mission School; while in Lahore the son of a leader of the Arya Samáj, who was a prominent student in the Arya Samáj (D.A.V.) College, was deeply implicated. The latter was sentenced to five years' imprisonment; Amir Chand was among the four who were hanged. The Sessions Judge aptly described him as "one who spent his life in furthering murderous schemes which he was too timid to carry out himself."

Two Bengalis who had brought up the Delhi and Lahore bombs from Calcutta and helped to place the bomb which killed the messenger at Lahore, were also convicted of the murder. One of them was sentenced to be hanged; the



other, on the ground that he was the less intelligent of the two, to transportation for life. Both appealed to the Chief Court.

At the same time a Hindu official of an outlying district, who had also been charged as a member of the conspiracy but was acquitted by the Court of Session, applied to be reinstated in his post. After going through the papers I decided, contrary to the opinion of my legal advisers, that Government should also appeal and ask for the death penalty on the Bengali, and for the conviction and adequate punishment of the petty official. The Honourable Judges accepted the appeal on both points. The petty official, who might have escaped justice had he kept quiet, was sentenced to transportation for life, and the Bengali was sentenced to death. These sentences were in connection with the Lahore Bomb Case for, though the Delhi Bomb Case was part of the same conspiracy, sufficient evidence was not forthcoming to put anyone on trial. But the second Bengali, *after* he had unsuccessfully petitioned the Viceroy for mercy and a few days before he was hanged, informed the Criminal Investigation Officers that it was he who, disguised as a Mohammedan lady heavily veiled, and standing in front of the Punjab National Bank in the Chandni Chauk, had thrown the bomb which killed one of the Viceroy's attendants, severely wounded the others, and caused injuries to the Viceroy which would have killed a man of less spirit and courage. These facts did not, however, come to light till nearly a year later.

When I returned to the Punjab after an absence of nearly sixteen years, I found an enormous improvement in material prosperity. This was most noticeable among the rural population and was mainly due to the combined effects of the great irrigation and colonisation scheme which had transformed some ten million acres of arid waste or precarious dry cultivation into vast expanses of rich and secure crops.

This improvement had been strengthened by the Land Alienation Act of 1900 (referred to in Chapter IV) and the Rural Co-operative Credit Movement. Both measures had been strongly opposed by the urban *bourgeoisie* who looked on the peasantry as their natural prey. As a result of this increased

prosperity, the peasantry and the landed gentry had developed a spirit of healthy independence, and were demanding that the public revenues which they mainly contributed should be spent more for their benefit, and that they should have an increased share in the public services, of which the urban *litterati* had in the past enjoyed the monopoly.

Indeed considerable progress had been made in these directions under the guidance of Sir Charles Rivaz, Sir Denzil Ibbetson, and Sir Louis Dane as Lieutenant-Governors, with the active assistance of high officials such as Sir James Wilson, Mr. S. S. Thorburn, and Colonel Montgomery.

Throughout my term of office I did what I could to further the interests of the rural masses whom I regarded as the basis of the stability and prosperity of the Province. My efforts, and those of my predecessors, were rewarded by the splendid spirit of co-operation and active loyalty displayed by the rural population as a whole in peace and war.

But the policy was naturally not popular with a section of the urban Intelligentsia and *bourgeoisie*—mainly Hindu—who saw in it a danger to their monopoly of place and power.

They did not dare to attack that policy openly; to do so would show their hand and antagonise the rural population—over 90 per cent of the whole. But towards the end of the War, when the Reforms Scheme gave a great stimulus to political discussion, they began to attack the administration through the Press and the platform, which were almost completely under their control. At the same time they endeavoured, though with little success, to stir up the rural masses. I found from the start elements of serious trouble at work in certain sections of the three great communities, Mohammedan, Hindu, and Sikh, which form respectively five-ninths, three-ninths, and one-ninth of the Punjab population. The account of the various conspiracies in the next four chapters is based on the Sedition Committee's (Rowlatt) Report of 1908 and the judgments of the Courts in the various conspiracy cases from 1914 to 1917.

## CHAPTER XI

### PAN-ISLAMIST MOVEMENT AND MOHAMMEDAN CONSPIRACIES

THE rural Mohammedans and their leaders at that time took little interest in any but local politics, being chiefly concerned to protect themselves against exploitation by the more astute urban Hindus. Some of the urban Mohammedans had, however, as the result of the propaganda of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, and later of Enver Pasha, become imbued with Pan-Islamic aspirations.

The neutral attitude of Great Britain in the Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars of 1911-13 had caused some resentment, and a speech of the Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith) in November, 1912, was interpreted as showing British hostility to Turkey and Islam.

The views of this section were expressed in a very fiery newspaper (the *Zamindar*) edited by a notorious firebrand, Zafar Ali Khan. He had in 1912 started subscriptions for the Turkish Red Crescent, and himself gone to Constantinople to present to the Grand Wazir some of the money collected. On his return the tone of his paper became more and more anti-British, and after many warnings I was compelled in 1913 to forfeit the security under the Press Act. Higher security was demanded and furnished, the paper reappeared, and again indulged in disloyal and inflammatory articles, which led to the confiscation not only of the security but of the press. This order was upheld by the Chief Court. Early in 1914, the Turkish Consul-General came to Lahore to present to the Badshahi (Imperial) Mosque a carpet sent by the Sultan of Turkey as a mark of his gratitude.

A few weeks later he was followed by two Turkish doctors

of the Red Crescent Society. Thus, up to the opening of the War, there were intrigues going on between Turkey and a small but bitter and unscrupulous Pan-Islamist section in Northern India. The leaders of this anti-British section in the Press were Zafar Ali Khan, of the *Zamindar* at Lahore, Muhamed Ali Khan of the *Comrade*, and his brother, Shaukat Ali at Delhi; and they made no secret of their sympathy with Turkey, both before and after the outbreak of the War. But the great mass of intelligent Mohammedans realised from the start that Turkey, by joining our enemies, would bring about her own ruin, and at the same time create a very difficult situation for Indian Mohammedans.

They therefore wisely used all their influence, which was not much, to prevent Turkey taking the fatal decision. After it had been taken, the Mohammedans of the Punjab generally made it clear that the War was a secular one, that their religious freedom was in no way threatened (the British Government had hastened to give them assurances about the safety of the Holy Places), and that it was their duty as loyal subjects of the King-Emperor to help him in the struggle with his enemies.

But the Pan-Islamist section continued its intrigues with Turkey, Arabia, Germany, and Afghanistan, endeavouring to stir up rebellion among Indian Mohammedans and mutiny among Muslim troops by fanatical appeals, and, finally, after these schemes had been brought to naught by the defeat of the Central Powers, joined hands with the Hindu revolutionaries in the so-called Hindu-Mohammedan Entente.

This temporary union led to a last desperate effort to shake the British power in the East. It led to the Punjab and Bombay outbreaks of April, 1919, and to the more serious Moplah rebellion of 1921-22. But, after spreading disorder and bloodshed over India for years, it speedily collapsed when the Indian Government at last allowed the law to take its course.

The protagonists of the Entente—Gandhi and the Ali brothers—were sentenced in 1921 and 1922 to long terms of imprisonment for the sedition and incitements to rebellion, which they had openly gloried in.

How much bloodshed and misery would have been saved if this step had been taken three years earlier, when the simultaneous outbreaks in the Punjab, Bombay, Calcutta, and Peshawar showed how deep-seated was the conspiracy and how wide its ramifications ! But firm action at that time might have disturbed the "peaceful atmosphere" which Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford were then hoping to create for the successful launching of their scheme of Diarchy. Moreover, from 1919 to 1922, Gandhi and the Khilafat were the two "bogies" of which the Indian authorities were in mortal terror. Yet the "bogies" vanished on the first contact with the realities of a Court of Justice.

The removal of the leaders gave an opportunity for the traditional hostility between Hindu and Mussulman, "hating one another for the love of God," to reassert itself in an acute form, and, as the authority of Government has been steadily sapped or openly defied, the tension has within the last two years caused widespread disorder and bloodshed. The prevention of communal strife is now the most serious problem of the Indian Government.

The summary action of the new Turkish Republic in deposing the Sultan, abolishing the Khilafat, and sending the last of the historic house of Osman to wander, a penniless fugitive, in foreign lands, has given the final blow to the Pan-Islamist Movement in India ; and those who so long made use of it for their own selfish ends are now being called on to give an account of their doubtful stewardship of the funds collected for the cause from the Faithful. To these Muhamed Ali has recently given the assurance that the accounts will be rendered in Heaven !

Thus ends the movement which for a dozen years had been a "bogy" to the Government of India. But during the War one had to take it seriously, and one of the first measures I took in the Punjab was to restrict Zafar Ali Khan to his native village, and to keep him there till the end of the War.

About the same time the Government of India, on my representation and that of other Heads of Provinces, similarly restricted the Ali brothers to a place near Delhi, and when they

abused such liberty as was left them by seditious incitements in the troubles of 1919, they were interned far from their homes.

Such executive measures were not only justified by the state of war, but, as events proved, were in the interests of the persons concerned. Zafar Ali Khan after his release resorted to his old methods, and in 1920 was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for the most flagrant incitements to rebellion. Perhaps he will find comfort in the fact that the Punjab Legislature has recently carried, against official opposition, a resolution for his release. He is now at liberty once more, but is a spent force.

Muhammed Ali in September, 1921, after the outbreak of the Moplah rebellion, was similarly convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. He is again at large, but his efforts to galvanise the dead and buried Khilafat agitation into new life have fallen hopelessly flat.

I knew both these men personally. Indeed, Muhammed Ali in 1911, at Indore, consulted me, being also a son of Oxford, as to whether he should take up a post in a Native State under my jurisdiction or start his paper, the *Comrade*. As he had practically arranged with some friends about the latter project, I advised him to persevere with it. At first the tone was extremely humorous, but not anti-British. It was probably the reversal, in December, 1911, of the partition of Bengal, in deference to Bengali Hindu agitation, that drove him and other young Mohammedans into opposition to a Government which they thought had played them false. It was the irony of fate that I was subsequently one of the chief objects of his journalistic attacks.

Both he and Zafar Ali Khan were born journalists and brilliant masters of that frothy oratory that appeals to an Indian audience. Young India, unfortunately, cannot escape being drawn into the vortex of politics, and lacking balance and self-restraint, his eager ambition to make his mark leads him in journalism into reckless attacks on the Government and often into seditious incitements. This is also good business, for, as a friend wrote to me from India the other day: "It pays to go to jail, and you can't sell

a newspaper which doesn't throw mud at Government and its officials."

The prompt action taken against seditious propaganda in the Press or on the platform, and the hearty co-operation of leading Mohammedans, urban and rural, such as Nawabs Bahram Khan and Sir Fateh Ali Khan (both since dead), Sir Umar Haiyat Khan and Sir Khuda Bakhsh Khan, Tiwana, Maulvi Sir Rahim Bakhsh, Chief Minister of the Bahawalpur State, Saiyed Sir Mehdi Shah, and the great Pirs or religious leaders of the North and West Punjab, kept the Punjab Mohammedans as a whole steady, and enabled us to recruit 180,000 Mohammedans for the Army from 1915 onwards. The main trouble was with the Pan-Islamists from outside the Province.

In the Christmas week of 1914, soon after Turkey entered the War, a Mohammedan Educational Congress was held at Rawal Pindi. This was attended by certain Mohammedan firebrands from down-country, Abu Kalam Azad, Muhamed Ali, and others. But their efforts to push their violent propaganda were frustrated by the sensible and loyal men of the Punjab. Some of them went on to Peshawar, others stopped at Lahore on their way back and lectured to young and impressionable Mohammedan students at tea-parties in some of the Lahore Colleges. We only heard of this visit after they had left.

A few weeks later, in February, 1915, fifteen young Mohammedan students, many of them sons of men of staunch loyalty and good position, disappeared from Lahore, and at the same time some Frontier students also disappeared from Peshawar and Kohat. The Punjabis made their way by devious routes, with the assistance of the secret Pan-Islamic organisation, to the Wahabi sect of Mujahaddin, known as the Hindustani Fanatics, beyond the North-West Frontier, which for nearly one hundred years has been receiving funds and recruits from India, and in return has inspired many local risings against the infidel British Government and many murders of British officials. The Amir of the Fanatics after a time passed on the students to Kabul. There they were first imprisoned, but afterwards, on the strong representations of Sirdar Nasrullah,

the Amir's brother, and the anti-British section at Kabul, they were released and given allowances. They soon got into touch with the Indian revolutionary leaders, Mahendra Partab and Barkatulla, the joint Presidents of the "Provisional Indian Government," who, with German help, had found their way to Kabul and were using it as an advanced base to foment trouble for the British in India.

Mahendra Partab was a wealthy landowner in the United Provinces, and brother-in-law of a loyal Sikh Maharaja in the Punjab. He had gone to Europe just after the outbreak of the War; had there fallen under the influence of Har Dayal—so successful in corrupting others; and through him had obtained an interview with the Kaiser who, impressed by a megalomania akin to his own, had sent him with Barkatulla on a mission to Kabul. Mahendra Partab on arrival in Kabul claimed to have had interviews not only with the Kaiser, but with the Sultan, the ex-Khedive, Enver Pasha, and with them "to have set right the problems of India and Asia!" With the same end a combined Turco-German Mission arrived in Kabul about the same time. The runaway students, bringing news of the state of affairs in the Punjab, which they represented as in the throes of the Ghadr rebellion, were made much of by these anti-British plotters. In fact they were described by one as "the moving units of this work." A few of them died a miserable death in Kabul; others were sent on dangerous missions to Central Asia, Japan, and Persia. Three of the latter, together with the notorious Sikh revolutionary, "Dr." Mathra Singh—afterwards hanged for rebellion and murder—fell into the hands of our Russian allies on the Persian border, and were made over to the local British authorities. Mathra Singh and one of the students were on a mission to China and Japan; the other two were the bearers of letters to the Sultan of Turkey. Of these, one was, I think, shot for treason and espionage by order of a local court-martial in Persia, and two were brought back to Lahore early in 1917. Men have been hanged for less than they were guilty of; but more out of regard for their friends than for themselves, I gave these men a conditional



pardon. The information they gave of their wanderings in the prosecution of Pan-Islamic German and Afghan intrigue was most useful and threw light on the "Silk Letter" plot.

It was in August, 1916, that we got information of the "Silk Letter" plot, and were able to nip it in the bud. This plot originated in Kabul in 1915-16.

It was designed to unite all the forces of Islam, the Turks, the Arabs under the Sherif of Mecca, the Afghans, the Frontier tribes, and the Mohammedans of India, in a combined effort against British rule. This was to take the form of an attack by the Frontier tribes, incited by the Hindustani Fanatics, a matter easy enough to manage and which in this case did come off—supported by a general Mohammedan rising in India. It was hoped that the revolutionary Hindus and the America-returned Sikhs would at once join in.

The conspiracy was organised with some skill, and was pushed in India, Central Asia, the Hejaz, and Mesopotamia, by all the traditional Oriental methods—spies and emissaries going to and fro, letters in elaborate ciphers and cryptic scripts. At this stage the "silk letters," which were the key to the whole mystery, fell into my hands in a curious way.

Among the "runaways" in Kabul were two sons of a fine Mohammedan soldier—a Khan who was an old friend of mine. I had, at his instance, got messages sent to the Amir to allow these youths to return under promise of a free pardon. This was unsuccessful. The two youths then sent a family servant, who had joined them in Kabul, back to India with a message for their father. The servant's comings and goings aroused the old man's suspicions. He admitted, when severely heckled, that he had brought something else from Kabul. These were the famous "silk letters," i.e. letters written neatly in Persian on lengths of yellow silk and sewn up inside the lining of his coat. The coat had been left for safety in a Native State. It was produced under the Khan's threats; the Khan cut out the "silk letters." Not being a Persian scholar he could not make much out of them, but realising that they concealed some inner meaning, he took them to the Commissioner of

the Division. The latter sent them on to me, saying he thought they were pure nonsense.

I did not grasp their full meaning at first, but understood enough to satisfy myself that they revealed a plot with wide ramifications. I passed them on to the Criminal Intelligence Department, where Sir Charles Cleveland speedily unravelled the whole mystery. The letters were communications from two Maulvis, Obedulla and Ansari, who had filled important posts in the Deoband (United Provinces) School of Theology, had preached and written there and in Delhi in favour of Jihad (Holy War), and to realise that object had gone to Kabul in 1915, visiting the Hindustani Fanatics on the way. At Kabul they were well received, got into touch with the Turco-German Mission, with the Indian revolutionaries, Mahendra Partab and Barkatulla, and set the wires working. Ansari had already gone to Arabia and returned to Kabul.

The "silk letters" were dated 9th July, 1916, and were addressed to a trustworthy agent in Sind, who was enjoined to send them on by a reliable messenger, or to convey them in person to a famous Mohammedan religious leader, Mahmud Hasan, who had already gone from Deoband to Mecca to promote the conspiracy there.

The letters described the progress of the movement in Kabul and India, the arrival of the German and Turkish Missions, the departure of the former, the formation of the "Provisional Government," the activities of the students. They then outlined the plan for forming an "Army of God," to drive out the British through an alliance of all-Islamic rulers.

The "Provisional Government" had earlier, in 1916, gone so far as to dispatch a Mission with letters signed by Mahendra Partab to the Russian Governor-General in Turkestan and even to the Tsar (this letter was engraved on a gold plate), urging Russia to throw over her alliance with Britain and assist in the invasion of India—for a consideration. This Mission was turned back by the Russian Imperial Government; but the Bolsheviks when they rose to power in 1917 were quick to grasp the value of this means for giving Britain a stab in the

back, and have since employed it with great persistence and some success.

Prior to this, the German Government in Berlin, with the assistance of its expert staff of Indian traitors, had addressed similar letters written in faultless Urdu, sumptuously bound and signed by the Imperial Chancellor (von Bethmann-Hollweg), to the leading Indian Princes, promising them wonderful concessions if they shook off the yoke of Great Britain. But many of these letters, which we saw later, were intercepted by us when a German Mission was captured in North Persia, and doubtless they now form interesting historical documents in the archives of the Indian Foreign Office.

These intrigues show what strenuous attempts were being made by the "Provisional Government" in Kabul and their allies to prepare the way for the "Army of God."

The great Mohammedan Maulvi from India, to whom the "silk letters" were addressed in Mecca, had already got into communication with the Turkish General in the Hejaz—Ghalib Pasha—and obtained from him, as Ghalib Pasha subsequently admitted when he was our prisoner of war in Egypt, a declaration of Jihad (Holy War) against the British. Copies of this, known as the *Ghalibnama*, had been distributed in India and among the Frontier tribes. The "silk letters" urged the Maulvi to carry the movement a stage further, to secure the active co-operation of the Turkish Government and of the Sherif of Mecca, who had not yet revolted against the Turks when the letters were written. This part of the scheme was ingeniously constructed, and by no means impossible of execution in the circumstances then existing.

The letters went on to describe the constitution of the "Army of God," and here the scheme appeared to be unreal and fantastic. The headquarters were to be at Medina, and the great Maulvi was to be Commander-in-Chief!

There were to be separate but subordinate Commands at Constantinople, Teheran, and Kabul, and the writer and arch-plotter, Obedulla, was to have the Kabul command. The letters gave the names of three patrons, of twelve Field-

Marshals, of whom one was the Sherif of Mecca, and of many other commanders. The Lahore runaway students were not forgotten. One was to be a Major-General, one a Colonel, and six were to be Lieutenant-Colonels.

All this part of the scheme only existed on paper, but it gave us valuable information as to the sympathisers in India, and enabled us to take necessary preventive measures. In the Punjab these did not go beyond the internment of a dozen or so of those who were known to be the most active pro-Turkish adherents.

I think now we perhaps treated the matter too lightly ; for its centre, the "Provisional Government," remained firmly rooted in Kabul, whence it continued to encourage seditious agitation in India and hostile action by the Frontier tribes during the War. After the War and the murder of our faithful ally, the Amir Habibullah, in February, 1919, it threw all its influence into promoting the rebellious outbreaks in India in April, 1919, in linking them up with the Afghan and tribal aggressions, and in precipitating the latter against Northern India in May, 1919—fortunately too late to be effective.

The main reason for not taking the "Silk Letter" conspiracy more seriously was that the revolt of the Sherif of Mecca against the Turks, in June, 1916, divided Islam, and knocked the bottom out of the project for combined Muslim action against British India. I have always thought that the valuable results of the Sherif's action at a critical time—among other acts he arrested and handed over to us the great Maulvi and other Indian conspirators—have not been fully appreciated.

The Government of India at the time appeared to be unduly nervous that the revolt would antagonise Indian Mohammedans and thus cause serious trouble in India. I never held that view. The small but seditious Pan-Islamist section doubtless resented the Sherif's action and, if allowed, would have used it as the basis for an anti-British agitation. One such meeting was, in fact, held at Lahore—attended by only a dozen or so. It was a *ballon d'essai*—the first ; and I took care it should be the last. The Government of India made it clear that they

would not tolerate any condemnation of the Sherif, who had declared himself to be the ally of the British Government, and who was freeing his own people from Turkish oppression.

This completes the account of the Mohammedan movements in the Punjab before and during the Great War. It is significant that except at Kabul, where contact was established with revolutionary Hindus inspired from Berlin and India, it was entirely distinct from the simultaneous Hindu and Sikh revolutionary movements. Of the hundreds who were convicted and punished for complicity in these latter, there were not, I think, more than one or two Mohammedans. The aloofness of the Mohammedans from the revolutionary societies now terrorising Bengal is equally marked.

The fidelity to his treaty with us of the Amir Habibullah throughout the War was an asset of enormous value. The Amir could not afford openly to oppose the strong section among his Sirdars and officials who urged him to throw in his lot with Turkey and Germany—whose agents were in his capital—and declare a Holy War which would bring in Afghanistan, the Frontier tribes, and the small but actively seditious Mohammedan element in India.

He temporised very adroitly, and is reported to have said to the Turco-German Mission, that when they could show him an army of 100,000 men at Herat, he would begin to think they meant business. It was at this stage that the Germans left Kabul in disgust. They could not deliver the goods.

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## CHAPTER XII

### HINDU AND SIKH CONSPIRACIES

THE beginnings of the seditious movement in the Punjab in 1907 have already been referred to, as well as the prompt action taken by Sir Denzil Ibbetson for the deportation of the two leaders, Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh. The investigations then made showed that among those implicated were many members of the Arya Samáj. This Hindu movement, ostensibly for religious and social reform, had in the previous thirty years made much progress among educated Hindus, and had established an organisation in nearly every district; it had its own separate schools and colleges and its own ably edited newspapers.

Men like Lajpat Rai, Bhai Parma Nand, Ram Bhaj Dat, whose seditious activities have since 1907 been so often manifest, were even then prominent in the Arya Samáj. Previous Lieutenant-Governors had noted that the Samáj, which was bitterly opposed to Islam and Christianity as well as to orthodox Hinduism, had been largely responsible for the growing tension between Hindus and Mohammedans, and that though in its ranks there were Government servants, loyal and capable men, its general tendency was disloyal. Alarmed by the deportation of Lajpat Rai, one of its most prominent members, the leading men of the organisation waited on Sir Denzil Ibbetson in May, 1907, to assure him that the Arya Samáj, *as a body*, had nothing to do with the late disturbances, and that the College students had taken no part in the Lahore riots. (Students of this College were implicated in the bomb case of 1912-13 and in the rebellion of 1919, and some were convicted.) Sir Denzil, according to the report in the *Tribune*,

said he was pleased to receive this assurance, but he had been informed by nearly every District Officer that wherever there was an Arya Samáj (society) it was the centre of seditious talk.

In fact the Arya Samáj is a nationalist revival against Western influence; it urges its followers in the *Satyarth Parkash*, the authoritative work of Daya Nand, who was the founder of the sect, to go back to the Vedas, and to seek the golden future in the (imaginary) golden past of the Aryas. The *Satyarth Parkash* also contains arguments against non-Hindu rule, and a leading organ of the sect a few years ago claimed Daya Nand as the real author of the doctrine of Swaraj.

However, the Arya Samáj in 1907 thought it wise to publish a resolution to the effect that as mischievous people here and there had spread rumours hostile to them, the organisation in reiterating its old creed declared that it had no connection of any kind with any political body or with any political agitation in any shape. While accepting this declaration as disassociating the Samáj *as a body* from extremist politics, it should be noted in fairness to the orthodox Hindus that while the Samáj does not include perhaps more than 5 per cent of the Hindu population of the Punjab, an enormous proportion of the Hindus convicted of sedition and other political offences from 1907 down to the present day are members of the Samáj.

The deportations of 1907 checked but did not kill the seditious movement in the Punjab. Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh on their release became active in various ways. The former through Bhai Parma Nand, a professor of the Arya Samáj College in Lahore, who was in Europe in 1907, had been trying to obtain from Krishna Varma, of India House notoriety, books and money for propaganda among students. Parma Nand was put on security in 1910, and sentenced to death in 1915 for active participation in the Ghadr rebellion at Lahore. The sentence was commuted by the Viceroy to transportation for life, but he has since been amnestied.

Ajit Singh in 1909 disappeared into Persia. Thence he went to Paris and to that centre of revolutionary activity, Geneva. Early in the War he moved to Rio Janeiro, and there

kept in close touch with the Ghadr Party in San Francisco. His brother, Kishan Singh, with one Lal Chand Falak, carried on a seditious agitation which led to their conviction in 1910.

About this time one of the most sinister figures in the revolutionary movement appeared on the scene. This was Har Dayal, a native of Delhi, educated in St. Stephen's College (Cambridge Mission), Delhi, where he came into contact with Amir Chand. After a brilliant academical career in Delhi and Lahore, he went to St. John's, Oxford, as a State Scholar in 1905. He threw up this scholarship in 1907, and thenceforward devoted his undoubted talents to revolutionary work. He was back in Lahore in 1908, and stayed for some time with Lajpat Rai with a party of young men, whose characters he was forming by preaching passive resistance and boycott, thus anticipating Gandhi by ten years.

He went back to Europe in 1908, and after visiting London, Paris, and Geneva returned to India in 1910. In Geneva he edited the seditious *Bande Mataram*, and in Paris stayed for some time with Krishna Varma, who had fled thither from London after the cowardly assassination of Sir Curzon Wyllie at an India Office reception by one Dhingra, a Punjabi student.

Among his pupils in 1910 were Dina Nath, a Punjabi, and a Bengali named Chatterji. When Har Dayal left for America, the political education of these was taken up by Amir Chand, a trusted teacher in the Cambridge Mission School in Delhi, and the Bengali, Rash Bihari, a clerk in the Forest Department. These two, as explained in Chapter X, then became leading spirits in the conspiracy in India, which included several Bengalis among its members, drew its funds and its bombs from Bengal, and brought about the murderous attack on the Viceroy in December, 1912, and the Lahore bomb murder of May, 1913. The conspiracy was unravelled by the Criminal Investigation Department with great skill. Dina Nath turned informer; Amir Chand and three others were hanged; but Rash Behari escaped and during the War continued his murderous designs. He is still at large. [I have recently heard of him in Tokio.]



So is Har Dayal. He arrived in the United States early in 1911, and established himself in Berkeley, California, where a seditious movement had been at work for some years to corrupt the Indian immigrants, chiefly Sikhs, of whom several thousands had settled since 1907 along the Pacific coast from Vancouver to San Francisco.

Har Dayal found the ground prepared and at once set to work to sow the seed. The attempt on Lord Hardinge's life was claimed by him, and with some reason, as the work of his party, and he invited all to help in ridding India of the "British Vampire." The infamous *Ghadr* newspaper, which openly incited to murder and mutiny and urged all Indians to return to India with the express object of murdering the British and causing revolution by any and every means, was started by Har Dayal in 1913. He was assisted chiefly by Ram Chandra, Peshawari, and Barkatulla. The latter was a native of Bhopal and a strong advocate of anti-British Pan-Islamism. In 1909 he became Professor in Tokio University, where he started a paper called the *Islamic Fraternity*. In 1911 he visited Cairo, Constantinople, and St. Petersburg, and was in communication with Krishna Varma in Paris. On his return to Japan the tone of his paper became so anti-British that it was suppressed by the Japanese Government in 1912. Early in 1914 he was deprived of his appointment in Tokio, and he then came to San Francisco to join Har Dayal, and threw in his lot with the Ghadr party.

Translations of the *Ghadr* in various Indian vernaculars were being freely circulated in America and secretly smuggled into India in the year preceding the War. Har Dayal was clearly using the United States as a base for attacking the British in India, and in March, 1914, the States Government arrested him with a view to deportation as an undesirable alien. He was released on bail, but forfeited his bail and absconded to Switzerland with Barkatulla, leaving his lieutenant, Ram Chandra, Peshawari (afterwards murdered in San Francisco by another Punjab revolutionary in course of a trial), to carry on the *Ghadr* and continue his revolutionary propaganda among the Sikhs. All this time Har Dayal was

clearly in the confidence of Germany. At a meeting at Sacramento on 31st December, 1913, according to subsequent judicial findings "portraits of famous seditionists and murderers were displayed on the screen, and revolutionary mottoes were exhibited. *Har Dayal told the audience that Germany was preparing to go to war with England, and that it was time to get ready to go to India for the coming revolution.*"

How promptly his advice was acted on after the outbreak of war, *seven months later*, will appear further on.

The outbreak of the War found the two arch-conspirators, Har Dayal and Barkatulla, in Berlin. There they, with certain Bengalis, Chakrabarti and Chattopadhaya (the brother of Mrs. Naidu and the apologist for the murder of Sir Curzon Wyllie), a Madras named Pillai, and other seditious Indians, were, according to the judgment in the Lahore (third) conspiracy case, attached to the Indian section of the German General Staff, and "were the leaders of an Indian Revolutionary Society." The judgment goes on, "This society, which aimed at establishing a Republic in India, held constant meetings attended by Turks, Egyptians, German officials, and, most noteworthy of all, German ex-professors and ex-missionaries, who in their time had received the hospitality of the British Government in India. Har Dayal and Chattopadhaya were in daily communication with the German Foreign Office. To carry out the revolution in India there was an Oriental Bureau for translating and disseminating inflammatory literature to the Indian prisoners of war in Germany. Inflammatory letters drafted by the German Government and addressed to the Indian Princes, were translated and printed, and meetings were held in which the common objects of Germany and India were dilated upon, these meetings being sometimes presided over by highly placed German officials."

One can imagine how thoroughly the Indian conspirator, with his low cunning, abnormal vanity, inborn aptitude for intrigue, and capacity for glossing over unpleasant facts, was at home in this atmosphere. It also appealed to them on other grounds; they could contrive murder and mutiny without running any risks themselves, for, as the Judges in the Lahore

(first) conspiracy case found, "Har Dayal, while inducing his dupes to go to a certain fate, had carefully kept himself and his leading lieutenants out of danger."

It was at this stage that the evil-minded but fatuous Mahendra Partab appeared in Switzerland. He was at once seized upon by Har Dayal, invited to Berlin, introduced to the German authorities and the Kaiser as an influential Raja, treated with great distinction, and in the following year sent with Barkatulla and the German Mission through Constantinople and Baghdad to Kabul, there to establish the advanced base against the British in India.

Thus, in the first year of the War, we have the centre of the conspiracy against British India firmly established in Berlin (where a nucleus still remains working with the Bolsheviks) with Har Dayal as the leading figure. He was in close touch with all the outlying branches—in Lahore, Delhi, Calcutta, through his Punjabi and Bengali associates, in Canada and the United States, through the Ghadr Agency—his own creation, in the Far East, through Barkatulla and others, in Kabul, through Mahendra Partab and Barkatulla. All these in their turn were, as already shown, in close and direct communication with the revolutionary forces in India—Hindu, Mohammedan, and Sikh.

The Germans had made their preparations with characteristic thoroughness. Bernhardt in his book, *Germany and the Next War*, published towards the end of 1911, had described the revolutionary movement among the Hindus of Bengal and the growth of the Pan-Islamist agitation among Indian Mohammedans, a combination between which might, in his opinion, shake Britain's position throughout the East.

In March, 1914, the *Berliner Tageblatt* showed an uncanny knowledge of the secret organisations that were spreading in India with help from outside, and had referred in particular to the Ghadr movement in California.

The Germans in Berlin, and through their diplomatic, consular, and other more secret agencies in America and the East, were, as the evidence in the Lahore conspiracy case proved, in touch with these revolutionary organisations,

directed or encouraged their activities, and supplied them with funds and sometimes with arms. They directly assisted the Mohammedan movement from Kabul, which took shape in the "Silk Letter" and other conspiracies, and the Hindu-Sikh Ghadr movement from the Pacific coast and the Far East.

This latter was by far the most serious attempt to subvert British rule in India. It took many forms. One was to stir up a rebellion in Bengal, the leaders, arms, and ammunition being imported through Batavia and Siam. Another was to start a rising in Burma (then almost denuded of British troops and guarded mainly by Sikh military police who were to be incited to revolt) by the returning Ghadr emigrants from America, working into Burma through Siam. Both of these conspiracies were carefully planned under the general direction of the German Consul-General at Shanghai, but both were frustrated by the vigilance of the Indian authorities, as explained in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE SIKH-GHADR CONSPIRACY

THE third and most menacing of all the conspiracies was the Ghadr (mutiny) outbreak of the America-returned and other revolutionary Sikhs in the Punjab in 1914-15. With this I deal in some detail both on account of the serious trouble it caused at the time and of its bearing on the present Sikh situation.

Even as early as 1907, Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh had realised the advantage of spreading the anti-British agitation among the virile and war-like Sikhs. The attempt met with but little success in the Punjab, where there were then many loyal and influential Sikhs to remind their brethren that they owed to the British Government their continued existence as a separate religion and something approaching a separate nationality. But the thousands of adventurous Sikhs, who from 1907 onwards emigrated in increasing numbers to the Far East, the Pacific coast of Canada, and the United States, had lost touch with these restraining influences and fell gradually under the influence of clever intriguing Hindu revolutionaries. The Sikhs were, as a rule, ignorant but sturdy men of the peasant type, many of them old soldiers, who had gone abroad to better their lot.

By working on their ignorance, their credulity, and their grievances, real or imaginary, in connection with the Canadian immigration laws and the status of Indians abroad, Har Dayal and his associates succeeded in enlisting many of them in a conspiracy to subvert British rule in India. The *Ghadr* newspaper was used to spread the gospel of revolt among Sikhs in the Punjab and abroad. In the summer of 1913,

three Sikh delegates came from Canada to the Punjab. They were really advance agents—though we did not know this at the time—of the Ghadr Party.

Their ostensible object was to arouse public opinion in India to the hardships of the Canadian immigration laws. They held meetings throughout the Province, some of which were attended by many men of undoubted loyalty. But after a time the tone of these meetings changed. Instead of reasonable criticisms of the immigration laws, the speeches became menacing and inflammatory. At this stage I sent a warning to the delegates that if this continued, I would be compelled to take serious action; for the Province was then in a state of high tension as the result of the Delhi and Lahore outrages and the increasing communal friction.

The delegates on this asked for an interview with me. I had a long talk with them and repeated my warning. Two of them were oily and specious; the manner of the third seemed to be that of a dangerous revolutionary. They wished to see the Viceroy, and in sending them on to him, I particularly warned him about this man. They returned to Canada about the beginning of 1914. A year later, after the Ghadr storm had burst over the Province, we discovered that these three men had actively, but secretly, been spreading sedition in the Punjab. All three took a prominent part in the subsequent rebellion. One of them was arrested by the United States Authorities in 1914, for smuggling arms to Indian revolutionaries in Canada, but seems to have escaped. He was next heard of as a Ghadr leader and a German agent in the Far East, engaged in pushing the revolutionary movement in Burma and Siam. He was arrested by the Siamese Government in 1915, deported to India, tried in the second Lahore conspiracy case, for murder, rebellion, etc., and sentenced to death.

The man I had warned Lord Hardinge against turned out to be one of Har Dayal's most trusted lieutenants. He had been a prominent member at the banquet held in San Francisco on 25th December, 1912, to glorify the outrage on Lord Hardinge two days before. Yet a few months later this

scoundrel appears before Lord Hardinge under the disguise of a peaceful delegate !

In 1913 it was easy enough to fall into the trap. But there is less excuse for the high officials in India and England who in recent years have been so ready to grant interviews to so-called Indian "politicians," whose proper place is the prison from which they have been prematurely released for reasons of "political expediency," but who, so far from showing any signs of repentance, have resumed their criminal designs with renewed vigour and with an increased contempt for the Government that, in their own and the public esteem, had shown itself afraid of them.

In 1914 the Sikh "delegates" had left. But even before the outbreak of the War, which the Ghadr Party in America had been warned to expect, we continued to receive from loyal Sikhs serious reports of the spread of the Ghadr propaganda. Our enquiries, however, showed that, as in the case of the Pan-Islamist conspiracy, it had met with a response only from a very small anti-British section of the Punjab Sikhs.

But our anxieties were increased by the knowledge, immediately after the War began, that thousands of the Sikh emigrants, some of whom we had even then reason to believe disaffected, were on their way back from America and the Far East.

It would have been courting disaster to allow these men to spread over the Province. The problem was how to deal with them. The Government of India had already passed a Foreigners' Ordinance, in order to prevent the entry into India and restrict the movements of undesirable aliens.

By a happy inspiration we decided to adopt *mutatis mutandis* those provisions in the case of suspicious Indians returning from abroad. The result was the Ingress Ordinance of 5th September, 1914, which in the Punjab was one of our main safeguards against the returning Ghadr conspirators throughout the War.

We were only just in time. The S.S. *Komagatu Maru* with some four hundred Sikhs and sixty Mohammedans from the Far East arrived in the Hooghly on 27th September. This Japanese ship had been chartered by a Sikh named Gurdit

Singh—a man prominent in the Far East—to take Sikh and other passengers from the Far Eastern ports to Vancouver, and force the Canadian authorities to allow them to land regardless of the immigration laws.

To create a spirit of defiance, anti-British lectures were delivered on board, and copies of the *Ghadr* were freely circulated among the passengers. The Canadian Government was, however, firm. Only a few of the passengers who could satisfy the regulations were allowed to land, and the ship, which had repulsed with force a body of Canadian police attempting to enforce the Government orders, was finally compelled under threat of naval force to leave Vancouver with the remaining passengers, after being fully provisioned.

This decision did not improve the tone and temper of the passengers, many of whom had staked their all on Gurdit Singh's assurance that he would secure their admission to Canada. Gurdit Singh cleverly directed their anger from himself to the British Government as the cause of their misfortunes.

At Yokohama, on the return journey, they heard that war had broken out and that they would not be allowed to land at Hong-Kong or Shanghai, both of which had their own Ghadr societies to deal with, but would be taken on to Calcutta. This gave a further stimulus to the seditious agitation, and on arrival at Calcutta at the end of September many of the Sikhs were ready for any acts of violence, and several of them were in possession of arms and ammunition. We had sent down a body of Sikh police from the Punjab, with a few British officers, to take charge of the passengers and bring them up to the Punjab in a special train.

The Bengal Government had charge of the arrangements for landing and entraining them after search, and had made military and police arrangements for the purpose. Unfortunately the search was perfunctory and many revolvers and much ammunition were brought ashore, either concealed on the person or among the cloths covering the Granth Sahib or Sikh Bible.

Only some sixty, including all the Mohammedans, agreed



to enter the special train at Baj Baj. The remaining three hundred started to march on Calcutta, some ten miles off. They were met on the way by the late Sir William Duke, then a member of the Bengal Government, who was accompanied by a strong military force, and were forced to return to Baj Baj. There further persuasion was tried. In the tumult a shot was fired. This was a signal for a general discharge of fire-arms. Two or three of the Sikh policemen were shot by revolver bullets, and some of the British officials were wounded. Eighteen Sikhs were killed. The rest fled in various directions, flinging away their revolvers. Most of these were rounded up in the course of a few days, but some thirty, including the leader, Gurdit Singh, escaped. Gurdit Singh was arrested a year ago, tried and imprisoned.

The arrested men were interned at Calcutta under the Ingress Ordinance, pending a decision as to their prosecution. An executive enquiry was meantime held by representatives of the Government of India, of Bengal, and of the Punjab. As this showed that most of the men interned were the dupes of Gurdit Singh, and that the most dangerous men had been either killed in the riot or had escaped with Gurdit Singh, all but thirty-one were released after a few months.

The incident showed the defiant and highly-explosive temper of the returning Sikhs. It was distorted by unscrupulous agitators in the Punjab and the Ghadr agents abroad into a gratuitous attack by an oppressive Government on unoffending Sikhs. In this form it was presented to the thousands of Sikhs now on their way back from America and the Far East, and thus it gave a powerful stimulus to the Ghadr propaganda already at work among them.

Shiploads of these returning emigrants now began to arrive at Calcutta, Madras, and Colombo. Machinery for dealing with them under the Ingress Ordinance was hastily improvised ; but time and experience were needed to make it effective, and meantime many hundreds of dangerous men slipped through our hands. Fortunately in the most important case of all we were on the alert.

On 28th October, the Japanese S.S. *Tasu Maru* arrived at

Calcutta bringing 173 Indian passengers, mostly Sikhs from America, Japan, Manila, and Shanghai. Among them, as was afterwards proved in the Lahore conspiracy cases, were most of the Ghadr leaders who were to take the chief part in promoting rebellion in the Punjab, and with this object had been allotted separate circles in the Sikh districts. We had received information that the passengers had been in touch with German agents *en route*, and had made no secret of their intention to start rebellion on arrival, but hearing of the strict search for arms now instituted they had thrown away their weapons and ammunition before reaching Calcutta. I was particularly concerned about this shipload, as the Ghadr outrages had already started in the Punjab, and we were still in the dark as to the extent and the resources of the hidden enemy. We dispatched a strong force of Punjabi policemen under experienced British and Indian officers to bring them up to the Punjab, where their antecedents were to be investigated, in a special train. Our officers were instructed to wire to us on the way up what they could elicit as to the temper and intentions of the emigrants. We were soon informed that they were violently seditious, hurled abuses at the British officers, and boasted openly of the impending downfall of the British Raj. I was on tour when this news came, and, contrary to the advice of the Inspector-General of Police and other advisers, I gave orders that the whole band were to be interned in the Central Jails of Montgomery and Mooltan. This was done. After some time an attempt was made to discriminate. We released seventy-three on security and kept one hundred in jail.

It shows the character of this desperate gang, that of the seventy-three released as *less* dangerous, six were afterwards hanged for participation in the subsequent Ghadr outrages, six were transported for life, six, who were strongly suspected in the same connection, were re-arrested and interned, and two, who were among the chief leaders in the subsequent campaign of murders, rebellion, and dacoity, fell into our hands and saved their necks by becoming informers and helping us to unravel the conspiracy. The confessions of these two

men make the most lurid detective story appear tame reading. On the other hand, of the hundred *more* dangerous men whom we kept from further misdeeds by internment, only six were brought to trial for their share in the conspiracy. They were convicted and sentenced to transportation for life. What the state of the Province would have been if all this gang had remained at large one shudders to imagine.

The internment of the responsible leaders seriously disorganised the original plan of campaign, the success of which turned mainly on the secrecy and suddenness of their attacks. Before they were able to devise another plan and replace the leaders interned, we knew much more about their nefarious designs and were in a better position to cope with them.

Meanwhile, from October, 1914, onwards, thousands of Sikhs from abroad were pouring into the Province. Our method of dealing with these under the Ingress Ordinance, was to watch them from the port of landing and warn them to report themselves at a Central Enquiry Office in Ludhiana. There the antecedents of each man were investigated by our most capable police officers and magistrates, who collected in a *dossier* all the information available as to his movements abroad, his character and relatives in the Punjab, and his general attitude. On the result of this enquiry it was decided whether he should be (a) interned in jail, if really dangerous, pending prosecution, or a change in his mentality or in the general situation, or (b) if less dangerous, restricted to his native village, generally on the security of reliable relatives or of the village headman, or (c) discharged with a warning if believed to be comparatively free from the Ghadr views, the local authorities being told to keep a watch on him. Out of eight thousand who returned in the first two years of the War, some four hundred were interned in jail, two thousand five hundred restricted to their villages, and the remaining five thousand were discharged as above explained. Some of the worst men slipped in through the ports unobserved or failed to report themselves; and some of those who reported, but were not then regarded as very dangerous, proved afterwards,

as shown in the case of the *Tasu Maru*, to be so. It was these men that later on gave us most trouble.

They at once got into touch with the small disaffected element among the local Sikhs, and with the larger section that is easily inclined to rapine and lawlessness. We soon began to receive information that secret meetings were being held in the Sikh districts. Gangs were being organised, emissaries were visiting villages to stir up disaffection, persistent efforts were being made to corrupt students and seduce Indian troops.

Preventive action under the Ingress Ordinance of the ordinary law was taken wherever definite and reliable information was forthcoming; but all this time we felt we were living over a mine full of explosives. In fact, from October, 1914, to September, 1915, there was a constant series of explosions. All over the Central Punjab police were murdered; loyal citizens, especially Sikhs known to be assisting the authorities, were shot down or killed by bombs; gang robberies, sometimes with murder, of wealthy Hindus were carried out to raise funds for the cause; several attempts were made to derail trains or blow up bridges; factories for the preparation of bombs were established in various places; bombs and material for bombs were received from the revolutionary depots; *cachés* of revolvers and guns were made in British districts and Native States; an attack was made on the Indian military picquet guarding a railway bridge on the main line close to Amritsar, the guard was murdered and their rifles taken; plans for seizing the arsenal at Ferozepur and the magazines at Lahore and other cantonments were formed; and persistent attempts were made, not in all cases without success, to tamper with the Indian troops in at least a dozen stations in the Punjab and United Provinces. The fact that most of the regular British troops had gone to France and that many of the most daring of the returned emigrants were old soldiers made this part of the scheme particularly sinister.

It was at this critical stage that Rash Bihari, the organiser of the Delhi and Lahore outrages of 1912-13, moved up into the Punjab to take general charge of the operations. He

brought an astute but daring Mahratta Brahmin of Poona, N. G. Pingle, who had returned from America with the Sikh revolutionaries, as one of his chief lieutenants. These two men became the brains of the conspiracy after so many of the *Tasu Maru* men had fallen into our hands. Bhai Parma Nand, M.A., and professor in the Arya Samáj College at Lahore, was one of the links between the disaffected section of the Hindu Intelligentsia and the Sikhs of the Ghadr Party. He had returned from America before the War broke out.

The Ghadr Party and their local adherents had thus, by the end of 1914, defied the Government which it was their avowed object to subvert, and had by a campaign of terrorism, enforced by the revolver, the dagger, and the bomb, endeavoured to paralyse authority and attract adherents to their cause.

Fortunately all through this anxious period the great mass of the rural population, including the Sikhs, remained staunch and loyal, and continued to give, often at great risk, the most active assistance to the authorities in rounding up and bringing to justice the revolutionary gangs. One instance out of scores may be cited.

On 27th November, 1914, a gang of fifteen Ghadr Sikhs at Ferozepur, while awaiting orders from headquarters for an attack on Ferozepur arsenal, decided to loot the Government treasury at Moga, which had only a small police guard. On their way they were stopped and challenged by a sub-Inspector of Police and a Sikh Zaildar (rural notable). These, after a brief parley, they shot dead with revolvers. They then fled towards the jungle, hotly pursued by the Sikh villagers and a few police. Shots were exchanged; two of them were killed and seven were captured, as the villagers set fire to their cover and compelled them to come out. Those seven were tried by the ordinary courts, convicted and hanged within two months of the outrage. The six who escaped were all, I think, arrested later and brought to justice for this or other murders.

Grants of special pensions and of Government land were promptly made to the heirs of the murdered sub-Inspector and Zaildar respectively, while the villagers were rewarded

by a substantial reduction of the land-tax. Similar measures were taken promptly in every case where active assistance was forthcoming, and these had a wonderful effect in stimulating popular co-operation.

I may mention one other instance. Riding down the Anarkali Bazaar at Lahore one morning, a police officer showed me the place where a Sikh sub-Inspector had been shot dead the previous evening by a Ghadr revolutionary whom he had challenged as a suspect. The murderer had attempted to escape, but was promptly collared, knocked down and made over to the police by a local sweetmeat seller. I asked to see the latter. He was not present then, but a few hours later turned up at Government House. He was a cheery brawny fellow and explained to me that he had some skill in wrestling, and this had encouraged him to tackle a murderer with a smoking pistol in his hand! I doubt if any Indian but a Punjabi would have been so daring. He left Government House with a handsome pecuniary reward, followed up by a grant of land.

It was, however, not enough to reward promptly our loyal supporters. It was even more necessary to inflict stern and prompt punishment on those who were proved guilty of the outrages.

In December, 1914, I represented to the Government of India that "it is most undesirable at the present time to allow trials of these revolutionaries, or of other sedition-mongers, to be protracted by the ingenuity of Counsel and drawn out to inordinate lengths by the committal and appeal procedure which the criminal law provides." At the same time I submitted the draft of an Ordinance for speeding up the procedure, in cases certified by the local Government, by providing for the trial of the offenders directly after the police investigation had established a *prima facie* case. This trial was to be before a Tribunal of three Judges, who would, of course, be bound by the ordinary rules of procedure and evidence, but from whose decision and sentence—and to this the Chief Court of the Punjab agreed—there should be no further judicial appeal. The right of the accused to petition

both the Local Government and the Viceroy for clemency remained intact. Provision was also made for rendering the security sections more effective, and for the punishment of village officers and others colluding with or assisting revolutionary criminals, also of persons carrying arms in suspicious circumstances. The methods proposed were admittedly exceptional to meet a temporary emergency, and would, I was convinced, have the support of all peaceful and law-abiding people in the Province. The Government of India at this time were considering similar measures on a wider scale, which eventually took the form of the Defence of India Act. My proposals were, therefore, treated as part of the larger question, and this caused serious delay at the most critical time.

In the early months of 1915, the Ghadr outbreaks became more alarming in spite of the most vigorous efforts of the administrations to cope with the situation by the ordinary law. No less than forty-five serious outrages had been committed up to February, 1915, by the revolutionaries, who were now drawing recruits from the lawless elements in the population. Rural notables and village officials on whom Government relied for support and information were being terrorised, and loyal people were showing signs of being affected by the insidious propaganda which declared that the British power was shaken to its base throughout the world. In pressing those facts on the Government of India in February and March, and again asking for special legislation on the lines proposed in the previous December, I had to bring to their notice two startling developments of the gravest import, viz. (1) the abortive attempt at rebellion which went off at "half-cock" at various centres in the Province on 19th February, and (2) the agrarian rising of the Mohammedan peasantry in the South-West Punjab, directed mainly against their Hindu creditors, which broke out early in March.

These two outbreaks, though simultaneous, had no direct connection with one another; but they showed how seriously the foundations of public security were being shaken in the Province which was the key to the military situation in India and the chief recruiting-ground for the Indian Army.

I followed up my written representations by a visit to the Viceroy at Delhi in the middle of March. Lord Hardinge, though he was sympathetic to legitimate Indian aspirations, and even more so after the cowardly attack on his life, had both courage and statesmanlike vision. The Government of India in his time was not afraid of its enemies, and was prompt to act when the necessity was established. After a few interviews with the Viceroy and the Home Member, Sir Reginald Craddock, I was informed that the Defence of India Bill had become law. It gave me all the powers I needed, and I returned to the Punjab confident that with these powers and the support of a loyal people the Administration would soon be able to restore order. Within a fortnight I was able to report a marked improvement.

It may be convenient here to refer to the abortive outbreak of 19th February.

It has been explained above that, early in 1915, the Bengali Rash Bihari, with the Mahratta Brahmin, Pingle, were the brains directing the revolutionary activities of the Ghadr Party, who were mainly Sikhs. Rash Bihari had established his headquarters at Amritsar, where he lived with other Bengalis, whom he and Pingle had brought up from Bengal to assist in bomb-making. These leaders were also active in endeavouring to enlist the support of Indian troops, especially Sikhs and Rajputs, in Northern India.

In January and February their emissaries were tampering with the troops from Jhelum on the North to as far down as Benares. They had met with some success in certain battalions lately returned from the Far East and also in a Sikh squadron of a cavalry regiment at Lahore. We got wind of this through an informer who was in close touch with the would-be mutineers and related to some of them. We also got information that a general rising had been planned for the night of 21st February, when in various cantonments of Northern India certain troops would mutiny, murder their British officers, and combining with the Ghadr adherents from outside, who were to be ready on the spot, would seize the magazines, arms, and ammunition, and bring about a general rising.



The idea was not fantastic, for it had penetrated as far down as Bengal and was known to the disaffected elements in Dacca. In Lahore the first move on the above lines was to come from the disaffected Sikh squadron. It was my misfortune to have a dozen men from this squadron as my personal escort at the time. I resisted the suggestion of my private secretary, who, with the head of the Criminal Investigation Department and myself, alone knew the full ramifications of the conspiracy, that I should change the escort. To do so would probably arouse suspicion that *their* plans had leaked out, and we did not want to act till *our* plans were matured. So the escort stayed on, though I used them as little as possible. On the morning of the 19th February, we received information from our spies that Rash Bihari and Pingle had moved their headquarters to Lahore, that suspecting the leakage of their plans they had decided to antedate the rising to the night of the 19th, and had sent messages or emissaries to the various selected centres, including several cantonments, to act accordingly. We had then to act at once.

The rebel headquarters in four separate houses at Lahore were raided by our police that afternoon headed by that very brave and able officer Khan Liyakat Haiyat Khan, and Mr. L. L. Tomkins, the efficient head of the C.I.D. Thirteen of the most dangerous revolutionaries were captured with all the paraphernalia of the conspiracy, arms, bombs, bomb-making materials, revolutionary literature, and four rebel flags (one of which I claimed and hold as a souvenir). Unfortunately, Rash Bihari and Pingle were not among the gang that were captured.

Both escaped down country. Pingle was arrested a few weeks later in the lines of the 12th Cavalry at Meerut with a collection of bombs brought up from Bengal and sufficient, in expert opinion, to blow up a regiment. He and Parma Nand were among those tried, convicted, and sentenced to be hanged in the first Lahore conspiracy case by the Special Tribunal under the Defence of India Act a few months later. Pingle was hanged. Parma Nand's sentence was commuted by the Viceroy to one of transportation for life, and he has, I believe, since been released! Of the two I should have been more

inclined to show leniency to Pingle, who did not hesitate to risk his life, acknowledged the justice of his sentence, and met his death like a man; while the other, like Rash Bihari, had kept out of danger himself while inciting his dupes to action which in some cases led to their death.

The *coup* at Lahore on 19th February foiled the plans for a general rising that night. We at once wired in cipher to the various cantonments, Sialkot, Ferozepur, Rawal Pindi, etc., and the military authorities took the necessary—in some cases perhaps excessive—precautions. At Lahore and Ferozepur Cantonments, gangs of the Ghadr Party had gathered to “chip in” when the expected mutiny began. But they found all the troops fallen in and under arms, and they beat a hurried retreat. The tainted Sikh squadron was sent to the Front soon after with the rest of the regiment; for in time of war it was not thought advisable by the military authorities to have a court-martial which would make public the mutinous preparations.

The depot was moved to a distant station, and when it was detraining, some of the bombs, which had been secreted for months after 19th February, exploded. A court-martial could not now be avoided. The result was that eighteen men of the regiment were sentenced to death, and twelve were actually executed. I was too busy at the time to enquire how many of these had been among my protective escort prior to the 19th February.

This fact and others showed that the failure of a bold design, though it strengthened our hands and steadied the waverers, did not dishearten the leaders. They found the atmosphere of the Punjab too hot to be comfortable for themselves and took refuge in the United Provinces, whence they directed a campaign of assassination and outrage for several months more. Above all they continued their efforts to seduce Indian troops. But the capture in March of Pingle at Meerut, in the lines of the 12th Cavalry, and of other agents, who were tampering with the 22nd Cavalry in the Punjab but were seized and given up by the Sikh officers and men, showed that this was a dangerous game to play at.

Meantime, one after another the Ghadr leaders in the Punjab were falling into our hands. To save their skins several of these gave information which gradually gave us the key to their organisation and methods and led to the arrest of their confederates. Above all the Special Tribunals of three Judges, including one Indian, while most thorough in their investigations and displaying a sense of justice which was publicly acknowledged by many of the accused, ensured the prompt and stern punishment of the guilty. The Sikh community as a body had throughout helped us in the struggle with this body of denationalised Sikhs (for the Ghadr adherents in America had renounced many of the essential Sikh practices), who were bringing disgrace on the Sikh name.

In March, 1915, when the situation was still critical, I held a conference of a dozen of the leading Sikhs of the Province with the Commissioners and Deputy-Commissioners of the Sikh districts at Lahore. I put the situation very frankly before them—it is only our latter-day politicians who think that candour is not appreciated by Orientals—told them that the Government was strong enough to crush the Ghadr rebellion by its own resources, but that this could be done more promptly and with less bloodshed if I had the hearty co-operation of the Sikhs themselves. Moreover, the movement was bringing the Sikhs as a whole into discredit, and their interests as well as their honour were involved. I then invited their suggestions. All were eager and sincere in offering to me their own co-operation and all the influence at their command ; some were anxious to go much further in the way of drastic measures than I was, e.g. they wished to intern in jail the whole three thousand two hundred emigrants who had up to then returned and of whom we had only interned some two hundred in jail and seven hundred in their villages. I pointed out that we could not intern thousands in jail on vague suspicion, but that we would readily intern any of those now at large against whom a reasonable suspicion of sympathy with the Ghadr conspiracy existed.

Eventually it was decided that in the districts in which the conspiracy was most active, committees of the local Sikh

magnates should be established to enquire into the conduct and reputation of the returned emigrants and their supporters, and to advise the Deputy-Commissioner as to the action to be taken under the Ingress Ordinance or the ordinary law. These Sikh committees proved to be a most valuable help to the Administration ; they associated with it the leading Sikhs and through them all the loyal members of the community ; they gave the Deputy-Commissioner most valuable information which enabled him to supplement and check the reports he was receiving from the overworked police ; and finally, at a later stage, they enabled him to show that the committees were not utilised solely for punitive purposes, for releases from internment and other restrictions were made by Government or the Deputy-Commissioner in consultation with the Sikh committees. I have never known a system so hastily improvised work so smoothly and so successfully. I was glad to see that a somewhat similar method of dealing with the seditious Akali agitation among the Sikhs was started last year by the present Governor of the Punjab (Sir Malcolm Hailey) directly after he took charge of the Province and has already been justified by results.

Once loyal men are assured that Government will not let them down, to conciliate its enemies and theirs, they will come forward, at least in the Punjab, to help in maintaining order. But they will do nothing for a Government from which, as one of the most influential Sikhs said two years ago, "its friends have nothing to hope, its foes have nothing to fear."

The position of these loyal Sikhs in 1915 was one of considerable danger ; for the revolutionaries, becoming more desperate as they lost ground, resorted more freely than ever to cowardly assassination of those who were helping the Government. In April a loyal Sikh Sirdar (Chanda Singh) was murdered in Hoshiarpur. Two returned emigrants were promptly convicted and hanged for this.

In June a Sikh magnate of Amritsar, Sirdar Achar Singh, who had been prominent in assisting the authorities, was murdered, also by returned emigrants. In this case the two murderers were promptly caught, convicted, and hanged.

In August one Kapur Singh of Amritsar, who had given evidence a day or two before against some of the accused before the Special Tribunal, was murdered outside his house. The assassins escaped at the time, but were afterwards brought to account and hanged for this or another murder.

These prompt proofs—I have quoted only a few out of many—that the arm of the law was as strong as it was long, accompanied by liberal grants of land to the relatives of the murdered men, soon turned the tide of popular opinion to the side of the Government. By June the rural population were so disgusted at the Ghadr outrages and so confident of support and reward from Government, that of their own motion they took up the hunting down of even the most desperate Ghadr gangs with courage and enthusiasm.

Early in June a meeting of revolutionaries from British districts had been held in the Kapurthala State to arrange a plan for seizing the State magazine. Meantime a gang of eight was sent to attack the military picquet on an important railway bridge near Amritsar and seize their rifles and ammunition for use in the larger scheme. On the night of 11th June, they rushed the picquet, killed two of the sentries, and carried off four rifles and some ammunition.

Here again, as in Ferozepur in the previous November, the country-side turned out and gave chase. Hotly pursued, the murderers made for the ferry over the Beas River into Kapurthala. They shot a ferryman and took his boat. They shot another of the pursuing party. But the pursuit was maintained into the Kapurthala State. There five of the murderers were captured with the help of the State police, tried by a Special Tribunal, and promptly hanged. Two had detached themselves from the rest of the party, but these subsequently fell into our hands; one turned approver and the other was hanged.

By August, 1915, that is within nine months of the first outbreak, we had crushed the Ghadr rebellion. Nearly all the leaders and many of their most active adherents were in our hands awaiting trial or were brought to justice later, internal order was restored, and, above all, the Sikh community had again proved its staunch loyalty.

Curiously enough, the annihilation of a gallant Sikh battalion (14th Sikhs) in Gallipoli on June 4th, 1915, in an heroic stand against an overwhelming Turkish force, was one of the most powerful factors in securing the loyalty of that martial race. The fighting Sikhs on hearing the news raised their heads again (many of them had been sullen or dejected during the Ghadr campaign) proudly conscious, for the Sikh is never reticent as to his great deeds, that they had vindicated their reputation for loyalty and courage. After that the rush to the colours in the Sikh districts was extraordinary. In the four years of war the Sikhs from a total population of two-and-a-half millions—less than 1 per cent of British India—furnished no less than ninety thousand combatant recruits, or one-eighth of India's total. In fact so enthusiastic was their response, so gallant were their deeds, and so generous the rewards and appreciation, that many of them have got the idea into their heads that "we won the War."

This exaggerated sense of their importance has contributed to the turbulent and arrogant attitude that the fanatical Akalis, worked up by the incitements of Hindu and Muslim extremists, have since adopted. Such men can only, as the history of the Ghadr movement shows, be brought to reason by a firm and consistent policy; and our policy in handling the Sikh shrines agitation and its various side-issues has, at least till recently, been neither firm nor consistent.

To close this long narrative of the Ghadr conspiracy, it may be stated here that 175 accused persons were brought before the Special Tribunals which dealt with the general conspiracies, as apart from the separate outrages. Of these 136 were convicted of offences in nearly all cases punishable with death; 38 were sentenced to death, but the sentences were commuted to transportation for life in 18 cases (two by me and sixteen by the Viceroy), and in the end only 20 were hanged; 58 were transported for life; 58 were transported or imprisoned for shorter periods. In 115 cases forfeiture of property was ordered by the Courts, but in most of these the order was remitted by the Local Government.

As internal order was restored, the men interned in jail as

highly dangerous were released, generally on the security of their friends, when we were satisfied either that their revolutionary tendencies had disappeared, or that they were no longer dangerous. By the end of the War only some half-dozen, who were absolutely *intransigent*, were still detained.

Similarly the restrictions on those who were confined to their villages were steadily removed, and before I left the Province had been almost totally withdrawn. We had to face certain risks in doing this, for some twenty cases were brought to light in which the men so released had taken an active part in the Ghadr or other subversive movements. But these were speedily brought to justice. On the whole the policy of restriction of the America-returned suspects to their villages was singularly successful. These men had been living abroad in a false atmosphere, fed on the lies and calumnies against British rule propagated by Har Dayal and his associates through the *Ghadr* newspaper and by inflammatory lectures. A return to their home life and surroundings soon showed most of them that the British Government in India was not an instrument of tyranny and oppression, but was doing its duty towards the people as well, if not better, than the governments of other countries they had seen.

So anxious were some to show their return to loyal citizenship, that they formally petitioned to be allowed to enlist in the Army during the War with their brother Sikhs. The military authorities, however, were not prepared to take the risk of recruiting men, some of whom might have as their object to corrupt their comrades, as happened in a few instances at the beginning of the Ghadr campaign.

In 1917 and 1918, the America-returned Sikhs gave us very little trouble. They were quick to take to heart the lesson that revolution was a dangerous game.

In the rebellion of April, 1919, the attitude of those nine or ten thousand men, scattered over all the districts of the Central Punjab where the rebellious movement was most marked, gave us cause for anxiety. Had they thrown in their lot with the forces of disorder the situation would have been even more grave than it was. The information we received

from several independent sources was that many of them were waiting on events, and if we had not succeeded in crushing the rebellion within a few weeks we should have found many of them on the side of the rebels. Anticipating this, one of the first steps we took was to tighten our surveillance over them, and to show them the might of Government by sending movable columns through the areas in which they were most numerous. Anyhow they remained quiet; and of the one thousand eight hundred persons convicted for complicity in the 1919 rebellion there were not more than two or three of the returned emigrants. But it would be foolish to expect that the views of the thousands who had been infected with revolutionary ideas in America and the Far East had permanently altered for the better.

The fear of the law was the main restraining influence with many. When this fear was removed by the premature amnesty of the 1919 rebels, some of the Ghadr adherents began to raise their heads again. It is notorious that they formed the nucleus of the new revolutionary movement of the Akali Sikhs, which has grown up in the last few years, and were prominent members of the Babbar (Lion) Akali gang that was responsible for a murderous campaign on the Ghadr lines in Jullundur, Ludhiana, and Hoshiarpur, and was finally suppressed in 1923 after much bloodshed by a combined attack of the troops and police. Perhaps one can no longer talk of the unchanging East. But it is true to say, "*Plus ça change; plus c'est la même chose.*"



## CHAPTER XIV

### AGRARIAN RISINGS IN SOUTH-WEST PUNJAB

TOWARDS the end of February, 1915, when the Ghadr troubles were at their worst and the anti-British Pan-Islamist movement had shown itself in the flight of the Lahore students to Kabul, our anxieties were increased by a sudden rising of the Mohammedan peasantry in the Mooltan, Muzaffargarh, and Jhang districts of the South-West Punjab. This had no connection with either the Pan-Islamist or the Ghadr movement, except that like them it was encouraged by the belief, fostered by certain seditious newspapers, that the Germans and Turks were advancing on India and that the British power was on the wane.

The Mohammedan peasantry of the South-West Punjab are a simple, credulous, and home-staying people, lacking the virile instincts of their martial brethren of the North-West Punjab. They were as a body heavily in debt to Hindu moneylenders and were suffering from the high prices and contraction of credit due to the War. There was also a severe epidemic of plague which drove many of the Hindus to the towns.

The peasantry seized this opportunity to pay off old scores. They rose in a body, looted the shops of the Hindus, seized the grain and money, burnt the account-books which recorded their debts, and began a campaign of disorder and looting which spread with alarming rapidity.

The word had gone round that the British had gone. In one case emissaries had been sent to the district headquarters to see if the British flag was flying. It was a Sunday, and the offices were shut and the flag hauled down. This strengthened the belief that the British had gone. The peasantry organised

themselves in bands, and within a month—from 22nd February to 20th March—committed some fifty gang-robberies on the Hindus, two of the leaders posing as the Kaiser and the Crown Prince! There was great destruction of property, but little loss of life. Four or five Hindus died of their injuries and six or eight of the *jacquerie* were shot by the police and villagers. Armed police were rapidly rushed into these remote districts to restore order and round up the plundering bands. These made no resistance, and collapsed directly they saw the strong hand of authority. During the outbreak no Government property was looted, no Government servant attacked. A few companies of British Territorials from Mooltan were marched through the affected tracts, an invaluable method in times of trouble, but one which is too rarely used—and were welcomed and entertained everywhere on the march. Some four thousand of the raiders were promptly arrested, and pending trial confined in a concentration camp at Mooltan.

The rapid collapse of the rising was hastened by the passing at this critical stage (March, 1915) of the Defence of India Act, and the setting up of the Special Tribunals, which in the popular mind were taken to mean "Martial Law." The Mooltan Tribunal in a few months dealt with about eight hundred of the principal accused, convicted some five hundred, and sentenced them to exemplary punishments. The rest were discharged either because sufficient evidence was not forthcoming or because the law had been sufficiently vindicated. Several of the leading Mohammedans had exerted themselves to protect their Hindu neighbours and restore order; others had shown either apathy or sympathy with the raiders. These were dealt with by executive action. A strong force of punitive police was posted in the disturbed areas at the charge of the offending inhabitants, and the lesson given was so sharp and prompt that serious crime of all kinds was reduced to a minimum. Naturally there was a residuum of bitterness, especially among the Hindus who had suffered so heavily. To restore good feeling Conciliation Committees were established under tactful and impartial Mohammedan officers, and they, after due enquiry, persuaded the offending

inhabitants to make good the loss of the Hindus and give fresh acknowledgment of the debts, the evidence of which had been destroyed.

It was made clear by me in a tour through the tract six months later, that, once good feeling was restored by these measures, I would be prepared to consider a reduction of the heavy sentences imposed on the raiders by the Courts and to withdraw the punitive police. Thus it was to the interest of both parties to come to an agreement, and though agitators from outside, Hindu and Mohammedan, attempted to keep them apart and make political capital out of the situation, the local people were sensible enough to come to an amicable settlement.

Within a year or two I was able to withdraw the punitive police, and remit or reduce most of the sentences.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE WAR EFFORT OF THE PUNJAB

THE Legislative Council of the Punjab, at its first meeting after war was declared, unanimously passed a resolution assuring the King-Emperor of the devotion of the people of the Province and of their determination to serve His Majesty, in every form in which their help might be required, against the enemies of his Empire. The Council was composed mainly of elected or nominated representatives of the Mohammedan, Hindu, and Sikh communities; and the resolution gave expression to the feeling of active loyalty that inspired the Province as a whole.

As Head of the Province it was my duty and my privilege to help and direct in translating the resolution into effective action. The Punjab, with its hardy and martial rural population of peasant proprietors, had, since its inclusion in the Empire, been rightly regarded as the "Shield," the "Spear-head," and the "Sword-hand" of India; it had won those proud titles by its association with the flower of the British Army in every Eastern campaign from the Mutiny down to the present day. This gallant record had perhaps led the military authorities from Lord Roberts's time to concentrate too much on the Punjab fighting men—the Rajput Dogra of the lower Himalayas, the Punjabi Mohammedan of the north-west, the Sikh of the central districts, the Jat of the south-eastern—to the neglect of the fighting material of other Provinces. The argument of those great military authorities, Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener, who as Commanders-in-Chief had carried out the reorganisation of the Indian Army, was, however, irrefutable, viz. that as India could only afford a small army of seventy-five thousand British (now reduced to

under 60,000) and one hundred and sixty thousand Indian troops for the protection of a sub-continent of over 300 millions of people, it would be unwise to take any but the best Indian material, and this was to be found mainly in the Punjab.

Accordingly, on the outbreak of the War, one-half of the Indian Army was drawn from the Punjab, over one-sixth from the Frontier and trans-border Pathans and the gallant Ghurkas of our Nepal ally, and less than one-third from all the remaining Indian races.

It was therefore natural that when the demand for man-power became urgent, the military authorities should look primarily to the Punjab and to ask for the fulfilment of the pledge to His Majesty which the Legislative Council had given in the name of the Province. The Punjab was found ready and willing.

The necessity of removing every obstacle to the successful prosecution of the War, and to the rally of our man-power to the colours, was the key to the policy which I considered myself bound to pursue during the War. It was essential to this policy to crush as promptly as possible the various subversive and revolutionary movements described in previous chapters. It was also essential to discourage the spread of political agitation which, though ostensibly constitutional, might be and was used by some of its promoters either for seditious purposes, or at least as a means of creating difficulties for a Government engaged in a death-struggle against powerful enemies.

The splendid response which the Punjab made to the Empire's call was the more remarkable, because the experience of previous campaigns, and especially of the second Afghan War, had shown that it was very difficult to raise recruits in any number *during* a war even on India's land frontiers. Further, the Nicholson Army Committee on the eve of the War (1912-13) had put it on record that, "We have evidence, too, that in the event of a serious war recruitment would fall off unless the conditions of field-service in the theatre of operation were such as to attract the Indian ranks." No improvement of conditions was made until the third year of

the War. Finally, more than half the Punjab population is Mohammedan, and it was considered by those who had only an outside knowledge of the rural Mohammedans that they would hesitate to come forward in a war against Turkey and waged in lands, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, which had been under Turkish rule and contained the Holy Places of Islam.

All these pessimistic anticipations were speedily falsified. At the beginning of the War the Punjab had about one hundred thousand men of all ranks in the Army. At the close of the War no less than half a million had served with the colours. The number of fighting men raised during the four years of war was roughly three hundred and sixty thousand, more than half the total number raised in India—and of these one-half were Punjab Mohammedans, who enlisted with the knowledge that they were going to fight the Turks, and who, with a few insignificant exceptions, remained true to their salt in spite of the most persistent and insidious attempts to sap their loyalty. Speaking at Rawal Pindi, where he had once commanded the Punjab Army, on 16th February, 1921, H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught said, "The achievement of the Punjab was indeed remarkable. Even before the War the Punjab had a name familiar in the military annals of the Empire. But during the War she became a household word, not only on account of the number of men from the Punjab who joined the colours, but also on account of the splendid fighting qualities they displayed in many a campaign."

The causes of this splendid war effort were manifold; but the main influences at work; up to the end of 1916, may be briefly summarised.

(1) The rural population were on the whole prosperous and loyal, as a result of the great schemes for their improvement and protection carried out in the previous twenty years; they had trust in and were trusted by their Government.

(2) The association of the martial races with the Army had become steadily closer, the material benefits of military service had been realised, interest in and enthusiasm for the War were stimulated by the civil authorities; the announcement

that Indian troops were to fight against a European foe on the Western Front caused widespread enthusiasm ; and no finer or better-equipped force ever left India than the Lahore and Meerut Divisions, which were sent to France in the autumn of 1914 and played such an heroic part in the first great crisis.

(3) Active help in recruiting was from the outbreak of hostilities placed by the Government foremost among the duties of the civil officials and rural men of influence ; new depots were opened and the recruiting organisation steadily expanded ; no effort was spared to bring home to the people that the War was *their* War, one for the defence of their hearths and homes, which, as the Ghadr and "Silk Letter" Conspiracies showed, were menaced by the Turco-German combination and the intrigues at Kabul for an Afghan and tribal attack on Northern India.

(4) Finally, and this was the most effective of all inducements to the Punjab peasant, directly war broke out, I put at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief one hundred and eighty thousand acres of valuable canal-irrigated land for allotment later to Indian officers and men who had served with special distinction in the field. I also set aside some fifteen thousand acres for reward-grants to those who gave most effective help in raising recruits.

These measures were an indication that the Punjab was more prompt in realising the emergency created by the world-war than other Provinces with less martial populations and less exposed to attack from outside. The difference is clearly apparent in the recruiting figures for the first two and a half years of the War, i.e. up to the time when the gravity of the situation was recognised throughout India.

1914. The Home Government had asked for 21,000 combatant recruits in the last four months of the year ; 28,000 were raised, of whom 14,000 came from the Punjab, 3000 from Nepal, 3000 from the Frontier and trans-Frontier, and 8000 from the rest of India.

1915. 93,000 combatants were enrolled, of whom 46,000 were from the Punjab, 14,000 from Nepal, 6000 from the Pathan areas, and 28,000 from the rest of India.

1916. 104,000 combatants were enrolled, viz. 50,000 from the Punjab, 15,000 from Nepal, 5000 from the Pathan tribes, and 32,000 from the rest of India.

By the end of 1916 the Punjab, which had started the War with 100,000 men in the Army, had supplied 110,000 out of the 192,000 fighting men *raised in India*. The Pathan areas had supplied 14,000 ; all the rest of India (with eleven-twelfths of the population) only 68,000 ; while the Nepal State had raised 33,000, making a grand total of 225,000.

Thus, while the Punjab was redeeming its pledge, other Provinces, and especially those who were loudest in their claims for political concessions as a reward for India's (?) War services, were taking matters very lightly. For this failure the Government of India were partly responsible. Having done splendidly in the prompt dispatch of three out of their nine Divisions—Lahore, Meerut, and Poona—in the first few months of the War, and in dispatching the heavy drafts made to keep them up to strength, they were disposed to think that they had done enough and that the situation in India would not allow the garrison to be further reduced. Indeed, in introducing the Budget in March, 1916, the Finance Member found cause for satisfaction in the fact that, though the British Empire was fighting for its life, the Indian military expenditure was being reduced owing to the Home Government accepting all charges for the Divisions at the Front ! This attitude was resented by many of us in India, as showing that the Government of India had not yet fully realised their War responsibilities, and certain unhappy episodes of the Mesopotamia campaign, then being conducted from India, which were becoming known, and were brought out later in the report of the Mesopotamia Commission, went to confirm that view.

It struck some of us on the spot that in 1915 and 1916, the Government of India were unduly preoccupied with the internal situation (though in the Punjab at least there was no serious cause for anxiety after September, 1915) and with the consideration of the post-War political reforms.

In both these years while at Simla I was asked by successive Viceroys (Lord Hardinge in 1915, and Lord Chelmsford in



1916) to assist the Government of India in these deliberations. We held frequent meetings in 1916, at which the Commander-in-Chief (General Sir Beauchamp Duff) was always present. His wide knowledge not only of military matters but of the general political situation was undoubtedly a great help. But I could not help thinking that constitution-making could well stand over till it was clear whether at the end of the War there would still be a British India, and that all of us, and especially the Commander-in-Chief, would at the time have been more suitably employed on matters directly concerned with the prosecution of the War which was to decide that issue. Lord Kitchener, according to common report, had expressed that opinion in more forcible language when his requests for further military assistance from India were being held up and, after his tragic death in 1916, the same view was taken by the Home authorities.

A few months after Lord Chelmsford came out as Viceroy (April, 1916), the Home Government made it clear that if the Indian Empire as a whole was to take an adequate share in the War, the organisation generally, and in particular that part of it engaged in raising man-power, must be recast so as to utilise the whole machinery and influence of the Civil Government as was then being done in Great Britain. General Sir Charles Munro, who succeeded Sir Beauchamp Duff as Commander-in-Chief in the autumn of that year, pressed the same view, and it was at last accepted by the Government of India.

The decision was welcomed by us in the Punjab, as it was practically what we had been trying to do for the previous two years. At the Viceroy's instance I prepared a Memorandum showing how the military and civil machinery could be co-ordinated, giving instances of the evil results which had followed from the lack of such co-operation and of the failure of the military authorities to adapt their system, suitable enough for peace-time, to the new conditions created by the War. The reorganisation of the whole military machine was soon after taken in hand by the Government of India and the new Commander-in-Chief.

From February, 1917, in the Punjab, and from June, 1919,

in the other Provinces, the civil administration was directly associated with the military in the task of providing men and munitions ; the recruiting organisation was rapidly expanded by the appointment of experienced civilians, official and non-official, with a knowledge of the people, as assistants to the military recruiting officers ; Indian officials or non-officials of influence were employed on recruiting work in nearly every district ; the territorial system of recruitment by which suitable men of every class could be enrolled in nearly every district was substituted for the old class system under which there were only four recruiting centres, Rawal Pindi for Mohammedans, Amritsar for Sikhs, Jullundur for Dogras, Delhi for Jats ; while in the more backward districts, unaccustomed to military service, local depots were established for the training of the young recruits near their homes. Above all, assistance in raising men for the Army was made a duty of all executive and village officials and of all who were enjoying grants of land or other marks of consideration from Government, and one of the main qualifications in establishing claims on Government. In these arrangements we received the most valuable help from Sir Patrick Fagan, the Head of the Land-Revenue Department, which is in such close connection with the rural population.

Thus the whole machinery of the Province was concentrated on providing men for the Army. But it was clearly laid down that while no legitimate form of appeal should be neglected, there was to be nothing savouring of coercion or compulsion. These, to put the matter on the lowest ground, would defeat their own object by creating a feeling of resentment or opposition among a people who would not submit to being bullied and who had from the beginning of the War made such a splendid spontaneous response to our appeal. These warnings were necessary to prevent the zeal of subordinate Indian officials from outrunning their discretion and to check the ardour of non-officials who, believing that the bringing in of recruits would be a means of acquiring merit in official quarters, were not likely to be overscrupulous as to the methods by which the recruits were obtained.

For this reason the so-called "purchase" of recruits, i.e. the payment of money to the individual recruit or his relatives by private individuals, was prohibited. Among other objections this would seriously interfere with the principle of local responsibility. The system of district administration in British India, linking the Government at the top with the village community as the revenue-paying and administrative unit at the bottom through a well-defined official gradation, lends itself admirably as an organisation for mobilising the war resources of the Indian Empire.

In May, 1917, the Government of India appointed a Central Recruiting Board with the Finance Member (Sir William Meyer) as President. Two other civilian members of the Viceroy's Council, the Adjutant-General (who was now made responsible for all recruiting, combatant and non-combatant), the Secretary in the Army Department, two Indian Princes, and myself were the other members.

After surveying the whole situation as regards man-power, the military resources of each Province, the numbers already furnished, and the probable demands of the Army, the Central Board fixed for each Province a quota of combatants and non-combatants—the total for India was, I think, four hundred and eighty thousand—to be made good within the year beginning 1st July, 1917. The system already in force in the Punjab, as above described, was suggested as likely to be a useful guide; but of course each Province was allowed a wide discretion.

Provincial Recruiting Boards were formed in each Province, with the Head of the Province or other high official as President, to help the Local Government to carry out the policy of the Central Board. In the Punjab this Board had the Lieutenant-Governor as President, and the members were the Head of the Land-Revenue Department, Sir Patrick Fagan, the five Commissioners of Divisions, the three principal military recruiting-officers, and seven influential Indian gentlemen representing the martial races of the Province—three being Mohammedans, two Hindus, and two Sikhs. With the assistance of this Board, the quota fixed for the Province by

the Central Board—two hundred and four thousand men for the year beginning 1st July, 1917—was distributed roughly over the five Divisions and twenty-eight districts of the Province.

In each district a War League or Recruiting Board was formed with the Deputy-Commissioner as President, a few leading officials and a large number of influential non-officials as members, to help in distributing and raising the quota proposed for the district.

In this way, after a thorough investigation by local experts, each district, each sub-division, each *zail* or circle of villages, and each village, having regard to its male population of military age, the number of men already in the Army and its military traditions, was told what further number it was expected to provide. Many villages, *tahsils*, and districts gave numbers far in excess of this quota : others fell short for one reason or another.

We did not wish to spur the willing horse or to denude the martial tribes completely of the flower of their manhood. In order to distribute the obligation imposed on the Province by the Government of India more equitably, it became necessary to tap castes and tribes that had hitherto been little recruited, and to draw upon areas, especially in the South-West Punjab, which had few military traditions.

It was in attempting thus to equalise the burden, that riots and disturbances arose in three or four out of the twenty-eight districts in the last year of the War. There were not more than a dozen serious cases in the Punjab, and similar disturbances occurred in many other Provinces. But the incidents gave rise to the legend among those in other Provinces who were jealous of the great War achievements of the Punjab and eager to malign its administration, that the Punjab results were obtained by wholesale "terrorism." How that libellous charge, when publicly made by an Indian who was a member of the Government of India during the War, was exposed and refuted in a British Court of Justice will be described in a later chapter.

It is a pity that the Central Recruiting Board was not started two years earlier. But its work at the most acute

stage of the War was invaluable not only in apportioning the quotas between the Provinces and awakening the more backward, e.g. Bengal, Behar, the Central Provinces, Bombay, and Madras, to a sense of their Imperial obligations, but also in establishing the machinery and suggesting the measures necessary to fulfil those obligations. At the same time the Board was in a position to give authoritative advice to the Government of India as to the further concessions required to attract men to the colours, after the first rush of volunteers was exhausted. The fact that the late Sir W. Meyer, the President of the Board, was also Finance Member was a great help, and those who had occasion to criticise his parsimony in regard to military expenditure in the earlier years of the War, should not overlook the splendid services he rendered as President of the Recruiting Board.

The first two and one-third years of the War had brought to the colours about one hundred and twenty thousand Punjabis, the cream of the fighting races, even without the extra inducements which the Nicholson Committee in 1913 had considered indispensable for increased recruitment in war-time. But at the beginning of 1917, it was rightly decided by the Government of India that the basis of recruitment should be widened so as to bring in not only the best fighting material, but also to attract classes who though possessing good fighting qualities had hitherto held aloof or been excluded from the Army. To obtain this object further inducements were clearly needed. Accordingly from 1st January, 1917, free rations, instead of a rather inadequate messing allowance, were granted to all Indian ranks, and substantial additions were made to the pay and pensions. Later in the year, as the result of the recommendation of the Recruiting Board, a bonus of Rs.50 was given to every combatant recruit on enlistment, and special war allowances were sanctioned for all ranks. Later still, after the King-Emperor's call to India in April, 1918, further concessions were given to recruits who had completed their training and to all ranks serving overseas. By the end of the War the conditions of service all round were liberal, and even generous.

These measures did much to overcome the hesitation of the would-be recruit and the opposition of his family. The family was more willing to part with one of its bread-winners when he was able to remit, as nearly all recruits did, the whole or the greater part of the bonus, and later a considerable part of his pay. As the War advanced, the remittances which the Indian soldiers made from their now liberal (according to the Indian standard) emoluments formed an important addition to the resources of the peasantry from which they were drawn. This was especially the case in agriculturally poor districts such as Jhelum and Rawal Pindi.

Each of these Mohammedan districts, out of a total male population of a quarter of a million, had over thirty thousand men with the colours in the last year of the War (Bengal with over 23 million males had only a single battalion at the Front). Each was receiving from £15,000 to £20,000 monthly in remittances, and this undoubtedly encouraged those at home to continue sending their young men to the Army, and enabled them to bear the burden of bad seasons and high prices.

The military authorities having now done all that could be expected of them, it remained for the Civil Government to supply the further stimulus needed. The work of the provincial and district Recruiting Boards has already been referred to. These were particularly helpful in encouraging new classes to come forward, and in stimulating a healthy competition between localities, classes, castes, and religions.

The strongest appeal to a Punjabi is one to his *izzat* (honour) or that of his tribe, caste, or community, and the most effective way in which such an appeal can be made is in the public Durbars, which are a traditional feature of Oriental administration. Hence from the beginning of the War I revived the system of holding Durbars in every district or group of districts for war propaganda; and from July, 1917, I made use of these great assemblies to meet the prominent men of each district, especially the war-workers, to review by tribes, religions, and localities the results already obtained, to arouse officials and non-officials to a sense of the common danger and

the need of raising men to protect their hearths and homes, to encourage further effort by :

“ Checking the crazy ones,  
Coaxing on-aisy ones,  
Lifting the lazy ones on—with moral suasion ! ”

and above all to reward publicly those who had done well.

The rewards were such as would appeal to the Oriental mind, such as Indian titles of honour from “ Raja ” and “ Nawab ” down to “ Rai Sahib ” and “ Khan Sahib,” robes of honour, swords of honour, guns, revolvers, complimentary *sanads* (parchment rolls) inscribed with the name and services of the recipient, cash rewards, grants of Government land, of revenue-free land to individuals, and to communities remission of taxation.

Thus the village communities in each district which had the best record—some had given half their male population—were entered on a Roll of Honour and received remissions of land-revenue exceeding £100,000.

The grants of land to the extent of fifteen thousand acres to individuals who had been most active in furnishing recruits *from their own localities* and of *jagirs* (assignments of revenue) to those who had helped not only in recruiting but in other war activities, such as the two War Loans (to which the Punjab contributed over seven millions sterling), the Aeroplane Fund, for which £100,000 was subscribed, the Comforts for Troops, and other funds, were most valued as combining both honour and profit to the recipient.

Most of the Punjab districts were being reassessed for land-revenue during the War, and in deciding on the amount of the assessment and its term, I had no hesitation in giving favourable consideration to the war-services of the rural population, especially in Gujrat, Shahpur, and Amritsar. Two districts of the Punjab—Rawal Pindi and Jhelum—stood out pre-eminent in all India, and for these, in addition to other rewards, I obtained sanction to the extension of their revenue settlements for an extra ten years—a concession representing £20,000 to £30,000 annually.

By such measures it was brought home to the people that Government would reward loyal service with honour and material benefits. The results are evident in the recruiting figures of 1917 and 1918.

In 1917, 186,000 recruits were raised in India (besides 12,000 from Nepal); of whom 95,000 were from the Punjab and 91,000 from the rest of India. In 1918, up to the Armistice, 317,000 men were raised in India (besides 10,000 from Nepal), of whom 134,000 were from the Punjab and 183,000 from the rest of India. Up to the very end the Punjab, though the man-power of some districts was showing signs of exhaustion, strained every nerve to help in the struggle and to meet the growing menace of invasion from the north-west.

The King-Emperor's appeal of April, 1918, had emphasised this danger, and also plainly stated that *great as has been India's contribution to the cause of the allies, it is by no means the full measure of her resources and her strength.*

To remove that reproach the All-India War Conference, summoned by the Viceroy at Delhi at the end of April, pledged India to raise five hundred thousand men in the coming year. The Punjab was asked to furnish two hundred thousand, and to meet this demand the co-operation of all classes was essential. At a great public meeting at Lahore in May, 1918, attended by six hundred representatives of the Province and of the Native States, over which I presided, it was unanimously decided to furnish that quota, the proviso being added that if voluntary measures failed, resort to other measures should be considered.

In many parts of the Province the people were by this time prepared to face conscription (which would involve only 2 per cent of the male population) as the most equitable method of distributing the demand, provided that the measure was applied to all India.

Proposals were framed accordingly by the Punjab Recruiting Board. But the Central Board decided to carry on by the voluntary method as long as possible. Fortunately within six months the problem was solved by the Armistice. But up



to the end the Punjab displayed the same grim resolution in meeting its obligations. In each of the months, August and September, 1918, over twenty-one thousand recruits were raised, surpassing all previous records, and the falling off in October was due to the appalling epidemic of influenza. In a few months that epidemic carried off half a million of the Punjab population. Whereas among the half-million Punjabis who served in the War the death casualties were only some thirty thousand.

“Peace hath her perils no less severe than war.”

About half of the seven hundred thousand combatants raised in India came forward in the last year of the War, and as six to nine months' preliminary training were necessary to fit men for active service, few of these later recruits ever went to the Front. This is why the war-casualties of the Punjab, which had supplied 60 per cent of the men raised in the first three years, were heavier than those of all the other Provinces combined. This point should be borne in mind when down-country politicians talk eloquently of India's war achievements. As a matter of fact, even including the Punjab, the only great Province which made a really serious war effort, the death-casualties for all India, with 320 millions of people, were less than those of Canada with her 8 millions, of Australia with only 5 millions, and only double those of New Zealand with little over a million of people.

Even in the Punjab there was enormous variation according to race, religion, and locality. The Mohammedans of the Rawal Pindi Division, the Sikhs of Amritsar, Ludihana, and part of Ferozepur, the Hindu Rajputs of Kangra and Hoshiarpur, the Hindu Jats of Rohtak and Gurgaon, were foremost both in the proportion of men raised and in their fighting value. The Mohammedans of the Mooltan Division, the Sikhs of Lahore, Lyallpur, and Gujranwala, the Jats of Karnal and Ambala were among the worst. Much depended on the military traditions of races and localities; much, too, on economic conditions. Their very prosperity and the needs of a highly-developed agriculture were among the causes that kept

back the Sikhs and Mohammedans of Lahore, Lyallpur, and Gujranwala.

A most important factor was the capacity of the local officers and rural leaders to inspire enthusiasm. The Rawal Pindi Division would never have produced one hundred and twenty thousand fighting men, some of the best material in the Indian Army, if it had not had a Commissioner such as Colonel Sir F. P. Young to get the best out of his officers and his people, and great territorial magnates with a fine military spirit such as Colonel Sir Umar Haiyat Khan, Nawab Sir Khuda Bakhsh Khan of the famous Tiwana tribe, Nawab Ghulam Muhamed Khan Gheba, Malik Muhamed Amin Khan Awan and his uncle Ghulam Jilain, the Ghakhar and Janjuha Chiefs, the Awan Maliks, and many others to set a splendid example of loyal service. Among the many Rajput notables none had more influence than Lieutenant-Colonel Raja Sir Jai Chand of Lambagraon in Kangra, both from his ancient lineage and his military connections; while among the Hindu Jats, of the many notable workers perhaps Chaudhri Lieutenant Lal Chand Pleader and Chaudri Chotu Ram of Rohtak, both subsequently Ministers in the Punjab Government, were the most conspicuous. Among the many Sikhs who gave splendid help, Sirdars Gajjan Singh of Ludhiana, Ragbir Singh and Arur Singh of Amritsar, Jawahir Singh of Amballa, and Captain Gopal Singh of Gurdaspur were conspicuous.

But the most striking difference was between the urban and rural population. The recruits, at least for the combatant services, were almost exclusively rural. A considerable number of the urban skilled workers were enlisted for technical duties, and a good many of the educated classes received safe and remunerative employment on clerical work. We made persistent efforts to induce the urban Intelligentsia to give practical proof of their patriotism and their capacity to defend their country by joining the colours. But these met with practically no response. The Indian, like the Chinese, *literati* look on military service as the *métier* not of *intellectuals* but of the rough uneducated masses.

I made special efforts through the leaders of the Bar,

the heads of colleges, and other men of urban influence to raise two thousand men of the urban classes for *home* defence to replace regulars sent to the Front, and also to form a University Company of two hundred men for active service from the ten thousand University students, past and present. For home defence only two hundred out of the two thousand promised were found willing to undergo the hardships of a few months' training in Lahore Cantonment. The military authorities and myself took special pains to nurse and encourage this little nucleus of what is now, I believe, one or more Territorial battalions. There was good material amongst them. But educated India is impatient of discipline, and the usual sectarian jealousies soon appeared. At the end of the training I was advised by the military authorities that faction feeling was running so high between the Hindus and Moham-medans that if called out for an emergency they would be as likely to attack one another as the common enemy!

For the University Company only seventy students out of the ten thousand appealed to came forward. Compare this with the British Universities where, even before conscription, practically every student who was physically fit joined the colours. Indeed all the staffs and students of the Punjab University and its Colleges sent fewer men to fight than a single Middle School of the Belgian Franciscan Fathers at Dalwal in the Salt Range, from which nine Punjabi teachers and ninety-five boys—practically all who were of age and fit—were enlisted. As the numbers for a University Company were not sufficient, the seventy who had come forward were formed into a signalling corps and after training at Poona did well in the field in Mesopotamia. They, too, were chiefly men of rural connections or military traditions; some of them have since received the King's commission, and most of the remainder have been given posts in the civil departments.

To a section of the Indian Intelligentsia the maxim that England's difficulty is the Indian politician's opportunity made a stronger appeal than the menace which threatened not only the Empire but the very liberty which they professed to be working for. Many of the educated classes gave consider-

able assistance in the various War Loans and in subsidiary measures connected with the War. They would probably have done more, were it not that at the most critical stage of the War the question of post-War political reforms was inopportune, in the opinion of many Indians as well as British, brought to the front. The visit of the then Secretary of State (Mr. Montagu) to work out the scheme of reforms at the end of 1917, gave the "politically-minded" classes an excuse for forgetting that India, with the rest of the Empire, was still in the throes of a death struggle. But the fighting races are not likely to forget that those who have been given so much power, and who are already clamouring for complete Swaraj, have in the great crisis shown neither the will nor the ability to help in the defence of their country.

A reference must be made to the splendid war services of the Punjab Native States, which have a population of 4½ millions.

Their Rulers were prompt in offering all their resources in men and money at the outbreak of the War. The Maharajas of Patiala, Jind, Kapurthala, Sirmur, the Raja of Faridkot, the Nawabs of Bahawulpur and Maler Kotla sent their Imperial Service contingents to the various Fronts, where they served with credit to themselves and honour to their States. All these Princes, as well as the Rajas of Chamba and Bilaspur, the Nawab of Loharu, and the lesser Chiefs spared no efforts to raise men in their States for the Indian Army. Patiala's contribution—over twenty thousand—was second only to that of Jammu and Kashmir in all the States of the Indian Empire. Other Sikh States, Jind, Kapurthala, Faridkot, came up to the high standard of adjoining British districts. The Maharaja of Patiala himself started for the Front with his troops, but had to return owing to illness. In 1918, His Highness was one of India's representatives at the War Conference of the Empire, and visited the Western and Palestine Fronts.

Throughout the War the Punjab Princes as a body rendered constant and valuable help to the Punjab Government in maintaining internal peace and order. At its close it was my privilege to assist in obtaining for them from the King-

Emperor generous and appropriate recognition in the form of additions to their honours and dignities, to their titles and salutes, the grant of high military rank and other privileges which they appreciate.

The control of the political relations with these States has since the War been transferred from the Punjab Government to the Political Department of the Government of India. That transfer was contemplated even before the War; but Lord Hardinge, as Viceroy, kindly acceded to my strongly-urged request that it should not take place in my time. I am glad that this was so, for without the hearty co-operation of the Punjab States, fostered by close personal intercourse, the Punjab would not have emerged so secure from the network of revolutionary movements, nor from the great strain of the War, which left her exhausted indeed, but proud of the fact that she had again proved herself to be both the Shield and the Spearhead of India.

One of our most effective methods of stimulating patriotic effort in the last year of the War was a weekly newspaper, the *Hakk (Right)*, ably edited by Mr. Kitchin of the I.C.S., and Khan Sahib Abdul Aziz of the Press Department. This was published in English, Urdu, and Gurmukhi, the Sikh dialect, and rose to a circulation of seventy thousand copies, as much as that of all the other newspapers of the Province combined. In a special Victory Number, dated 16th November, 1918, I sent the following message to the people of the Punjab:

“The great conflict of the last four years has now ended in the complete triumph of the King-Emperor and his allies. . . . I desire to acknowledge through the pages of the *Hakk* the unfaltering spirit of loyalty and sacrifice which the Punjab has shown throughout the struggle, even in the days of gloom and anxiety.

From the beginning of the War the Punjab has sent nearly four hundred thousand of her sons to fight the battles of the King-Emperor.

In France and in Belgium, in Africa and in Persia, and above all in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, those

men have bravely upheld the proud traditions of their Province, successfully protected the frontiers of India, and have borne a gallant part in the achievement of final victory.

The Punjab will ever cherish the memory of those brave men who have fought and fallen ; it will welcome back with honour those who will now return ; and it will not forget those at home, who, though they could not share the dangers of war, helped to secure the peace of the Province, to maintain the flow of recruits to our forces in the field, and to succour the wounded and suffering.

I am proud that the Punjab during my term of office has so nobly fulfilled its duty, and as Head of the Province I desire to express my deep gratitude to all who have borne a part in upholding the proud position of the Punjab in India and in the Empire.

(Signed) M. F. O'DWYER."

## CHAPTER XVI

### PUNJAB INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION (1913-19). THE WEAKENING OF THE BRITISH SERVICES UNDER THE REFORMS

THE suppression of the revolutionary movements and the direction of the war efforts of the Province, as described in the last five chapters, bulked large during my term of office. But they were something over and above the normal administration of a Province of 20 millions of people which had to be carried on as usual. Indeed the Punjab, owing to the character of its people, the existence of a third great community—the Sikhs, the great opportunities for developing its arid wastes by irrigation works, and its proximity to Afghanistan and the Frontier tribes, offers more varied and interesting administrative problems than the older and more settled territories. It is a Province in which the Head of the Government and his officers must keep in close touch with the masses of the people and their leaders. They, as the War record shows, respond loyally and readily to appeals for help and co-operation from those who understand them and whom they know and trust. Perhaps this is the main reason why the One-Man Rule, indigenous throughout the East, and what the man in the street and the man behind the plough best understand, was maintained in the Punjab till it was decided to give all Provinces alike, regardless of their varying traditions and aptitudes, the uniform blessings of a so-called democratic constitution.

Up to 1920 the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, subject to higher authority, was in sole control of the administration. He had no colleagues, no Executive Council with whom to share responsibility. But in my time he had a Legislative Council with an Ind'ar, though not an elected, majority, of

which he was President with a right of veto on legislation in the last resort.

For the transaction of general administrative business he had a Chief Secretary, two Secretaries, and three Under-Secretaries; while the heads of certain departments, Police, Public Works, Education, were also Secretaries or Under-Secretaries to Government for their own departmental affairs. During the War a temporary Secretary was added to deal with cases connected with the War and the political situation.

This was a simple and inexpensive form of administration as compared with the elaborate structure built up under the Reforms, chiefly to bear the dead weight of the Diarchy. In place of the single head, the Punjab Executive now has seven high officials, viz. a Governor at the top, two Executive Councillors, one British and one Indian (a Sikh), two Indian Ministers (a Hindu and a Mohammedan) chosen from the legislature, a whole-time President of the Legislative Council, and an Agent to the Governor-General for the more important Native States. Secretarial staffs and establishments have had to be considerably increased, and the cost of the superior administration is now at least four times what it was in pre-reform days.

However, we managed to keep things going in the unreformed Punjab, because we had the support of able and devoted services who still had confidence in the Government, and the co-operation of a loyal population, whose "pathetic contentment" had not yet been deliberately disturbed by impatient statesmen. Nothing was more remarkable than the *esprit de corps*, the self-sacrifice, the readiness to take responsibility of the services, and especially the "security" services—the Punjab Commission and Punjab Police—in the stern tests to which they were subjected under the double strain of war and internal troubles. One-fourth of the British officers of the Commission and Police, and one-third of those in other departments, had been taken away for active service or duties connected with the War. Those that remained bore the strain of extra work and responsibility with cheerful readiness. Throughout the War, and after, there was not



even the shadow of a claim for the war bonuses which were so liberally granted to Civil Servants at home. One would have expected the Government of India to take the initiative in this matter. But they were too concerned with meeting the demands of clamorous politicians to bestow much attention on their loyal servants. The latter suffered in silence; and for many the increased burden of debt is the only thing they have to show for their self-sacrifice.

The primary division of the Punjab Commission is into the executive and judicial branches. Roughly speaking, of the one hundred and twenty members on duty during the War, two-thirds were executive and one-third judicial officers. The judiciary was under the direct control of the Chief Court of the Province, consisting of a Chief Judge and six Puisne Judges, including two Indians, recruited in about equal proportions from the Civil Service and the Bar.

There are few Indian Provinces which have not at one time or another been disturbed by friction between the Executive and the Judiciary, and the Punjab had been no exception. I was fortunate in being throughout on the most friendly terms with the Honourable Judges, and in being able to secure their co-operation and advice in the many emergencies that arose during the War and the conspiracy trials. They were consulted freely in regard to any special war legislation or procedure, and it was owing to their invaluable help that we were able to establish the various Special Tribunals and ensure prompt justice and the speedy punishment of the guilty. I cannot recall a single instance of a difference of opinion between myself and the distinguished gentlemen who held the office of Chief Judge, viz. Sir Arthur Reid and Sir Henry Rattigan who had been selected from the Bar, Sir Alfred Kensington and Sir Donald Johnstone who were members of the Civil Service.

One of the first questions I took up was the raising of the Chief Court to the status of a Chartered High Court, thus securing for the judges an increase in dignity and emoluments commensurate with their arduous responsibilities. There was some opposition to the change in high quarters, and a good

deal of delay owing to the War. But I steadily pressed the point and had the satisfaction of formally opening the High Court on 1st April, 1919. Their altered status made no difference in the willingness of the Honourable Judges to assist the Executive. Even in the crisis of April, 1919, which will be referred to in a later chapter, I did not propose the imposition of martial law in the area of rebellion till I had consulted the Chief Justice, Sir Henry Rattigan, and obtained his concurrence. He also gave me the benefit of his ripe experience in devising the judicial system which had to be improvised for the trial of cases of rebellion, conspiracy, etc., withdrawn from the purview of the ordinary Courts.

The harmonious relations with the Judiciary were also strengthened by other facts. I had as my Legal Remembrancer (Attorney-General) in succession two members of the Civil Services, Messrs. S. W. Gracey and T. P. Ellis, who were distinguished for their wide judicial experience, practical common-sense, and almost unerring judgment. The work done by Mr. Ellis in 1919 in drafting the martial law regulations, in preparing the various conspiracy cases for the Courts, and generally in advising the civil and military authorities in a novel and critical situation was beyond all praise. But it appears to have met with censure rather than with due recognition from higher authority. My Chief Secretary for most of the time, Mr. J. P. Thompson (now Political Secretary to the Central Government), combined with a brilliant intellect a thorough knowledge of the law acquired as a judicial officer; for the old Punjab system, which has now, I fear, been altered, ensured that all executive officers had gone through a thorough judicial training and *vice versa*. In my own case, though I had never been a purely judicial officer, I had throughout my service been continuously discharging judicial functions, from those of an assistant magistrate and civil judge up to those of a High Court with powers of life and death. Anyhow I claimed to know enough law to avoid doing anything illegal, and to be able to detect any serious legal flaw in the executive acts of my officers. The combined result of all these factors was that,

though from 1913 to 1919 we had in hundreds of cases to take prompt decisions with little time for deliberation, I doubt if there was a single instance in which any illegal action was detected even by the most hostile and meticulous critics.

The first serious problem which the Administration had to tackle in my time was the alarming increase in violent crime. There is a large lawless element in the Punjab, and serious offences against the person and property were being encouraged by the comparative immunity of the criminals from punishment. To take the case of murder. The Punjab, with half the population of England, has on the average seven hundred murders in the year, England only seventy. There was a similar excess in cases of culpable homicide (manslaughter), arson, gang robbery (dacoity), rioting, burglaries, and thefts.

I think it was Lord Palmerston who said that the main duty of a Government is to maintain order and enforce contracts. In the Punjab the task of maintaining order was becoming increasingly difficult owing to three main causes, the weakness of the police, the failure of the public to assist in the prevention and detection of crime, and the tendency of the Courts—the *personnel* of which was 90 per cent Indian—to take too technical and narrow a view of evidence (a fact which led to the acquittal or discharge of thousands of criminals), and to inflict in the small proportion of cases convicted inadequate sentences. Thus the community was suffering while the criminal enjoyed comparative immunity, and every failure of justice tended to swell the ranks of the law-breakers.

To deal with this situation the first steps were to strengthen and improve the police, weeding out the corrupt and inefficient, to tighten up the proceedings in Court by strengthening the prosecuting agency and bringing home to magistrates and judges that they had a duty to the community as well as to the accused, and above all to enlist the active co-operation of the people in the suppression of crime, by stimulating and, in special cases, generously rewarding their efforts when these involved personal risk or danger.

The reform of the police was taken in hand with the

Inspector-General, the late Colonel Sir Hector Dennys, who spared no efforts in purging the department of its "black sheep" and thereby gradually gaining for it the support of the people—an end which many had believed to be unattainable, but which was steadily achieved. The Punjab police contains about twenty thousand men under about one hundred and twenty British officers. The reform involved (1) a substantial increase in the emoluments of a force which, though grossly under-paid, had wide opportunities for illegal gains; (2) a persistent but successful effort to recruit for the various grades men of good position and education who would secure the confidence of the people, and (3) the protection of the force against the malignant and baseless attacks which are so common in India, but which had generally been allowed to pass unnoticed.

In this way the reputation and self-respect of the police were steadily raised, and the people began to regard them not as hectoring bullies, corrupt or tyrannical, but as "public servants" to whom they could look for protection and redress. Having known the Punjab police from 1886 to 1919, I was glad to be able to say before leaving the Province that no department had shown such a marked improvement in integrity and ability, and none had done better service to the State in my six years of administration. The steady decrease in the statistics of crime and the increasing success in the prosecution of criminals are the most convincing proofs of this improvement, for which much credit is also due to Messrs. A. C. Stewart and L. L. Tomkins, who in turn succeeded Sir Hector Dennys as Inspector-General.

The next factor was the Criminal Courts. The Judges of the Chief Court were prompt in considering suggestions, and, where necessary, in taking action to make the Judiciary realise their duties, to reprove slackness, and to check the inordinate delays to which weak magistrates, either of their own motion or to meet the convenience of an over-stocked Bar, are so prone. The Chief Court itself set a notable example in regard to passing adequate sentences, by generally inflicting the death-penalty in the murder cases which came

before them on appeal or for confirmation, unless there were some extenuating features. The fact that the number of people who suffered the extreme penalty rose steadily from about sixty in 1912 to about one hundred and fifty in the years 1914-16 had undoubtedly a salutary result in steadily reducing the number of murders.

Here I may mention that in nearly every case in which the death sentence was imposed, the prisoner petitioned me as head of the Executive for mercy. Thus in six years I had to deal with some seven hundred cases of capital punishment—a figure which appalled a former Home Secretary to whom I mentioned it. These cases gave, however, little trouble. There was a complete written record and judgment of the Sessions Court and an admirable judgment of a Bench of two Judges of the Chief Court. A perusal of these judgments and of the petition at once showed whether there was any *prima facie* case—it had to be a very strong one—for interfering with the due process of law. In very special cases the opinion of the Chief Court Judges who had passed the final order, or of the Sessions Judges responsible for the conviction and sentence, or even of the local District Magistrate was solicited. But I doubt if I interfered with more than 5 per cent of the death-sentences, and on the further petitions, which the prisoners often made to the Viceroy, there was still less intervention. I am convinced that the arbitrary interference for reasons of political expediency with the decisions of the Courts, which has been so common since Mr. Montagu's general amnesty of "political" criminals in 1919, has done more to lower the credit of our administration, dishearten the Courts, the Magistracy, and the Police, excite the contempt for and continued defiance of the law by those who, though pardoned, have usually remained impenitent, and generally embolden the forces of disorder, than any other administrative measure. Fortunately there are signs that the executive authorities in India are at last beginning to realise the error of their ways.

The "cat-and-mouse" policy pursued for three years in regard to the Akali Sikhs, convicted of serious breaches

of the law committed under the very thin disguise of religious reforming zeal, who were imprisoned one day, released the next, again imprisoned, again released without any guarantees for their good behaviour, undoubtedly encouraged them in their truculent attitude. They believed, and with some show of reason, that the Government was afraid of them. Latterly the Punjab Government has been allowing the law to take its course. The endeavours made by General Sir William Birdwood in the summer of 1924 to bring them to reason broke down because they insisted that, as a preliminary, Government should release all the Akalis now in jail for so-called "political" offences, many of these being serious crimes against person and property. The present Punjab Government have, however, stood firm, and by their determination to enforce the law, civil and criminal, a decision which it is hoped will not be over-ridden by the influence of sentimental cranks and intriguing politicians, have succeeded in rallying the saner elements among the Sikhs to the cause of law and order.

This brings me to the third step taken by the Punjab Government in my time to secure the co-operation of the people in the campaign against crime. As the police and the magistrates became more alive to their duty, public opinion began to wake up to the advantages of supporting the cause of law and order, and as the conviction gained ground that punishment, swift and stern, awaited the criminal and those who harboured him, crime began steadily to decrease.

A specific instance will make the matter clearer. "Dacoities" or gang robberies committed by hordes of desperate men, often armed, and therefore accompanied by murder, are the barometer of public security in a province like the Punjab. A few successful *coups* by such hands spreads alarm among peaceful people, attracts many new adherents, and encourages the formation of fresh predatory gangs. The evil can only be coped with by close and effective co-operation between the police and the inhabitants of the areas in which the dacoits operate. Such co-operation involves serious risk of bodily danger at the time or of subsequent revenge to those called

on to render it. It was therefore necessary to encourage them by prompt and liberal rewards to those who had faced those dangers.

In the year 1915-16 I sanctioned remissions of land-revenue amounting to over Rs.10,000 to thirteen villages in various parts of the Province, and the grant of four thousand acres of irrigated land in the canal colonies to one hundred and twenty-two individuals from ten different districts, who had rendered special service to the public and shown exceptional pluck in resisting or rounding up these robber bands. Money rewards to the value of Rs.29,000 were in the same year distributed to several hundred persons for similar services, and special pensions were obtained for the dependents of those members of the police and the public who had lost their lives in the cause of law and order. This policy was pursued to the end with the most beneficial results.

In 1913-14 the Pindi and Attock districts were terrorised by the depredations of a particularly bloodthirsty gang headed by one Fazl Dad, which after each successful robbery or murder raid would melt away for a time, *pour mieux rebondir*. Fazl Dad himself generally slipped across the Indus and found shelter, for a consideration, among a trans-border tribe north of Mardan. The terrorism reached such a pitch that special police had to be drafted in, troops called out, and picquets posted on the Indus ferries. Large rewards were offered for the apprehension of the gang; most of them gradually fell into our hands or were shot in resisting arrest or in committing outrages. Fazl Dad himself remained at large and till he was captured there was no real security. We offered a reward of Rs.5000 for his arrest, and I solicited the aid of the authorities of the North-West Frontier Province and of my old friends among the Khans there to put pressure on the tribe harbouring him to give him up and obtain the reward. The border Pathan will do a good deal for money. A few daring men of the tribe one night surrounded the hut where Fazl Dad was in hiding. He evidently suspected a trap and opened fire, but was shot down on the spot. I was sorry that he was not taken alive and made to stand his trial for the terrible list of

murders and robberies outstanding against him. I could not refuse the claim of the tribesmen for the reward, though I politely declined their offer to bring down his head to Lahore to satisfy me that they had got the right man ! But the head of the tribe later came down to see me at Lahore and pressed a claim for a grant of land in addition to the Rs.5000. He was disappointed when I told him he might have qualified for this if he had brought in the man alive, but not otherwise. *He* evidently thought that Fazl Dad was worth more dead than alive.

The wiping out of this gang in 1914 had an immediate effect in stamping out organised crime in the Rawal Pindi Division. But bands of trans-Frontier tribesmen guided by outlaws from our districts continued to make sporadic raids in the Miyanwali district, which lies on both sides of the Indus, as well as in Attock, Rawal Pindi, and the trans-Indus district of Dera Ghazi Khan. These were less easy to cope with as the raiders had their base outside British territory and were generally so well armed that our people were at a disadvantage in tackling them.

This raiding went on all through the War ; but the efforts of the authorities of the Frontier Province helped us steadily to reduce it. The last dangerous gang was, after a series of most daring outrages, finally rounded up by a combined police and military force assisted by the rural population. The outlaws took refuge in a cave in a cliff side which was deemed impregnable. They were well supplied with arms, ammunition, and food ; but they were not proof against a bombing attack, and after some of their number had been killed or wounded, they put up the white flag and surrendered to justice.

In the Sikh districts of the Central Punjab the Ghadr rebellion had been supported largely by the proceeds of successful dacoities. Even when that was put down, a few well-organised bands of desperate men, including some ex-soldiers, spread terror over thousands of square miles from the Himalayan foot-hills almost to the walls of Delhi.

The history of one of these gangs composed of Jat Sikhs of



Ferozepur is instructive. One faction had a dispute about land with another faction in the village. One day during harvest-time the members of one faction, including a few old soldiers, armed themselves, sought out the rival faction, surprised two of them in their cornfields and shot them down; surprised another, a headman of the village, on the roadside and shot him. Having thus polished off their enemies they decided in the true dacoit fashion to "take to the road." Their sister met them in the village at this stage and said:

"It is all very well for you to clear out; but what is to become of me who must remain here exposed to taunts and disgrace."

Her brothers said, "We shall see that you suffer no disgrace. Go and put on your best clothes and all your jewellery."

She did so. The men-folk meantime primed themselves with drink for their terrible deed. They prepared a funeral pyre. When the sister returned gaily bedecked, they put her on the pyre, lit it and stood by, firing occasional shots as a mark of joy till she was consumed in the flames! They then took to the road with their arms and money, and for nearly a year terror and bloodshed followed in their wake. Nearly all the country-side was against them, but they were desperate men and had their own friends to harbour them. Over and over again they evaded the pursuing bands. Rewards of Rs.10,000 were offered for the capture of the gang, and the survivors (one or two had been killed) when in hiding in a hut in the jungles of Hissar were betrayed by one of their friends. A force of armed police under a gallant British officer surrounded the hut. The outlaws put up a stubborn resistance, and there were casualties on both sides. Finally, when the hut was set on fire, the leader (Mit Singh) agreed to surrender, but only to a British officer. The officer readily took the risk of being shot by a man who knew that in any case he was doomed to death. But Mit Singh played the game, passed out his rifle through a hole in the door and gave himself and the rest of his band up. He and a companion were tried and condemned to death. They escaped from the condemned cells in Ludhiana

jail, where I had interviewed them, were recaptured, placed under a stricter guard, attempted to cheat the gallows by taking poison but failed, and at last paid the penalty of their crimes on the scaffold.

These few instances out of many are cited as typical of the desperate men one had to contend with in keeping the King's peace. There are many Mit Singhs and Fazl Dads in the Punjab. It is only the fear of the strong arm of the law that keeps them in check. That arm is showing signs of weakening.

Our first line of defence is the Punjab police, a force which, inspired by a small but splendid body of British officers, has shown in the past a very high degree of loyalty and gallantry. But the British officers of the police are being stampeded out of India more rapidly than any other service, and though there are many able and gallant men among the Indian police officers, the fact remains that the Indian policeman, like the Indian soldier, does his best work under British leading. One therefore trembles to think what will happen to the cause of law and order in the Punjab if the number of British officers for the twenty thousand police and the 20 million inhabitants of the Punjab falls, say, below one hundred. If at the same time, to meet the views of Indian politicians and contrary to the wishes of the masses, the British element in the Civil Service is reduced, as is now proposed, by one-half—or to something under one hundred officers—then, knowing from the experience of 1913-19 the minimum of British officers necessary to maintain law and order, I have no hesitation in saying that we are courting disaster and exposing the people who look to us for protection to the most appalling outbreaks of disorder.

As I write these lines I find the strongest corroboration of my views in an extract from a speech of Sir Charles Innes—a member of the Government of India—in the Legislative Assembly, cabled from Calcutta on 12th September, 1924. In recommending the Assembly to accept the proposals of Lord Lee's Commission for remedying some of the grievances of the services and thereby induce the men in the service to

stay and new recruits, who are now not forthcoming, to come in, he said :

“ I do not care what form of Government you have, you must always have something corresponding to the Civil Service ; you may change the form of Government, but you cannot change the nature of the people of India, who like a personal rule. Indian politicians are interested only in the form of Government, *but there are 240 millions of people in British India who do not care two straws what is the form of Government provided it is a stable one.* It cannot be stable without a strong Indian Civil Service and police. Never was there greater need for a strong and efficient service to maintain law and order. You have your class, communal, racial, and religious dissensions. Efforts are being made to sap the foundations and at any time there may be a great conflagration.”

To anyone who knows the irresponsible character of many of those who profess to represent the Indian peoples, it is not surprising that this appeal fell on deaf ears, and that the proposals to make it possible for British officials to serve in India were rejected by a huge majority. Fortunately the Upper House (Council of State), which is composed of more responsible men, accepted the proposals by a unanimous vote.

One of the main reasons for maintaining a strong British element in the security services is the appalling growth of sectarian feeling which is leading almost daily to civil strife and serious bloodshed, for the repression of which troops, preferably British, and armed police have frequently to be called out. Those in the best position to judge attribute this growing disorder to two main causes, (1) the racial and religious friction engendered by the struggle of rival religions and classes to grasp the power of which the British Government in India has prematurely divested itself, and (2) the rapid decrease in the number of British officials who, being impartial and detached, are trusted by all parties and are in the best position both to prevent such outbreaks and to deal with them when they have occurred. It is significant that in every place where such outbreaks have taken place within the last year or two,

Mooltan, Amritsar, Saharanpur, Meerut, Delhi, Lucknow, Calcutta, Kohat, Gulbarga, etc., the "politicians" who glorify the Hindu-Muslim *entente* are almost invariably found to be conveniently absent. Both parties, and even the extremist leaders, are the first to ask for British police officers and British magistrates to restore order, and dispense impartial justice. In fact, as an extremist paper at Allahabad plaintively put it, "*The Hindus want that Mohammedan officials should go ; the Mohammedans want that the Hindu officials should go ; with the result that the Europeans would remain.*" But the British officials are no longer there in numbers adequate to meet such demands, and the Indian politicians in the cool and secluded atmosphere of the Simla Council Chamber are clamouring for, and in fact obtaining, the reduction of the small band that still stands between India and anarchy. Half of the Civil Service is now recruited in India from Indian candidates. Half is recruited still in England, the object being to obtain British candidates. But they are no longer forthcoming. This year of the eleven posts offered in England all but three went to Indians, and among them there was not a single Mohammedan or Sikh. In India, in the three years 1922-24, forty-five candidates were selected for the I.C.S. Of these forty-one were Hindus; there was not a single European or Mohammedan. On the other hand, the Indians admitted to Sandhurst are almost all Sikhs or Mohammedans. So that in the future the divorce between the Hindus holding political power, and the Mohammedans and Sikhs in the Army, will become even more marked than at present. Even now only a strong "steel frame" of British officers can hold together these hostile elements. But if the present policy of drift continues, the "steel frame" will soon have ceased to exist except as a brilliant simile and an illustration of the difference between the promise and the performance of British statesmen. The British element in the Civil Service is now twelve hundred men for a population of 320 millions; if we reduce it by more than one-third we shall be courting disaster in India.

But apart from the need of strong British services to hold the scales even between contending factions, there is need for

them in another way which, though everyone, British and Indian, is conscious of it, is not often mentioned. That is to maintain by their example and vigilant control those standards of honour and integrity in the public service which are almost unknown in purely Oriental administrations, and are not yet firmly established in British India. One of the greatest achievements of the British services there, and one which is but dimly appreciated in England, is the slow but steady improvement in the probity of the Indian *personnel* which forms so large a proportion of the public services. That has been due to British example and British control. Both of these influences have been seriously weakened by the Reforms Scheme and the too rapid Indianisation of the services. Already there are complaints from nearly every department of the increase of corruption and nepotism in the Indian elements of the public services, and the Administration is now becoming so weakened that it is powerless to cope with this growing evil and in fact does not face what it knows to be the fact. The ground so slowly gained in the past is rapidly being lost, and at the present pace of deterioration the Indian masses may soon find that Indianisation has resulted in placing them under the heel of an officialdom almost as corrupt as that of any purely Oriental administration. The cynical arguments that they have only themselves to blame, that a people get the public services they deserve, and that they do not want a high standard of integrity, are unworthy of British statesmen and afford no satisfaction to the masses. The latter are the toads beneath the harrow, and it is not for

to                   “the butterfly upon the road  
                      whispers contentment to the toad.”

During my six years in charge of the Punjab I waged unceasing war against official corruption. I ventilated the matter in every way possible, invited the co-operation of the Indian Press, the Bar, the Legislative Council, the general public. I issued the most stringent orders to all departments to investigate promptly all complaints of corruption, and when well-founded to prosecute the offender or punish him departmentally. Again

and again I pointed out publicly that Government could not succeed in stamping out corruption unless backed up by the public, and unless the bribe-taker, whatever his position, was brought under the ban of a healthy public opinion and shunned by all honourable men as a criminal. This insistence made people realise that Government meant to see the matter through, and several of those who had been practically black-mailed into giving bribes to officials, but who had kept silent out of fear, began to come forward. The most capable officers, police and others, were deputed to investigate these complaints, and in the end several of the most notorious bribe-takers were sent up for trial.

In April, 1918, I was in a position to tell the Legislative Council that during the previous year four members of the provincial service, magistrates and judges (including one Anglo-Indian) had been convicted judicially and sent to jail. All were highly-educated men and all, I think, graduates. Anyhow, three had entered the service by competition—a very severe test in India—and the fourth, and worst, was an Indian barrister who had failed in the I.C.S. examination in England, but had afterwards been appointed to the provincial service. Several Indian officials in other departments were similarly dealt with. These stern measures had an immediate effect in reducing corruption in all departments. But while much appreciated by the masses, I doubt if they were at heart approved as a whole by the educated classes who did lip-service to the cause of public integrity. My doubt was based *inter alia* on the two following facts. One of the officials convicted and sentenced to three years' imprisonment was an official of some standing in the Irrigation Department, in which the opportunities of the bribe-taker are specially great. After his appeal had been rejected by the Chief Court, I received a petition from several of the most prominent men in the Province—including members of the Imperial and provincial councils—asking for his pardon, not because there was any doubt of his guilt, which had been judicially established in several cases, but because he belonged to a "highly respectable family"!

Again, in an informal meeting with some twenty members of the provincial service—Indian judges and magistrates—I took occasion to congratulate them on our having done something to restore the good reputation of the service by the punishment of the “black sheep” who were giving it a bad name. My remarks did not meet with the warm approval I had anticipated, and on pressing for the reason, one of the company, an official of high character, frankly said that though it was right to expel the bribe-takers from the service, it was too severe a punishment to send them to jail, because there they would perhaps have to rub shoulders with common criminals whom they themselves had sent to jail!

These two incidents illustrate the greatest difficulty that faces us in India, to make the people, and especially the Intelligentsia, understand that in the eyes of the law there is no privileged class, and that British justice makes no exception in favour of the rich or educated criminal.

Unfortunately in recent years the British authorities in India have repeatedly sacrificed this principle to political expediency. The immunity allowed for years to highly-placed or influential offenders, while their unhappy dupes have been punished with the full severity of the law, has done more than anything else to shake respect for a rule which formerly made no distinction between the Raja and the ryot when the law was broken, among a people quick to detect any weakness or deviation from the right path in their rulers. Here again we seem to be learning a lesson from experience. There is now less talk in high quarters of “British Justice,” but happily an increasing inclination to enforce it. But how difficult it is to recover the ground or the arms we have abandoned to the enemy!

The result of the measures taken to strengthen the police, improve the magistrates, inflict adequate punishment on the criminal, purge the public services of corrupt officials, and secure the co-operation of the public, is shown in the steady decrease of serious crime. From 1912 to 1918 the figures show a decrease of one-third. The statistics for the two worst

forms of crime, murder and dacoity, are cited as the surest index of the state of public tranquillity :

	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
Murders .	670	627	646	612*	582	511	502
Dacoities .	128	142	140	287*	110	47	60

Between 1913 and 1918 the number of burglaries dropped from 18,500 to 13,800. The improvement, which was only interrupted by the Ghadr outbreak and the agrarian dacoities of the South-West Punjab in 1915, is the more remarkable in that it was achieved in time of war and internal disturbance, and also when the security services were temporarily depleted by the calls of the Army. It shows that if the Government places in the forefront its duty, as defined by Palmerston, to maintain order and enforce contracts, the people even in an Eastern country will rally to its support.

The improvement has, I fear, not been maintained. One of the first results of the Reforms Scheme, though one not contemplated by its authors, was to weaken authority and encourage lawlessness. The annual reports on the criminal administration of every Province since 1919 are sad reading. I will quote only one instance, from the Punjab, as the exact figures are available to me. The number of gang robberies had by strenuous efforts been reduced to 47 in 1917 and 60 in 1918. In 1919, they went up to 169, in 1920 to 147, in 1921 to 265, in 1922 to 557. The total number of offences reported had by persistent efforts been brought down from an average of 47,000 cases in the years 1912-15 to 41,000 in 1916, 35,000 in 1917, and 37,000 in 1918. They have steadily increased under the Reforms and in 1922 had risen to over 48,000, an increase of 33 per cent in five years. There could be no more striking illustration of the growth of insecurity and of defiance of the law, and it will scarcely be credited that when the subversive movement was at its worst in 1922, the Local Government, to please the politicians, accepted and gave effect to a resolution for the reduction of the police—permanent and temporary—by some 4000

\* The Ghadr and the S.W. Punjab outbreaks swelled the figures.



men. Presently they had to requisition troops to do police duties, and the Commander-in-Chief had to explain in the All-India Assembly that this was *one* of the reasons why it was inadvisable to reduce the Army budget. Perhaps this is the most glaring example of the sacrifice of the interests of the community to the clamour of a few irresponsible politicians whose real object is to weaken and discredit British rule. Unfortunately they have succeeded only too well. But the future historians of the "Lost Dominion" will sit in judgment on those agents of the British Government in England and India, whose weakness and blind obstinacy gave them the opportunity.

The above remarks deal mainly with the great questions of the public security and with the public services—the I.C.S. and the Police—which maintain it. But outside these there were other great services and administrative activities of the most fascinating kind. Of these I need mention here only the departments of Irrigation, Agriculture, and Co-operative Credit, which were specially active in my time. These departments, which have done and are doing so much for the prosperity and contentment of the rural population of the Punjab—18 millions out of 20—are entirely the creation of British rule. They have no Oriental counterpart. They have been brought into their present high pitch of beneficent activity by the brains and organising capacity of a series of British officials of the Imperial or all-India services who are steadily training their Indian colleagues and helpers to carry on the good work. Those splendid services, with all others except the Civil Service and the Police, are now to be "provincialised," which means that the British element will be steadily squeezed out (in fact British recruitment for the Educational, Agricultural and Veterinary Services has already been suspended by the Government of India); the initiative necessary to plan and carry out the great schemes still awaiting execution will disappear; apathy and corruption, hard to combat even now in the Irrigation Department, will spread; even the existing works will deteriorate from lack of supervision and efficient maintenance; and while a section of the Intelligentsia may find

comfort in having appropriated the few hundred posts vacated by the British, the 18 millions of rural folk, who take little interest in politics but look for clean and efficient administration, will look for it in vain.

This is no fancy picture. It represents what is daily taking place before our eyes in India. Looking further afield it is exactly what has happened in the Philippines since the United States Government—between 1915 and 1920—in deference to Mr. Wilson's Utopian theory of self-determination, substituted Filipino for American agency, which was, however, employed on a much greater scale (there were more American officials for the 12 million Filipinos than there are British for the 320 million Indians) than British agency in India, in all departments. That pitiful but instructive tale is told in the report of General Leonard Wood's Commission of 1920.

But before writing their epitaph a few words may be said of the achievements of these services in the Punjab.

When we took over the Province seventy-five years ago it was agriculturally in much the same condition as Alexander had found it over two thousand years before. Agriculture was most precarious except in the few favoured tracts with a good rainfall or suitable for irrigation from wells; famines of the most devastating nature were of frequent occurrence; nearly all the high-lying lands away from the rivers were arid wastes where the scanty rainfall sufficed only to raise a few patches of crops and luxuriant pasture for a few months in the year; much of the population was still nomadic and predatory. In the lowlands, the canal irrigation was limited to a series of rough cuts which drew off the water in the summer from the rising rivers swollen by the melting snows of the Himalayas, and spread it over the low riverain lands. It did not amount to more than three hundred thousand acres in all.

To-day, as the result of the continuous and combined labours of our engineers and revenue-officers, one after another of the great rivers of the Province have been harnessed to the service of agriculture; great dams have been thrown across them, and the fertilising waters which used to flow uselessly into the Indian Ocean or the Bay of Bengal, are now spread

in an increasing flow over the arid uplands, transforming them into expanses of rich cultivation supporting millions of industrious peasants. To-day, of the 27 million acres under tillage in the Punjab, there are 11 million acres, or 40 per cent of the total, irrigated from canals—almost entirely constructed by British engineers and financed by British capital—and the crops raised on them in a year are valued at 50 millions sterling. The Punjab irrigation system, built up in the last seventy years, is already twice as great as that of Egypt, which is the product of at least six thousand years; and if and when the present great projects are carried out—and they certainly will not be carried out under a Swaraj Government—the irrigated area will be 20 million acres.

Such is the work of a Government which, according to Mr. Gandhi, Mrs. Besant, and the majority of Indian politicians, has drained away the life-blood and the riches of India. I myself saw land in Montgomery and Mooltan selling in 1887 at eightpence an acre. Before I left in 1920 the same land, as the result of canal irrigation and railway extensions, which invariably go hand in hand, was selling at £40 per acre. Can any other country show anything to compare with this wonderful achievement? Yet those who have accomplished it are unknown and unhonoured by their own countrymen, *quia carent vate sacro*. The Indian masses are dimly conscious of what they owe to these men; most of the Indian politicians, if they realise it at all, dislike the more those who are able to do what they know they cannot do themselves. It is again a case of

“Take up the white man’s burden,  
And reap his old reward;  
The blame of those ye better,  
The hate of those ye guard.”

The great irrigation schemes carried out by British enterprise and British capital have raised the Punjab from the poorest to the richest province, agriculturally, in India, and have permanently banished the gaunt spectre of famine.

The Agricultural Department, established by Lord Curzon’s Government within the last twenty years, aims at increas-

ing the out-turn and quality of the agriculture by means of (1) scientific education, the main centre of which is the splendidly-equipped agricultural college at Lyallpur, under a small but capable staff of four British experts with many Indian assistants; (2) scientific research and investigation which are carried out at Lyallpur, and by the rapidly-increasing staff of experts, almost exclusively Indian, working in the districts; and (3) demonstration and propaganda work, of which the centres are the farm at Lyallpur, corresponding to Rothamsted in England, and the eight subsidiary farms in other centres for research and demonstration work in the chief staples, wheat, cotton, rice, maize, sugar cane, etc.

It took a decade for the department to overcome the conservatism of the Punjab agriculturist and gain his confidence. But since that has been accomplished, its activities have increased by leaps and bounds, and the rush of applications for agricultural education at Lyallpur is now so great that the Principal has had to lay down strict rules to govern admission. Here, too, I found that the quicker-witted urban literate castes were crowding out the genuine agriculturist whom above all we desired to convert and instruct; for he could convert and instruct his rural brethren where the townsman would fail to obtain a hearing. Hence in 1916 orders were issued to reserve two-thirds of the vacancies in the college for men from the soil, and to aim at selecting the *personnel* of the department mainly from this class. This action, though in the best interests of the people generally, was naturally not popular with the literate classes, but it has been the foundation of that close co-operation which now exists between the department and the rural population and which is the chief factor in its success.

The results have only begun to show themselves in the last seven or eight years. But even before I left the Province, the economic value of the improved varieties of wheat and cotton, given out by the department after the most careful investigation, was two or three millions sterling annually. From the point of view of export, cotton is perhaps the most important

staple, and we were at great pains to acclimatise and recommend an American long-staple variety instead of the coarse short-staple local cottons. Any failure of the variety would shake confidence in the department, and we therefore went very slow at first. In 1914 we put out a few hundred acres of an American variety known as 4 F. It was most successful in irrigated lands. In 1915 the acreage rose to some twenty thousand acres, and the demand steadily grew till in 1920 the acreage had risen to seven hundred thousand acres, or nearly half the total area under cotton in the Punjab. At a moderate estimate, owing to the greater yield and higher price of this superior variety, every acre under it yielded an extra £2 as compared with the indigenous cotton. The British Cotton Growing Association, for whom I set aside seven thousand five hundred acres of Crown land in one of the Canal Colonies during the War, is now busy with experiments for improving the staple in its own sphere of influence; and if Lancashire devotes to this matter in India the attention it has given to cotton-growing in other parts of the Empire, great things may be achieved in increasing the out-turn of the longer staples.

But agriculture is now a transferred subject under an Indian Minister. The funds which were essential to the development of a new and progressive department, whose work comes home to every Punjab peasant, have been steadily reduced to provide for more showy enterprises; the small British staff of some half a dozen experts is being steadily reduced in pursuance of the policy of "Indianisation," and Lancashire's ambition to increase the world-supply of long-staple cotton through the Indian cultivator and thereby increase his prosperity is likely to be looked on with suspicion as another form of the "drain of India's wealth." The man behind the plough will suffer, but he does not count in Indian politics.

Another development, due entirely to British initiative, which has done more than anything else in recent years for the Punjab peasantry is the Co-operative Credit Movement. The Land Alienation Act of 1900, which restricted transfer of agricultural land to non-agriculturists, was and still is strongly

opposed by the urban middle classes, who regard the peasantry as theirs to exploit. The immediate result was a contraction of credit which was in some ways beneficial. Towards the end of the last century a few British officers, working among the peasantry, started a few societies for co-operative credit in Mohammedan villages which are the favourite prey of the Hindu usurer. Progress was very slow till about 1905 when a Co-operative Credit Societies Act was passed, and a member of the I.C.S. was appointed Registrar. His special function was to preach the gospel of co-operation in rural communities, often rent by feuds and factions, to make them realise that by pooling their resources they could finance one another at 9 to 12 per cent instead of paying the moneylender 24 to 36 per cent, and that the loans advanced under the system should be for legitimate and preferably remunerative objects, e.g. payment of old debts, redemption of mortgaged lands, etc. The Registrar selected (Mr. A. Langley, I.C.S.) was a man of great tact and sympathy with the people. He was fortunate in gathering round himself a band of enthusiastic Indian assistants, chiefly Mohammedans of the rural classes, who realised that the movement meant the economic salvation of hundreds of thousands of a peasantry steeped almost hopelessly in debt. Government bore the cost of the establishment and gave its powerful moral support. But for finance the societies had to make their own arrangements. The twelve societies of 1905 had grown to over a thousand in five years, and to about one thousand eight hundred when I returned to the Punjab in 1913. The Mohammedan village communities of the Central Punjab were the chief pioneers; but the movement now began to get hold of the Hindu and Sikh villages—which were, however, less under the grip of the usurer. At this stage the money-lending classes, who had already been hard hit by the Land Alienation Act, took alarm, fearing that their occupation would be gone. Having much influence in the Bar, the Indian Press, and the subordinate executive and judicial staff, all of which are largely recruited from their ranks, they endeavoured to check the spread of the co-operative credit by covert means, e.g. by

suggestions that the co-operative agency was trenching on the functions of the Judiciary, by harsh execution of decrees against debtors who had joined the movement and other such methods. They even endeavoured to create friction between the Chief Court, which controlled the Judiciary, and the executive authorities who were pushing the co-operative campaign.

One of my first public announcements at Gurdaspur in October, 1913, was to make it clear that the movement had the strong support of Government, that it had come to stay, that it was not hostile to the legitimate business of the money-lender, and that if he were wise he would accommodate himself to the new conditions by reducing his exorbitant rates of interest to his clients and by placing some of his capital at the disposal of the Co-operative Societies. The opposition, I think, ceased at least openly. Anyhow the co-operative system became firmly rooted in nearly every district and spread with marvellous rapidity. To guide its development two more members of the I.C.S. were selected as Assistants to the Registrar, and given separate areas to work; the Indian Agency was trained in scientific methods of organisation and working; European systems were examined on the spot and, where suitable, adopted; the system was extended to cover co-operative purchase of seed, machinery, etc., co-operative sale of agricultural produce, and even to bring in the poorer artisans of the towns, who are notoriously sweated by those who finance them. The British Civil Servants associated with the department in recent years, Messrs. Calvert, Strickland, and Darling, are now among the recognised authorities on the co-operative system, and the works they have published are of European reputation.

The twelve societies of 1905, with a few hundred members and a capital of a few thousand rupees, had grown when I left the Province in 1919 to over six thousand, with one hundred and fifty thousand members, and a working capital of 1½ millions sterling. The rate of interest payable by agriculturists had been brought down throughout the Province to less than one-half of what it had been before, and hundreds

of thousands of acres of peasant holdings had been redeemed from mortgages. It is to be hoped that this beneficent work for the Punjab peasant is now so firmly rooted as to be able to defy opposition. But this, too, like Agriculture, is a "transferred" subject, and had, from the Reforms up to the end of 1923, been under the charge of an Indian Minister of the urban moneylending class who has made a name for himself rather by speculative financial enterprises and by dabbling in extremist politics than by sympathy with the peasantry. One fact is significant. Litigation is one of the main sources of rural indebtedness. A few years ago an enthusiastic Registrar set to work to use the agency of the Co-operative Societies to substitute as between the members arbitration for litigation—the League of Societies for Warfare in the Courts. It was a most promising development, but was naturally unpopular with the Bar, which is so powerful in Indian politics. The Minister in charge was himself a lawyer; cold water was thrown on this form of co-operative activity, and, as the Registrar pathetically wrote, "litigation being our second greatest industry cannot be interfered with."

The three great factors in promoting the economic well-being of the Punjab rural population in this generation have been Irrigation, Scientific Agriculture, and Co-operative Credit. All of them, as has been shown, are the creation of British brains and have been developed by British capital and energy. I have never known any Indian politician to take a real interest in them. They are neither *la haute finance* nor *la haute politique*. But all are capable of much greater expansion under British initiative and guidance. These are being steadily reduced by the policy of over-rapid Indianisation of the services to please Indian politicians, and the Indian masses, whose interests are being sacrificed to a political theory, are not yet able to make their protests heard. Meantime Britain wraps herself in the complacent belief that by a noble "gesture" she has given India the blessings of democracy!

There is one more service—the Indian Medical Service—with a long record of achievement only second to that of the



I.C.S., which seems "doomed to death," though all well-wishers of the Indian people will continue to hope against hope that it is "fated not to die." Probably no body of medical men in the civilised world has done more to combat Oriental diseases, investigate their causes, and thereby improve the health and comfort of hundreds of millions than the four hundred members of the I.M.S. in civil employment. The names of some, such as Sir Peter Freyer, Sir Ronald Ross, and Sir Leonard Rogers, are famous for their brilliant research work all over the world of medicine; the names of others, such as Colonel Henry Smith "of Asia and Jullundur," are treasured with affectionate remembrance in the thousands of households to which their professional skill and human sympathy have brought relief from suffering. Hundreds of able Indian Assistant Surgeons, of whom Rai Bahadur Mattra Das of Moga is the most famous, have learnt from them in the hospitals or medical colleges, and gratefully acknowledge their indebtedness to their teachers. Their quiet, unpretentious work among the people has been in the past one of the greatest assets of British rule, for they were known, consulted, and trusted by all classes. Even Mr. Gandhi, to whom the service of humanity makes a special appeal, though his own methods of pursuing it have been disastrous, has more than once publicly acknowledged what he owes to the I.M.S. surgeon whose skill and care last year probably saved his life.

But this splendid service is also being sacrificed to the cry of Indianisation, and if the demands of the Indian politicians are listened to, only a fraction of the British element will be retained to look after the rapidly-dwindling British element in the services and their families. As it is, the word has gone round the medical schools and colleges in Great Britain that there is no longer a career in the I.M.S., and the most persistent efforts to whip up suitable candidates even for the few vacancies still open have achieved but little. The India Office has been driven to the costly and unsatisfactory method of employing medical men on a five years' contract. The Indian Medical Service, as a British career, is practically dead.

The following table, taken from the Report of the Lee Commission, shows the present strength of the all-India services and how they are to be dealt with in future :

Indian Civil Service	.	.	1250	} to remain all-India Services, but British element reduced to one-half.
„ Police „	.	.	739	
„ Forest „	.	.	348	} All, except Forest and Irrigation officers in certain Provinces, to be provincialised, that is placed under the Control of Provincial Governments and Indian Ministers.
„ Educational Service	.	.	345	
„ Agricultural „	.	.	109	
„ Veterinary „	.	.	38	
„ Engineering „	.	.	733	
„ Medical (Civil) Service	.	.	373	
Total			3935	

All of these services are at present open to Indians who qualify, and about 500 of the existing members are Indians. Under the Lee Commission Scheme, 1000 out of the 2000 posts in the Civil Service and Police will continue to be held by British officers (if suitable candidates are forthcoming). Nearly all the 2000 posts in the other departments will, if the proposals are given effect to by Parliament, be held by Indians. For, even if British candidates are forthcoming for the small proportion, generally one-fourth, remaining open to them, the provincial authorities are not likely to accept them.

The Lee Commission admit that many experienced officers expect some deterioration from the change.

They express the hope that Ministers, on the one hand, will still seek to obtain the co-operation of Europeans in these departments, and that qualified Europeans, on the other hand, may be no less willing to take service under Local Governments than they were, in the past, under the Secretary of State. A pious hope, but I fear a vain one. There is nothing said as to the views of those primarily concerned—the Indian masses.

All these measures, forced on a weak Government by a small but clamorous section of Indian politicians, are undoubtedly contrary to the wishes and the interests of at least 99 per cent of the people. But it will be argued—if so why do not the 99 per cent make their protest heard in the constitutional way

through the ballot box and their representatives in the legislative bodies? This argument assumes that India is politically as advanced as Western countries which have adult suffrage. In India only one person in fifteen is literate, only one in forty-five has a vote even for the provincial Councils, and only one person in one hundred and sixty voted at last year's provincial elections. For the All-India Assembly, where large questions of policy are decided, and which has shown the bitterest hostility to the British official, only one person in two hundred and fifty has a vote, and only one in one thousand actually voted. At the recent general election in Britain over *40 per cent of the total population cast their votes*, unmade one Government and made another. That is genuine democracy. The political machine in India is almost entirely in the hands of a highly-organised caucus representing the urban literary classes, which has almost complete control of the Press, the platform, and the local Bar, in fact all the forces dominating politics. In these conditions the unorganised rural inhabitant, even if he has a vote, cannot make his influence felt. This is admitted even by the most ardent official advocates of the Reforms Scheme.

The mistake made was to pass that scheme into law while at least 98 per cent of the population were incapable of comprehending it or taking any part in working it. That is a travesty of democracy.

It was to prepare the way for the political emancipation of the masses, that the Punjab Government in my time carried a measure through the Council for compulsory education of boys between the ages of six and ten years—girls had to be excluded to meet Oriental prejudices—where local bodies were prepared to provide the educational machinery. To meet the difficulty as to funds we arranged that Government should meet from one-half up to the full cost according to the varying circumstances of each district—war services being one of those circumstances. At the same time the system of primary education was thoroughly overhauled so as to complete the course in the “three R’s” in the four years of compulsion. The results have so far been disappointing. Only a

few large towns have made use of the powers given to the local bodies. Others hold back from fear of being saddled with heavy future expenditure or because the supply of trained teachers is not yet adequate. No doubt a compulsory system even for boys is much more difficult to work than in England. India, owing to its social backwardness, has practically none of those female teachers who in England play the chief part in primary schools; the local influences which do so much for the schools in English towns and villages, the managing and visiting committees in towns, the squire and the parson in the villages, are almost entirely absent in India. Above all the Intelligentsia, which should play the chief rôle in removing the ignorance of the masses, have so far been more anxious to appropriate such funds as are available, 90 per cent of which come from the rural population, for the secondary and higher education of which they have a practical monopoly. Finally, the Reforms Scheme has already wiped out the enormous balances which most Provinces had accumulated during the War, and the new Councils will not risk unpopularity by imposing fresh taxation for such objects as primary education and agriculture. I left the Punjab treasury in 1919 with a surplus of over 2 millions sterling. This surplus was not the result of starving the departments. The grants under every head of useful administration had been considerably increased between 1913 and 1919 :

Irrigation	.	.	.	from 78	to 94 lakhs.*
Agriculture	.	.	.	„ 8½	„ 27 „
Police	.	.	.	„ 59	„ 72 „
Education	.	.	.	„ 44	„ 60 „
Medical	.	.	.	„ 14	„ 28 „
Forests	.	.	.	„ 9	„ 26 „

In three years of the Reforms that surplus had disappeared, and the Punjab Legislature to balance their budget cut down the police and other security services and reduced the grants for agriculture ! One wonders who has benefited.

A comparison of the five pre-Reform with the five post-

\* A lakh is equal to £7500.

Reform years is instructive. In the earlier period, in spite of the War and conspiracies organised from outside, the Punjab had efficient and contented services, British and Indian. Serious crime was diminishing steadily ; the prosperity of the people was rapidly increasing, aided by British initiative and enterprise ; the co-operation between the Administration and the people was growing ; a successful effort had been made to check corruption in the public services ; the finances were carefully managed, and there was a growing surplus to be devoted to the greater development of movements for the benefit of the masses. Against that we *now* see the services discontented and weakened by the premature exodus of many of the best British members ; violent crime showing an alarming increase ; bribery again becoming rampant ; race-hatred aroused against the British ; sectarian animosities between Hindu, Mohammedan, and Sikh, intensified by the jealous struggle for place and power, and leading to civil strife and bloodshed ; an empty treasury and the closing down or contraction of schemes for the real benefit of the people. Such are the first results of subordinating honest administration to dishonest politics.

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE PUNJAB REBELLION OF 1919

THE complete victory of Great Britain and the allies in November, 1918, over the Central Powers and Turkey appeared to establish the British Empire on a securer footing than it had ever occupied. A few weeks after the Armistice I had two interesting, but widely different, outlooks on the situation from two of my Indian friends.

The first was the late Nawab Sir Fateh Ali Khan, Kizilbash, one of the most prominent members of the Shiah community in Northern India, head of a loyal, influential, and historic family with connections in Kabul and Irak, and thoroughly conversant with Islamic thought and feeling. In congratulating me on the success of the British arms, he said with pride that England, having crushed her enemies, was now the dominant power in the East and the West and had the world at her feet.

The visitor who followed him was a Hindu gentleman of wide knowledge, acute observation, and shrewd judgment. I mentioned to him what the Nawab had just said, and then he told me something very significant. This was that Gandhi had been heard to say that the British were now full of pride in their victory and considered themselves the masters of the world; but that he was master of a weapon which would soon bring them to their knees. That, of course, was his policy of Passive Resistance—already used by him with effect in South Africa—which he later in India developed into the policy of so-called “Non-Violent Non-Co-operation.” My Hindu friend told me to be on the look out for Gandhi’s next move.

About the same time an English friend, then a Judge of the

Chief Court, warned me that there were constant rumours in the Bar rooms—which are the *foci* of political activities in India—that the Punjab extremists, and he named three who took a leading part in the subsequent outbreak, intended to have a trial of strength with Government; but had not quite made up their minds whether to make their effort in my time (I was to retire in April, 1919) or to await my departure. I was therefore to some extent prepared for what followed.

There were many other indications that mischief was brewing. The subterranean revolutionary movements among certain sections of Hindus, Sikhs, and Mohammedans had indeed been crushed, as described in earlier chapters, with the aid of the special provisions of the Defence of India Act. But the Armistice made resort to those exceptional war measures more difficult. At the same time the declaration of 20th August, 1917, the release soon after of Mrs. Besant, the apostle of Home Rule, and the Secretary of State's visit to India in November, 1917, had given a strong stimulus in the Punjab to political activity, which had been almost quiescent since the collapse of the Ghadr rebellion in 1915. Some of this activity was legitimate and constitutional; but in certain centres, especially Amritsar, it speedily assumed an extreme and anti-Government form.

The Sikh community as a whole was then actively loyal, and justly proud of the part it had played in the Great War. But the revolutionary movement still lingered among certain Hindu and Mohammedan elements, and with these the extremist politicians speedily allied themselves. The opportunity for such an alliance was favourable. The collapse of Turkey and the rumours of her probable dismemberment had led to increasing agitation by the (then) small but violent section of Pan-Islamists in the towns; the extremist Hindus were encouraged to claim "self-determination" on the analogy of Egypt, Syria, and Irak. Both for the moment were induced to unite against the Government which was believed to have been bled white by the sacrifices of the War, and was represented as the deadly foe of Turkey and the represser of India's national aspirations.

This unholy alliance was most marked at Amritsar. From the middle of 1918 Dr. Kichlu, a Kashmiri Mohammedan, who had taken a degree in a German University and come to practise at the Bar in 1915, and Satya Pal, a Hindu assistant surgeon, were leading a most violent anti-Government agitation, which compelled me later to curtail their licence of speech and freedom of movement. The same anti-Government propaganda characterised the extremist National Congress at Delhi in December, 1918. The Rowlatt Bill was attacked, the Reforms Scheme denounced, and full provincial autonomy was immediately demanded. At the instance of the Amritsar delegates, including the two mentioned above, the decision was taken to hold the next extremist National Congress at Amritsar. At Delhi not only did the Congress and Muslim League hold joint sittings, but great efforts had been made to secure rural delegates from the Punjab. This had met with little success, and it was then decided by the Congress to carry on an active "political" propaganda among the rural classes in the Punjab, who had been so staunchly loyal throughout the War.

The All-India Muslim Conference was even more openly rabid in its tone. The speech of Dr. Ansari seemed to me such a dangerous incitement to rebellion that when it came to my notice (Delhi is outside the Punjab and directly administered by the Government of India) I at once prohibited its circulation in the Province, and I believe other Provinces followed my lead. But meantime it had done much mischief among the fanatical Mohammedans of the towns.

All that cold weather I was on tour throughout the Punjab, busily engaged in holding Durbars in different districts for the public acknowledgment of war services and the distribution of rewards to the thousands who had done splendid work throughout the War.

Those rewards went almost exclusively to the rural classes, who alone had shown marked loyalty, and this fact was resented by the urban Intelligentsia. In those Durbars and at various informal meetings, I endeavoured by constant advice and exhortation to make clear to the extremists, even speaking personally to some of their leaders, the dangers of the course



they were pursuing in seeking to disturb the peace of a loyal province. At the same time I warned all loyal and reasonable men against the attempts being made to sow dissension between them and their Government, and asked their help in maintaining peace and order. I did not ask in vain ; for in the subsequent disturbances the rural populations, with few exceptions, remained unshaken and the trouble was confined to Amritsar, Lahore, and certain adjoining towns and areas which fell under their influence or that of Delhi.

The extremists throughout Northern India were all this time concentrating their efforts on stirring up trouble in the Punjab, as being the most vital point in the Indian Empire. But I am confident that there would have been no outbreak but for the Rowlatt Bill, which at this critical juncture gave all the forces openly or secretly hostile to the British Government a pretext for combining in a great effort under Gandhi's leadership to "bring Government to its knees"—to use his own phrase of some months before.

The Bill was a reasonable and practical measure intended to take the place of the Defence of India Act, but much less drastic in its provisions. It dealt only with revolutionary and anarchical crimes, and was based on the report and proposals of a most competent committee of eminent judges, administrators, and lawyers—British and Indian—presided over by Justice Sir Sidney Rowlatt of His Majesty's High Court. The Committee had in the cold weather of 1917-18 made a most exhaustive investigation of the revolutionary conspiracies in every province, and the Bill was framed to meet their recommendations. It was naturally regarded by the extremist agitators, and the many "Moderates" who in India invariably oppose any measure to strengthen authority and thereby protect society, as fatal to their designs. When introduced it had the general support of many Indian members ; but as the agitation against it, aided by the most unscrupulous campaign of malignant misrepresentation that India up to then had witnessed, grew in volume and violence, these were frightened into open or passive opposition. When the Bill was passed into law on the 18th March, 1919, not a single elected Indian member

voted for it, though some, to my certain knowledge, approved of it. This was the signal for the opening of Gandhi's passive resistance, which I had first heard of in the previous November. The ground had meantime been prepared by his manifesto of March 1st, announcing his intention and formulating the pledge of passive resistance, by the menacing speeches of several members in the Legislative Council, threatening the authorities with an agitation of unprecedented violence if the Bill became law, by a series of most inflammatory articles in the Indian Press generally, and by the mobilisation in a campaign against the Act of every political or semi-political association—the Congress and Khilafat Committees, Indian Associations, Hindu-Mohammedan Associations—generally headed in the Punjab by extremist journalists, lawyers, and members of the Arya Samāj.

#### *Delhi Outbreak, 30th March*

On the 23rd March, Gandhi, having marshalled his forces, began the war against the Act by proclaiming a Hartal or stoppage of all work throughout India on the following Sunday—30th March. In the Punjab the Hartals took place on that date only at Amritsar, Mooltan, and a few other places, as there was some doubt about the date.

But a Hartal took place at Delhi and, as any sensible man who knows the temper of an Indian mob could foresee, the "passive resistance" was soon enforced by violence and intimidation. The railway station, which is the focus of all the railway traffic of Northern India, was stormed by the mob to compel the vendors of food and sweetmeats to close. They resisted and were assaulted, and the station was damaged. The police were called in, but failed to clear out the mob. The British police officers were assaulted, and the crowd remained hostile and riotous even after the release of the two ring-leaders who had been arrested. British and Indian troops were called out to force back the mob. The latter resisted, the police and troops were stoned, and the magistrate ordered the troops to fire—after several of the police had been injured.

A few of the rioters were killed ; the mob was pushed back towards the main Bazaar, but again attacked the troops, who at first fired in the air. The mob then charged the troops and were again fired on with a few more casualties. There were in all eight death casualties. Frequent disturbances broke out up to 17th April when a police picquet was attacked and had to fire in self-defence, killing two and wounding several of the mob. None of those who incited or participated in the disorders were ever brought to justice ; in fact they were regarded, and regarded themselves, as masters of the situation, and as dictating terms to the Chief Commissioner. For weeks order was not restored in the capital of India. The example of the paralysis of authority there was not lost on those who were preparing to defy it elsewhere. Had firm action been taken at Delhi, it is probable that the disorders, which in the next fortnight spread from Delhi through Bombay and Calcutta, the Punjab and Peshawar, would have been averted.

To quote again Sadi's Persian couplet :

“ Sar-i-Chashma ba bayad giriftan bá mil,  
Chi pur shud na shayad guzashtan ba fil.”

(“ A stream can be stopped at its course by a twig,  
Let it flow, and it will drown even an elephant.”)

### *Extremist Preparations in the Punjab*

The Delhi disturbance added fresh fuel to the fire. The few who had lost their lives by defying the law were exalted into “ martyrs ” and glorified in the Press. Mr. Gandhi, instead of calling off a spurious agitation based on the wildest falsehoods, which he saw had already led to bloodshed, ordered another Hartal for Sunday, 6th April. Meantime the attitude of the extremist Press became more violent, and in Lahore and Amritsar posters appeared urging the populace at Amritsar to “ kill and die,” and warning the British officials at Lahore that “ there will be a great Ghadr (rebellion) at Lahore on 6th April, our National day. Be prepared to meet all that awaits to befall you Englishmen on that day.”

Realising that a storm was coming, we in the Punjab did

what we could to prevent or minimise it. Proceedings were taken against some of the most dangerous firebrands and most violent newspapers, and in Lahore and Amritsar public meetings were forbidden without previous sanction. On the 6th April the Hartals took place in nearly all the chief towns of the Central Punjab, and were enforced, as I saw personally at Lahore, by the most open intimidation in which College students—especially from the Arya Samáj institution—played a leading part. The orders regarding public meetings were openly defied, menacing crowds with black flags paraded the streets, and only the presence of a large body of British and Indian troops, including cavalry, with machine-guns prevented them from forcing their way into the European quarter. To expose the falsehoods about the Rowlatt Act employed to excite the ignorant mobs, we had hastily printed and distributed tens of thousands of copies of an explanation of the Act—which had not yet been brought into force in any part of India and could not be without the special sanction of the Government of India. These copies were torn up or burned publicly, for those who were behind this lawless agitation knew that it could only thrive on falsehood.

The Lahore mob that night made hostile demonstrations against prominent Indian gentlemen known to be supporters of the Government. Something similar was taking place at Amritsar, Kasur, Jullundur, Mooltan. At Mooltan on the previous day Gandhi's disciples, the "passive resisters," refused to allow the 2/30th Punjabis to march through the city to receive the welcome arranged for them by the Municipality on their return from the War. At Amritsar—a city of one hundred and fifty thousand people with only one company of British troops—the situation created by the virulent agitation of Kichlu and Satya Pal, who were still influencing it, had become so critical that on 8th or 9th April I ordered their removal to a distant place and at the same time asked the military authorities to strengthen the garrison (General Dyer had already sent troops from Jullundur to protect the railway station). But unfortunately my request was not received by them till the 11th and the outbreak took place on the 10th.

On 7th April I had a final meeting with my Legislative Council at Lahore. As I was to leave in a few weeks, nearly all the Indian members were good enough to eulogise my six years' administration of the Province. The member, Raizada Bhagat Ram, a Hindu lawyer and a strong supporter of the Arya Samáj, who on the 7th April was perhaps most profuse in his eulogies, seemed to have changed his views rapidly, for within a few days, according to his evidence in the case of *O'Dwyer v. Nair*, he was organising a deputation to represent to the Viceroy that there would be no peace in the Province till I was removed, and he went so far as to impute to the Commissioner of the Division a share in this back-stairs intrigue. In concluding the Council proceedings I took the opportunity to add another most emphatic warning of the dangers of the unscrupulous campaign of lies that was being carried on to excite the ignorant masses, and made it clear that I would hold the Press and the platform orators responsible for the results of what they wrote and spoke.

I quoted Lincoln's famous remark, "You can (if you are very clever and very unscrupulous) fool all the people for some time, and some people for all time. But you cannot fool all the people for all time."

To point the moral as regards the responsibility of the Press and the platform, I quoted Æsop's story of the enemy trumpeter who, when the city fell, begged the soldier of the victorious army to spare him on the ground that he was a non-combatant. The soldier (rightly) refused on the ground that without the trumpeter's call the enemy's soldiers would not have advanced to the fight!

I had hoped that my grave warning, which was at once published in the Press, would have brought home to those who were working up the city mobs to the point of frenzy, that if a serious outbreak resulted, they would be the first I would lay hands on (as I did), and that this knowledge would restrain them; for most of this class are at heart cowards, and when the trouble starts they disappear into their hiding-places. But either things had gone too far for them to draw back, or they thought that I was "bluffing"—as I was to

leave in a few weeks—and would not have the support of the Government of India. They saw, too, that nothing effective was being done to restore the situation in Delhi—the Government of India headquarters.

It was at this critical stage that I received news that Gandhi was on his way to Delhi and the Punjab. I at once issued orders prohibiting him from entering, and the Government of India passed similar orders as regards Delhi and agreed to Gandhi, if he disregarded the orders, being sent back to Bombay. On the morning of 9th he was served with the orders at a railway station on the borders of the Province, protested against them, but agreed to go back to Bombay by the next train ; and one of our police officers saw that he did. It was open to the Bombay authorities to prosecute him for breaking the law there, but they decided not to do so.

Two days after my speech of 7th April the local extremist organ—the *Tribune*—which had been holding up to admiration the Delhi “martyrs,” came out with a savage attack on my warning in an article headed “A blazing indiscretion.” Clearly the extremists had decided on a trial of strength with Government—as I had been warned months before—and circumstances were considered favourable for flinging down the challenge in my time. The inner section who were directing the agitation were well aware that the British troops in the Punjab were few and were mainly Garrison battalions or Territorials, of whom Kichlu had spoken so slightly a week before at Amritsar that I quietly directed arrangements for his protection from the risk of reprisals by the brave men he had libelled. They also hoped that when the explosion came they would be joined by a large section of the Indian Army and the Indian police ; indeed on the 6th April attempts had been made to tamper with the troops on duty in Lahore. They also counted on being joined by a large section of the virile rural population—especially the Sikhs—and agents were sent out from Delhi, Amritsar, and Lahore to work them up.

Finally, some at least were already invoking the aid of Afghanistan and the Frontier tribes—to whom emissaries had been sent from Delhi and Amritsar—in the attack on the

British Government. Fortunately all these plans either failed completely or did not materialise in time.

The Indian police, in spite of most insidious attempts to seduce them, remained, as ever, true to their salt. Among the Indian troops there were certain disquieting symptoms, especially in some of the new units which were still raw and undisciplined. When challenged on this point, in the case *O'Dwyer v. Nair*, and confronted with the statement of the Adjutant-General to the Hunter Committee that he did not know of any organised or serious attempts to tamper with the Indian troops, I replied that I had a list of eighteen instances in which, to my own knowledge, attempts had been made to corrupt the Indian troops in April, 1919, and that in six of these cases there had been some success ; I could give details if pressed, but as, fortunately, owing to our prompt measures no serious results followed, I would prefer to remain silent. The point was not pressed, but the evidence in my possession was irrefutable, though perhaps not known to Simla.

The rural population generally failed to respond to the incitements of the extremists, though, when the trouble spread, they "chipped" in in many instances along the railway line in Lahore, Amritsar, and Gujranwala, to take a hand in the looting. If the disorders had continued a little longer, they were preparing to plunder wholesale their wealthy Indian neighbours in the towns, and this would have speedily led to bloodshed and massacre.

The Afghans and the Frontier tribes, incited by Indian emissaries, began to move towards the Frontiers early in April—a fact which though well known was never brought out before the Hunter Committee—and began a concerted attack on the North-West Frontier *at the end* of April. They were encouraged by the belief that the Punjab was seething with rebellion and ready to receive them with open arms. The rebellion had broken out on 10th April, but it had been crushed a week before our external enemies were able to make their effort. Instead of being welcomed by mutinous troops and a rebellious population, as they had been led to expect, they found a well-equipped army of two hundred thousand men

barring their way, supported by the loyal millions of the rural Punjab, who had again rallied to the defence of the Empire which they had done so much to maintain in the Great War.

The various risings in the Central Punjab between the 10th and 20th April have been described as isolated episodes with sufficient accuracy in the majority report of the Hunter Committee and in the dispatches of the Government of India and the Secretary of State dated 3rd and 26th May, 1920. But their interconnection and their significance, as part of a widespread and well-organised movement, have been overlooked. No impartial critic will *now* accept the conclusion of these authorities that there was no evidence of an organised conspiracy. The evidence was there. For instance, an Afridi native officer who had won the V.C. in the War, was ready to testify to the overtures made to his tribe by seditious Hindus from the Punjab and Peshawar. But for reasons of "political expediency" it was not produced, or, when already available, as in the judgments of the Martial Law Commissions which dealt with the various outbreaks in half a dozen districts of the Punjab, Lord Hunter's Committee positively declined to look at it. Moreover, that Committee by its terms of reference was debarred from going into the outbreaks at Calcutta in April and in Peshawar in May, 1919, both of which were part of the general revolutionary movement.

#### *Amritsar Outbreak, 10th-12th April*

The outbreak at Amritsar, which was in any case inevitable after that of 30th March at Delhi, was undoubtedly precipitated on 10th April by the deportation that morning of the two arch-seditionists Kichlu and Satya Pal, both of whom were afterwards convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, but were speedily amnestied. The mob, which had been incited to defy the law by months of open and secret revolutionary propaganda, at once rose, endeavoured to force its way into the Civil Station where the British officials and non-officials reside, and was held up by the small British picquets on the bridges over the railway which connect the city with



the Civil Station. The mobs attacked the troops with stones, sticks, and other missiles ; were fired upon and suffered a few casualties ; at once attacked and murdered all the Europeans (five) whom they could lay hands on in the city. They attempted to murder two Englishwomen—a lady missionary and a lady doctor working in the city, and left the former for dead in the street ; set fire to the Anglican Church, to the Mission School, while the teachers and pupils were inside, and to several other Mission buildings. They then looted the two English banks, after murdering the three British managers and burning their bodies ; set fire to the railway goods station and murdered a British railway official on duty ; attacked the railway passenger station but were repulsed by the small force that General Dyer had wisely posted there a day before, and by two hundred unarmed Gurkhas who had opportunely arrived by a troop train ; attacked and gutted the Central Telegraph Office and attempted to murder the telegraph master, who was rescued by some Indian troops ; set fire to the Town Hall ; burned and looted the various post offices ; looted a goods train in the station ; attacked the Calcutta mail train on its way to Lahore ; and wrecked and looted the railway station adjoining Amritsar. Such was the manner in which the Amritsar mob in a few hours gave a display of Gandhi's "Soul Force."

I got a brief confused report of these doings at Amritsar that afternoon at Lahore—all telegraphic and telephonic communications except the railway telephone were cut at the beginning of the outbreak—and at once dispatched the Commissioner, Mr. Kitchin, an officer of twenty-five years' service and of proved capacity, from Lahore, thirty-five miles off, to deal with the situation as he found it. Reinforcements, British and Indian, were at once dispatched from Lahore ; and the Commissioner finding that the situation had passed out of civil control, decided that it was a military one and directed the Officer Commanding to take the measures necessary to re-establish civil authority. The civil authorities did not abdicate ; they remained in close touch with the military and helped them with advice and information.

*Lahore Outbreak, 10th-12th April*

Soon after receiving the terrible news from Amritsar I was informed that mobs were assembling, in defiance of the legal prohibition, in Lahore City with the object of invading the Civil Station, where there were some thousands of Europeans, the majority being women and children. There were no troops nearer than Lahore Cantonment, five miles off. I sent urgent messages to the Divisional Commander, General Sir William Beynon, who had so skilfully handled the critical situation on the 6th, to send in troops at once to take the same protective measures. Being Thursday, it was a soldiers' holiday, and there was some delay in getting the troops together. Colonel Frank Johnson, commanding that fine battalion, the 4th Royal Sussex, rose to the occasion and got some of his men in first.

Meantime we in Lahore, who knew what had happened at Amritsar a few hours before and what was likely to happen on an infinitely greater scale in Lahore if military aid was delayed, went through some hours of the most terrible suspense. I had asked for the troops about two o'clock. About five o'clock I heard of the collection of the city mobs. Up to 6.30 I had no news of the arrival of the troops. At 6.45 I got hold of the District Magistrate (Mr. Fyson) and the Superintendent of Police (Mr. Broadway). Messages had come in that the mobs were moving on the Civil Station; from my verandah I could hear their ominous cries,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles off, and there was only a small body of armed police to block their way. I sent the two officers in a motor to take charge of the body of Indian police holding the Mall which links the city to the Civil Station, with instructions to parley with the mob, hold them up as long as possible, induce them, if possible, to return to the city, and, if they persisted in the attempt to force their way through, to use force to disperse them. I ascertained that the police were armed with buck-shot, and I said that if they had to fire there was to be no firing in the air. We could afford to take no risks where the safety of thousands of women and children was at stake. Meantime, on the suggestion of

Mr. Montgomery, the Chief Engineer, we collected all the women and children who could be got together at Government House, where there was a small military and police guard, both Indian. We kept them there till we heard that the troops had arrived and the mobs had been driven back to the city.

The District Magistrate and Police Superintendent, when they came up with the small police force on the Mall, found them being steadily pushed back into the Civil Station by a howling mob of ten thousand people. They were joined by Mr. Cocks, head of the C.I.D., and all three showed the greatest courage and forbearance. The mob attacked the officers, threw down one British officer who was rescued by his men, and attempted to wrest their weapons from the police. The District Magistrate then ordered the police to fire. One or two of the mob were killed and four or five wounded—among them students from the Colleges. At this the mob on the Mall began to fall back. But another mob attempted, as in Amritsar, to rush the Central Telegraph Station, through which all the wires to the north pass. Fortunately, Colonel Frank Johnson had sent on an advance party of the Sussex to protect it, and the mob were driven out at the point of the bayonet. By this time the Indian Cavalry from cantonments had also arrived to reinforce the exhausted police. The mob were steadily pushed back towards the city, but they were joined by thousands of others emerging from the city and at the Lohari Gate again put up a fight. The police and troops were stoned for half an hour from the streets and the roofs of houses. The police were again ordered to fire by the magistrate after due warning. There were three or four more casualties—one fatal—and the hostile crowds, who had been shouting that the Indian troops had mutinied at Amritsar, and that Lahore City was in their hands, were driven back into the city about 9.30 p.m. One wonders what would have happened if the police had had to await *written orders* from the magistrate before firing, as the Bill of an Indian "patriot" which has just passed its second reading in the All-India Assembly provides, or if they had had to wait *for an hour* after the reading of a Proclamation and for further serious attacks on life and property within

that hour, as the Right Honourable Mr. Sastri proposed. These gentlemen had never been in a riot, much less in a rebellion.

But the city was still in the hands of lawless mobs, and the police had to be withdrawn till the 12th. On that date a force of all arms, under Colonel Johnson, entered the city, dispersed the mobs, and was attacked. The police were again called upon to fire, as they had buck-shot while the troops had only ball-ammunition—which would cause serious casualties. There were a few more casualties, but authority was re-established. A strong military force, British and Indian, was left to hold the city gates and the waterworks in the middle of the city, and this was maintained till the end of May.

The arrival of the troops on the 10th saved the situation at Lahore for the moment. Late that night, with my wife, I went to the Lawrence Hall to receive an address from the representatives of the martial classes, which had been arranged some time before. I was strongly advised to put it off for the atmosphere was still electric. But I thought it wise to carry out the programme as it gave me an opportunity of telling these loyal men the situation which had arisen, and of invoking their co-operation in dealing with it. I asked the leading men of the Province, most of whom were in Lahore, to meet me next morning at Government House to discuss the action to be taken. Some thirty to forty attended. General Sir William Beynon accompanied me. It was a critical occasion and gave one the opportunity of seeing how men are tested by a crisis. I invited free expression of opinion. Two of the Lahore urban representatives, one of whom, Sir Muhamed Shaffi, became later a member of the Government of India, suggested opening negotiations, as at Delhi, with the mob leaders, who were now supreme in the cities of Lahore and Amritsar and openly encouraging the seditious movement. All the others who spoke were of one opinion, that only prompt and drastic action by Government would avert a serious rising. I told them that I would accept co-operation from all honestly desirous to restore peace, but would accept dictation from none, that I would not enter into negotiations with rebels (that was the mistake made at Delhi, and it prevented the authorities from

subsequently bringing the seditious leaders to justice), and that Government was quite capable of restoring the situation by itself, but would do so more speedily with their co-operation. This was promised by all. Steps were taken to issue a manifesto advising the people to obey the law, avoid public meetings, and not listen to evil rumours. The manifesto which was prepared by some of the Lahore politicians was a very milk-and-water affair and showed that I could not expect much help from that quarter.

However, Mr. Shaffi and Raja Narendra Nath, on their own initiative, entered into negotiations with the popular leaders—Harkishan Lal, Duni Chand, Ram Bhaj Dat, etc. (all three were lawyers and all were subsequently convicted of waging war and of conspiracy to wage war and confiscation of property under Sections 121 and 121A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to transportation for life, but were amnestied later). They had been promoting or participating in seditious meetings of the most violent type in the Badshahi Mosque in the city on 11th and 12th. There a Sikh ex-Sepoy announced (falsely of course) the mutiny of the Indian troops and the killing of five hundred British (including six by his own hand). He was applauded by the delirious audience and carried in triumph to the pulpit. Other inflammatory speeches were delivered from the pulpit by Hindu orators, and a Council of twenty (after the approved Soviet model) was appointed to direct the seditious agitation. The mob left these gatherings intoxicated with the spirit of rebellion, tore down and stamped on the pictures of Their Majesties, shouting that the Sultan or the Afghan Amir or the Kaiser was their Sovereign, called on the police, who were then effecting a re-entry into the city, to join them, and established a Danda Fauj (Bludgeon Army) to coerce loyal citizens and bring about a general strike at the railway workshops, where six thousand able-bodied Punjabis were employed. The leaders who were found by the Martial Law Commission to have organised and been present at the meetings which were so soon followed by these manifestations were not likely to help the authorities in restoring order. In fact, however, some of them condescended to dictate

terms as the price of their assistance in quelling the disorders, the rapid spread of which had caused some of them alarm. The terms were *inter alia* :

(1) That the troops and police who had occupied the city on the 12th should be at once withdrawn.

(2) That those arrested for the criminal acts of 10th-12th April should be released on security.

(3) That for the future Government should act only after consultation with a Committee, including some of the "popular" leaders.

I need hardly say I refused to consider these terms. I was not prepared to abdicate to rebels. This was on the 12th, *after* we had regained possession of Lahore City.

#### *Kasur Outbreak, 12th April*

On the same date I got news of a serious rising at Kasur, a railway station some twenty-five miles from Lahore and forty from Amritsar. Mobs from the town had invaded the Kasur railway station; held up the trains; brutally murdered two British warrant officers; attempted to murder two British officers and two non-commissioned officers who sustained severe injuries but saved themselves by fighting their way through; attempted to murder an English lady with her three children, who were saved by the gallant action of one Khair Din, a railway inspector, who hid them in a hut and stoutly defended them; looted and burnt the station; cut the telegraph wires. They then attacked the Government buildings; burned the Civil Courts; attacked the Treasury, and were finally driven off after the police guard had opened fire. The railway staff, who were either seditious or intimidated, had not moved a finger to prevent these outrages in which some of the bigger students, one of whom was afterwards sentenced to death for murder, from two of the local schools, had played a leading part. Kasur had followed the example of its great neighbours, Lahore and Amritsar, emissaries from Amritsar having been at work there on the 11th, and as was to be expected, the trouble at once spread along the line from Kasur to Amritsar. Several railway stations were

attacked and looted, and the Government Treasury at Taran Taran was attacked that night.

*Martial Law Proposed, 13th April*

That evening (12th) I communicated news of the grave situation to the Government of India at Simla by telephone. Up to then, except at Amritsar, only the police had fired on the mobs, and I was told from Simla that the view there was that if troops "had to fire they should make an example." I noted this in my Diary, but kept it to myself, for I wanted to have as little bloodshed as possible. When my Diary was produced in the case *O'Dwyer v. Nair*, the defence counsel based on this entry the ingenious theory that I had instructed General Dyer (whose presence at Amritsar I was not aware of then) to fire indiscriminately on the peaceful citizens of Amritsar assembled in the Jhalianwala Bagh on the 13th for a prayer meeting!

That night I met at dinner, at the house of Sir Zulfikar Ali Khan, Sir Muhamed Shaffi, Raja Narendra Nath, and other Indian gentlemen of "moderate" views who had been negotiating with the Lahore extremist leaders. By that time they were not in a position to help, even if they had wished to. But I told them, for their information and that of the extremists, that if the attitude of rebellion continued martial law was inevitable. I also warned them that there might be difficulty in restraining the British troops from taking reprisals for the brutal murders of their comrades and countrymen at Kasur and Amritsar. Fortunately, through all these troubles the British troops showed a splendid discipline and self-restraint which won for them the admiration even of the rebels and their sympathisers.

The outrages at Amritsar, Lahore, and Kasur from 10th to 12th and the general attack on railways and telegraphic communications all showed signs of prior organisation, extending over a large part of the Punjab. The outbreaks in Ahmedabad, the home of Gandhi, and its vicinity, one thousand miles away from Amritsar, on 12th-14th April (which

followed almost exactly the same course as that of Amritsar and were repressed by the military authorities using the same drastic measures as Dyer used at Amritsar) showed that the revolutionary organisation was not confined to the Punjab. Indeed Gandhi at Ahmedabad on 14th April, trying for the moment to allay the storm he had aroused, admitted this when he said :

“ It seems to me that the deeds I have complained of have been done *in an organised manner*. There seems to be a definite design about them, and I am sure that there must be some educated clever man or men behind them. They may be educated, but their education has not enlightened them ; you have been misled into doing these deeds by such people.”

Gandhi knew what he was talking about, and if the Hunter Committee, the Government of India, and the Secretary of State were not prepared to accept my word, surely in this matter they might have accepted his. Mrs. Besant, who in this matter could also speak with authority, wrote on 18th April in the *Times of India* :

“ The cutting of the telegraph wires, the derailment of troop trains, the burning of railway stations, the attacks on banks, the setting free of jail birds are not the actions of *satyagrahis* (passive resisters), nor even of casual rioters, but of revolutionaries.”

At Amritsar, the centre of the rebellion, the situation was still extremely menacing. The rebel mobs were in complete possession of the city after the 10th and openly defiant, proclaiming that “ it might be the Raj of the Sirkar outside but in the city it was their Raj.” No British official and no Indian policeman could venture into the city without a strong escort. Meetings to carry on the rebellion were being held in defiance of repeated proclamations, emissaries were being sent to incite the rural population, and on the morning of the 13th the main railway line near Amritsar was torn up by skilled hands and a train derailed.

The previous night a number of railway stations between Amritsar and Kasur and Amritsar and Lahore had been looted



and in some cases burned. Amritsar City, so far from showing any signs of repentance, was still on the 13th in a state of tumult and revolt. The British residents of Amritsar and the vicinity, including one hundred women and children, had been collected in the fort for safety. The rebels had practically isolated General Dyer, who had arrived from Jullundur on the night of 11th April, and his small force of about one thousand men. That was the situation in the Central Punjab which confronted me on 13th April.

After consulting Sir William Beynon, the Divisional Commander, and the Chief Justice, the late Sir Henry Rattigan, I sent the following message to the Government of India at Simla about 3 p.m. by wireless, all other means of communication having been cut :

“Railway stations between Kasur and Amritsar looted. British soldier killed and two British officers injured at Kasur. Bands of rebels reported on move. Kasur and Taran Taran Treasuries attacked. State of open rebellion exists in parts of districts of Lahore and Amritsar. Lieutenant-Governor, with concurrence of General Officer Commanding 16th Division and Chief Justice High Court, requests Governor-General in Council to suspend functions of ordinary Criminal Courts in Amritsar and Lahore districts, to establish martial law therein and to direct trial of offenders under Section 2 of Regulation X of 1804. Section 4 (allowing trial by ordinary Courts instead of by Courts-Martial where the latter procedure was not indispensably necessary) should be borne in mind. Situation critical. Movable column starts on march from Ferozepur to Amritsar through worst tract with guns to-morrow morning.”

As remarked by the learned Judge in the case of *O'Dwyer v. Nair*, this was an understatement rather than an exaggeration of the situation.

The Government of India, of which Sir Sankaran Nair was a member, at once sanctioned my proposals for martial law. They were made *before* Dyer's action at Amritsar that evening ; but the sanction was, owing to the cutting of communications, not received till the 14th, and martial law was not formally

proclaimed in Amritsar and Lahore till the 15th. To save time my wireless message of the 13th April had been sent *en clair*. It was picked up at the Bolshevik wireless station in Tashkent and used by the Bolsheviks, as we learned later from General Malleon at Meshed, to show that the British were fighting for their very existence in India.

*Dyer's Action at Amritsar, 13th April*

On the evening of 13th April the inevitable collision between the defiant Amritsar rebels and the forces of law and order under General Dyer took place. Rumours had reached Lahore that evening, but the first official account was received by me in a message from the Deputy-Commissioner (Lieutenant-Colonel Miles Irving) brought in by two British officials about 3 a.m. on the morning of 14th.

I at once communicated the substance of the message, without awaiting the military report, to the Government of India in the following telegram :

“At Amritsar yesterday Brigadier-General Dyer and Deputy-Commissioner read proclamation in city forbidding all public meetings. Prohibition proclaimed by beat of drum and read and explained at several places in city. In spite of this, meeting attended by six thousand was held at 4.30 contrary to Deputy-Commissioner's expectation. Troops present under command of General Dyer fired, *killing about two hundred*. Deputy-Commissioner not present. Military report not yet received. City quiet at night, but political effect on Manjha (Sikh tract around Lahore and Amritsar) and troops uncertain. In view of possibilities General Officer Commanding is arranging to draft into Lahore more troops, British and Indian.

Early this morning large mob attacked railway station at Wagha (between Lahore and Amritsar) ; rail was removed by skilled hands and signaller bolted. Armoured train went out from Lahore and two cars were derailed and left on line under guard. Assistance being sent. Line cutting and attacks on trains becoming frequent.”

In this message I expressed no definite opinion on General Dyer's action, because I had not received his report, and also

because I was led to understand by the gentlemen who brought in the Deputy-Commissioner's report that General Dyer had used only British troops, as the Indian troops had refused to fire, and that he had no British civil official with him.

Later on the 14th, General Beynon received Dyer's report of that morning and verbally communicated to me the substance of it. Dyer's report, written *at once* after the events described, and *transmitted at once to the Government of India*, through his military superiors, is so important that I transcribe it in full :

"I arrived here on night of 11th April, and the same night went through the city to bring the Superintendent of Police in charge of the city to hear personally what he had to say. After consultation with the Deputy-Commissioner and police officials, I determined, with a view to show the inhabitants that I had a sufficient military force, to force them to law and order and also to arrest certain ringleaders. This was carried out between 12 hours and 15 hours on 12th April.

I was aware that the inhabitants had been warned that they were not to hold meetings or followings *and that if they did so they would be fired on*. To further enforce my wishes, a Proclamation was proclaimed on morning of 13th by beat of drum in many of the main streets of the city, warning the inhabitants that unlawful acts would be prevented by military force. On my way back from the city I was informed that the disaffected characters in the city had ordered a meeting in the Jhalianwala Bagh at 16.30 hours. I did not think this meeting would take place in the face of what I had done.

At 16 hours I received a report from the police that a gathering was beginning in the place mentioned above. I immediately sent picquets to hold various gates of the city (to prevent a renewal of the attack of the 10th on the British quarter) and marched with 25 Rifles 9th Gurkhas, and 25 Rifles from detachments of 54th Sikhs F.F. and 59th Rifles F.F., making a total of 50 Rifles, and also 40 Gurkhas armed with *kukris*. I entered the Jhalianwala Bagh by a very narrow lane which necessitated leaving my armoured car behind. On entering I saw a dense crowd, estimated at about 5,000 (those present put it at 15,000 to 20,000) ; a man on a raised plat-

form addressing the audience and making gesticulations with his hands.

*I realised that my force was small and to hesitate might induce attack. I immediately opened fire and dispersed the mob. I estimate that between 200 and 300 of the crowd were killed. My party fired 1650 rounds.*

I returned to my headquarters about 18 hours. At 22 hours, accompanied by a force, I visited all my picquets and marched through the city in order to make sure that my order as to inhabitants not being out of their homes after 20 hours had been obeyed. The city was absolutely quiet and not a soul to be seen. I returned to headquarters at midnight. The inhabitants have asked permission to bury the dead in accordance with my orders. This I am allowing.

(Signed) R. B. DYER, Brigadier-General.  
Commanding 45th Brigade."

This full and frank report supplemented my telegram of the morning in several particulars. It showed that Dyer had used only Indian troops, that his force was dangerously small for the execution of his imperative duty, and that if he had delayed in order to give *further* warnings, in addition to those that he and the Deputy-Commissioner had been giving for four hours earlier in the day, his small force would probably have been swept away like chaff before the wind; and then what would have happened to Amritsar, to Lahore, and the Central Punjab? As Dyer said later, he had the rebel army before him, he was practically isolated in the middle of a great city seething with rebellion, and hesitation would have been fatal.

General Beynon also told me that he believed Dyer's action had crushed the rebellion at its heart, Amritsar. My own view, based on my knowledge of the people and the opinions of competent judges like the Commissioner, Mr. Kitchin, was that not only did Dyer's action kill the rebellion at Amritsar, but, as the news got round, would prevent its spreading elsewhere. As a matter of fact after the 18th, by which time the news had penetrated over the Province, it was not necessary to fire another shot. Outside the Punjab the immediate

results in stopping the seditious movement were equally marked.

General Beynon told me he was conveying approval of his action to Dyer and asked if he might add mine. I had at first some hesitation, as Dyer's action was a military one, but on fuller consideration I thought it advisable to endorse General Beynon's approval. He then sent the message (by aeroplane, I think) to Dyer.

"Your action correct and Lieutenant-Governor approves."

Much capital has been made of this message by certain Indian politicians and their British supporters. I shall deal with the point later.

*Further Outbreaks, 14th April, Gujranwala City*

The 14th April was the high-water mark of the rebellion. On that date I received reports of outbreaks at half a dozen places which took place before the news of Dyer's action at Amritsar on 13th April had time to spread, and were either directly incited from or inspired by the example of Lahore and Amritsar. The most serious was that at Gujranwala, forty miles from Lahore.

I had scarcely finished with Amritsar before I received, about 1 p.m., the news of the Gujranwala outbreak. This has been summarised in Chapter IV. The Indian Deputy-Commissioner succeeded in getting the following telegram sent from an out-station, eight miles off, all local communications having been cut :

"Hartal and disturbances going on. Mob active, more expected. Bridges on either side of station burnt. Police insufficient. Military arrangements required."

On asking for troops to be dispatched, I was informed by the military authorities that no troops were available, and if available could not be got there in time. It was then that I suggested sending an aeroplane to drop bombs if necessary and if a good target (i.e. mobs engaged in arson and outrage) presented itself. It was the last chance of saving Gujranwala

and the small British community there. Two days previously, when a few aeroplanes had fortunately arrived, General Beynon and I had discussed with Colonel Minchin, the Officer Commanding the Air Force, the conditions under which aeroplanes might drop bombs or use their machine-guns. The suggestion I then made was that, as a rule, no bombs should be dropped *in* cities or towns, and that machine-guns might be used in the circumstances in which troops on the ground would fire.

The military authorities at once dispatched a few aeroplanes which arrived in the nick of time—about 3 p.m.—to save the Treasury building (in which the few European women and children had taken refuge) and the jail, which the rebels—having destroyed all other public buildings—were threatening. The aeroplanes speedily dispersed the rebellious mobs by bombs and machine-gun fire—causing some dozen death casualties, and restored the situation pending the arrival of troops from the north late that night.

My action in this matter was one of the “atrocities” imputed to me in the case *O’Dwyer v. Nair*. The situation which confronted me is admirably summed up in the Hunter Report :

“The urgency and the extremity of the need for prompt dispersal of the rioters is incontestable. The rioters had cut off communication by telegraph or telephone between Gujranwala and outside places ; they had been trying their best to make the railway useless for sending troops to the town ; their violence could only be measured when it had been stopped ; it was not stopped till the aeroplanes appeared ; the police had definitely failed to impose control and were practically exhausted ; troops dispatched on the earliest information did not arrive till five hours afterwards ; there was no certainty of (those) troops reaching there that day at all ; and there were no other troops who could be sent.

*We are not prepared to lay down as a Charter for rioters that when they succeed in preventing the ordinary resources of Government from being utilised to suppress them, they are to be exempted from having to reckon with such resources as remain.*

. . . . .

As regards the bombs which fell *in* Gujranwala we confine ourselves to the two bombs which burst. This action we uphold. These bombs appear to have fallen in the midst of rioters caught in the act of rioting and fully minded to continue. . . . These bombs were not only justified, but in our view were invaluable, and the fact that the disorders were ended by the aeroplanes long before troops arrived is, we think, in large measure attributable to them. . . .

Major Carberry's action in firing with his machine-gun upon crowds in the streets of Gujranwala, does not appear to us excessive."

The Government of India and the Secretary of State endorsed this view. The Committee criticised the Air Force officer—or rather the deficient instructions given to him—in connection with the dropping of bombs, which caused a few casualties, on some places in the vicinity of Gujranwala on collecting or retiring crowds and also the sending out of an aeroplane which dropped a few bombs on the morning of 15th. But of this latter I knew nothing till after it had returned. That afternoon (15th) I got the military authorities to dispatch an aeroplane to Gujranwala, at Colonel O'Brien's request, to demonstrate over the town while he was effecting the arrest of the ringleaders (barristers, pleaders, and others of the urban Intelligentsia.) The presence of the aeroplane enabled him to effect those arrests without resistance with a small British force of twenty-five men. The aeroplane returned without having dropped a bomb or firing a single round from its machine-gun. This was another of the "atrocities" on which the defence relied in the case *O'Dwyer v. Nair*.

#### *Other Outbreaks in Gujranwala*

How rapid was the spread of the rebellion is shown by the fact that from 14th to 16th April, before the news of Dyer's action got known, there was serious disorder at fourteen other places along the railway line in the Gujranwala district alone—including all the urban centres, Wazirabad, Akalgarh, Hafizabad, Ramnagar, Sheikhpura, Chuharkana, Sangla.

The Government of India in their dispatch of May 3rd, 1920, briefly summarise these. They say :

“ At Wazirabad, a riotous mob was expelled by troops from the railway buildings, but did extensive damage to the telegraph system. It also set fire to railway bridges, sacked and burnt the bungalow of a Scotch (Irish ?) missionary and made an unsuccessful attempt to wreck the mail train. At Akalgarh and Hafizabad extensive damage was done to the telegraph wires, and at the latter place an officer of the Military Farms Department (travelling with an English boy) had a fortunate escape from the murderous intentions of a threatening crowd. In the Sheikhpura subdivision persistent and determined attacks on the telegraph and railway systems were made at Chuharkana, Sheikhpura, Sangla, and other places, at least three railway stations being destroyed (after being looted), whilst savage assaults were made on certain railway employees and Government servants (British). An armoured train was sent to the rescue from Lahore, and fire was opened from this at Chuharkana under the orders of Rai Sahib Sri Ram Sud (the Indian Magistrate). The (Hunter) Committee find that this officer acted in a difficult situation with promptitude and decision.

The minority (three Indian lawyers) take a different view and condemn him on the ground that his intention was punishment and that the firing was therefore not justified. The Government of India accept the opinion of the majority in all matters arising out of the disturbances at those places and agree with them that Sri Ram Sud displayed promptitude and decision in the discharge of his duties.”

I may explain that on receiving the information of the rebellious outbreaks in various parts of Gujranwala on 14th April, I at once applied for and received sanction to the extension of martial law to that district. It was the prompt application by Sri Ram Sud for troops to restore order in his subdivision that led me to ask for the immediate dispatch of the armoured train, which at once went out with repairing equipment and a small section of the British branch of the Defence Force. The Indian Magistrate accompanied this force and in consultation with the officer commanding—



Captain Flowerdew—decided when fire was to be opened on the rebellious mobs engaged in tearing up the line, burning bridges, burning and looting stations in the forty miles from Sheikhpura to Sangla.

These outrages, as was reported to me at the time and later established judicially, had been instigated by down-country preachers (Hindu and Mohammedan) calling themselves "Gandhi's men," who for weeks previously had been exciting against the Government the Hindu traders in the markets along the railways and in the adjoining Sikh villages, by the most lying tales of the oppressions that would result from the Rowlatt Act. The accounts of the outbreaks at Lahore and Amritsar on the 10th and at Kasur on the 12th had further stimulated the spirit of rebellion, and it was spreading with alarming rapidity, even among the rural population, in this remote tract till Sri Ram Sud, the sturdy Indian Magistrate, and Captain Flowerdew appeared on the scene with their armoured train. In two days they restored order at a cost of some half a dozen death casualties. Colonel O'Brien, the Deputy-Commissioner, and Mr. Bosworth Smith, I.C.S., then came on the scene, and completed the work of restoring order by arresting and bringing to speedy justice those implicated in the disturbances, including several pleaders and traders. Both officers were subsequently censured on the ground that their measures were too drastic, though the Government of India, on 14th April, had expressly laid down the necessity to prevent "by all means however drastic" the spread of the disorders and gave the officers responsible "the fullest assurances of countenance and support."

From Gujranwala, as might be expected, the rebellion spread along the line of railway north into Gujrat, through which run the two main lines of railway communication to the Indus and the North-West Frontier, and west to Lyallpur, the richest agricultural district in India, through which another railway line runs to the North-West Frontier. Each of these districts, like Gujranwala, has a population of about a million, but has no troops, British or Indian, and only a few British officials.

*Gujrat and Lyallpur Outbreaks*

In Gujrat and Lyallpur, as in Gujranwala, the risings were mainly the work of local agitators, mainly lawyers of the Congress Party, who were in touch with what was taking place in Lahore and Amritsar and in a position to excite the town mobs. Hence the disturbances took the familiar forms already described. The Government of India thus summarise them :

“The chief features of the disturbances in these areas were attacks on railway communications and telegraph wires. At Gujrat on the 15th April, fire had to be opened on a riotous mob (attacking the railway station) which was dispersed without casualties. At Malakwal (a railway junction in Gujrat) a train was derailed on 17th April and two lives were lost. At Lyallpur a very disquieting and prominent feature was the continued exhibition of posters of an inflammatory and criminal character. Indians were called upon, in the blessed name of Mahatma Gandhi, to fight to the death against English cheats and to dishonour English women. Great tension existed for several days, and the situation at Lyallpur was an anxiety to Government on account of the memories of the previous troubles of 1907 (in connection with which the notorious Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh were deported). The position was so serious that the Europeans in the stations were collected for safety in two houses in the civil lines, but no actual violence occurred except the cutting of telegraph wires at a few places in the district. The arrival of troops on the 17th April prevented any further disorders.”

The villages around Lyallpur are largely inhabited by prosperous Sikh colonists. A determined attempt was made by the local agitators to work them up to attack the British in the town, by spreading false and malignant rumours that the Sikh Golden Temple at Amritsar had been bombed by our troops, and that Sikh girls had been outraged by British soldiers. The following are extracts (quoted by the Hunter Committee) from the inflammatory posters referred to by the Government of India.

“O Sikhs, die or drown yourselves in the tank of the

Deputy-Commissioner's bungalow as your daughters were dishonoured at the hands of the sweepers. Allow your young men to take revenge."

Fortunately the Deputy-Commissioner, Mr. (now Sir) G. de Montmorency, was an officer of great local knowledge and personal influence with the rural population. He collected the European population (ninety persons, including some seventy women and children) into two bungalows in the civil station and arranged for their defence by their own menfolk. At the same time he called in to his aid Indian soldiers or pensioners from the adjoining Military Grass Farms and mounted men whom some of the rural leaders gladly placed at his disposal. The danger from the excitable and virile Sikh population was a much more real one than that from the town rabble, and Mr. de Montmorency therefore arranged for the patrol of the roads leading into Lyallpur to intercept any hostile bands from outside. These measures saved the situation till a small force of Indian troops arrived from Mooltan on 17th April; and on 19th April a movable column was organised to operate against Gojra, Toba Tek Singh, etc., where disturbances had occurred and the railway line had been wrecked.

How critical the situation was for the small British colony, and especially the women and children, till the troops arrived, may be gathered from the contents of another poster—quoted by the Hunter Committee :

"Blessed be Mahatma Gandhi. We are the Sons of India. We shall not give way. We shall lose our lives. We shall never abide by the Rowlatt Bill.

Gandhi! We the Indians will fight to the death after you. The flag of cruelty and oppression has been fixed in the ground. Alas, British, how you have cheated us. . . . You have fired on the Indians and shot them to death. . . . The treatments meted out to our girls at Amritsar are unbearable and we cannot expose them. It is very sad, that all our brethren are keeping silent at this moment.

*What time are you waiting for now? There are many (English) ladies here to dishonour. Go all round India, clear the country*

of the ladies and those sinful creatures and then will be the only time when we can all say together, 'Blessed be the Hindus, Mohammedans, and Sikhs.'"

The English women and children went through some weeks of great physical privation and mental anguish before we were able to send them to a place of safety in the hills, for ninety people were huddled together in the hot weather in accommodation designed for half a dozen. Similar hardships were endured by the hundred and twenty English women and children hastily collected in the Amritsar Fort, and by smaller numbers in many other stations. Anxiety as to these was one of our most serious preoccupations.

Martial law was extended at my suggestion to the Gujrat and Lyallpur districts about 20th April, among other reasons for the protection of the indispensable railway communications which were being continuously attacked at their most vital parts,

### *Gurdaspur*

At the same time the military authorities proposed the extension of martial law to the district of Gurdaspur, due north of Amritsar. There, a very serious situation menacing the scattered British community and the American Mission had arisen, and there were many attacks on railway, canal, and road communications, as well as threats to burn the civil station. Serious outbreaks were averted by General Dyer detaching troops from his small force at Amritsar on 12th and 13th April to protect the various danger points in Gurdaspur. But the danger continued till on and after the 20th, when he marched a column from Amritsar to Gurdaspur and with the Commissioner and Deputy-Commissioner (Mr. Harcourt) made the seditious elements realise that Government was master of the situation. I therefore decided not to propose martial law, as I wished to limit its application as far as possible. My forbearance was made the basis of another "atrocities" in the case *O'Dwyer v. Nair*. The Commissioner (Mr. Kitchin) of his own motion had directed the arrest of

some half a dozen pleaders, reasonably suspected of having taken a prominent part in the agitation. They were removed to Lahore Jail for safe custody as the local jail was not considered safe. Later on, after I had left the Province and the disturbances had ceased, it was decided, *as an act of grace*, not to prosecute them, and they were discharged after being kept some two months in custody. I had never heard of the case, but was charged with being responsible for the "atrocities."

### *Precautionary Measures Taken*

Of the twenty-nine civil districts in the Punjab, with an average population of three-quarters of a million, more than half had no troops, British or Indian. On the 14th April, when I realised the widespread character of the risings and the organised nature of the attacks on communications all over the Province, I at once arranged for the dispatch of troops under a British officer to all districts which previously had none. This measure was promptly carried out, and the appearance of the troops had an instantaneous effect in strengthening the waning civil authority and preventing many fresh outbreaks. An equally effective measure was the dispatch of movable columns under experienced officers through the most disturbed areas in Lahore, Amritsar, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Lyallpur, Jullundur, Hoshiarpur, Gurdaspur. The troops were welcomed by the loyal rural population, including thousands of ex-soldiers, and were able, as they went along, to get information of local feeling, to contradict authoritatively the lying rumours used to inflame the ignorant, to punish summarily those convicted of offences against martial law regulations, and generally to give confidence to the loyal and overawe the malcontents and disturbers of the peace.

I believe the timely appearance of these columns, on and after 14th April, was a main factor in keeping the countryside steady and in preventing the Ghadr Sikhs, of whom there were some thousands in the affected districts, from joining the rebellion. On the 16th April the telegraph and

telephonic communications being still cut, I reported to the Government of India at Simla by wireless :

(1) That the rural population was joining in to loot trains, treasuries, and other Government property.

(2) That there was nothing to show that the demobilised men (over one hundred thousand had been demobilised in the previous few months) or the Ghadr Sikhs were prominent in the rebellion, though some few might have joined.

(3) That persistent attempts were being made to seduce Indian troops, but so far they had proved staunch everywhere, also the Imperial Service troops.

The reference to the latter reminds me of another powerful influence in our favour, that of the Punjab Native States. These have a population of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  millions, a virile peasantry, and considerable bodies of troops. But all the Rulers, whether Sikh, Hindu, or Mohammedan, with one exception, had given splendid proofs of their loyalty in the Great War and in the Ghadr disturbances of 1914-15 ; nearly all were my personal friends, and at my instance their services had received generous recognition. So, directly the troubles broke out, I addressed each of them personally, pointed out the dangers with which we were threatened, and asked for their assistance and that of their troops in restoring order, in protecting communications through their States, and in such other ways as circumstances required. One illustration will show how promptly and effectively they responded. The premier Prince, His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala, at once took over the protection of the entire length of railway line within his State, mobilised his troops, went straight off to see the G.O.C. at Amballa, and put himself and his men at the General's complete disposal.

#### *Attacks on Communications*

The persistent attempts on the railway and telegraph lines through the whole length of the Punjab from Delhi to Attock showed more than anything else a prearranged design to immobilise our troops and isolate the main centres of rebellion. This part of the rebels' plan of campaign caused the military

authorities and myself more concern than anything else ; but its significance does not seem to have been fully appreciated either by the Hunter Committee or the Government of India.

From the 10th April every effort had been made to bring about a general strike of the railway staff in Lahore and the Punjab generally, and also among the six thousand workers in the railway workshops at Lahore. At midday on April 11th, when Lahore City was in the hands of a seditious mob and speeches inciting to rebellion were being delivered by Hindus and Sikhs in the Imperial Mosque, an Indian railway-signaller sent a telegraphic message to his friends at Delhi. This was that Lahore City was being looted, that the Indian troops were about to rise against Government, that the railway staff (Indian) of the North-Western Railway had decided to strike, and that other railways (no less than six pass through Delhi) should be asked to do the same.

On 12th April, this message was sent on to various other railways from Delhi *after consultation with the leaders of the agitation at Delhi* in the following form :

“ On receiving the word ‘ Rowlatt,’ Indian soldiers have decided to strike in the Punjab as well as the East India Railway and Oudh and Rohilkund Railway (staffs). Telegraph to Great Indian Peninsula and Bengal-Nagpur railways to look out and do the needful at once.”

This clandestine message was intercepted on 13th April at different places throughout India, including Bina, Agra, Patna, and Khargpur. On 13th April a railway employé at Delhi sent the following message to the following junctions in the Punjab on the North-Western Railway—Shakarpur, Jakkal, Bhatinda, Bahawluagar, Samasata, Khanewal :

“ All railways—Great Indian Peninsula, Rajputana, Malwa, Bombay, Baroda and Central India—leave work to-night from midnight. Hindolu [*sic*] passive resistance. Gandhi arrested. From Indian brothers.”

As a result, on 14th April railway strikes occurred at all those junctions, and also at Amballa, Mooltan, and Kundian,

which had received similar instructions from Lahore. Obviously a general railway strike, in the Punjab at least, was rapidly spreading as part of a concerted movement in support of the rebellion. Such a strike would have made it impossible to receive timely information, to move troops and to crush promptly the rapidly-spreading rebellion. Confronted with this situation, on 16th April after consultation with the military and railway authorities, I asked the Government of India, "in consequence of perpetual attempts on railways and cutting of telegraph lines," to sanction martial law for all railway lands in the Province. They replied on the 18th suggesting other measures. But meantime the Agent of the North-Western Railway, in anticipation of sanction, had telegraphed all over the line (over four thousand miles) that martial law *had* been extended to the railways. This error saved the situation, for by that time the wholesome effects of martial law had begun to show themselves in other directions. The strikes at once collapsed, and though attacks on the railway and telegraphs continued till the beginning of May, and in some cases were traced to seditious members of the railway staff, there was no longer any concerted strike movement.

But up to the end of April train services had to be cut down to a minimum, night running was generally suspended, the trains carried armed guards, while goods traffic had to be almost completely suspended and passenger traffic was only allowed on passes. In all, one hundred and thirty-two cases of tearing up the railway line, burning and looting stations, cutting telegraph wires, wrecking telegraph offices occurred in nineteen out of the twenty-nine districts in the Province. A most effective method of protecting the railways was to enforce village responsibility. The rural population readily understood this, and when called upon turned out promptly to guard the lengths of line through their village area. They did it most efficiently, and this work saved the troops and the police for urgent duties in other directions. Similar organised attacks had been made at the same time in and around Ahmedabad (Gandhi's home) one thousand miles off. The Government



of India were surely over-cautious in their conclusion a year later that :

“ These (outrages) indicated the extended area over which this class of offence was committed, giving rise to a *suspicion* of preconcerted action.”

However, as the result of our prompt measures, we were able to move troops freely, dispatch armoured trains by rail and armoured cars by road to all the disaffected centres, and above all maintain the line of communications to Peshawar and the Afghan Frontier.

### *Martial Law—My Responsibility*

Our most potent weapon in repressing the rebellion in the five districts, Lahore, Amritsar, Gujranwala, Gujrat, Lyallpur, in which martial law was imposed by the Government of India, and in preventing its spread to other districts, was the special power given by martial law. This weapon had not been used in India since the Mutiny of 1857, and its unexpected production had immediate and most salutary results.

Foreseeing the difficulties likely to arise from the exercise of those novel powers by inexperienced officers, I desired *from the start* to keep the administration of martial law (apart from purely military operations) under civil supervision. The local military authorities had agreed, and on the 16th April (a day after the proclamation of martial law), having framed the necessary orders and proclamations on that basis, I informed the Government of India of my intentions.

They gave an emphatic veto in their telegram of 18th April from which I quote the following extract :

“ View here (Simla) is that martial law having been declared subject to

(a) Maintenance of ordinary Courts for ordinary offences, and

(b) Courts-martial, now special tribunals, for offences specified in Section 2 of the Regulation (waging war, conspiracy, helping rebels, etc.),

all further powers of prescribing offences, penalties, Courts

procedure for trying the same, are vested in the General Officer Commanding, *and he only can exercise those powers. There is thus no power in the Lieutenant-Governor to take the line proposed in your telegram.* Ordinance (which I had proposed to issue) in these circumstances would be inoperative. Suggest any action already taken should be ratified by General Officer Commanding. Commander-in-Chief will direct him to act in consultation with you.

Military authorities consider it impossible to place officer with executive military authority under orders of Lieutenant-Governor."

[The difficulty *could* have been met by giving the Lieutenant Governor a military title and military powers in his Province as was done in the case of the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, when martial law was proclaimed there a few weeks later.]

The effect of these orders to me was that the Civil Government had to stand aside in the administration of martial law. It could offer advice or suggestions, as I did, but it rested with the military authorities to accept or reject that advice. The responsibility was theirs, not mine. They had to consider the situation primarily from a military standpoint, I naturally had also to give weight to other considerations. Hence while they often accepted my advice, they also sometimes rejected it, or more frequently, deferred acting on it till they considered that the military situation would justify them in doing so.

Thus at Lahore they accepted at once my suggestion, made before Lord Chelmsford wrote to me on the subject, to give up public whipping. But they did not, and I think they acted wisely, abolish whipping as a punishment. Similarly they hesitated to ease off many martial law restrictions, e.g. curfew, roll-call of students, the closing of the Imperial Mosque, where sedition had been openly preached, when I first made such suggestions. *They* were responsible. They waited till the military position was more secure and they had obtained the necessary guarantees. Similarly at Lahore they accepted

my advice not to call in arms in possession of the loyal population. General Beynon, however, stoutly resisted my suggestion to admit Counsel from other Provinces (permits to enter the martial law area were required from *all* outsiders) whose object was solely to defend the accused and to exclude only those who were thought likely to encourage seditious agitation. The Government of India, half of whom were then lawyers, were so agitated over this point that I put General Beynon in direct telephonic communication with them. He stuck to his guns; they disagreed, but they, *who alone could*, did not overrule him. I dwell on this point because Lord Chelmsford, in the case *O'Dwyer v. Nair*, while of course admitting that they had vetoed my proposal to supervise martial law, asserted that the fact that the General Officer Commanding was instructed to act in consultation with me made me *de facto* if not *de jure* responsible. He also stated that if I brought to the notice of the Government of India any case in which the military authorities disregarded my advice they (the Government of India) "would have something to say to him."

They evidently expected me in the middle of a serious rebellion, when civil and military co-operation was so essential, to do what *I* had not the power to do, and what *they*, who had the power, were not prepared to do! What had *they* "to say to" General Beynon, that "man of steel" as Mr. Justice McCardie aptly described him?

This matter of responsibility came to a head when at the end of April, 1919, Lord Chelmsford, at the instance of the Commander-in-Chief, brought to my notice General Dyer's so-called "crawling" order at Amritsar and asked *me* how I could justify it. The particular order was that the lane, in which a lady missionary had been brutally assaulted and left for dead on 10th April, was closed *during the day*, a military picquet being placed at each end, and that any people who wanted to pass through that way should do so by measuring their length on the ground, as Hindu pilgrims do at certain very sacred places in Benares, etc. My view of the order and of my own responsibility in the matter is given in my

letter of 1st May to Lord Chelmsford—from which I quote below :

“ I have just received your letter of 30th April about the order (a martial law one by General Dyer at Amritsar) that every Indian passing down the street where a lady missionary had been assaulted should proceed on all fours. The order gave me as much of a shock as it did to your Excellency, and directly I saw it in print among the martial law orders of Amritsar, I asked—I could not order—that it should be at once cancelled. I think similar action was taken by the Commander-in-Chief and the order was cancelled at once.

General Dyer came to see me two days ago, and I think he now realises the impropriety of the order. He urged in extenuation that as there was a picquet on each side of the place in question, no one could pass there except under military escort, and apparently the only person in regard to whom the order was enforced, was someone (there were six) arrested and brought along that way by the troops.

I am doing what I can, in communication with the General Officer Commanding the Division and his Brigadiers, to prevent any abuse of martial law orders. *But where martial law has been proclaimed, the military authority supersedes the civil in the ground covered by martial law orders, and all I and my officers can do is to advise and suggest. In Lahore, where as a matter of courtesy the General Officer Division sends round the orders before issue, I am able to keep a check on any action which appears ill-advised, but it is obviously impossible to exercise this preliminary control over General Officer Commanding outside Lahore, as I could not ask them to submit their martial law orders for my previous approval. Even as it is I am in a very usurping function and exercising a control which should be exercised by the higher military authorities through their special martial law officers.* The order in question is the only one I have noticed which indicates serious misuse of authority, and I don't think it is likely to be repeated. But I hope your Excellency will *realise that it is impossible for me to accept responsibility for the acts and orders of military officers executing martial law (though I will continue to all do I can to advise and suggest) and that it is for the higher military authorities to issue the necessary instructions and effect the necessary control.*”

In explanation of the above I may add that, almost at once after the proclamation of martial law and the vesting of authority in the General Officers Commanding at Lahore (Sir W. Beynon) and Rawal Pindi (Sir Charles Dobell), Army Headquarters deputed two experienced officers to advise them as to martial law administration, and the Divisional orders were issued after consultation with those experts. Similarly from the end of April the Government of India had their own liaison officer, Sir E. Maclagan, at Lahore, reporting to them direct. But there were also several Brigadiers (Clarke at Lahore, Dyer at Amritsar, Southey at Ferozepur, Campbell at Wazirabad) and Officers Commanding (Colonel Frank Johnson at Lahore, Colonel MacRae at Kasur, and half a dozen others) administering martial law in their respective areas and issuing their own orders according to local circumstances and independently of the Divisional Generals who could only maintain a very general control.

I received no reply to my letter of 1st May to the Viceroy, and naturally presumed that the position as stated by me was accepted. However, in view of that letter and of the Government of India order of 18th April, above quoted, it was a surprise to me to hear Lord Chelmsford state in Court that he regarded me as *de facto* responsible for the administration of martial law. The evidence of General Sir C. Monro (who was then Commander-in-Chief) showed that the military authorities had no desire to shirk their responsibility; the Judge in his summing up, and the jury by their verdict, showed that they did not accept the late Viceroy's view.

### *Martial Law "Atrocities"*

Much has been said and written of the martial law "atrocities." The unscrupulous propaganda, so sedulously pursued by the extremists to discredit the weapon which had foiled their designs and to vilify those who had made use of it, created a widespread impression both in England and in India that the authorities, military and civil, went out of their way to inflict racial humiliation on Indians. The Government of

India at that time were "on the run" and left the field open to the Indian extremists, while Mr. Montagu's unfortunate speech in the Dyer Debate lent some support to that grossly unjust view. The view of the Hunter Committee on this point may be quoted :

"As regards martial law orders and cases arising out of the breach thereof, we think it unfortunate that, in several important aspects, martial law assumed as intensive a form as it did. . . . Some of the orders issued were injudicious. They served no good purpose and were not, in our opinion, drawn with sufficient tact to prevent undue annoyance to the civil population."

They then refer to :

(1) General Dyer's "crawling" order (which no one attempted to defend).

(2) General Campbell's "salaaming" order, prescribing that the people of Gujranwala should accord to British officers "wherever met, the salutation usually accorded to Indian gentlemen of high social position in accordance with the customs of India."

(3) Colonel Frank Johnson's orders directing that the students of four, out of ten, colleges at Lahore which had been implicated in the disturbances should attend roll-calls four times a day to keep them from spreading sedition.

(4) The order of the same officer arresting and interning in the Fort for twenty-four hours from fifty to one hundred students of a College where the martial law orders had been torn down.

(5) *Public* floggings (whippings with a cane) at Lahore and the excessive number of floggings generally.

(6) "Fancy" punishments by Captain Doveton at Kasur, e.g. making convicted men touch the ground with their forehead (a traditional method of expressing repentance in the Punjab) and skipping, in lieu of the ordinary but more severe punishments—such as whipping, fine, and imprisonment.

It is not my business to justify orders for which I was not responsible. But, except for the "crawling" order, there is nothing very terrible, having regard to the situation which led

to their issue, in any of these orders and certainly no intention of inflicting racial humiliation. To show how groundless that charge is I may quote Colonel Johnson's instructions to martial law officers :

“Officers will not allow resentment to obscure their judgment in the proper administration of justice. In the measures undertaken under martial law there should never be any suspicion of resentful retaliation.”

A little knowledge of Punjab customs would have given the Committee a clearer insight ; but it did not, unfortunately, contain a single member who had ever exercised administrative authority anywhere in India, and five out of the eight members were lawyers. One explanation of the whipping sentences (two hundred and fifty-eight were so punished out of one thousand eight hundred people convicted) is that nearly half of these whippings were inflicted in out-of-the-way places—Kasur, Chuharkana, etc., far from a jail, and in the absence of railway facilities it was deemed expedient to inflict the punishment on the spot rather than send the prisoner to a distant jail to be imprisoned. There were even cases in which the prisoner asked to be whipped rather than fined. Whipping with a cane is a recognised punishment under Indian Criminal Law, and is a very mild affair as compared with the English flogging with the cat.

The Government of India's opinion on the matter of martial law administration was as follows :

“We accept the view (of the Hunter Committee) that the administration of martial law in the Punjab was marred *in particular instances* by a misuse of power, by irregularities, and by injudicious and irresponsible acts.”

They go on to say :

“It is to inexperience, to ignorance of local conditions, and *lack of guidance* when confronted with an abnormal situation, rather than to deliberate misuse of power, that most of the mistakes committed must be ascribed.”

They then, very sagely, lay down the principle, "that in any area in which *in future* it may be necessary to enforce martial law, senior civil officers should be appointed to act as advisers to the various military authorities." But they unfortunately omitted to state that this was the very system I had proposed to them on 16th April, viz. general civil supervision of martial law administration, but which they had decisively vetoed on 18th April when they directed me to abdicate in favour of the General Officer Commanding.

In his dispatch of 26th May, 1920, Mr. Montagu criticised the majority of the Hunter Committee for inadequate condemnation of these "improper punishments and orders."

He added that these things would not have occurred "had the civil authority been able to retain a larger measure of contact with the administration of martial law," and pointed out, what the Government of India had overlooked,

"that as regards the administration of martial law generally, Sir Michael O'Dwyer had evidently contemplated arrangements by which civil officers would be accorded a recognised position to advise on military administration."

In this matter I personally had no reason to complain of the dispatch. But the result of the orders was the censure or other punishment of many officers, civil and military, who had done splendid service in repressing the rebellion and who were sacrificed by an ungrateful Government to the clamour of the very men who had engineered that rebellion. What makes the action of the Coalition Government, of whom Mr. Montagu professed to be only the mouthpiece, the more deplorable is that neither the Government of India nor the Secretary of State expressed any detestation or condemnation of the acts of the rebels and murderers. Indeed six months *before* they decided to punish their own officers, they had, by a premature amnesty or commutation of sentences, liberated all but 5 per cent of the eighteen hundred persons convicted of waging war, murder, arson, robbery, wrecking railways and telegraphs, and other such offences. Their thunder was reserved for their own loyal but unfortunate servants. No



wonder a loyal Sikh magnate exclaimed, "How long can a Government last from which its friends have nothing to hope, its foes have nothing to fear?"

The only result of this sacrifice of their principles, their servants, and their friends to placate their enemies has been to excite the contempt of and encourage further defiance by the latter. They doubtless reason like my Irish Republican friend in Chapter I: "And who could have any respect for a Government that lets down its own people?"

### *Comparison of Punjab and Malabar Rebellions*

The lesson was not lost on the enemies of British rule or on the servants of Government in India. As I wrote publicly at the time (*Fortnightly Review*, February, 1921), the consequences would appear when the Government in India had again to handle a rebellion. My prophecy was unfortunately fulfilled in a few months. The Moplah rebellion, worked up by the fanatical incitements of the Ali brothers and other Khilifat agitators, and encouraged by the fact that the Government of India had divested itself of nearly all its emergency powers to please the new Assembly and had turned a deaf ear to the representations of the Madras Government, broke out in August, 1921. One of the arguments used to assure the Moplahs that rebellion was a safe and even a profitable game, was to recite to them the action taken by the Government a year before in pardoning the Punjab rebels and punishing the Punjab officers who had suppressed the rebellion!

The Government of India now, under Mr. Montagu's "superintendence and control," had the opportunity of showing how *they* would deal with a rebellion. They soon made their policy clear. The first step was that the Home Member (Sir W. Vincent) in reply to a question in the Assembly stated that the military commanders had been instructed to show all possible leniency to the rebels! That was early in September, 1921. Within a month the rebellion, which at the start was a trivial local affair as compared with the Punjab outbreak, had spread like a forest fire. The efforts

of our troops to restore order were rendered null and void by the martial law regulations with which Lord Reading's Government tied their hands. Murder, massacre, outrage went on unchecked to an extent a hundredfold greater than in the Punjab. In October the unfortunate Hindu population of Malabar, who were the chief sufferers from Moplah fanaticism—the men having been murdered by hundreds and forcibly converted to Islam by thousands; the women, also in thousands, meeting with an even worse fate—sent up from Calicut a remonstrance to Lord Reading. Probably it was the first time a Viceroy of India had to be reminded of his duty by those he was there to protect. The remonstrance dwelt on the horrible outrages of which they were the victims, the inefficacy of the measures taken, and demanded drastic action. Then, after the rebels had been given a start of two months, the martial law procedure was stiffened up to a point far beyond what I would allow in the Punjab. To give only one illustration. Military commanders in Malabar were given power to impose the death sentence on rebels after conviction by a drum-head court-martial. In the Punjab we had a tribunal of three experienced civil judges—including one Indian—generally presided over by a High Court Judge, to deal with such cases. The Punjab rebellion of 1919 was crushed *in a few weeks*, at a total cost of under five hundred lives (including three hundred and seventy-nine in Dyer's action at Amritsar.) The Moplah rebellion, as a result of the "lenient" policy pursued at the start, went on for *nearly a year*. The results are thus described at p. 88 of Sir Sankaran Nair's *Gandhi and Anarchy*, and as he was at the time a member of the Council of India and his birthplace is Malabar, the home of the rebellion, he speaks in this matter with some authority :

"The results were disastrous both to the Mohammedans and the Hindus. More than two thousand Mohammedans killed by troops, according to official estimates, thousands more in other ways, larger numbers wounded; the number of Hindus butchered in circumstances of barbarity, skinned alive, made to dig their own graves before slaughter, running into

thousands; women, and *purda* (veiled) women too, raped, not in a fit of passion, but systematically and with calculated revolting and horrible cruelty for which I have not been able to find a parallel in history. Thousands (of Hindus) were forcibly converted. . . . All this due directly to the visit of Gandhi and Shaukat Ali and to the organisation of Khilafat associations. They carried on their activities openly without any obstruction by the authorities; the Government of Madras was prevented from interfering with Khilafat agitators by the Government of India, who are therefore as responsible as if they had directly ordered all this frightfulness."

He might have added that over 20,000 were brought to trial in the Malabar rebellion against 2500 in the Punjab; that over 12,000 were convicted in Malabar against 1800 in the Punjab; that over 3000 Moplahs were still awaiting trial *a year after* the outbreak, while all the Punjab cases were disposed of *in three months*; and that over 8000 Moplahs are still undergoing sentences in jail for an outbreak which might have been averted.

Sir Sankaran Nair's indictment of the weakness of Lord Reading's Government is all the more remarkable as coming from a man who had been a member of Lord Chelmsford's Government and who in the same book went out of his way to accuse me of being *personally* responsible for the Punjab "atrocities" referred to above. He does not seem to realise that our prompt action prevented the horrible outrages that took place in Malabar, and that if firmness had been shown at the start in Malabar, as in the Punjab, nine-tenths of the subsequent bloodshed and suffering would have been prevented. If we in the Punjab had not crushed the rebellion of 1919 within a month we should have had the Afghans and the Frontier tribes down on us, as arranged between them and our revolutionary leaders.

### *Afghanistan and the Punjab Rebellion*

The Afghan menace, next to the behaviour of the Indian troops, was our greatest source of anxiety. Like the question

of the troops, its significance has been insufficiently brought out by the Hunter Committee, which did not take the evidence of witnesses on the point brought down from Peshawar to Lahore, and by the Home and Indian Governments. The most damning exposure of the attempt of the Afghan Government, while still our ally, to take advantage of the troubles in India and stab us in the back, is given in the Viceroy's *public* proclamation of 10th May, 1919, after War had been declared. I could make the case much stronger from facts within my personal knowledge, but prefer to take Lord Chelmsford's words.

### "NOTIFICATION

No. 912. d. 10 May, 1919.

The following is published for general information.

### PROCLAMATION

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India desires to make known to the loyal subjects of the King-Emperor the regrettable news that the Amir of Afghanistan, in violation of the treaties and in disregard of the steadfast policy of his wiser predecessors, has resolved to make a sudden and wanton attack upon the peace of India. His Excellency believes that this surprising folly is due directly to the course of internal events in Afghanistan which followed upon the murder of His late Majesty the Amir Habibullah. A powerful section of opinion in Afghanistan is not satisfied that the true culprits have been brought to account; and resents the method in which punishment was meted out. The growth of this internal dissatisfaction is the reason which, His Excellency believes, led Amir Amanulla to his present rash adventure, in the hope of distracting his subjects' minds from internal discontents. But there is also reason to believe that the present breach of faith with India may be in part the long-delayed fruit of the efforts of friends of Germany in Kabul who failed in all their endeavours to seduce the judgment or shake the loyalty of the late Amir. Whatever the causes, however, the results are apparent. Evidence is in His Excellency's hands which shows that the Amir excuses this act of treachery by pretending that India is in a state of revolution which will react on his

own country. The Amir has professed to his people that in India neither men's property nor their religion is safe ; that three men are forbidden to speak together ; that Muslims are excluded from their mosques and Hindus from their temples. Every man in India knows that these statements are false : *Relying on such mis-statements the Amir has called on Hindus and Muslims alike to show him allegiance. He has also caused it to be falsely stated that Sikhs have fired on British troops ; that Germany is about to recommence war ; and that the English have been destroyed.*

*The Viceroy has also proof that the Amir has caused to be prepared false leaflets and proclamations of this kind for dissemination in India, and has made plans to corrupt such newspapers as were willing to be bought.*

Inspired by these futile hopes of seducing His Majesty's subjects from their allegiance, the Amir has already commenced military operations. Yesterday, Afghan troops were driven back by our forces from various points which they had occupied in our limits, in the vicinity of Landi Kotal ; military objectives at and near Dakka in Afghanistan were bombed by our aeroplanes with excellent results.

In his suicidal folly the Amir has ventured to measure his strength against that of a Power which has just emerged victorious from the greatest war ever fought. The Government have overwhelming strength at their disposal, and this wanton and criminal incursion will meet with the speedy punishment it deserves.

Meanwhile, His Excellency the Viceroy, having thus taken into his confidence the people of India, bids them to abstain from believing the false rumours which the enemy seeks to circulate, to do nothing to impair the public confidence, and to refrain from any conduct which may add to the burden of his Government. They have in times now long past had sorrowful experience of invasions from the North-West frontier. From any repetition of those miseries the power of the Government has always been and is well able to protect them.

In the name of the King-Emperor, His Excellency the Viceroy enjoins all loyal people to assist his Government in crushing the enemy of the peace of India and to refrain from

any action which might give colour to the false stories so assiduously disseminated.

CHELMSFORD,

Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

God save the King-Emperor."

Further light is thrown on the Afghan participation in the conspiracy by the official communique which appeared in the *Pioneer* of May 11th :

"A press communique says martial law was proclaimed in Peshawar city to-day. For some time past the Afghan postmaster in Peshawar has been distributing inflammatory literature and making himself the centre of agitation of the wildest kind. . . .

A few days ago the Afghan postmaster left the post-office (Afghan) and betook himself to the heart of the city where he surrounded himself with a gang of armed ruffians drawn from the dregs of the large Afghan population in Peshawar, and openly defied the British authority. At two o'clock yesterday afternoon, a cordon (of troops) was skilfully drawn round the city. So securely had the arrangements been made that the Afghan postmaster and his staff were taken completely by surprise and gave themselves up on demand. Three Indian agitators who had been making common cause with the enemy, Dr. Ghosh (Bengali Hindu), Abdul Jabil (Pan-Islamist), and Nihal Singh (Sikh) gave themselves up a little later. Peshawar city was cleared of these dangerous elements without loss of life; but Khan Bahadur Ghulam Hasan Khan, who was sent to the city to parley, was stabbed in the crowd and is lying dangerously wounded."

The communique might have added that large sums of money, arms, and incendiary proclamations were seized at the Afghan headquarters in the city.

Sir George Roos-Keppel in informing me of the measures taken said that he had run matters very fine, that the plot was to burn the aerodrome, attack the jail, and release the criminals there, murder the British officers and start a general rising to fit in with the Afghan offensive all along the border.

He added that it was most fortunate that we had crushed the rebellion in the Punjab before the Afghan aggression and Peshawar disturbances could link up with it, as had been intended.

It was, and is, common knowledge that the Afghan invasion and tribal risings were encouraged, if not instigated, by emissaries from Delhi and Amritsar; and that early in April, on receiving news of the outbreak of 30th March at Delhi, the Amir had begun moving troops towards our border. Meantime Afghan intrigue had been busy throughout India, and on 28th April the Afghan Foreign Minister had written to the Afghan Envoy at Simla asking him

“to obtain allegiance from Hindus and Mohammedans. Afghanistan shares the feelings of the Indians and is determined to support them. If you get the chance please get exciting articles inserted in the newspapers. It is essential that Ghulam Hasan and other agents should win over the hearts of Hindus and Mussulmans, win favour with the Hindus, remove the ill-feeling of Mussulmans against Hindus and also induce the Hindus to unite with the Mussulmans (against the British).”

The result of these nefarious plots was that the Chief Commissioner at Peshawar warned us to be on the look out for outbreaks on 15th May, the date originally fixed for the Afghan attack and simultaneous risings in India.

This was the time when the Government of India were pressing us in the Punjab to abolish martial law! The above information tallied with what I had heard, about 20th April, that the Punjab risings of 10th to 15th April were premature, precipitated probably by the rumour of Gandhi's arrest and the removal of Satya Pal and Kichlu from Amritsar on 10th April. It was fortunate for us that the rebellion went off at “half-cock” before the Afghans and Frontier tribes were ready. Peshawar was really the key position in the larger movement contemplated. But Mr. Montagu, when questioned in Parliament, *said there had been no disturbance in Peshawar*, and he distinctly excluded Peshawar from the ambit of the Hunter Committee which was only authorised “to investigate

the recent disturbances in Bombay, Delhi, and the Punjab, their causes and the measures taken to cope with them." Hence the Committee refused to take any evidence showing the connection between the Punjab rebels and Afghanistan and the Frontier tribes. Had they done so they would have hesitated to put on record the extraordinary view that "*on the evidence before us there is nothing to show that the outbreak in the Punjab was part of a prearranged conspiracy to overthrow the British Government in India by force.*"

How opposed this view is even to Afghan admissions is shown by the statement of Ali Ahmed Khan, the principal Afghan member of the delegation sent to sue for peace after the Afghan defeat. He said publicly in the mosque at Rawal Pindi on 1st August, 1919, that "the recent action of Afghanistan (i.e. the invasion of British India) had been the result of her sympathy with the Indian Mussulmans." That statement was made eight months *before* the Hunter Report was submitted.

In the hearing of the case *O'Dwyer v. Nair* the bearing of this Afghan menace on the situation in the Punjab and on the measures we had to take there, was clearly realised by the Judge and duly impressed on the Jury.

### *Policy in dealing with the Rebellion*

I have omitted referring to many minor outbreaks and many threatening situations, which but for prompt civil and military dispositions and the vigorous measures taken by the troops under the orders of Generals Sir William Beynon at Lahore and Sir Charles Dobell at Rawal Pindi, would have developed into dangerous rebellion. All our efforts were directed to localising the various outbreaks and repressing them before they could spread. That is the only safe and the only humane policy in dealing with rebellion. In support of it I quoted to the Hunter Committee an apposite passage from Mayne's *Indian Criminal Law* :

"Every day that a rebellion continues, it is strengthened by new recruits, and the power of the Government is weakened,



*The Governor who waits to recognise a rebellion till it looks like a war will probably find that he has waited too long. That which distinguishes a riot which is the beginning of waging or levying war, from a riot which will end (only) in plunder or broken heads, is the object with which it is started. That is the principle of English law—and there is no country in which it is so necessary to enforce it as in India."*

A comparison of the Punjab and Malabar rebellions will show which method is the more humane and effective, the prompt and drastic action we took in the Punjab, or the dilatory and lenient-at-the-start method pursued by the Government of India in Malabar. If there is any doubt, let the Hindus of Malabar be the judges.

#### *Farewell to the Punjab*

But for the rebellion I should have made over charge of my office at the end of April to Sir Edward Maclagan on his arrival from home. It was, however, considered desirable that I should see the disturbances through and that my successor should not be associated with the measures necessary to suppress them. Sir Edward Maclagan, therefore, on his arrival was posted to Lahore as *liaison* officer of the Government of India, reporting direct to them. By the end of May internal disorders had been suppressed, those responsible for them had been brought to justice, the Afghan aggression had been repulsed, in fact the Afghan envoys had come in to sue for peace. I was therefore able to say that my part of the business had been finished, and to seek some rest after six years' continuous strain.

That, however, had not been so serious as might be imagined. For, though I had never had a day free from work and responsibility, I had rarely allowed those to encroach on my morning ride and afternoon game of golf or tennis; while in the cold weather at Lahore one had two mornings a week with the hounds. Then there were the occasional duck-shoots in Bahawalpur, pig-sticking in Patiala, and one glorious week after stag in Kashmir, where my flies, however, followed me.

Our hunting days at Lahore were Thursday and Sunday, and we met at 7 a.m. It was represented to me, not by members of my own Church, that I was setting a bad example by hunting on Sundays. My reply was that on the contrary I was setting a very good example, as I always pulled off even in the middle of a run (!) in time to get back to Mass at 10 a.m. Our family party, for we all hunted regularly, used to go straight from the hunting-field to the Cathedral (built by the subscriptions of pious Belgians.) We occupied a pew under the pulpit, which enabled me to conceal from the preacher and the congregation an occasional lapse into slumber during the sermon. That is a failing inherited from my father, but it was perhaps stimulated by the hunting.

Without these relaxations, only a man accustomed to a sedentary life—and I was not—could have kept going; and I never believed in taking one's work too seriously. It may be put down either to a good conscience or a callous one, but it is a fact that public cares never lost me half an hour's sleep. However, on 26th May, 1919, I was glad to transfer them to my successor and become a free man again.

But I could not help a feeling of regret in parting from the officers and the people of the Province who had throughout been so staunch and loyal. This is the farewell message I addressed to them on 26th May, 1919 :

“ Sir Michael O'Dwyer to-day makes over charge of the office of Lieutenant-Governor to Sir Edward Maclagan.

Before doing so he desires to leave on record his deep obligation to the public services of the Punjab in all departments and branches—imperial, provincial, and subordinate—for the loyalty and efficiency they have steadily shown in carrying on the work of the Administration during his six years' term of office. At no time since the Mutiny have heavier demands been made on the officers of Government, and they have responded to every call promptly and ungrudgingly. The Lieutenant-Governor is glad to think that the conditions of many branches of the services have received a much-needed improvement in recent years, and he hopes that other branches will soon receive a similar and substantial amelioration.

Sir Michael O'Dwyer welcomes this opportunity of expressing his gratitude to the people of the Punjab for their vigorous support of and hearty co-operation with the Administration in these critical years. To their co-operation are due the splendid war record of the Province, and the promptitude and success with which the recent disorders have been suppressed. Those disorders were limited to particular areas and to minorities in those areas, and the bulk of the Province was in no way affected by them. To restore public order it was found necessary to place certain disturbed areas under martial law. But the rapid improvement of conditions has already enabled the authorities to dispense with many of the restrictions imposed, and Sir Michael O'Dwyer hopes that it will be possible to abolish martial law in certain areas almost at once, and, if the improvement continues, to dispense with it in the rest in the next few weeks. That will close a chapter in the history of the Province which, while it brings out the danger to the public safety caused by a disorderly and disaffected section, has also made it clear that the great masses of the people of the Punjab are solidly ranged on the side of law and order, and actively loyal to the King-Emperor and his Government.

Sir Michael O'Dwyer has never doubted the people of the Punjab, and now that he is laying down his office of Lieutenant-Governor his faith in them and in their future is greater than ever."

On the 29th May, 1919, I left Lahore for Bombay and *en route* had the satisfaction of receiving messages of appreciation from the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and from the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Charles Monro, conveying the good wishes of the Army in India. The latter I particularly value, as the two classes who have the warmest corner in my heart are the Indian fighting races and the British soldiers in India. With the former I have spent most of my life, and my best friends in India are among them. No words of mine could do justice to the British soldier in India, to his steadiness and courage in a crisis, his cheerfulness and resource in conditions the most depressing, his splendid discipline and self-restraint in circumstances of the greatest provocation. I have seen him tried in all these ways and never found him wanting. It was to me a

great satisfaction that the closing act of my official connection with India was, as a member of the Esher Committee in 1919-20, to investigate the conditions of the Army in India (British and Indian) and to make proposals—some of which have been accepted—for their improvement. I must mention one more matter. After I left the Punjab in 1919 the Princes and people of the Province subscribed a sum of over £20,000 to raise a memorial to me. At my suggestion this was used to establish in Lahore Cantonments two splendidly-equipped Institutes or Soldiers' Clubs for the British and Indian troops respectively. I am proud to think that in this way my name will remain associated with the Army in India.

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## CHAPTER XVIII

### THROWN TO THE WOLVES

**I**N my farewell message to the people of the Punjab I had said that the abolition of martial law would close a chapter in the history of the Province. My forecast was too optimistic. Those who had fomented the disturbances, and whose designs had been frustrated by the prompt measures taken, were not prepared to throw up the sponge without a further struggle, and in this they had powerful supporters in the "advanced" politicians in India and at home. I had no sooner left India than a violent agitation, enforced by every form of calumny and misrepresentation, was set on foot in India and in England to vilify all those who had helped to crush the rebellion, and to prevent future resort to "the speedy and effective methods of martial law."

The Government of India and the India Office feared that this fictitious agitation might disturb the peaceful atmosphere they desired for the Reforms Scheme. They both gave way to it, and instead of boldly following up the advantage gained by the suppression of the rebellion, and setting themselves to bring home the responsibility to the authors of the conspiracy outside the Punjab, they adopted a weak defensive position. The Indian extremists, as usual, seeing that they again had the Government on the run, redoubled their attacks, and sedulously spread the false and malicious propaganda which gradually consolidated into the "Punjab atrocities." A Secretary of State, whose main concern was to get his Reforms Scheme through Parliament, was only too ready to conciliate "Indian" opinion by lending an ear to the tales of the Indian politicians who had swarmed to London in the

summer of 1919. As a result, the Hunter Committee of Enquiry was formed by the joint efforts of the India Office and the Government of India, who had pressed, but in vain, for an immediate enquiry, to *begin* the investigation into the disturbances seven months *after* they had been repressed. The Committee was presided over by Lord Hunter, a Scotch Judge, and consisted of a Judge of the Calcutta High Court, a Major-General, a Secretary to the Government of India, a British merchant, and three Indian lawyers.

It was strong on the legal side, but did not contain a single member with experience of civil administration in India. Of the three Indian lawyers, one had been prohibited by General Sir William Beynon from coming to the Punjab to defend some of the accused. Another, two years before, had in a public speech made an outrageous attack on me, which he had been required, at my instance, to withdraw publicly, and he did so with much reluctance. When I heard of the appointment of this man I protested, but without success. As General Beynon's action and mine were among the main objects of the investigation, we had some reason to doubt whether these two gentlemen would approach the enquiry with minds quite disinterested.

The Government of India in paragraph 22 of their dispatch on the Hunter Report complacently say they "were determined that it (the Committee) should be a body of commanding weight and high judicial experience in which perfect faith could be reposed by the public, both at home and in India." In fact, its composition did not inspire some of us with complete confidence. Several witnesses who appeared before it, complained that the attitude of some of the members was that of advocates rather than judges, and that certain officers of Government who appeared before the Committee were treated with less consideration than if they had been prisoners in the dock.

It would be flogging a dead horse to comment at any length on the chief findings of the majority of the Hunter Committee or of the minority report of the three Indian lawyers. But it may be noted that the Secretary of State

attached much more value to the latter than the Government of India did.

I cite one instance as bringing out the nature of the Committee's enquiry and the value of the conclusions which the Government of India based on it.

They say in paragraph 5 of their dispatch "with regard to the firing at the Jhalianwala Bagh on which the attention of the public both at home and in India has been so largely concentrated since December last (1919), the *Committee had the most ample materials for judgment and further evidence would have contributed nothing to their knowledge of the facts.*"

The words underlined, as the evidence and the Judge's summing up (quoted in a later chapter) in the case *O'Dwyer v. Nair* clearly establish, are, to put it mildly, far short of the truth. Dyer's action at Amritsar was the most important issue in the enquiry; but neither the Hunter Committee nor the Government of India nor the Secretary of State ever got at the full facts.

The Government of India, too, in paragraph 21 of this dispatch of 3rd May, 1920, on the Hunter Report say: "Making every allowance for the difficult position in which Sir Michael O'Dwyer was placed, he would have acted more wisely if, before expressing any approval of General Dyer's action, he had taken steps to ascertain the facts and circumstances of the firing more fully."

In fact I expressed no opinion in my earlier telegram to them, as at that time I did not know all "the facts and circumstances." Later in the day, when I had ascertained from Dyer's own account (as given to me by his military superior) and other sources all that could be known at the time, I expressed approval. Indeed, to withhold it would have been contrary to the policy formulated by the Government of India themselves in the admirable Resolution they issued on that very day, 14th April. In that document (which unfortunately was never translated into action), after referring to the recent murderous outrages at Amritsar, Ahmedabad, Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, and Lahore, they asserted "in the clearest manner the intention of Government to prevent by all means,

*however drastic*, any recurrence of these excesses," and declared that the Governor-General "will not hesitate to employ the ample military resources at his disposal to suppress organised outrage, rioting, or concerted opposition to the maintenance of law and order." The Resolution ended thus : "*To those servants of Government who are charged with the onerous responsibility of suppressing excesses against public peace and tranquillity*, the Governor-General in Council extends the fullest assurance of countenance and support."

Brave words, but only words, and quickly forgotten when the crisis which inspired them had passed. In fact the Government of India, who were at once put in possession of Dyer's and my reports of 14th April—including the fact that two to three hundred had been killed—for several months showed *their* approval of Dyer's action in a most practical way. When he had restored order in and around Amritsar, where his action met with general approval from the rural population and led the Sikhs to confer on him the unprecedented honour of being enrolled as a Sikh in their Holy of Holies—the Golden Temple—he was sent with his brigade to carry out the relief of Thall which was being invested by the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, Nadir Khan. Dyer quickly sent Nadir Khan and his army flying back to Afghanistan. He was commended in dispatches, promoted to substantive Brigadier, was later promoted to act as Divisional Commander at Peshawar, but owing to illness due to overstrain, was unable to take up that post. In September, 1919, the Indemnity Bill following on martial law, came up in the Legislative Council. Pandit Malaviya and others, who had for months been carrying on a virulent campaign against the Punjab Government and the officers who had crushed the rebellion, came forward with the wildest allegations regarding my misdeeds and Dyer's action at Amritsar. That action was defended and justified in a most powerful and convincing speech by General Sir Havelock Hudson, the Adjutant-General, who had before him not only Dyer's first report of 14th April, but the very complete explanation of the whole circumstances furnished by Dyer to the military authorities on 25th August. Up to this stage,



i.e. six months after the event—everything indicated that Army Headquarters and the Government of India, being in full possession of all the material facts, approved of Dyer's action just as much as Major-General Beynon and I had approved of it on 14th April.

The question arises—Why and when did those high authorities change their minds?

Two explanations occur to me. The Government of India—of which the Commander-in-Chief is a member—were becoming alarmed by the spurious agitation worked up over the Punjab “atrocities,” were doubtless being pressed by Mr. Montagu to make any concessions that would secure a “calm atmosphere” for the Reforms, and adopted the usual, but ineffective, method of throwing some of their servants to the wolves.

The second suggestion is that in giving his evidence before the Hunter Committee in November, Dyer, a blunt, honest soldier, under stress of a hostile cross-examination, appeared as having made statements which he, like many other witnesses, was given no opportunity of correcting and which, when he saw in print, he did not recognise as his own. Portions of those statements divorced from their context, and telegraphed by clever propagandists all over India and Great Britain, made it appear as if he had deliberately shot down hundreds of innocent persons when he <sup>had</sup> dispersed the mob with a wave of his hand. The <sup>cry</sup> to cry in the home Press was due to ignorance, but was <sup>un</sup>unnatural; for the Government of India and the India Office, for reasons best known to themselves, had never put the Press and public at home in possession of the full facts of the 1919 outbreaks, and in particular had issued only the most meagre and misleading summaries of my own and Dyer's reports of 14th April on the firing at Amritsar on the 13th April. While these papers and others connected with them were confidential, neither Dyer nor myself could quote or refer to them in explanation of our action. They, however, ceased to be confidential when the Government of India and India Office, with great reluctance and only after my repeated applications,

allowed me to produce *some* of them in Court in the case *O'Dwyer v. Nair*. After the decision I gave them publicity for the first time, in a letter to the *Times* dated July 10th, 1924. Though those responsible for the withholding of the detailed facts in 1919 are now in England (some of them in high office) and must have seen or heard of my letter, none of them has so far offered any explanation. What could they say?

Anyhow, in deference either to the clamour of the extremists in India who were loudly demanding Dyer's prosecution and downfall, as well as my impeachment, or to the outcry of the uninformed Press at home, the authorities in India and here decided that it was no longer expedient to support Dyer's action. On the receipt of the Hunter Committee's Report—the conclusions of which were, as regards Dyer, based on unverified statements and incomplete investigation of the character of the meeting fired upon—they professed to find enough to justify them, a year after the event, in repudiating the action which they had hitherto approved; action which was undoubtedly justified by the local conditions at Amritsar, which admittedly saved the Punjab and Northern India from a most serious rebellion, and thus marred the opportunity of successful foreign invasion for which the Afghans and the Frontier tribes were eagerly waiting.

To me their conduct, especially in view of the assurances in their above-quoted Resolution of 14th April, 1919, seemed harsh and unjust. I had never met Dyer before the Amritsar episode, and on one of the few occasions on which I met him afterwards, I took him strongly to task over his unfortunate so-called "crawling order." But I felt that even if his own Chiefs had deserted him, it was my duty, having been the indirect cause of his having to deal with the Amritsar situation, to do all I could to explain the circumstances and to vindicate his action.

The first point I seized on was one which the Hunter Committee and the Government of India had entirely and inexplicably overlooked; though the evidence of it was before them in the published judgments of the Amritsar Martial Law Commission (composed of a Judge of the High Court

and two other judges, British and Indian). This was the nature and objects of the Jhalianwala Bagh meeting, assembled in defiance of his proclamation, on which Dyer had opened fire. It was shown clearly in careful and lengthy judgments (1) that the meeting had been convened on the 12th April, after consultation with his fellow-conspirators, by one of the leading rebels who was later sentenced to death for his share in the bank murders; (2) that, as Dyer and the Deputy-Commissioner stated in their reports, it was announced on the morning of 13th April simultaneously with Dyer's prohibition of all meetings (which was represented as mere bluff, as he had not troops adequate to enforce it); (3) and that the meeting, composed of over fifteen thousand people, had been addressed before Dyer's arrival by eight speakers of whom six were subsequently convicted of taking a leading part in the rebellion, murder, and seditious propaganda of the three previous days. It was clear also from the account of the speeches and the character of the resolutions that the object of the meeting was to incite those present to further defiance of authority, and that if Dyer had not promptly taken, on 13th April, the "drastic action"—prescribed in the Government of India Resolution of 14th April—a situation would have arisen at Amritsar and rapidly spread elsewhere, infinitely more serious than the murderous and rebellious outbreaks of the 10th April.

While the whole case was still under consideration by a Cabinet Committee, I applied to Mr. Montagu to be allowed to explain these and other relevant matters to them. My request was not allowed. I then applied to the Army Council, to whom Dyer's case had been referred by the Cabinet, to be given a hearing. That, too, was refused, but I doubt if the military members of the Army Council ever heard of my application.

I then attempted in a letter of 9th June, 1920, to the Press to bring out the facts which had been ignored by the Government of India and the Secretary of State in their dispatches of 3rd May and 26th May, 1920. The result, I believe, was to create some agitation in official circles here and to cause the hurried adjournment of the debate on the subject in the

Commons, as the Coalition Government were afraid of a break-away of many of their supporters.

For the debate—at which I sat next to Dyer—I helped to “brief” Sir Edward (now Lord) Carson, who opened the attack by a most forcible exposure of the un-British and unjustifiable procedure by which a gallant soldier had been condemned without a hearing.

Mr. Montagu’s pitiful exhibition had almost alienated the supporters of the Government, when Mr. Churchill and Mr. Bonar Law intervened and by a judicious mixture of tact and parliamentary adroitness saved the situation for the Government. Their action in depriving Dyer of his command was approved by a large majority, chiefly composed of Labour and Liberal votes ; but no less than one hundred and thirty of the Conservatives went into the opposite lobby. For Mr. Montagu and the Government it was a Pyrrhic victory, for it was the first outward sign of the revolt which afterwards broke up the Coalition. Next day a public subscription was started for Dyer by the *Morning Post*, to which the editor, Sir Edward Carson, and myself were the first subscribers. Dyer was at first averse to it and asked my opinion. I told him that as it was the only way in which the public could show their sympathy for him and their disgust at his treatment by the Government he had served, he should allow it. He then waived his objection. The subscription brought in nearly £30,000 from thousands of subscribers all over the Empire. A few weeks later in the freer and more impartial atmosphere of the House of Lords the question was again raised. It was significant that the many Law Lords who joined in the debate, with one exception, either supported Dyer’s action or condemned the procedure by which he had been censured and punished. In the division there was an enormous majority against the Government.

In his first speech on India affairs in February, 1924, Lord Olivier, the Secretary of State for India in the Socialist Government, referred to this action of the House of Lords as one of the alleged causes of the growing anti-British feeling among “political” Indians. This is another instance of the argument, which for the last five years has been carried so far

in India and elsewhere, that justice should be sacrificed to political expediency. Happily, justice, as expounded in the British Courts, has not yet been degraded to that level, and one may still appeal to *them* with confidence.

After my return to England in April, 1920, I spent two years in vain efforts to secure some measure of alleviation, if not of justice, for the other unfortunate officers, civil and military, who had been censured or otherwise punished, in accordance with Mr. Montagu's dispatch of 26th May, 1920, for their action in suppressing the Punjab rebellion. I appealed first to Mr. Montagu. He had in writing to me stated that a section of the Press in India and here had accused me of having approved Dyer's "crawling order" at Amritsar, and asked my permission to quote in the House, in the Dyer debate, my letter of 1st May, 1919, to Lord Chelmsford to show that when I became aware of that order I at once suggested—I could only suggest—its cancellation; and it was cancelled.

I replied that the attitude hitherto shown to me and others engaged in suppressing the rebellion by the India Office had not encouraged us to hope for a fair presentation of our case in Parliament by them; but that his letter gave some encouragement to the opposite view and that I had no objection to his quoting my letter to the Viceroy. When the debate came on, he was too preoccupied with other matters to do what he himself had suggested. Thereafter I asked that my own case, though there were two gross misrepresentations of my action—one of them attributing to me an order passed by my successor—in his dispatch of 26th May, should be left out of consideration. I appealed on behalf of the censured officers alone, pointing out that no one had questioned their *bona fides*, and that if in novel and difficult conditions they had acted injudiciously, that was because the authoritative advice and guidance I had arranged to give them, as admitted in Mr. Montagu's dispatch, in administering martial law, had been ruled out by the Government of India in their telegram of 18th April, 1919.

However, these arguments made no impression on Mr. Montagu. He went so far as to admit that mistakes had been

made in the India Office despatch, but held that no good purpose would be served by further discussions and appealed to me to let the matter rest. This I could not do while the officers who had suffered looked to me to secure for them some measure of redress.

The Government of India had not proposed any censure or punishment of those officers. They had left it to local governments "to take such action as may be necessary to mark in these cases the disapprobation of the Government of India." They doubtless remembered their own Resolution of 14th April, 1919, enjoining "drastic action" in repressing the disturbances, and their own responsibility for any errors that may have been committed through "inexperience, ignorance of local conditions, or lack of guidance"—to use their own words; but they omitted to mention the fact that it was *they* who had rejected my proposals to supply that guidance. But that was not enough for the Secretary of State. In his despatch of 26th May he wrote: "His Majesty's Government must express strong disapproval of these orders and punishments and ask me to leave to you the duty of seeing that this disapproval shall be unmistakably marked by censure or other action which seems to you necessary *upon those who were responsible for them.*"

If this instruction were followed, the Government of India would be the first to be censured and punished, not their officers. The officers affected adversely by this *Fatwa* were:

*Military.* A Major-General, a Brigadier-General, two Lieutenant-Colonels commanding battalions, a Major, and a Captain.

*Civil.* Two Judges of the High Court who had kindly agreed to preside over Martial Law Commissioners, a Commissioner, the Chief Secretary to the Punjab Government, four I.C.S. officers of the standing of Deputy-Commissioners, one British Magistrate, and one Indian Magistrate.

Of the civil officers, some left the service in disgust, believing that their future had been ruined; others were denied promotion or transferred under a cloud from the posts they held.

Mr. Montagu, when driven out of office in March, 1922, piteously complained that he had been thrown to the wolves. If so, he met the fate he had meted out to these loyal servants of Government.

Having failed to obtain any redress from Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of State, I brought the case of the military officers still in the service to the notice of the new Commander-in-Chief—Lord Rawlinson—and of General Sir William Birdwood, commanding the Northern Army. I am happy to think that they gave the matter sympathetic consideration and that the future prospects of these officers have not been prejudiced by the unjustified censure.

The case of the civil officers was more difficult. I could not expect Lord Chelmsford, as Viceroy, to intervene on their behalf. But I represented the case verbally to Lord Reading before he went to India, and also in writing soon after he had assumed charge as Viceroy. My letter was not acknowledged. The quest for the much vaunted British justice seemed a hopeless one.

In 1921 I brought the matter to the notice of the Prime Minister—Mr. Lloyd George—through his Private Secretary. I received as sympathetic a hearing as the delicate nature of the case—an appeal against the action of a colleague in the Cabinet—would allow. But I was given to understand that the old maxim, "*fiat justitia, ruat cælum*," no longer applied in British politics. That indeed I had already realised. I was, however, asked to give particulars as regards each officer, with the promise that Mr. Lloyd George would personally consider it. I did so and waited for months but could get no reply. Finally I went down one day in October, 1921, to 10 Downing Street to see the Private Secretary and, if possible, the Prime Minister. I was told that both were too busy conferring with Michael Collins and his colleagues to see me.

In writing to the Private Secretary to express my disappointment I could not help saying that had I been, like Michael Collins, a successful organiser of rebellion against the British Government, the doors of Downing Street would

have flown open before me, but as I had merely come to plead for men who had suffered for assisting me in crushing a rebellion against the British Government, Downing Street was a closed door to me ! I hope the shaft struck home. But the official to whom it was addressed did not cease to interest himself and the Prime Minister in my appeal. I believe that my representations to the Prime Minister did bear some fruit as regards some of the civil officers concerned (many had already quitted the service). They may also have opened his eyes to the policy of his colleague at the India Office, and to the arduous responsibility imposed on the British services in India, to which he paid such eloquent testimony in his "steel-frame" speech of August, 1922. Mr. Montagu had left office by then, but the results of his work remain. We see them in the state of India to-day.

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## CHAPTER XIX

BRITISH JUSTICE. O'DWYER *v.* NAIR

HAVING done what little was possible with the Government here, all that was left to me was to give as much publicity as I could in the Press to the grievances of the officials who had been sacrificed to conciliate the Indian extremists, and to point out the disastrous effects which this surrender was producing on the *morale* of the Indian Services generally. The outbreak of the Malabar rebellion in August, 1921, and its rapid spread owing to the unwillingness of officers to take responsibility in an emergency, soon pointed the moral.

Fortunately, later on an opportunity presented itself of obtaining the verdict of a British judge and jury on the whole question of the Punjab "atrocities," including Dyer's action at Amritsar. The opportunity arose from the publication in India and England of Sir Sankaran Nair's book, *Gandhi and Anarchy*.

Sir Sankaran Nair, formerly a Judge of the Madras High Court, had been a member of the Government of India from 1915 to July, 1919. He had agreed to the imposition of martial law in April, 1919, but had resigned in July, 1919, apparently as a protest against certain phases of the martial law administration, of which, as already explained, the Government of which he was a member had refused my proposal to exercise control. He had completed his service for a pension, but his resignation increased his popularity with the advanced Indian politicians with whom he had been closely associated. Later in that year he came to England and was selected by Mr. Montagu as one of his colleagues in the India Council. He was there when the Moplah rebellion, in which his Hindu

kinsmen, the Nairs of Malabar, suffered grievously from the Moplah fanatics; but he advocated, and rightly I think, measures for checking that rebellion far more drastic than any I had ever suggested or taken in the Punjab. That rebellion was largely the result of Gandhi's alliance with the seditious Khilafat agitation, and Gandhi, instead of denouncing the Moplah rebellion and the Moplah outrages on their Hindu neighbours, showed an extraordinary sympathy with them. In a manifesto issued at Bombay on November 27th, 1920, in the height of the rebellion, he said :

“The forcible conversion of Hindus was terrible. But the Moplah bravery must command admiration. These Malabaris are not fighting for the love of it. They are fighting for what they consider is religion, and in a manner which they consider is religious.”

The “religious manner” included torture of unoffending Hindus, who were given the alternative of conversion to Islam or of digging their own *graves* (cremation being essential for Hindus), and unspeakable outrages on innocent Hindu women. This and similar declarations by Gandhi and the Khilafat leaders appear to have at last opened the eyes of a section of the Hindus to the dangers of Gandhi's movement. Sir Sankaran Nair was one of them. He had resigned his post in the India Council in November, 1921, having already arranged to take up the post of adviser to the Indore State on a salary of Rs.100,000 p.a. At Bombay he presided at a meeting at which Gandhi was present, and endeavours were made to make Gandhi see reason. But like everyone else, including Viceroy, who had tried to negotiate with Gandhi, he failed, withdrew from the meeting, and published a manifesto attacking Gandhi and his wrecking policy. This he followed up by the book *Gandhi and Anarchy*, the first edition of which was published, early in 1922, at the Indore State Press, in which he vigorously denounced the non-co-operation movement as fatal to the political progress of India, and as having led up to the horrors of the Malabar rebellion. He also criticised the Government of India under Lord Chelmsford and Lord Reading, for their

weakness in dealing with the Malabar situation and the Khilafat Movement.

All this was to the good, though rather belated. If the book had stopped there, it would have had my hearty approval, as I had been constantly preaching the same doctrine for three years previously. But for some reason or other Sir Sankaran Nair thought it advisable to go out of his way to attack me in the following passages :

(1) Discussing the effect of Mr. Lloyd George's Turkish policy on Mohammedan recruiting during the War, he wrote :

“The recruitment of non-Mohammedans also went up and both were due to *the terrorism* of Sir Michael O'Dwyer. Very useful in *this* instance.”

(2) Referring to the Punjab “atrocities,” he wrote :

“No one feels for the Punjab more than I do. I doubt if anyone was in a position to know more of it than I was. Even now, with all the enquiries made by the Hunter Commission and the Congress Sub-Committee, many deplorable incidents, as bad as any, worse perhaps than any reported, have not been disclosed. At this distance of time it is best that they should remain so. It is with a full knowledge of the facts that I make the following remarks.”

Then follows the libellous statement :

“Before the Reforms it was in the power of the Lieutenant-Governor (i.e. myself), a single individual, to *commit the atrocities in the Punjab* we know only too well.”

(3)

“Above all, it will be remembered, it was necessary to pass an Act of Indemnity to save the *delinquents* from proceedings in Civil and Criminal Courts. Such an Act of Indemnity would scarcely be possible now.”

(4)

“The troubles in the Punjab arose out of the Rowlatt Act which will be repealed. Many high-handed proceedings were taken under the Regulation of 1818, the provisions of

which were applied for purposes for which they were never intended."

(I had never even suggested the use of this regulation, which in any case could only be applied by the Government of India, of which the defendant was a member.)

(5) Paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's Dispatch on the Hunter Report contained the following reference to my administration :

"With the general question of Sir Michael O'Dwyer's administration of the Punjab, His Majesty's Government are not now immediately concerned. They recognise that it has formed the subject of much controversy in India, and that a widespread impression has been engendered ('engineered' was the expression used in the Dispatch as published in India) that the Punjab Government, under his direction, was hostile to the educated classes, and was determined to suppress not only illegitimate, but also legitimate and constitutional political agitation. While they sincerely trust that this impression may be dispelled they are fully conscious of the difficulties by which he was faced. Conspiracy, the activity of the enemy agents, the rise in the cost of living, and the necessity of furnishing the bulk of the vast number of recruits for the Indian Army which the needs of the Empire required, though fortunately powerless to disturb the loyalty of the province, as a whole, caused constant anxiety throughout his term of office. That term is now closed, a long and honourable connection with India is ended, and His Majesty's Government desire here to pay tribute to the great decision, energy, and courage, which Sir Michael O'Dwyer brought to his task, and to express their appreciation of his services."

I suppose it is inherent in the nature of a Coalition Government to speak with two voices. In the earlier part of the above extract one seems to detect Mr. Montagu in his usual rôle of playing up to the Indian politicians, while the later part seems to emanate from a mind in contact not with shams but with realities.

However, the "eulogy" was distasteful to the Indian

politicians whose pretensions I had so often attempted to expose. Sir Sankaran Nair doubtless thought that he would appeal to them by writing :

*"I realise that the eulogium passed by the English Cabinet on Lord Chelmsford and Sir Michael O'Dwyer was an outrage on Indian public opinion."*

I had since 1913 been accustomed to libellous attacks of this sort from the extremist Press and extremist politicians in India. No public man in those days who tried to do his duty without fear or favour could hope to escape their venomous invectives. Indeed, a very high official cynically observed that when he was not so attacked, and especially when he found himself commended by the extremist Press, he felt he must be failing in his duty! One could, and did, disdain such attacks when they came from a venal or irresponsible source.

But when they were made by a man who was a member of the Government of India—the authority to which I was directly subordinate—at the time of the events in question, and who had, as he claims, special inner knowledge not available to the general public, I could not pass them by. Moreover, the book containing the libels on me as Lieutenant-Governor was purchased largely by the Punjab Government and circulated to *their* officers—who had a few years before been *my* officers! Copies and translations were also circulated by the Governments of other Provinces. The first edition was published by the State Press of a State (Indore) of which I had for three years been in political charge, and with the Ruler of which I had been in friendly relations. Finally, Sir Sankaran Nair had been good enough to send two copies to the India Office.

When the book was brought to my notice by a friend in India, I took legal advice. My solicitors (Sir William Joynson-Hicks and Co.) wrote to Sir Sankaran Nair, who was back in England, in June, 1922, calling his attention to the libels and requested him to publicly withdraw and apologise for them, recall the book from circulation, and pay £1000 to charities

to be specified by me, failing which a suit for damages would be lodged. The request was refused and the suit was brought in the English Courts after the vacation of 1922. One and a half years were spent in preliminary proceedings. The defendant's attempt to get the case thrown out here as "harassing and vexatious" to him was rejected. He then applied for the examination of over two hundred witnesses on commission in India, and when this was allowed, I applied to have eight or nine Indian witnesses examined. In the summer of 1923 a Commission was issued to the Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court, and after some delay an Indian Sub-Judge was appointed to take the evidence. The defendant went to India to marshal his witnesses, who were mainly the same who had made statements before Gandhi's Congress Sub-Committee which, repudiating the Hunter Committee, had set itself to investigate the Punjab "atrocities" in 1919-20, and brought out their *ex parte* report as Sir Sankaran Nair described it in his book, in advance of the Hunter Report.

In all, some one hundred and twenty-five witnesses, chiefly from the districts of Shahpur and Gujranwala, and certain extremist leaders of Lahore, Gujranwala, and Amritsar—many of whom had been arrested in connection with, or prosecuted for, or convicted of complicity in the rebellion of 1919—were examined on behalf of the defendant. Certain prominent "moderate" politicians, viz. Sir Muhamad Shaffi of Lahore, a member of the Government of India, Raja Narendra Nath, and Raizada Bhagat Ram, a former member of my Legislative Council, also gave evidence on his behalf.

My Indian witnesses were :

Nawab Colonel Sir Umar Haiyat Khan, Tiwana, of Shahpur.

Nawab Sir Khuda Bakhsh Khan, Tiwana, of Shahpur.

Saiyed Sir Mehdi Shah of Lyallpur.

Nawab Sir Bahram Khan, Baluch Chief.

Rai Bahadur Amar Nath, Registrar, Lahore.

Rao Bahadur Chaudhri Lal Chand, Pleader, Rohtak.

All of these, as members of the Provincial Recruiting Board or otherwise, had rendered notable service during the War, and all of them were present at Lahore at the outbreak of the disturbances in April, 1919. In Lahore, as well as later in their own districts, they had taken a prominent part in preventing the spread of disorder and generally in aiding the Government to restore public tranquillity.

The proceedings before the Indian Sub-Judge reveal the growing laxity of procedure which is, I fear, an inevitable result of too rapid Indianisation. It was ordered either by the Chief Justice or by the Sub-Judge that the proceedings should be "in camera." But the cross-examination of my witnesses and the examination of defendant's witnesses were daily reported in full in some organs of the extremist Press in India, the result being to discourage some of my witnesses from coming forward. It was found that some of the legal practitioners admitted to the Court made use of the opportunity to take shorthand notes and send them to the extremist Press. This went on for weeks, in spite of the protests of my Counsel (Khan Bahadur Sheikh Abdul Kadir), and attempts were also made to intimidate him, but as he is a man of courage these had no result.

Finally, *after three weeks or so*, Sir Shadi Lal, the Chief Justice, issued more stringent orders against publishing the proceedings. The result was that a Mr. Gaube, son of Mr. Harkishan Lal (late Minister in the Punjab Government and a witness for the defence in the Court here) retired from the defence in protest!

Before the case came on in the Courts here, very strong pressure was brought to bear on me from many quarters, official and non-official, to drop it. The grounds urged were that I would not succeed; that even if I did succeed, I would not be able to recover my costs from the other side; and that the evidence which defendant would produce as to my "atrocities" would give a handle to those whose favourite pursuit is to blacken the British Government. The last thing these kindly advisers seemed to think of was that if one had a reputation worth defending, it was one's duty to defend it.

*Attitude of the India Office and Government of India*

But the chief obstacles I encountered in clearing my character as a public servant, were those placed in my way by the Government of India and the India Office. I naturally expected no help from them in a suit which necessarily challenged some of their past decisions; but I did not expect that they would compel me to enter the ring with one hand tied behind my back.

The most convincing evidence I could produce to refute the charges of "terrorism in recruiting," "atrocities" and "high-handed proceedings" in the administration of martial law, was the periodic reports on the general situation in the Province, which I furnished regularly to the Government of India during the War and the disturbances, and which defendant, as a member of that Government, had to peruse. Those reports described in some detail every serious incident (there were not many) which arose in connection with recruitment, every case in which action had to be taken under the Defence of India Act. I had throughout put all my cards on the table, and if I had not played the game properly, it was for the Government of India, including the defendant, to call me to account at the time. Neither they nor he had ever done so. My reports would have brought out this and would have knocked the bottom out of defendant's allegations. Copies of those reports were in my possession. But the Government of India and the India Office prohibited me from producing them, or even relevant extracts, in Court on the ground that this would be prejudicial to the public interest—more than five years after the reports had been made. The fact that this refusal was most prejudicial to *my* official reputation as their late servant did not appear to weigh with them at all. I then asked that they should refer the matter to the opinion of the law officers in England, who have to decide when action is to be taken under the Official Secrets Act of 1889, and whose opinion I would of course abide by. This, too, was refused. Similarly the same authorities at first endeavoured to prevent me referring to the volume of the Hunter Com-



mittee's proceedings which contained my correspondence with the Government of India about martial law, and *inter alia*, their rejection of my proposal that I should control its administration. After a long wrangle, I was allowed to make use of a censored copy of this volume. The defendant, to whom I was assured by the India Office the same restriction applied, flourished in Court an uncensored copy, and his counsel cross-examined me on a Confidential Memorandum of the Government of India contained therein, to which he had access, and I had not. This was at once brought by me to the notice of the India Office but with no result.

The climax was reached when in the course of my cross-examination, defendant's counsel, to complete my discomfiture, as he thought, put into my hands the original and *most secret* file of the Punjab Government dealing with the prosecution of the editor of the *Tribune* and other persons in 1919, and referred me to my autograph order rejecting the application of the editor and one of the trustees to co-operate with the Government. I had rejected the application on the ground that it was "belated," that their prosecution had already been ordered, and that it was now a matter for the Courts. The order, which I had not seen for over five years, was a very proper one, but the question arose—how did the defendant get hold of this most confidential file from the secret archives of the Punjab Government? I brought this matter also to the notice of the India Office and hope they and the Government of India will solve the riddle. They have given me no explanation.

I have said enough to show the attitude of the Government of India and the India Office. Their attitude not only added enormously to the length and cost of the proceedings, but seriously endangered the success of my effort to clear my official character. Such is the manner in which the Government of India's public assurance of "countenance and support" was fulfilled in my case.

But I should make it clear that from the Punjab Government, in so far as they were not tied down by higher authority, I received throughout the most prompt response to my

legitimate requests—and I made none which were not legitimate—for information, copies of papers, etc.

The witnesses I called in this country were :

1. Viscount Chelmsford (then First Lord of the Admiralty), late Viceroy.
2. General Sir C. C. Monro (Governor of Gibraltar), late Commander-in-Chief in India.
3. Major-General Sir W. Beynon, late G.O.C. 16th Division, Lahore.
4. Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Johnson, late O.C. 4th Royal Sussex, Lahore.
5. Colonel the Hon. W. F. North, late O.C. Lahore Fort.
6. Major H. Wolley, late Recruiting Officer, Jullundur.
7. Sir Patrick Fagan, late Financial Commissioner, Punjab.
8. Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Irvine, late Sessions Judge, Punjab.
9. L. French, Esq., I.C.S., late Secretary to Government, Punjab.
10. T. P. Ellis, Esq., I.C.S., late Legal Remembrancer, Punjab.
11. A. J. W. Kitchin, Esq., I.C.S., late Commissioner, Lahore.
12. B. T. Gibson, Esq., I.C.S., late Deputy-Commissioner, Shahpur.
13. M. Leigh, Esq., I.C.S., late Assistant-Commissioner, Shahpur.
14. H. S. Williamson, Esq., I.C.S., late Deputy-Commissioner, Gujrat.
15. Lieutenant-Colonel Burlton, late Commissioner, Jullundur.
16. H. D. Watson, Esq., I.C.S., late Deputy-Commissioner, Jullundur.
17. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Smith, late Civil Surgeon, Amritsar.
18. E. P. Broadway, Esq., late Superintendent Police, Lahore.
19. Captain Botting, late R.H.A., late O.C. Ammunition Column, Amritsar.
20. Mrs. Bell, widow of the late Lieutenant-Colonel Bell, 27th Punjabis.

21. Major the Hon. Nawab Sir Muhamad Akbar Khan, Chief of Hoti in Peshawar, and late Second-in-Command 129th Biluchis and Recruiting Officer.
22. Sir John Maffey, I.C.S., late Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province.\*

The defendant, besides himself, called in Court here, Mr. G. A. Wathen—late Principal of the Klalsa (Sikh) College, Amritsar—who gave his evidence as to the situation at Amritsar before and during the outbreak in the way an English gentleman would—and Lala Harkishan Lal, late Minister of the Punjab Government, as one of the chief victims of my “atrocities!” After Harkishan Lal’s connection with the seditious newspaper *Bande Materam*, which he and the notorious Lajpat Rai had started in 1920, and his child-like ignorance of events in Lahore during the rebellion had been brought out in cross-examination, the defence gave up the remaining Indian witnesses.

It will be seen that more than half of my witnesses were officers who had filled posts of great but varying responsibility in the civil administration of the Province during the War and the disturbances. Defendant’s counsel, doubtless under instructions from his client, seemed to display particular bitterness towards those officers, and especially towards the members of the I.C.S. But his methods of cross-examination had no terrors for any of us. As judicial officers in India we had been familiar with such methods as practised by certain Indian legal practitioners, whom now and then we had to keep in order. So the cross-examination did not cause a single witness to lose his head or his temper.

Mr. Justice McCardie’s summing up, which has been published by the Government in India for another purpose, may be quoted in this connection. He said:

“I am glad to observe that whatever criticism may have been made upon the conduct of the plaintiff and other officials in India, throughout the whole case no one has challenged in

\* Lt.-Col. E. C. Bayley, C.I.E., my Private Secretary during my six years’ term in the Punjab, unfortunately died in London a day before the case opened. In him I lost not only a valuable witness, but a most devoted and loyal friend.

the slightest way the incorruptibility, ability, absolute honesty, and efficiency of the civil officers who have been called before us."

Now and then the cross-examination had its amusing side, as when Sir W. Schwabe, in dealing with the Nawab of Hoti, mixed up the Emperors Akbar and Aurangzib and tried to right himself by making out that Aurangzib was Akbar the Second! Also when he tried to get this witness, but without success, to admit that his tribe, the Yusafzai (Sons of Joseph), were allied to the present-day Jews.

I was kept for over four days under cross-examination. Sir William Beynon was under the same ordeal for two days. When I was being heckled by Sir W. Schwabe I could not help remembering a story which a solicitor brother of mine used to tell. He had briefed a leading K.C. to defend a young farmer who was charged with murder. As he was entering the Court at Clonmel with the K.C., the father of the accused, a wild man from the hills, rushed forward, slapped the eminent Counsel on the back and shouted to him, "Fight for me you divil. I have hired you!" The story helped me to get through the cross-examination with equanimity and even with an enjoyment which I fear caused the learned Counsel some annoyance.

### *Necessity of Martial Law*

As regards the situation in the Punjab at the time martial law was sanctioned, the line taken by the defence was that I, as Lieutenant-Governor, and the civil and military authorities generally, had lost our heads, and by exaggerating in our panic the situation had prevailed on the Government of India to impose martial law (the defendant admitted having agreed to its imposition) though there was no real need for it. Scores of Indian witnesses of Lahore, Amritsar, etc., had been called in India to give evidence on those lines. But as the majority of these witnesses had themselves been convicted of taking a prominent part in the disturbances, or of being connected with extremist organisations that promoted them, most of the evidence went for naught. The two witnesses to this point on which the defence chiefly relied, were Sir Muhamad

Shaffi, a member of the Government of India, and Raja Narendra Nath, who were both prominent Lahore "moderates" at the time of the outbreak, and had on 11th and 12th April advised acceptance of the demands of the seditious leaders.

Sir Muhamad Shaffi, in giving evidence in India, had quoted, with obvious self-complacency, the following minute of his dissent in the Government of India dispatch of May 3rd, 1920, viz. :

"We desire to add that our Hon'ble colleague, Mr. Shaffi, dissents from the finding of the majority of the Committee, accepted by us, that the declaration of martial law was necessary. In *his* opinion, there being no organised or preconceived conspiracy to subvert British rule behind these disturbances, the vast rural tract in the five districts having remained tranquil and loyal, there having been disturbances only in a few places in the urban areas, and even in those few places the majority of the residents not having taken any part in the disturbances, *there was no open rebellion, as alleged, and no justification in consequence for the proclamation of martial law.* Besides, before the date on which martial law in those districts was actually enforced, the disturbances had been quelled with the assistances rendered by the military, and, in consequence, there was no justification for enforcement and maintenance of martial law on those days and after."

In view of the state of affairs at Lahore, Kasur, and Amritsar from 10th April, when the outbreaks began, to 13th, when martial law was proposed, one wonders which is the more extraordinary—the allegations in the above extract or the conclusions based upon them.

In his evidence on commission Sir Muhamad Shaffi amplified the above expression of his views and *inter alia* stated (a) that there was comparative calm in the rural area, but that a certain amount of excitement *as a result of the Jhalianwala Bagh affair was natural*,\* and (b) that he had no recollection that at a meeting held in the Shahi (Imperial) Mosque, Lahore, on 11th or 12th April, a Sikh, pretending to be a soldier, announced that the Indian troops in Lahore Canton-

\* All the most serious outbreaks and all the murders of Europeans were prior to the Jhalianwala Bagh affair of 13th April.—M. O'DWYER.

ment had mutinied, that several British soldiers had been killed, including six by his own hand, that the rest of the Indian troops were on their way to Lahore, and that this speaker was lionised and garlanded by the mob in the mosque.

In all these matters Sir Muhamad Shaffi showed not only an extraordinary ignorance (for a man of his position) of current events, but even a more extraordinary forgetfulness of what he himself had said and written in April-May, 1919, about those events.

(1) As regards there being no conspiracy, no rebellion, and no need of martial law.

Sir Muhamad Shaffi had been a prominent member of a deputation representing the Mohammedans of the Punjab which, on May 12, 1919, presented me with a farewell address. That address contained the following significant passage :

“Although, towards the conclusion of Your Honour’s brilliant regime, the enemies of law and order, *as a result of organised conspiracy*, succeeded in deluding a section of the people into riots and disturbances, yet it is a standing tribute to Your Honour’s far-sighted statesmanship and firmness that the situation was soon got well in hand *by using the speedy and effective measures of martial law*, and peaceful life is once more possible for the law-abiding citizens of our chief towns.”

Sir Muhamad Shaffi admitted having signed the address from which the above is an extract, but tried to explain that he had not noticed this passage. However he heard it read, and after it was read made a speech assuring the Government of the loyal support of the Mohammedans against the Afghan invaders. He never repudiated the above extract till four and a half years after he had heard it read. That the above extract expressed his views *at the time*—however they may have altered later—was further established by the evidence of Colonel Frank Johnson, the officer administering martial law in Lahore. Colonel Johnson’s prompt measures to prevent bloodshed and disorder and keep down prices won him the gratitude of the people, and when he was about to leave Lahore at the end of May for the Afghan campaign, he was given a series of

farewell entertainments by the loyal people of Lahore. Sir Muhamad Shaffi was present at two of these, and at one he made a speech which was reported in the Press, in which with soaring eloquence he declared that generations yet unborn would bless the name of Colonel Frank Johnson who had saved Lahore from bloodshed and ruin !

(2) His ignorance of what took place in the Badshahi (Imperial) Mosque on 11th and 12th April, 1919, was even more astounding. For on 16th May, 1919, Sir Muhamad Shaffi, as one of the " Committee of the Supervision of the Badshahi Mosque," with fifteen other leading Mohammedan gentlemen, presented the following application to Colonel Johnson :

" We, the undersigned members of the Committee of Supervision of the Badshahi Mosque, make the following statement and give the undertaking set forth below :

- (1) The said Mosque was to our sorrow desecrated *on 11th and 12th April last by its misuse for seditious meetings, at which Hindus spoke from a portable wooden pulpit, and during one of which an officer of the Government was brutally assaulted.*
- (2) We acknowledge that such a deplorable misuse of the Mosque is intolerable and that so far as lies in our power, steps must be taken to prevent its repetition.
- (3) We will take all necessary steps that the Mosque is in the future used only for purposes allowed by the laws of Islam.

(Signed) FATEH ALI KHAN.

ZULFIKAR ALI KHAN.

MUHAMAD SHAFFI (and others).

Dated Lahore, 16 May, 1919."

When these facts were brought out in evidence, not even the high position of Sir Muhamad Shaffi as a member of the Government of India could reconcile the discrepancy between his evidence in the case and the statements to which he had subscribed publicly in May, 1919. It was significant that the defence counsel, who had made great play with Sir Muhamad

Shaffi's evidence in an earlier stage, hardly mentioned it at all in his closing address.

Raja Narendra Nath had given evidence on much the same lines as Sir Muhamad Shaffi. He, too, on 12th May, 1919, had been the spokesman of a very influential deputation representing the Hindus of the Province. The address, which was read out by him, contained the following passage :

" We are very sorry that foolish [*sic*] and mischievous acts of certain misguided men made the last few days of Your Honour's career specially strenuous. We condemn most emphatically all those acts of violence and lawlessness and we much deplore the damage done to private and State property. . . . We have learnt with great anxiety and concern of the recent troubles on the Frontier. We have full confidence in the strength of British arms. . . . We gladly place at the disposal of Government all our resources."

A few, very few, Sikhs were among the witnesses called by the defence in India to show that there had been no rebellion and no need for martial law. This evidence was easily refuted. On the same date (12th May, 1919) as I received the Hindu and Mohammedan addresses, I was also presented with an address from a strong deputation representing the Sikhs of the Province. Referring to the recent troubles they said :

" It is greatly [due] to Your Honour's wise handling of the situation that even with a world war on, people have been passing peaceful lives in their homes. It is a matter of deep regret that at the close of Your Honour's successful regime, a mischievous attempt has been made by some evilly-disposed persons to ruthlessly disturb the peace of the land *and in several places atrocities have been committed* [by those persons] which have besmeared the unsullied name of the Province. But Your Honour's firm grasp of the situation *and the measures adopted have nipped the evil in the bud*. It is gratifying to know that the mischievous activities of the agitators have received no support from the majority of the people. . . . The propaganda of spreading false and malicious rumours has been duly checked and normal conditions have been restored. Endeavours were made to influence the Sikh community by



spreading false news as to the bombing of the Golden Temple at Amritsar, and the restrictions of the use of the Kirpan . . . ; but it is a matter of congratulation for us that our community has remained unruffled and kept aloof from the disturbances. . . . They did not join the movement of passive resistance and dissociated themselves from it from the very start, knowing full well that for the practical province of the Punjab, such a thing was quite unsuited. . . . It is a matter of sincere congratulation that Your Honour will be leaving the Province to your distinguished successor in its usual tranquil condition."

In these addresses speaks the real voice of the peoples of the Punjab, expressing vividly the serious nature of the outbreaks which were "the result of an organised conspiracy," their horror at the "atrocities" committed by the rebels, their relief at the speedy suppression of the rebellion "by the speedy and effective measures of martial law." The addresses were all spontaneous and were signed by over one hundred of the most representative Mohammedan, Hindu, and Sikh gentlemen of the Province, great landlords, leading politicians, barristers, pleaders, journalists, business men, distinguished soldiers. There is no complaint of any "atrocities" having been committed by officers, civil or military, in suppressing the disturbances. For these men knew that you cannot repress a dangerous rebellion without drastic action, and that the measures taken did not exceed the necessity of the case. The case cannot be better put than in Mr. Justice McCardie's summing up :

"My own view is that martial law, when it is once declared, should on all occasions and at all costs be administered with firmness. I think further that it should be administered with rigour because the essence of the matter is that people should know that they must obey. . . . But, on the other hand, it ought not to be marked by any caprice—mere caprice—nor ought it to be marked by a severity which is not required by circumstances."

*Lala Harkishan Lal's Case*

But the witness on whom above all the defence relied was Lala Harkishan Lal. This man after a meteoric career as a barrister, a social reformer, a company promoter, had drifted into extremist politics, was prominent in the Lahore disturbances, and was convicted by a tribunal of three Judges—two British and one Indian—presided over by a Judge of the Chartered High Court, of complicity in the Lahore rebellion and sentenced to transportation for life and forfeiture of property. He had appealed to the Privy Council, but did not prosecute his appeal. Meantime he had come under the general amnesty and was released after some six or eight months in jail. He and others, in furtherance of Mr. Montagu's desire to create a favourable atmosphere for the reforms, were by special order exempted from the ineligibility (consequent on conviction of a serious crime) to stand for the new Councils. He was elected for a trading constituency and then, to the general astonishment, was selected by the Governor of the Punjab in 1921 as one of the two Indian Ministers. In the wave of enthusiasm on which the reforms rode proudly for a few short months, Mr. Harkishan Lal was described by the British President of the All-India Assembly as "one of the finest flowers of the reforms." He continued to bloom till the end of 1923, when he resigned his post of Minister, and soon after came to London to give evidence on behalf of Sir Sankaran Nair as one of the victims of my "atrocities." His appearance in the witness-box was dramatic; his exit from it, after he had been severely shaken by the skilful cross-examination of my counsel, Mr. Charles, K.C., and the stern interrogations of the Judge, was pathetic. The "atrocities" in regard to Harkishan Lal is thus described in the Judge's summing up:

"It happens that Mr. Harkishan Lal has been called before us, and I watched him with care, because one is always interested in the psychology of people who are called; and I wondered whether or not he would be good-humoured and

clever in repartee, before he commenced giving evidence. I guessed that he would, and indeed he is a very clever man. You heard him give evidence. The question is whether, upon the whole, he is really reliable. Take, for example, one point of his evidence ; as to whether he really gave you, when he was referring to the state of Lahore, before the declaration of martial law, a true picture of what occurred. Mr. Harkishan Lal (I am sure he will not mind my saying it) is a very clever man. Now there he is : and it is said Harkishan Lal was wrongly convicted. Was he or not ?

We have not got more than a tithe of the evidence taken before the Tribunal. There were seven hundred witnesses ; but we have got a precis of some parts of the evidence, and we have got the summing-up [judgment] of the Judge. I do not know what the desire is on the part of the defendant here. It is a very odd position. Does he desire me to express a ruling as to whether or not there was evidence to consider against Harkishan Lal ? Does he want me to consider whether or not Harkishan Lal was rightly or wrongly convicted ? But whatever it may be, I shall perform *my* part of the duty. I have looked at that judgment again. I am bound to say that though the evidence against Harkishan Lal was not strong, in *my* opinion, I say it advisedly, *I think there was sufficient evidence upon which the Judges were entitled to decide that he was guilty.*

He was found guilty ; he was sentenced to a very serious term of imprisonment—transportation, I think it was, for life ; and there he was. He was released, we know, in a few months, but the conviction stands. He did appeal to the Privy Council, but for reasons given by his lawyers, he abandoned that appeal. There is no doubt he was found guilty of serious misbehaviour by the Court, and they must have looked on him as being one of the more serious, because others, we see, got lesser sentences. It is right that I should say this in view of the discussion that has taken place upon that case. *There was a clear finding of guilt, and I think there was evidence upon which the Court could act.* It was not a Court consisting of a mere military officer ; one of the Judges was a High Court Judge ; another member was shortly elevated to that position ; and we have heard, though it only came out incidentally, that the Punjab had at that time its chartered

High Court. And the other (third) Judge—was he a military man? I observe that he was not, that he was an Indian Judge. That Court found Mr. Harkishan Lal guilty. I can understand the challenge of the decision upon the ground that the tribunal was wrong in law, or took a wrong view of the facts; that is legitimate: but I am glad to say that there has been *no challenge whatever* of the integrity of these three Judges—one Indian and two Europeans, who took part in the case: and I regard that as an important factor in the matter.

It is important not only upon this but upon other trials that we have heard of, and I think it is right that I should remind you of the words of the defendant himself on this matter when he said—I will give you the exact words, ‘I agree absolutely that the Judges of the Punjab when sitting on the martial law tribunals did their duty honestly.’ *There stands the conviction of this gentleman by an honest court composed in the way I have stated. No pardon has been granted in this case, you remember, although in other cases pardons have been granted, and the conviction stands.*”

These remarks show how much credit the Judge attached to Harkishan Lal’s evidence and in particular to his statements that he knew nothing at the time, though he was in Lahore, of what took place on the Lahore Mall on 10th April; that after his arrest he was informed by a friend that I had determined to have him and two others shot in the street; and that he had summoned several hundred witnesses in his defence in order to protract the hearing till I should have left the Province. In fact the judgment and sentence were not passed till two months after I had left. I had never even seen the man till he appeared in Mr. Justice McCardie’s Court.

For the critical state of affairs in Lahore before and after the declaration of martial law the most important witnesses on my behalf were General Sir William Beynon and Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Johnson. Of their evidence the Judge remarked:

“When one hears evidence of this kind, one asks oneself this question: are they tried men or not? . . . I do not know what your view is. But I should say that General Beynon was made of steel. He stood in that box with his

firmly cut lips and hard face. And no one, I think, could charge Colonel Johnson with being a sentimental man. He had got a smiling face and he had a pleasant manner; but he is apparently a man of iron; and his view of these incidents is that this was not a question of a crowd of two hundred; both these men expressed the opinion that there was a mob of quite ten thousand set on rebellion. . . . He (Colonel Johnson) says that on the 10th the mob were absolutely in possession of the city, and on the 11th and 12th until the institution of martial law. . . .

Then in connection with these incidents there was the evidence of Colonel North, who was the Commandant of the Fort. . . . Colonel North referred to the 10th first of all, the large crowd pulling down the trees on the side of the road. Then he passed on to the 11th and said, for example, that there was a large crowd, a threatening and gesticulating crowd, which shouted out in opprobrious terms: 'Kill the white people.' They were armed with sticks fitted with small axes. Then you will remember later on he dealt with the number of men coming in a vast crowd on the 12th, and it was fired on that day. He says, 'We were cut off in the Fort for several days, and our only communication was by helio. No one was allowed to go out of the Fort.' Then he points out that in the Fort . . . he kept all the stores and arms, and all the reserve of rifles and a very large sum in gold coins. . . . If that mob had acted in the manner described by the Plaintiff's witnesses—and you have seen them and can ask yourselves whether they were nervous men or not—was it or was it not an *atrocit*y to fire upon that mob in order to preserve Lahore from the incidents that might befall it? "

#### *General Dyer's Action at Amritsar*

The action of General Dyer at Amritsar and of my responsibility in the matter was one of the main issues in the trial. In view of the serious nature of that action, and of the controversy over the Judge's advice to the Jury—which the late Government held to be an *obiter dictum* and for their part repudiated—the matter is one of far-reaching importance. It should be made clear to start with that when Counsel for the Defence began to cross-examine me on that branch of the

case, the Judge at once endeavoured to avoid it—saying (I quote the *Times* report of May 2nd, 1924) :

“Have *we* to decide whether General Dyer was right or wrong? If so I shall have to tell the jury that where the safety of the Indian Empire was in question and through that the safety of the British Empire, perhaps it might be necessary to do things which would not be justified in other circumstances.”

To which Sir Walter Schwabe replied :

“We say that what General Dyer did (that is firing on a crowd of natives) was an *atrocitiy* from any point of view in the situation of the Punjab then. And we say that it was an atrocity which had the consent of Sir Michael O’Dwyer before it was committed, and his practical approval afterwards. *One of the questions which will have to be considered is whether the condemnation of General Dyer was right or wrong. Many facts are available now which were not available before.*”

It was therefore the defence that pressed for a decision on that issue, and the Court had no option but to face it. As a consequence, probably one-third of the twenty-five days of the hearing was devoted to the evidence and the arguments as to Dyer’s action. Unfortunately owing to shattered health, the result of his unjust condemnation in 1920, General Dyer could not himself appear : but for the first time the *sworn* evidence on the subject of scores of witnesses on both sides was heard and submitted to close judicial scrutiny. The Judge also critically examined the findings of the Hunter Committee, which unfortunately had not taken evidence on oath and in most cases, including Dyer’s, had not given the witnesses any opportunity of verifying the statements attributed to them.

The Judge had also before him the decisions of the Government of India and of His Majesty’s (Coalition) Government. A few of the most salient points in the Judge’s summing up are quoted as expressing his judicial opinion on all the evidence.

“It may be said that the full facts were not known to the authorities at home : but after the episode of April 13 it

comes out, again and again, from the evidence, that General Dyer was approved by his superior officer; he was given commands: he conducted operations with distinction and ability; he gained the approbation of all; and it was a year and three months after Amritsar that he was told that his services would no longer be wanted for the army. He has, one may feel, been punished with a severity that can only be realised by those who are cognisant of the high pride in their service felt by military officers of the Crown.

Now had he committed an atrocity?"

The learned Judge then proceeded to analyse all the evidence as to the state of affairs in Amritsar from 10th to 13th April. Referring to Dyer's proclamation on the 13th prohibiting meetings and to the meeting held that same day in defiance of his prohibition, his Lordship said:

"The Hunter Report has found that many innocent folk were there. I suppose that is a very important factor, *if it is correct*, in finding out whether or not there was an atrocity. But was the proclamation of General Dyer known or not, because if it were known to the majority of the folk and they assembled in the square, one would think that *all* of them knew it. . . . And there was first of all the proclamation that all meetings would be dispersed (by force), then the proclamation of General Dyer that all meetings would be dispersed (by force) if necessary; and according to the evidence given the proclamation was made by General Dyer at about nineteen places in the city, a proclamation mark you, on behalf of a newly-arrived military force, a powerful force, *a proclamation one would think that would create immediate knowledge of the circumstances*. Then at four o'clock or thereabouts the crowd was there. . . . I see that General Dyer put it at six thousand. I see, oddly enough, that one of the defendant's witnesses put it at twenty thousand. But there was the mob. What was the meeting of *men* for? . . . I cannot help feeling that the question of the *speakers at the meeting* was important. They (the resolutions) are here, and they are resolutions which refer in substance to the despotic conduct of the Government; and they mention the word 'tyranny.' But for myself I do not see any reason for thinking that these resolutions *of themselves* were seditious. . . . The

question you will think of is not the formal resolutions, but the question is who were the speakers? . . .

Mr. Ellis (Legal Remembrancer) says that eight speakers were speaking (had spoken?) at the square when General Dyer came. One of them turned King's evidence; one speaker was prosecuted for inciting the crowd to murder Mr. Scott and Mr. Stewart at the bank on April 10th; another speaker had been a clerk in that bank; he had led the murdering crowd to the room of Mr. Scott. A third speaker was one of the murderers of Mr. Scott, who was beaten to a pulp. A fourth speaker was also implicated in the bank murders. A fifth speaker had absconded to Kashmir. . . .

Another speaker was convicted of sedition and waging war, and the bank clerk, that was the third speaker, had published a poem directly inciting to murder. *This poem was being recited to the crowd just before General Dyer arrived.* Now, if that was so, and there is the evidence, what was this meeting? There were six thousand people as General Dyer says, twenty thousand as the defendant's witness says—those from the country with their sticks and some of them from the town with their sticks.

What were these people speaking of? The man who had led them to the bank murders was there. General Dyer fired."

His Lordship then read to the Jury General Dyer's summary of the reasons for his action as set forth in his statement to the Army Council, viz. :

"(a) I had before me the general situation summarised in the dispatch of the Secretary of State . . . and all its attendant military dangers. In addition I knew of the cloud from Afghanistan which broke three weeks later.

(b) I had before me in the Jhalianwala Bagh not a fortuitous gathering, which at worst had assembled negligently or even recklessly contrary to a proclamation, but a mob that was there with express intent to challenge Government authority and defy me to take any effective action against it, and in particular to defy me to fire upon it.

(c) I knew that it was in substance the same mob that had been in course of organisation for some days, and had committed the hideous crimes of 10th April, and was the power



and authority which for two days had ruled the city in defiance of the Government. *I had in fact the rebel army before me.*

(d) I knew, so far as human foresight could go, that if I shirked its challenge and did not there and then crush it, it would have succeeded in the design of its leaders, contempt and derision of Government power would have been complete, and that there would infallibly follow, that night or next morning, a general mob movement, both from inside and outside Amritsar, which would have destroyed all the European population, including women and children, and all my troops, and involve in its ruin the law-abiding Indian population as well.

(e) I knew that this result would lead to a similar result in numerous places throughout the Punjab.

(f) I knew that ineffective action against the mob would gravely endanger my small force on the actual spot and make its safe withdrawal difficult, and that its destruction would infallibly produce the results indicated in the last two paragraphs.

(g) I knew that on the four occasions when firing took place on the 10th at Amritsar, its effects in preventing disorder and restoring security had been quite ineffective, and that with the small body of troops at my disposal and the large determined and defiant assembly before me, I could produce *no sufficient effect except by continuous firing.*"

The Judge then referred to the evidence, little of which had been taken by the Hunter Committee, bearing on Dyer's reasons for his action. The most cogent was that of Lieutenant-Colonel H. Smith, Civil Surgeon, Amritsar; Mr. Kitchin, the Commissioner; Captain Botting, late Commandant of the Ammunition Column, Amritsar. This officer, through his Indian officers and men, had maintained close touch with what was going on in the city from 10th to 13th April and had informed General Dyer *on the morning* of the 13th that the feeling in the city was that "the British no longer governed," that it had been decided that the meeting would be held in the square, troops or no troops, that it was to be a trial of the strength of the British Government to enforce its authority and also of the loyalty of the (Indian) troops, who the rebel leaders

thought would come over to their side. Valuable corroboration was also furnished by several witnesses called for the defence, including Mr. Wathen and some of the Congress leaders. The latter had to admit that the meeting of the 13th had been *arranged at least a day before*, also that they were aware of Dyer's proclamation, and that, even after the meeting had gathered, they were aware from aeroplanes and the arrival of the police that Dyer was on his way to disperse it. But some of the organisers had told the crowd to stand fast when they showed signs of leaving the meeting.

Above all there was the evidence of Mr. Ellis based on the judicial findings of the martial law tribunals, which the Hunter Committee, the Government of India, and the Secretary of State had ignored, as to the mob of twenty thousand having been addressed in the hour between its assembling and Dyer's arrival by the most truculent of the rebel leaders in Amritsar, several of whom afterwards paid the penalty for their crimes.

Having discussed all this evidence the Judge, in words delivered with a solemnity which thrilled the crowded Court, spoke with the voice of Justice :

"Subject to your judgment, speaking with full deliberation and knowing the whole of the evidence given in this case, I express my view that General Dyer, in the grave and exceptional circumstances, acted rightly, and in my opinion, upon the evidence, *he was wrongly punished by the Secretary of State for India*. That is my view, and I need scarcely say that I have weighed every circumstance, every new detail that was not before the Hunter Committee ; but that opinion which I now express is an opinion which you as a Jury may say you disagree with, and may take up another position in regard to the matter."

As His Lordship concluded, the tension in the hushed audience gave way to an involuntary murmur of subdued applause. It was felt that after five years of suppression or misrepresentation of the facts the truth had at last been established. British justice had triumphed, a cruel wrong had

been righted. But the vindication came too late. General Dyer is shattered in health, a broken man.

My own part in the matter was a subsidiary one. The Judge went on to say that even if they considered that Dyer's act was an atrocity, my responsibility for it was a separate issue.

He continued :

"It is quite true that to begin with in the witness box plaintiff said, 'Knowing all the circumstances now—everything—in my opinion General Dyer was right, though upon the Hunter testimony I thought that his action was indefensible.' . . .\*

Here is the important point in the matter; aye or no. Can you in any fair sense of the word say that a man committed an atrocity, of which he previously knew nothing whatsoever, because upon the request of a General of high position, a day afterwards, he did, under the circumstances known to him, say, 'I agree with what has been done.' You may well say, 'I do not think it is fair to charge him with having committed an atrocity'; but you may well say also, 'I differ from the plaintiff when he gave his approval to what General Dyer had done.' "

The view of eleven of the jury was clearly that of the Judge, that Dyer's action was not an *atrocity*, but was justified in the circumstances, and that the defendant in charging me with an atrocity had libelled me.

If Dyer's action was justified my approval thereof next day was of course doubly justified. All higher authorities up to the Commander-in-Chief and the Government of India, who were informed at once of all the main facts by me and Dyer, as pointed out by His Lordship, had also shown their approval in the most practical manner for months afterwards. *They* then altered their views. *I* adhere to mine. Whatever the Coalition Government of 1920, or the Socialist Government

\* Apart from the Hunter testimony which Dyer repudiated directly he saw it, and which I never accepted as correct, I had from the start held Dyer's action to be justified, I said so at the time to the Government of India and later to the Secretary of State, and to the Hunter Committee as my evidence clearly shows, also my letter to *The Times* in January, 1920.—M. O'DWYER.

of 1924 may say or write, the fact remains that a British Court of Justice, the only tribunal that has investigated all the facts fully and impartially, has justified Dyer's action and my support of him and it. His vindication has caused me at least as much satisfaction as my own. The refusal of the late Government to face facts judicially proved is brought out in the following extract from the House of Commons proceedings on 28th July, 1924 :

"Colonel Sir Charles Yate,—To ask the Prime Minister, whether he will grant time for the discussion of the Motion standing in the name of the honourable Member for Melton or what action he proposes to take in the matter.

Colonel Sir Charles Yate,—O'Dwyer v. Nair,—To call attention to the facts brought out in the trial of the libel action brought by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, late lieutenant-governor of the Punjab, against Sir Sankaran Nair, formerly a member of the executive council of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, in the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, that in consequence of the defence having accused Sir Michael O'Dwyer of the commission of serious atrocities, including General Dyer's shooting on the mob at Amritsar on 13th April, 1919, and having insisted that this was relevant to the defence, the judge was compelled to advise the jury as to whether the shooting in question constituted an 'atrocitv,' and, if so, whether Sir Michael O'Dwyer was responsible for it; that after considering all the evidence on the subject, much of which was not before His Majesty's Government when they punished General Dyer in 1920, the judge expressed the view that 'General Dyer, in the grave and exceptional circumstances, acted rightly, and in my opinion upon the evidence he was wrongly punished by the Secretary of State for India'; and, considering that this view was accepted by 11 out of the 12 jurymen, an humble Address be presented to His Majesty praying that this judicial opinion and finding, based upon a full consideration of all the evidence, be accepted, and that His Majesty will be graciously pleased to revoke the censure passed upon General Dyer after the incomplete executive investigation in 1920.

The Prime Minister: No, sir. I am not prepared to grant time for the discussion of this motion."

*Terrorism in Recruiting*

Regarding the charge of terrorism in recruiting during the War, the defendant had called some eighty witnesses in India, while I had called eight there, of whom two were unable to appear owing to illness, and twelve in this country. The Judge summed up the evidence as follows. He referred to the speeches I made in nearly every district and the very definite orders issued by me prohibiting any coercion in recruiting, directing that any complaints of undue pressure were at once to be brought to my notice, vetoing the employment of the police agency in recruiting as likely to lead to complaints of abuses; and censuring the few officers who suggested methods that savoured of pressure. His Lordship then commented on the undisputed fact that neither in the Indian Press (there were over two hundred newspapers in the Punjab) nor in the Legislative Council was any complaint ever made, though the Punjab people are notoriously ready to complain of any real grievance, or question asked as regards the alleged wholesale terrorism; that the defendant (though living for half the year at Simla *in the Punjab*) admitted he had never heard of such a complaint; and that there was no evidence to show that anyone had made any representation to me, written or oral. His Lordship finally put the question:

“What is the explanation of that? Is the explanation this, as the plaintiff put it before you, that in fact there was no system of oppression at all; that here and there were isolated acts of wrong-doing that sprung from blood-feuds—the cruelty of a Tahsildar, a particular man who wanted to avenge some one of his blood—some episode like that? Otherwise what is the explanation? It is not given. . . .

In my view upon this evidence the defendant has *failed to prove that the plaintiff ever authorised or instigated a single act of terrorism*. If the defendant is wrong upon this particular point, both as to the justification and fair comment, then you will ask yourselves ought we to give damages to the plaintiff if he has been wrongly charged with oppression which he never knew of, never authorised, never consented to?”

The Jury had no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the charge was a libellous one.

*Other Atrocities*

The remaining "atrocities" attributed to me by Sir Sankaran Nair need not be discussed in any detail. All of them took place under martial law imposed by the Government of which he was a member. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that these acts were "atrocities"—and the evidence of General Beynon, Colonel Johnson, and Colonel North showed that they were dictated by military necessity—the obvious question arises: who was responsible for them? Was it I, who in proposing martial law had asked to be allowed to control its administration? Or was it the Government of India (including Sir Sankaran Nair) who in sanctioning martial law had refused to allow me the control I had asked for? I assume that no one will treat very seriously Lord Chelmsford's suggestion that because the General of the Division, to whom I was directed to abdicate my authority, was told to act in consultation with me, I was therefore *de facto* responsible! Why even the Government of India themselves, while expressing disapproval of the General's action in excluding counsel from outside, did not dare to set it aside.

His Lordship, in explaining this matter to the Jury, quoted General Beynon's conception of his position:

"After martial law has been declared, civil law ceases to exist. I take command and my word goes. . . . The plaintiff can ask me to act, but he cannot tell me what to do. I alone was to decide."

While Colonel Johnson was equally explicit:

"Martial law was ordered: the plaintiff had very little to do with the suggestions (as to its administration); nothing in the way of responsibility. I act upon my own judgment. I drew up every order myself. . . . All the plaintiff's suggestions were for mitigation and beneficial repeal."

Colonel Johnson shows how far he was prepared to go in the following statement which tickled the Court:

"The plaintiff (in Lahore) was under my orders; and when, for example, I refused to allow him to go into Lahore

City, I said I should arrest him (if he insisted), I think the plaintiff was the most surprised man in Asia."

I was certainly surprised, but I was not prepared to dispute Colonel Johnson's authority in a purely military matter, for my visit would have entailed the movement of troops.

The Judge after commenting on Lord Chelmsford's evidence and my letter to him of 1st May, 1919, went on :

"I want to add this further—that if you get a weak officer in command much *might*—I do not say *will*—be done with him ; but it happens that in this case Sir Michael O'Dwyer, who is not a weak man himself, seems in this case to have had to deal with two men of singular force of character."

It was fortunate for the Punjab, and for Lahore, that we had two such *men* as General Beynon and Colonel Johnson. There is nothing in my long Indian career which I look back upon with more satisfaction than my association with them, and other straight and gallant soldiers of their stamp, in coping with the crisis of 1919.

### *High-handed Proceedings*

The allegation by the defendant that "many high-handed proceedings were taken (by me) under the Regulations of 1818, the provisions of which were applied for purposes for which they were never intended" was shown to be an absolute invention. I had never made use of those regulations, which provide for the deportation of men dangerous to the State, and had no power to do so. Only the Government of India (of which defendant was a member) could apply them and I never even suggested their application. The weakness of the defendant's case in this and other respects is shown by the fact that in the second edition of his book, brought out after he had been served with the writ, he watered down some of the libels, and though he retained this, he admitted the mistake in the pleadings and said the reference was to "other regulations," such as martial law, Defence of India Act, etc., and not to the regulations of 1818.

The Judge's summing up on this point was :

“ Did he either actually authorise them or instigate them ? In some instances the plaintiff expressly disapproved : in other instances, for example with regard to the roll-call (of students of certain Colleges), he seemed to think the proceedings were right in the interests of the district and in the interests of the students themselves.”

As regards the fourth libel—“ Above all it will be remembered that it was necessary to pass an Act of Indemnity to save the *delinquents* from proceedings in civil and criminal Courts ”—it was proved that whenever martial law has been in operation it is necessarily followed by an Act of Indemnity. The suggestion was therefore merely an extra spirt of venom, and the Court held it to be interwoven with the other libels.

*Eulogy on Plaintiff an Outrage on Indian Opinion*

In regard to the fifth libel—“ The eulogium passed by the English Cabinet on Lord Chelmsford and Sir Michael O'Dwyer was an outrage on Indian public opinion,” the Judge referred *inter alia* to the evidence proving that I had introduced and carried through the Provincial Legislature a measure for compulsory primary education of boys, subject to local option, and had arranged to finance it. He put it :

“ The plaintiff, I gather, says, ‘ *Before* you give responsible government to the country you must have your electorate which is capable of exercising the functions which a democracy wishes to exercise.’ ”

The defendant had repeated the parrot cry that I was hostile to the legitimate aspirations of the educated Indians, because I did not see eye to eye with Mr. Montagu in certain aspects of his scheme of reform. The matter has been discussed in the chapter on the Reforms. The Judge with characteristic clarity and precision summed it up as follows for the Jury :

“ You must decide upon these matters and weigh them up, as to whether or not the plaintiff was hostile to education,



whether he really was hostile to the slow and gradual development of the ideal suggested by Mr. Montagu, and whether he was hostile to the educated classes *as such*."

### *The Jury and the Verdict*

On the completion of the Judge's summing up, Counsel on both sides agreed that as regards each of the four libels the questions to be put to the Jury were :

1. Are they defamatory to the plaintiff?
2. Are they true in substance and fact?
3. Are they fair comment?

The Jury retired at 3.5 p.m., and after nearly three hours' interval returned to Court at 5.50 p.m. The sequel is best described in the official report.

"*Mr. Justice McCardie*. Members of the Jury, you have now deliberated for a long period. Have you agreed yet upon the verdict at which you should arrive?

*The Foreman of the Jury*. No, my Lord, and I do not think we ever shall.

*Mr. Justice McCardie*. Have you considered each of the libels separately?

*The Foreman*. Yes.

*Mr. Justice McCardie*. Mr. Charles (plaintiff's Counsel) are you willing to take the verdict of the majority?

*Mr. Charles*. Yes, my lord.

*Mr. Justice McCardie*. And you, Sir Walter?

*Sir Walter Schwabe* (Counsel for defendant). Yes, my Lord, I will take the verdict of the majority *except on the question of damages*, as to which my learned friend and I have agreed a figure, if the verdict is against me.

*Mr. Justice McCardie*. Yes. You have both agreed to take the verdict of the majority?

*Sir Walter Schwabe*. Yes. If there is a verdict against me, that will be for the agreed amount *with costs*.

*Mr. Justice McCardie*. That will alter the position, members of the Jury, and enable you to secure release. Can you announce your verdict?

*The Foreman*. Yes. A majority of eleven for the plaintiff and one for the defendant—on all points.

*Mr. Justice McCardie.* The result is therefore that the Jury find a verdict for the plaintiff on all points. Now, Mr. Charles, what consequences follow from that?

*Mr. Charles.* The consequences are that I ask for judgment for the plaintiff for a sum which has been agreed upon between the parties as damages, and costs.

*Mr. Justice McCardie.* Very well. That is so, Sir Walter?

*Sir Walter Schwabe.* I think it follows. . . . The figure agreed upon between us is £500.

*Mr. Charles.* £500 and costs.

*Mr. Justice McCardie.* It only remains for me to express my appreciation to the Jury, although they were not unanimous in their verdict, for the great patience and attention they have given to the case. I do not think I have ever known a Jury which excelled you in the fullness of care and continuous courtesy and patience. . . .

*A Juror.* My Lord, I think I ought to say, on behalf of the Jury, that we are all of us very grateful to your Lordship for the care you have shown in helping us to the *proper appreciation of this case* during the long period we have had of sitting under you.

*Mr. Justice McCardie.* I am much obliged to you for your remarks."

The significance of the Juror's remarks will appear later on.

### *The Sequel*

The Judge's advice to the Jury (1) that General Dyer at Amritsar had acted rightly and had been wrongly condemned by the then Secretary of State; (2) in regard to the use of aeroplanes in an emergency, naturally excited general comment and led to many questions in Parliament. The Secretary of State (Lord Olivier) thought it necessary to send a dispatch to the Government of India to show that the Executive strongly dissented from the Judge's judicial opinion. The dispatch began by pointing out that the (former) Secretary of State who was criticised and condemned was not a party to the case. That overlooked the fact that I had repeatedly suggested to the India Office that the Secretary of State should at least be represented by Counsel with a watching brief.

The dispatch went on :

“ But it (the Judge’s expression of opinion) has a wider aspect and raises a general question of grave public importance. For Mr. Justice McCardie’s deliberate condemnation of His Majesty’s former Government, together with the remarks that fell from his Lordship at earlier stages of the trial, might lead to the inference that one of His Majesty’s Judges hold views regarding the use of force, when military action is invoked in support of civil authority, which are at variance with those which have hitherto been accepted by His Majesty’s Government and upon which the existing orders upon the subject are based.”

The dispatch went on to re-affirm those orders as laid down in Mr. Montagu’s dispatch No. 10 (Public) of 26th May, 1920, viz. :

“ The principle which has consistently governed the policy of His Majesty’s Government in directing the methods to be employed when military action in support of the civil authority is required, *may be broadly stated as the use of the minimum force necessary.* . . .

The principle was endorsed by Mr. Justice McCardie, in whose summing up the following words occur : ‘ The administration of martial law ought not to be marked by any caprice, mere caprice, nor ought it to be marked by a severity *which is not required by the circumstances.*’

But His Majesty’s Government feel bound to dissociate themselves from the further view, apparently held by the Judge, that the action proper to be taken by a military or police officer for dispersing an unlawful assembly may be determined by a consideration of the moral effect it may be thought likely by the officer taking it to have on other persons whom he may believe to be contemplating disorder elsewhere.

They also adhere to the views of their predecessors, expressed in the same despatch, from which Mr. Justice McCardie would appear to have been disposed to dissent, as to the principles which should govern the use of aeroplanes to avert civil disturbances.”

Mr. Justice McCardie may be trusted to justify his judicial utterances, if any justification is needed. But even a layman

cannot but notice how weak, loose, and unconvincing is the doctrine enunciated in the above dispatch. No one has ever questioned the principle that an officer repressing disturbances should use only "*the minimum force necessary*." But who is to be the judge of that? The Military Commander *on the spot*, who has to decide on the facts and the situation as they appear to him? Or the politician in his arm-chair at Simla or Whitehall a year later, who must inevitably be ignorant of much that was obvious to the man on the spot and must at the same time be influenced by many considerations, including political expediency, other than those before the soldier?

General Dyer always maintained, even in the badly reported statement to the Hunter Committee, if read as a whole, that he used only the *minimum force necessary in the conditions with which he was faced*. Those conditions are summarised in his statement to the Army Council as quoted by the Judge at pages 353 and 354 above. He was the military authority, not only in Amritsar City, but in an area of several thousand square miles in the Central Punjab, much of which was already in a state of "open rebellion," as certified by the Government of India, while the rest was likely to join in unless he acted promptly and decisively. Was he in deciding how to act to shut his eyes to this latter all-important fact, to the smallness of his force, to the cutting of his communications in order to isolate him, to the one hundred and twenty English women and children hurriedly gathered under a small guard into Amritsar Fort and trembling as to their fate?

Even in the dispatch of 1920 His Majesty's Government speak with two voices, for they distinctly say :

*"In discharging this responsibility with the small force at his disposal, Brigadier-General Dyer naturally could not dismiss from his mind conditions in the Punjab generally, and he was entitled to lay his plans with reference to those conditions."*

How can that sound principle be reconciled with the view, stated with equal insistence, that he must not take into consideration the effect of his action on persons "whom he

believes to be contemplating disorder elsewhere"—even in the very area for the protection of which *he* is responsible?

Lord Olivier's dispatch has settled nothing; and in justice to the officers, civil and military, who in India and elsewhere have to deal with civil disorders of increasing frequency and gravity, some clear and authoritative pronouncement is essential.\*

I doubt if any reasonable and impartial person will differ from the views of Mr. Justice McCardie, who was able to bring an impartial and judicial mind to bear on the facts which had been under his consideration for a whole month. The most striking testimony to this effect that I have seen, appears in a letter in *The Times* of 2nd September, 1924, from a distinguished *Indian* lady barrister who had been present in Court throughout the case. She wrote :

"Whatever may be the opinion of Lord Olivier and the India Office on the subject of the use of aeroplanes in time of war or of the necessity of producing a moral effect in times of unrest in India, it is important that we should not lose sight of the truth that the trial of the libel action in question upheld the very best traditions of English justice. *To this fact most unusual testimony was given at the end of the trial by the jurymen who were known to be the discordant jurymen in a verdict for Sir Michael O'Dwyer, which was not unanimous.* Having obtained leave to address the Court, he said in effect that he wished to thank the Judge presiding for the fairness with which he had tried the case and for the fairness and courtesy with which he had answered all questions put to him by the Jury. When it is remembered that some of the most able and searching questions put at the trial came from this particular jurymen, and *that his sympathies were obviously with the extremists, to visit whose late leader, Mr. Gandhi, he is said to have himself been to India, this testimony becomes the more remarkable and emphatic.* A British Court can still be relied upon to do justice whatever the views of individuals. This seems to me the essential conclusion of the whole matter for us in India at this juncture.

CORNELIA SORABJI."

\* See footnote on page 368.

The sidelight on the dissenting juror is illuminating. His dissent doubtless deprived me of the heavy damages which the remaining eleven would have awarded, and the charities to which I would have allocated anything over and above my actual costs suffered accordingly.

But it was a great satisfaction to me to have vindicated myself and others in spite of the obstacles which the Government of India and the India Office placed in my way from the beginning to the end of the case. That vindication I owe to the inherent strength of my case, to the frank and convincing evidence of my witnesses, British and Indian, to the skill with which my Counsel, Mr. Ernest Charles, K.C., and Sir Hugh Fraser, handled the evidence and presented my case, and to the admirable judgment and ability with which my solicitor, Mr. Ronald MacDonald, of Sir William Joynson-Hicks and Co., prepared a case of such magnitude and complexity. Given all these, I could leave the rest with full confidence to British justice.

Needless to say among the four hundred telegrams and letters of congratulations I received from all quarters (half of them were from soldiers varying in rank from Field-Marshal to Private), there was none from anyone connected with the Government of India or the India Office, though one would have expected them to be pleased at one of their former servants having cleared his character from charges of official "terrorism" and "atrocities." I had indeed asked two of my former colleagues in the Indian Civil Service, who were on the India Office staff at the time of the trial, to give evidence on certain points. But they showed such alarm and unwillingness that I did not press the matter.

A few weeks after the verdict in my favour, at an official reception by Lord Olivier at the India Office, among the prominent guests, according to the newspaper reports, were Sir Sankaran Nair, who had libelled me, and Mr. Harkishan Lal, the ex-convict, who had come from India to give evidence against me. This no doubt was a pure coincidence; but it led certain friends of mine, British and Indian, to the con-

clusion, doubtless an erroneous one, that the India Office wished thereby to mark their sympathy with Sir Sankaran Nair and his supporters.

I am happy to think I had, and have, some friends at the India Office, and perhaps even in the present Government of India. But they were not in a position to secure for me the fair play which was all that I asked—and asked in vain—for the decision did not rest with them.

The most interesting comment on the case I have seen in the Indian Press, is that in *The Servant*, the pro-Gandhi extremist paper in Calcutta. It says :

“ Sir Michael O'Dwyer thus stands vindicated before the bar of public opinion in England. He has had justice at last at the hands of a British Jury. Sir Sankaran Nair has paid the penalty of writing a book in haste. He is to-day a sadder, if a wiser man.”

\* The pronouncement suggested in the second sentence of page 366 has now been made. During the General Strike of May 1926, the Home Government promptly issued the following order in the *British Gazette* of May 8th :

“ All ranks of the Armed Forces of the Crown are hereby notified ‘ that any action which they may find it necessary to take in an honest endeavour to aid the Civil Power will receive, both now and afterwards, the full support of His Majesty's Government.’ ”

After the decision of the Judge and Jury in *O'Dwyer v. Nair* can anyone doubt that General Dyer's action at Amritsar on the very day when the Government of India issued a proclamation calling on all officers Civil and Military to take prompt action “ however drastic ” to suppress the disturbances, and assuring them of “ full countenance and support,” was an “ honest endeavour to aid the Civil Power ” ? Surely even at this late hour the Government will take action to make good their promise by removing the orders censuring him and depriving him of his command.

M. F. O'D.

## CHAPTER XX

### THE MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REFORMS AND THEIR RESULTS

THE charge has often been made that the Punjab Government in my time was opposed to the principle of the Reforms. Mr. Montagu, in his dispatch of 26th May, 1920, on the Report of the Hunter Committee gave some colour to that view, by suggesting, in the indirect fashion suggested by the quotation, "willing to wound, but yet afraid to strike," as one of the causes of the Punjab rebellion of April, 1919, that I was regarded as "hostile to the educated classes." I *did* expose and oppose the design of a small and unrepresentative section to get control of the administration, and I was certainly hostile to the particular measure—the Diarchy—which Mr. Montagu so unwisely adopted as the basis of his scheme of reform, and which has been described as "a spider's web spun out of the brain of a doctrinaire pedant." That measure I, with others more competent to judge, condemned at the time as unworkable in practice, and likely to lead to a deadlock in the administration. Experience has shown that our criticisms were just. I also strongly opposed his scheme in so far as it gave control of the administration of 250 millions of people to a narrow, inexperienced, and unrepresentative Indian oligarchy. Like nearly all others on whom the burden of administration rested, I was critical of an experiment evolved in the brains of theorists which had never been tried in any other country. We held that India was the last place for the trial of such fantastic innovations, and that the vast masses of the people, who admittedly had no political aspirations and for generations to come were unlikely to be moved by any but racial, sectarian, or caste considerations, would be unable to benefit by so-called



“political concessions” which were hybrid exotics and had in them nothing indigenous or intelligible to the average Indian mind. The only answer of the authors of the scheme to this criticism was that it was desirable in their own interests “to disturb the placid pathetic contentment of the masses.” *That* is the sole respect in which the scheme has succeeded. One wonders if its authors, contemplating the blood-stained annals of the last five years and the misery that the revival of racial and sectarian hatreds is causing throughout India to-day, still regard their ideal with complacency.

Those of us who had to work in India in pre-reform days had another ideal. It was that contained in Queen Victoria’s Proclamation of 1858, when the Crown took over the direct administration of the Indian Empire. It runs: “It is our earnest desire to administer its Government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength; in their contentment our security; and in their gratitude our best reward.” *Our* objects were therefore to make India strong and prosperous, secure and contented. The disturbance of the contentment of the people had no place amongst them.

Those objects were being steadily pursued and, on the whole, worthily realised. I doubt if any part of the world could show a more steady advance in orderly progress than our Indian Empire made in the sixty years between 1858 and 1918, when for the first time in her authentic history, she was given by us the blessings of external security and internal peace, under an honest and efficient administration. That progress did not exclude the political development which is a natural consequence of the spread of Western education and political ideas among a section of the population, even so microscopic as in India. Indians were being more and more freely admitted to high office; the Legislative Councils were steadily expanded from small and purely advisory bodies till under the Morley-Minto Scheme of 1909, they were given an Indian, though not necessarily an elected, majority with wide control of legislation, and, by the machinery of resolutions and interpellations, a considerable, though not a dominating, influence

over the administration generally. Lord Morley, though a broad-minded statesman, had no deep knowledge of Indian conditions. But he was probably wise enough to recognise his limitations, and to listen to those who had. He realised that to impair authority was not the way to extend liberty ; and he made no secret of his view that in the present stage of Indian social and political development parliamentary institutions were as much out of place there as a fur coat in the tropics. The Montagu Reforms were introduced in 1919-20. Lord Morley, in January 1921 (see Morgan's *Life of Morley*) said, "Montagu calls himself my disciple. I see very little of my teaching in him. This Diarchy won't work. . . . My reforms were quite enough for a generation at least." The Morley-Minto Reforms, while making provision for the training of Indians in self-government by increasing association in the work of administration and legislation, maintained the strong central authority which is essential in the government of Oriental peoples.

That scheme was working satisfactorily in the Punjab when I took charge of the Province in 1913. The Punjab being the last of the great provinces to come under British rule was politically less advanced than others were. The first Legislative Council had not been established till 1897 ; and, as the system of election was still looked on with suspicion by the majority of the population, it was entirely nominated. In 1909 five seats were thrown open to election, and all fell to Mohammedans, thereby creating a Hindu-Sikh grievance. In 1912, of six seats open to election four were carried by Hindus, one by a Sikh, and only one by a Mohammedan, thus creating a Mohammedan grievance, as they were the majority of the population. I increased the number of elected seats to eleven, so as to obtain a wider representation, and reduced the official members to eleven ; but to rectify anomalous results among a people by whom election was generally neither desired nor understood, I kept six seats to be filled by nominated Indians. These measures, being cautiously progressive, met with the approval of all communities. For in the Punjab, elections then, as now, followed communal lines, and I think it was

Mr. (now the Right Honourable) S. V. S. Sastri who, after visiting the Province in the autumn of 1917 to stir up interest in the new Reforms Scheme, complained that he had met there Hindus, Mohammedans, and Sikhs, but not a single Indian. It is to be feared that the communal lines of cleavage are even more marked to-day as the result of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms which were intended to promote the creation of an Indian nationality. If that object is ever to be attained, it can only be under the unifying influence of a strong, impartial central authority.

At my first meeting of the Legislative Council in April, 1914, one member, with ambitions of his own, made the suggestion for the first time, that it was desirable to have an Executive Council in the Punjab, as in some but not all of the other major Provinces. The view I took was that the question was one to be decided solely with reference to the interests of the Province and without regard to personal or service considerations, and that if it were shown that there were certain defects in the existing system which an Executive Council would remove, I would be prepared to take up the matter.

I believe it was then I quoted the well-known lines :

“For forms of government let fools contest,  
Whate’er is best administered is best,”

and I emphasised the more pressing questions—the restoration of law and order and the suppression of the anarchical movement with which the Government was then occupied, and with which, in its existing form, it was capable of dealing.

The hackneyed quotation was afterwards made the gravamen of a charge that I had stigmatised Indian politicians as “fools”!

The fact is, as everyone, British or Indian, who understands the East will, if honest, admit, that 99 per cent of the people do not care a brass farthing for “the forms of government.” What they do desire is protection of life and property, light taxation, a minimum of interference from subordinate officials, impartial and speedy justice, increasing facilities for medical relief, communications and elementary education, measures to

secure and improve agriculture and avert scarcity, and in general an honest and efficient administration. Some aspects of the progress that was being made towards the attainment of these objects have been sketched in a preceding chapter.

Politics play but a small part in these aims, and while not disregarded, were therefore not given undue consideration in pre-reform days. The excessive prominence given to politics, and politicians under the reform scheme, has admittedly thrown the solid work of administration for the good of the masses into the background.

Unfortunately, such work made but little appeal to ambitious Indian politicians eager for power and place, and possessed of an overweening sense of their own capacity. Having little historical sense and short memories, they have failed to visualise the anarchy from which India has been rescued by one hundred and fifty years' patient labour of British public servants, and the narrow margin of security, i.e. the British Services and the British Army, which safeguards India from relapsing into chaos. Hence their demand, put forward during the great crisis of the War, when England's difficulty was political India's opportunity, that India should be endowed *at once* with the political institutions of the most advanced Western countries. That demand was pressed with reckless disregard of the fact that "India is still a country (or rather a continent larger and more diverse than Europe with Russia left out) marching in uneven stages through the centuries from the fifth to the twentieth."

In September, 1916, Mrs. Besant's Home Rule League was formed; a few weeks later nineteen members of the all-India Legislative Council issued their manifesto demanding sweeping political changes. In December, 1916, the National Congress and the Muslim League agreed on a common programme, which included the support of the Home Rule propaganda. No doubt these demands were stimulated by the knowledge that the British Empire was engaged in a desperate struggle for existence, that the British Government had accepted President Wilson's doctrine of "self-determination" for nationalities who had rebelled against oppressive alien rulers,

and that a large section of British politicians, with whom a high-sounding formula takes the place of knowledge and experience, would support their claims. All this time the authorities in Simla were busy working out their own projects for satisfying the demands of the advanced Indian politicians, whose voice they professed to recognise as the voice of the people.

It was at this stage that the Diarchy was put forward by Mr. Lionel Curtis as a panacea for Indian constitutional ills. This was a scheme for a dual government, partly responsible to the Secretary of State and Parliament, partly responsible through Indian Ministers to an elected assembly. None of us in India then knew much about Mr. Curtis, except that he had played some part in constitution-making in South Africa ; and Mr. Curtis clearly knew very little about India, which seems to have swum into his ken when he and his colleagues of the Round Table were trying to frame a scheme for a Parliament of the Empire, but were held up by the fact that India had been left out of the picture. Mr. Curtis came to India in 1916 to repair this omission. Apparently, before starting, though we did not know this at the time, he had been engaged in discussing the lines of Indian Reforms with certain India Office officials, including the late Sir William Duke and Sir Thomas Holderness, the Under-Secretary of State. Between them they evolved the Diarchy, though all concerned seem later to have repudiated their share in its parentage ; and Mr. Curtis came to India with an informal mission to "sound the authorities" as to its acceptance. None of us, I fear, then took him very seriously ; his scheme was generally ridiculed as the phantasy of impractical doctrinaires. But Mr. Curtis took himself very seriously, and having failed to impress the provincial authorities, he addressed himself to a wider audience. He expounded the merits of his scheme in a series of "Open Letters to the People of India." Humbler mortals gazed open-mouthed at this colossal self-confidence. Up to then only the Sovereign had addressed messages to the peoples of India, and these only on great Imperial occasions. Even the Viceroy had, as far as I know, never ventured to

address any message of his own to India as a whole. Mr. Curtis, however, rushed in where Viceroys feared to tread, and though certain proceedings of his at one time gave offence, quite unmerited, to Indian politicians, they later realised that Mr. Curtis and his Diarchy might be useful to further their schemes for "contracting British power to stretch their own."

About this time, on 20th August, 1917, Mr. Montagu, who had just succeeded Mr. Austen Chamberlain as Secretary of State, made the historic announcement in the House of Commons on political reforms in India. This was that "the policy of His Majesty's Government is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India, as an integral part of the British Empire."

It further promised that substantial steps in this direction should be taken as soon as possible and that the Secretary of State would pay an early visit to India to discuss with all concerned how effect should be given to the policy.

As a message from politicians at home to Indian politicians, the declaration is open to no adverse criticism, if it be remembered that the latter represents only an infinitesimal section of the Indian peoples. Indeed Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford realised this fact when they stated at a later date, in their Report, that "the rural masses (232 millions out of 250) have the greatest stake in the country, but they are poorly equipped for politics and do not at present wish to take part in them." Unfortunately this cardinal fact seems to have escaped their notice when they came to formulate proposals to implement the declaration of August, 1917.

An announcement so momentous should have been made, like Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1858 and subsequent august messages, by the Sovereign himself to his Indian subjects. In that case, it would doubtless have conveyed some inspiring message to "all our subjects resident therein"—as Queen Victoria's did—and not have been addressed to the Indian politicians alone, "Responsible government"

has no meaning to the Indian peoples, no equivalent in any Indian vernacular; while the reference to "self-governing institutions," in so far as it was understood by the masses at all, was taken to mean that Britain was weary of rule and was withdrawing from her responsibilities, before they were even half discharged. To the peaceful, loyal and non-political masses, the message made no appeal; from them it evoked no response. The words of the Sovereign at all times make an appeal to Oriental peoples, who offer their allegiance not to an impersonal British Government, but to the person of their Sovereign whom they regard as something almost divine. Nothing shows more clearly the lack of imagination in latter-day politicians than their failure to make appropriate use of this potent influence. It was the call of the King-Emperor, and not that of the British Government or of the Prime Minister, that enabled us to rally hundreds of thousands of loyal Punjabis to the colours in the four years of the Great War.

Mr. Montagu arrived in India in November, 1917, with his Delegation, which included a few well-known public men—but none with any knowledge of Indian conditions—and some of his India Office staff, among them Sir William Duke, who had been associated with Mr. Curtis in evolving the Diarchy.

They sat for months at Delhi, in close consultation with the Viceroy and his Executive Council, and were most patient and assiduous in working their way through the mass of written proposals and the oral evidence in support of them, put forward by the various political organisations. The Indian "public men" had the time of their lives in expounding to a sympathetic Secretary of State and a patient Viceroy the defects of the British bureaucracy, and in propounding cut-and-dried formulas for the government of the Indian Empire. Men who had failed hopelessly in the management of a school, a newspaper, or a petty municipality were ready with schemes to run an Empire. Some of them enjoyed their new-found importance so much that on Monday they would be found representing a Hindu Sabha with one set of proposals, on Tuesday in a landlords' delegation advocating something quite

different. They took themselves very seriously and were taken seriously by Mr. Montagu and his colleagues. Now and again Heads of Provinces were called away from the pressing duties of administration and the then all-important task of raising man-power for the Army, to assist in the discussions. Most of us thought that the occasion was singularly ill-chosen and grudged the call on our time.

No steps were taken, nor, in the short time available, could with advantage be taken, to explain to the masses the questions under discussion and endeavour to ascertain *their* views on matters of vital importance to them. I remember more than once pressing on the Secretary of State and his *entourage* then sitting in Delhi, surrounded by and hearing only Indian politicians, that they were not getting down to the peoples of India. I begged them to come with me, if even for a week-end, to some rural part of the Punjab, e.g. Lyallpur, to see the working of the administrative machine and get into touch with the people. Only a few could find the leisure, and the Secretary of State was not one of them.

Thus the enquiry proceeded from November, 1917, to April, 1918, and from first to last I doubt if any real effort was made to find out what the man behind the plough thought of it all. The local governments did indeed endeavour to put their case forward; but in doing so were likely to be regarded as unsympathetic to "popular" feeling and "hostile to the aspirations of the educated classes."

This charge was in particular raised against myself. Coming fresh from a most successful recruiting campaign throughout the Punjab, I had been shocked by the indifference of Indian politicians at Simla to the War. In a debate on Punjab affairs in the all-India Council in September, 1917, I attacked the doctrines of passive resistance and conditional loyalty which some of the Indian members were preaching even at that supreme crisis. I criticised their action in basing their political claims on the War services of the Indian Army—mainly a Punjab army—in which they had no share and to which their class had made no contribution. I appealed to them to imitate the example of three Indian members of my own



Legislative Council, each of whom had furnished over three thousand recruits since the outbreak of War. Whatever I said was based on incontrovertible facts, and that made it the more unpalatable. My speech stirred up a nest of hornets, for as a distinguished Indian Maharaja, in complimenting me on speaking out, said, "It will make you many enemies. *C'est la vérité qui blesse.*"

Lord Chelmsford, who was absent from the debate, was inundated with protests from hypersensitive Indian members, each of whom thought that he himself had been attacked, though the names and antecedents of only a few were then known to me.

The Viceroy thought that while my remarks might have been appropriate in my own Council, they were ill-timed in his, as likely to disturb the atmosphere of harmony necessary for the discussion of the Reforms, and to promote which Mrs. Besant had just been released from internment by the Secretary of State against the advice of the Madras Government. At his instance, at the next meeting of the all-India Council, I expressed my regret if any of my remarks had caused offence, and explained that no such offence was intended, my sole object being to stimulate War efforts. But I withdrew not a word of what I had said, for not a single statement could be challenged. However, this episode and the release of Mrs. Besant were regarded as triumphs of the "popular" party over autocratic officials.

Probably Mr. Montagu when he arrived two months later was warned against me as a dangerous reactionary. The "popular" politicians were at this time having their innings, and no pains were spared to win their acceptance of the scheme which the Secretary of State and the Viceroy were then elaborating. Mr. Curtis also came into his own, for, in disregard of the almost unanimous opinion of provincial governments, the principle of Diarchy was made the keystone of the arch of the reforms in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report which was made public in August, 1918.

It was very skilfully arranged that the proposals, though in theory open to full and free criticism, should be published

with such a backing of authoritative opinion from the highest quarters as to make any subsequent criticism from subordinate authorities difficult. Among the appendices to it were :

(1) A letter, dated 3rd May, 1918, to Mr. Montagu from the Secretary of State's Delegation (the Earl of Donoughmore, Sir William Duke, Mr. Bhupendra Nath Basu, Mr. Charles Roberts, M.P.) in which they say: "We unitedly support your recommendations and are prepared to recommend their adoption to public opinion both in England and in India."

(2) A despatch, dated 3rd May, 1918, from the Government of India to Mr. Montagu which says: "There are, no doubt, detailed recommendations on which some of us hold divergent views, but we *wish to convey our cordial support to the general policy which the Report embodies.*"

(Signed)	CHELMSFORD.	C. SUNKARAN NAIR.
	C. C. MONRO.	G. R. LOWNDES.
	W. S. MEYER.	G. S. BARNES.
	C. H. A. HILL.	W. H. VINCENT.

(3) Mr. Montagu also fortified himself with a minute, dated 18th June, 1918, from his colleagues in the Council of India in London, which states: "*The general policy of the Report meets with our unanimous support.* We are of opinion that, on the whole, it recommends the measures best adapted to ensure safe and steady progress in the desired direction, and, while therefore reserving to ourselves freedom to reconsider the details of the various important measures suggested, when public criticism shall have been received, we heartily support the policy as a whole."

(Signed)	L. CURRIE.	MARSHALL REID.
	F. W. DUKE.	E. G. BARROW.
	M. HAMMICK.	S. AFTAB.
	CHAS. S. BAYLEY.	P. D. PATTANI.
	W. D. SHEPPARD.	BHUPENDRA NATH BASU.

These expressions of opinion—which might be criticised as premature—served a double purpose. They committed the influential signatories to the acceptance of the cardinal features of the scheme before they were in possession of the opinions of those who would have to work it, viz, the local

governments, and they spiked the guns of the latter in any criticisms they might make by confronting them with a solid phalanx of authority in support of the scheme. The manœuvre showed superb political strategy, but can it be regarded as a fair and honourable way of handling a momentous issue affecting the destinies of three hundred millions of people?

However, opinions were again invited in India on the definite proposals. The Diarchy, notwithstanding its acceptance by Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford and their respective Councils and colleagues, was again condemned as unworkable by seven out of the nine provincial governments. The only two which did not formally oppose it—Bengal and Bihar and Orissa—admitted that they did not like the scheme, but thought that as it had the backing of such high authority as the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, things had gone too far to go back upon it. The so-called “moderate” Indian politicians, who are now almost unanimous in condemning it as inadequate or unworkable, declared definitely for the Report with certain reservations; the “advanced” politicians generally opposed the scheme as disappointing and unsatisfactory, while in their hearts rejoicing at proposals which gave them at once far more power than the most extreme of them had dared to hope for, and in the future the means of bringing the Government of India to a deadlock. But they felt that they had the British Government in India on the run, and that if they continued to press it, they would gain even more sweeping concessions in the passage of the Bill through Parliament. To carry on an intensive propaganda with this object, Mr. Tilak, the extremist leader, and some of his associates, had started for England in the spring of 1918. But they were refused passports by the Home authorities on the ground that “such a proceeding at any time would be improper. Under existing circumstances, when the country is waging a great war and is confronted with a crisis which calls for supreme concentration of national effort, and so far as is possible the suspension of purely political agitation and platform controversy, it is one in which the Government cannot acquiesce.”

The argument was irrefutable. It was for precisely those reasons that I had in 1917 excluded Messrs. Tilak and Pal from the Punjab, where they desired to carry on the same propaganda in an even more highly charged atmosphere. But the logical outcome of the decision of His Majesty's Government was that the discussion of political reforms in India should be held over while the War was in progress. Such a decision would have been eminently wise, but would not have suited the politicians, British and Indian, who were eager for power and notoriety.

In 1919 the ban was removed. Mr. Tilak and his satellites, with numbers of other extreme politicians, hastened to England, had free access to the India Office, and through their influence there and with certain supporters in the Labour Party did much to give the Bill a shape favourable to their pretensions. They had organisation, money, and influence at their back, and they were masters in the arts of political intrigue. At the same time the Punjab rural classes, dimly realising how their interests were threatened, but having neither funds, nor organisation, nor influence with those in authority, asked for the assistance of Government to send a deputation to represent their case to the India Office and Parliament. The request was curtly refused; a suggestion that the views of the scores of Indian military officers then assembled in London for the Victory celebrations should be ascertained was summarily rejected, and not a single Indian representative of rural interests appeared either before the India Office or the Parliamentary Committee. This may have been clever politics, but it cast a slur on the British reputation for honesty and fair play.

This, however, is anticipating the course of events. Realising the difficulty of passing through Parliament a Bill, the main proposals of which were condemned as unworkable by seven out of nine local governments, Lord Chelmsford's Government made a last attempt to overcome their objections. The Heads of Provinces were again summoned to Delhi in January, 1919. All attended but the Governors of Bombay and Madras, who were preoccupied with the affairs of their own Provinces.

Lord Chelmsford addressed us, setting out the points in favour of the Montagu-Chelmsford Scheme, criticising the objections we had put forward, and *for the first time* gave us an opportunity of putting forward an alternative scheme, "in some detail, so that I and my colleagues may have the same chance of judging it as the critics of the Report have had of judging the proposals of the Secretary of State and myself."

We at once set to work, and in twenty-four hours produced what is known as the Majority Scheme, dated 15th January, 1919, to which the signatories are :

M. F. O'DWYER	(Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab).
HARCOURT BUTLER	(Lieutenant-Governor, United Provinces).
REGINALD CRADDOCK	(Lieutenant-Governor, Burma).
B. ROBERTSON	(Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces).
N. D. BEATSON BELL	(Chief Commissioner, Assam).

The Majority Scheme is printed among the parliamentary papers. But in view of its importance as expressing the views, however hurriedly formulated, of men experienced in and responsible for the administration of over one hundred millions of people, of the scant consideration given to it by higher authority, by Parliament and the Press, both of which seem to have been generally unaware of its existence, and of the fact that the Montagu-Chelmsford Scheme, to which it was an alternative, has now admittedly broken down in certain Provinces and threatens to break down in the rest, it seems advisable to quote from it at some length.

### *Majority Scheme*

"Para. 2. We desire to make it clear beyond any misunderstanding, that we are in entire accord with the statement made by His Majesty's Government on 20th August, 1917. We desire to give effect to it by a progressive scheme of a liberal character based on a policy of trust and co-operation. We desire to avoid future friction by framing a scheme on broad and simple lines which will require only a few checks and those based, so far as possible, on existing practice and accepted principle.

. . . . .

But we are deeply impressed by the weight of adverse criticism of what is known as the Scheme of Dualism (Diarchy) in the Report. There is a strong preponderance of local governments against the scheme. The position has been summarised as follows :

‘Bengal and Bihar and Orissa treat the main question as closed to discussion, but the former is dubious and the latter guarded in its opinion. Madras is in favour of instituting sub-provinces, but otherwise would fall in with the majority opinion. *All other local governments have declared against a dualised executive (Diarchy) and wish to maintain the unity of the administration.*’

There is great division of opinion among Indians in regard to it. *We are also impressed by the misgivings that exist in the services generally, British and Indian, as to their position and prospects under a dual form of government.* The scheme exposes a large surface to legislative, administrative, and financial friction. *It has all the elements which make for division at a time when there is most need for co-operation and association.*

3. *The proposals of the Report appear to us to have gone much further than the terms of the announcement required, but they have raised expectations which may render it necessary to make a greater immediate advance in the direction of the goal than the facts which face us justify. . . . The idea of association (of Indians in the administration) has been overshadowed and obscured by the idea of responsibility. . . . The Report begins by dividing (the Government) in order to get responsibility and ends by uniting in order to get association. We are also firmly of opinion that it is clearly advisable, as far as possible, to build on existing foundations, and to have a Scheme which, while giving effect to the announcement will fit in with an administrative system which has its roots in centuries of Indian (Oriental ?) rule. We believe that it is only by close association between officials and non-officials that we can bridge over the gulf that separates the present form of administration from popular government. We respectfully deprecate the sacrifice of practical experience to constitutional theory.*

In the Report, responsibility is defined as consisting primarily in amenability to constituents, and in the second place in

amenability to an (elected) assembly. *We need scarcely argue that in the absence of an electorate capable of enforcing a mandate, these conditions do not exist. In the words of the Bengal Government, 'responsibility can scarcely be derived from an irresponsible source.'*"

Having dwelt upon the doctrinaire and theoretical character of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals we went on to set forth our alternative.

"4. It is also evident that for some considerable period we shall be ignorant as to how the (new) electorate will act. The scheme in the Report in this respect is at present a leap in the dark. We content ourselves therefore with *the outline of a scheme which is as close as possible to the Scheme published in the Report, but which eliminates those features of dual government that seem to us to imperil the success of its practical working in existing conditions.*

5. *Structure of the Provincial Executive.* The Governor will have a Council of an *equal* number of official and non-official members, the latter being selected by him from the elected, or, in the Punjab, from the elected and nominated members of the Legislative Council. *We would do away with the distinction between reserved and transferred subjects and it should be open to the Governor to give any portfolio to any Member of his Council, whether he be official or non-official. They (the non-official members of Council) would be ultimately responsible to the Secretary of State; but they would necessarily be influenced by the opinions of the Legislative Council. . . . They would be responsible to the electorate in the same way as the Ministers under the Report Scheme (so far as the term 'responsibility' can apply) in that they would have to seek re-election at the end of the life of the Council. In this way a unitary government would be secured. The Government would further be kept in touch with the Legislative Council by Standing Committees and Under-Secretaries taken from the Council as in the report. We wish to see a substantial elected majority and we wish to give the Council very real powers in the matter of legislation and supply. . . .*

We believe that this will be a more liberal system in practical

working than the schemes of the joint report in that, in the words of the announcement, it will associate Indians with every branch of the administration. We would only reserve to the Governor his present power of over-riding his Executive Council.

#### 6. *Legislation*

We accept the powers of legislation proposed in the joint report, reserving to the Governor the right of veto. . . . It is part of our proposals that the existing powers of the Governor-General in regard to Ordinances and of the Governor-General in Council in regard to Regulations should be unimpaired.

#### 7. *Supply*

We would allow the budget to be voted by the Legislative Council, reserving to the Governor-in-Council powers of restoring the original budget provision on occasions covered by S. 50 of the Government of India Act (i.e. so far as essential for the security of the State). In regard to financial procedure, we desire to follow as nearly as possible the practice of the House of Commons.

#### 9. *General*

We recommend that our scheme may be adopted only for a period of years, in the course of which experience will be gained on the many points of which we are necessarily in ignorance at present. *The advantages of the scheme are that it is based on experience rather than on theory, that it will associate Indians with the Government more effectively than will the schemes of the Report, that it will avoid the admitted dangers of dual government and the inevitable friction between the official and non-official elements of government and foster a spirit of harmonious co-operation, that it rests on a system understood by the people, that it is capable of expansion in the light of experience subject to the realisation of the conditions of progress* (that Indian politicians should show a spirit of co-operation and a sense of responsibility in exercising the new powers conferred on them) set forth in the announcement of 20th August, 1917.

10. His Excellency has asked us to supply the following tests to our proposals:

Firstly. Will it be possible under it to affix responsibility to Indians with regard to any particular question of policy?



As regards *individual* responsibility in the *Executive Council*, our answer is in the negative, also that the announcement does not require it, nor does the scheme of the report secure it ; but the responsibility of the individual in the *legislative Council* will be manifest from the proceedings.

Secondly. Does it provide machinery by which a greater area of responsibility can later be transferred ?

Our answer is that . . . the machinery can be adjusted to meet developments,

- (a) by increasing the number of subjects in non-official members' portfolios.
- (b) by decreasing resort to the use of the powers of the Governor in regard to certification and of the Governor-in-Council in regard to the budget.
- (c) by giving more effect to resolutions and the advice of non-official members in matters of policy.
- (d) by increasing the number of Councillors chosen from the elected members of the Legislative Council.

Lastly. Does it lead up gradually to a stage under which full responsibility can be attained by Indians in the provincial sphere ?

The answer is in the affirmative.

10. We conclude by re-stating our general position. Except in the matter of control by the Legislative Council over supply of 'transferred' subjects . . . we consider that our scheme is at least as liberal and progressive as that of the report. *It does not comply with the test of responsibility as defined in the report ; but, as pointed out by more than one local Government, that is a narrow definition, the cardinal conditions of which (a competent electorate) are non-existent at the present time and cannot be created for some time to come.* The definition also overlooked the necessity, proclaimed in the announcement, of the principle of association and co-operation. WE MAINTAIN CONFIDENTLY *that in any case our scheme is a substantial step towards realising the policy of the announcement, and pays due regard to the conditions of progress laid down in it."*

The above proposals emanated from the Heads of five of the nine major Provinces and had the general support of two more. Only two Heads of Provinces (Lord Ronaldshay of

Bengal and Sir E. Gait of Bihar and Orissa) dissented from them. In their joint Minute of dissent, dated 16th January, 1919, they state :

“Although in theory the whole question is still an open one, the fact that the proposals in the joint report have been prepared by the Viceroy and the Secretary of State and have been published with the permission of the Cabinet, has given rise to the confident expectation that these proposals or something equivalent to them will be carried into effect. If any material abatement were now made, it would be believed by almost all educated Indians that the Government had been guilty of a breach of faith. . . . *From this point of view* we are prepared to support the scheme put forward in the joint report as preferable to any other scheme which has been devised.”

This dissent was unfortunate, for even Mr. Montagu would have hesitated to force through Parliament his ill-fated scheme, had *all* local Governments been unanimous in their opposition to its cardinal feature (the dual government). One obvious criticism on the dissent is that if the matter were a *chose jugée*, why were we asked to put forward an alternative scheme? It is the irony of fate that the Report Scheme has broken down more hopelessly in Bengal than in any other Province, and for the very reasons anticipated in our Majority Report, viz. that in endeavouring to secure a pseudo-responsibility, it overlooked the essential features of Indian association and co-operation.

One would have thought that the Majority Scheme, with its convincing exposure of the evils of the proposed dual government, and its liberal proposals for the association of Indian representatives in a unitary government, would have made the Government of India pause before taking what Lord Curzon subsequently termed the “leap in the dark.” But probably, like the Governors of Bengal and Bihar and Orissa, they too considered that it would be impolitic to go back on proposals published over the signatures of Lord Chelmsford and Mr. Montagu.

At all events, in their famous Reforms Dispatch of 5th

March, 1919, to the Secretary of State, they adhered in substance to the Montagu-Chelmsford report—including the dual government—and rejected our proposals in the following words :

“ Our judgment on the Majority Minute may therefore be summed up by saying that we regard it in the first place as failing to lay any measure of definite responsibility for any act of government upon the representatives of the electorate ; we therefore hold that it does not comply with the policy upon which the Home Government have decided. In the second place, it fails to fulfil what the authors themselves present as the paramount requirement of an undivided government, a unity which can, to our thinking, be secured only by a common allegiance and a common policy. In the third place, it affords no prospect of successful working without giving rise to such conflict and bitterness of feeling as may produce a deadlock ; and in the fourth place the scheme cannot progress in any direction except by one leap into full responsible government.”

This dispatch is signed by the members of the then Government of India.

CHELMSFORD.  
C. C. MONRO.  
C. H. A. HILL.  
C. SANKARAN NAIR.

G. K. LOWNDES.  
W. H. VINCENT.  
J. S. MESTON.  
T. HOLLAND.

They are weighty names ; but, as members of the Government of India, all were working in almost daily communication with the distinguished authors of the scheme they supported ; they were naturally influenced by such high authority ; nearly all of them were tied down by their acceptance of the “ general policy ” a year before ; and none of them, except Sir James (now Lord) Meston, had any recent or considerable experience of that provincial administration which was to be the *corpus vile* of the experiment in Diarchy.

It would not have been difficult for us to demolish the rather doctrinaire arguments which they used to override our practical experience. But the opportunity was never given. We went back to our provinces, and were soon struggling

desperately with the disorders caused by the agitation of Mr. Gandhi and others of Mr. Montagu's "friends" against the Rowlatt Bill. Even these disorders did not open the eyes of those in authority to the dangers of giving almost uncontrolled power over a large sphere of the administration to irresponsible or unscrupulous politicians, who, instead of displaying any sense of co-operation in helping the authorities to contradict the false rumours used to excite the ignorant masses, often employed their influence to promote the agitation by the grossest misrepresentation of the efforts of the authorities to quell the disorders. The India Office, too, fearing perhaps that the knowledge of the alarming situation in India might interfere with the progress of the Reforms Scheme through Parliament, either closed their eyes and their ears to those happenings or issued to the home Press and public only the most meagre information. Mr. Montagu in fact prided himself on his ignorance of the "details" (which were told to him by me on my arrival home in June, 1919, and were available to him from other sources), till the Hunter Committee began its enquiries seven months later. Meantime the Montagu-Chelmsford Scheme held the field in England, having the support of the Government of India and of the Secretary of State's Council.

The Majority Scheme of local governments appears to have been completely overlooked—so much so that a member of the Secretary of State's Council, who had given his support to the Report, was heard to condemn some of us for criticising its proposals, when we had nothing to offer in their place!

In the summer of 1919 a Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament was appointed to investigate and report on the whole question. By an unusual procedure, Mr. Montagu got himself and his Under-Secretary of State, Lord Sinha, appointed to that Committee, and secured a majority of members favourable to his particular views on Indian reform.

The crowd of "moderate" and "advanced" Indian politicians who had come to London for the purpose, again had things pretty well their own way, and, as no steps were taken to obtain representatives of the Indian masses, were accepted

as voicing the views of India. The Government of India, too, had able exponents of their views in Sir Claude Hill and Sir James Meston, who appears to have gone further in meeting the views of the Indian politicians and Mr. Montagu than even the Government of India desired. Having by that time arrived home I asked to be given an opportunity of stating the views of the majority of local governments; this was finally allowed. But I was not called before the Joint Committee till almost the close of their examination of witnesses, when they had practically decided on the Diarchy. It was clear to me from the impatience which Mr. Montagu and Lord Sinha exhibited towards my views, that they resented any criticism of their own proposals. But if the Memorandum I submitted to and the oral evidence I gave before the Committee are referred to, it will, I think, be found that my gloomy forecasts of the results of the Montagu-Chelmsford Scheme, and in particular of the dual government, have been only too fully and too speedily realised. In the interests of the peoples of India I wish it had been otherwise.

Even up to the passing of the Bill through Parliament, there was hope that some of its worst features might be eliminated, and that the central and provincial governments in India would still be left with power to do what they are there to do—to govern. Earl Curzon, introducing the Reform Bill in the House of Lords in July, 1919, in a weighty speech, which I had the pleasure of hearing, showed himself quick to discern the dangers in the Scheme and laid down four safeguards as in his opinion essential:

(1) That there should be no lowering of the standards of the Civil Services, whose work in the past has enabled India to take the place she now occupies in the Empire and the world.

(2) That nothing should be done to impair or diminish the authority of the central government in India.

(3) That nothing should be done to weaken the protection given by the British Raj to the vast multitudes to whom the electoral franchise and the vote mean nothing.

(4) That nothing should be said or done to encourage the

belief that the British Government is not good enough for India, and that India can safely cut herself adrift from the Imperial connection.

In view of subsequent events the recital of these conditions sounds grotesquely humorous. Every one of them has been systematically violated, either because the Bill as passed into law did not make due provision for their observance, or because the Governments in India who have to work the Act have failed in their duty to enforce them.

The Reforms Bill was hurried through a Parliament in which not one in fifty understood its complicated provisions, at the close of 1919, so as to become law (as admitted by Mr. Bonar Law in the Commons) before the 1919 session of the Congress at Amritsar—and in the hope that it might allay the growing violence of extremist agitation. The Bill was at once passed.

Mr. Montagu, who had shown much adroitness in pushing the measure through, was able to claim that this was the proudest moment of his life. But there were already ominous rumblings from the Indian extremists and revolutionaries whom his policy had encouraged. To placate these and create a favourable atmosphere, an amnesty was given on his recommendation to all but 5 per cent of those convicted a few months before of rebellion, conspiracy, arson, robbery, and cognate offences during the Punjab and Bombay disturbances of April, 1919. It was also extended to the Ali brothers and others who had been interned during the Great War and the Afghan War for incitements to rebellion. This was the beginning of that fatal policy of interfering with the course of justice for "political expediency" which has done so much to dishearten the police and judiciary, encourage sedition and bring contempt on British rule. Further to reconcile the irreconcilables, the faithful servants of Government, civil and military, who at great personal risk had promptly quelled the disturbances before the Afghan invasion, intended to synchronise with them, could materialise, were visited with severe censure which in many cases led to their resigning a service in which they were denied the "full countenance and

support " of which they were publicly assured by the Government of India at the outbreak of the disorders.

These two measures were naturally regarded by both British and Indians as a further proof of weakness in the Government, a further triumph for the forces of disorder and rebellion. The amnestied criminals, as might have been foreseen, showed their gratitude by at once heading an agitation more reckless than any that had gone before, and took a leading part in the Congresses at Amritsar in 1919 and at Nagpur in 1920, both of which were characterised by the most violent hostility to the British Government and its agents. Mr. Gandhi, whom Mr. Montagu had gone out of his way to claim as his " friend " and to describe in Parliament as " a very great and distinguished Indian, a man of the highest motives and the finest character," was encouraged to emerge from the obscurity into which he had temporarily fallen after the repression of the 1919 disorders—due to his unscrupulous agitation. He now joined hands with the Ali brothers in the so-called Hindu-Muslim *entente* and used the Punjab " atrocities " and the Khilafat " grievances " to stir up a subversive movement which for over two years caused bloodshed and disorder in every province in India, led to the serious Moplah rebellion of 1920-21, which cost at least ten thousand lives, and was finally suppressed only when, in 1922, the Government of India summoned up courage to enforce the law and bring the chief apostles of sedition and anarchy to tardy justice.

Such were the first results to the Indian peoples of the scheme of reform which was to allay political agitation and inspire Indian politicians with a spirit of co-operation and a sense of responsibility. In a preceding chapter an attempt has been made to sketch the rapid deterioration of the administrative machine in the Punjab under the dual executive—the growth of insecurity, of terrorism, of serious crime, and of official corruption, the decreasing efficiency of the great public services which minister to the needs of the masses, and the increasing defiance of all authority. The same pitiful tale might be told of every province in India within the last five years. It is the keynote of every report on the criminal

administration. Again one wonders what has become of the four essential safeguards laid down by Earl Curzon in 1919.

But it must in fairness be admitted that the general demoralisation is not a necessary consequence of the Reforms Act. That, even with the clumsy Diarchy, could probably have been made to work by the efforts of the splendid body of public servants in India, given two conditions, firstly, that the central and local governments should maintain a friendly but firm guiding hand over the new Indian Ministers and Legislative Councils till these gave proof of practical common-sense and administrative experience, and, secondly, that the Indian politicians on whom the opportunities of service were conferred should, as laid down in the Preamble of the Act, exhibit a spirit of co-operation and a sense of responsibility.

Unfortunately neither of these conditions has been forthcoming. The central and local governments did a great disservice to the cause of the reforms by their premature and extraordinary abdication of authority at the very time when the fragile exotic plant in an alien soil required most careful tending and watching. They left it to its own fate, and it was speedily choked by the luxuriant growth of indigenous weeds.

For this result, however, the authorities in India are not primarily responsible. They were directed in the instructions under the Royal Sign Manual issued by Mr. Montagu to exercise great restraint, unless grave reason to the contrary appeared, in any exercise of the emergency powers still vested in them in opposition to the policy and wishes of the Indian representative assemblies. Given such directions, local governments, whose criticisms and warnings had been ignored, were not likely to run the risk of further antagonising the Government of India and the Secretary of State by early interference when they saw things beginning to go wrong; and one knows how rapidly mischief spreads in India if not promptly checked at its source. The toleration of evil for the sake of a so-called political experiment must have been galling to many Heads of Provinces, and it is no longer a secret that, after three years' painful experience, it was the threat of resignation by two



Governors that compelled Lord Reading's Government to enforce the law in 1922 against the arch-criminal, Gandhi. One wishes in the interests of the Indian masses that they had forced an earlier decision. But all honour to them for their British insistence on the law being enforced without respect of persons.

Mr. Montagu's instructions were for years slavishly followed by the Government of India. They doubtless took their stand on the pronouncement of Lord Sinha, Under-Secretary of State in the House of Lords in July, 1920, when, speaking of Gandhi's anarchic movement, he said, "Do not interfere too hastily or too violently with a movement of this kind. Let it kill itself, as in time it does."

Was ever a more dangerous doctrine publicly enunciated by a responsible statesman? It was, however, reaffirmed by a subsequent declaration of the Government of India that Gandhi's movement, then at its most dangerous stage, should be left "to die of its own intrinsic inanity," and in their "Extraordinary Resolution" of 8th November, 1920, which, referring to the same movement, ended with this lame and impotent conclusion :

"How long, with due regard to their ultimate responsibility for the public safety, Government will be able to maintain that policy (of letting things drift) will depend largely on the success of sane and moderate citizens to check the extension of the movement and keep its dangers within bounds."

Surely it was for the Government to give a lead to the "sane and moderate citizens" by discharging its primary duty of enforcing the law, irrespective of persons, and maintaining public order and tranquillity. This was never more necessary than at the outset of a great constitutional experiment.

When such was the attitude of the executive authorities, it is not surprising that the new All-India Assembly and provincial Councils when they met early in 1921 showed a reckless irresponsibility and a violent desire to undermine such authority as still existed. Again they felt they had the

Government on the run, and they took full advantage of its weakness. One of the first acts of the All-India Assembly was to demand the repeal of all the so-called repressive measures, the emergency laws which enabled Government to deal with subversive and anarchic movements. A committee which included the Home and Legal Members of the Government of India reported in favour of such a repeal on the ground that "the revolutionary movement is now quiescent and the associations supporting it have been broken up." The laws were accordingly repealed. The Moplah rebellion, which was then brewing because the Government of India refused to listen to the representations of the Madras Government for preventive action, broke out *within a month!*

The repeal of these measures, and in particular of the Rowlatt Act, which had been duly passed in March, 1919, by a majority of the Legislature, gave an immediate stimulus to the revival of the revolutionary movements in the Punjab and in Bengal. The whole administration of the Punjab has now for three years been disorganised by the seditious Akali movement, which, at last, is being firmly handled by the new Governor, Sir Malcolm Hailey. In Bengal the underground revolutionary movement has become so threatening that Lord Reading has now been compelled to issue a special ordinance, *on his own sole authority*, to arm the executive with special powers to cope with it, and to quote the Rowlatt Report, which he threw over in 1921, in justification of his action. Time brings its revenges.

In the same spirit were the resolutions carried in the Legislative Assembly in its first and second sessions that one-fourth of the posts in the superior Civil Service be *at once* reserved for members of the lower services, and that one-fourth of the commissions in the Army be reserved for Indians. In vain was it pointed out that sufficient men with the necessary qualifications to fill those posts would not be forthcoming for a long time.

The attitude of "sane and moderate citizens" towards the repression of disorders, which increased alarmingly as authority was sapped, is shown in the resolution moved by the Rt. Hon.

Mr. Sastri that fire-arms should not be used on such occasions by the police or the military for *one hour* after the reading of a proclamation (similar to the English Riot Act) unless *in the meantime* the rioters caused serious damage to life or property.

One wonders how much of life and property would be left to-day in Delhi, Lucknow, Mooltan, Amritsar, Kohat, Allahabad, Shahjahanpur, and the scores of other places where troops have recently been called out to prevent wholesale murder, sacrilege, and plunder by fanatical mobs, if this resolution from the leader of the "Moderates" had been accepted.

The proceedings of the provincial Councils were, if possible, even more irresponsible. The new Ministers, who under the Diarchy were to be the bridge between the Government and the people, were mainly lawyers or journalists of the "Left" with little knowledge of administration, or of the practical needs of the masses; with little backing outside the petty political cliques, and either unable or unwilling to assist the Government in the increasingly difficult task of maintaining public order. In the Punjab, which for years has been the storm centre of India, one of the new Ministers was a man who had been sentenced to transportation for life for his share in the 1919 rebellion, but had been amnestied after a few months, although his appeal to the Privy Council was pending and was later withdrawn. It would be too much to expect that a man of such antecedents could help the Government in enforcing the law. Among the Ministers there was scarcely a single representative of the rural classes, or a single man who had rendered any notable service in the war.

The first acts of the Punjab Council were to cut down the police budget, to throw out the provision for the Publicity Department, established to counteract seditious and Bolshevik propaganda, to remit the fine of £120,000 imposed on Amritsar to compensate the relatives of the five murdered Europeans, and the English banks which had been looted by the murderers. The result was to make the tax-payers of an innocent and loyal province pay for the crimes of a guilty city.

Other provincial Councils took the same line, showing

especial hostility to the police force and to the British services, while the authorities, instead of making use of the powers still vested in them, sheltered themselves, as a rule, behind Mr. Montagu's instructions and meekly acquiesced. The forces of disorder steadily gained ground, the patient masses suffered, the politicians exulted, *Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi*.

Lord Reading succeeded Lord Chelmsford as Viceroy in April, 1921. He was quite new to India, but had a reputation as a brilliant lawyer and a skilful negotiator. He at once, like his predecessor, entered into personal negotiations with Gandhi, and with equally disastrous results. The interviews only strengthened still more Gandhi's position. The object of the negotiations was, through Gandhi's influence, to induce the Ali brothers, against whom a prosecution was pending, to give up the seditious agitation they had carried on since their ill-timed release by Mr. Montagu in 1919—an agitation which had brought on the Moplah rebellion. The Ali brothers, doubtless with their tongues in their cheeks, in order to escape prosecution, made a half-hearted apology "for the unnecessary heat of some of the passages of their speeches, which were never intended to incite to violence"! The prosecution was withdrawn. The true position is described in a letter of Mr. Gandhi to the Press a few weeks later. He wrote:

"The Ali brothers, like me, continue wilfully to break the law of sedition and to court arrest. Sooner or later, and that during this year if we can carry the country with us, we must bring about a situation when the Government must arrest us or grant the people's demands."

The Ali brothers lost no time in doing what Mr. Gandhi predicted. Their incitement to violence and rebellion became so outrageous that the Bombay Government in September, 1921—the Moplah rebellion had broken out in August—ordered their prosecution for inciting the Indian Army to mutiny. This at once drew from Mr. Gandhi the following statement in his paper, *Young India*:

"The National Congress began to tamper with the loyalty of the Indian Army in September last year (1920); the

Central Khilafat Committee (of which the Ali brothers were the most prominent members) began it earlier, and I began it earlier still. Every non-co-operator is pledged to create disaffection towards the Government. Non-co-operation deliberately aims at the overthrow of Government, and is therefore legally seditious. Lord Chelmsford knew it. Lord Reading knows it. . . . We must spread disaffection openly and systematically until it pleases the Government to arrest us."

This is a perfectly frank description of what had been going on for years, under the eyes of the authorities in India, with the disastrous results that are still showing themselves. But what can one think of those responsible whose only policy was to let this movement "kill itself, as in time it does"—to quote Lord Sinha in July, 1920, or to "die of its own intrinsic inanity" in the words of Lord Chelmsford in November, 1920.

The Ali brothers who, to quote the report presented to Parliament for 1921, "openly gloried in their hatred of the British Government," were convicted and sentenced to a few years' imprisonment, from which they have recently emerged. In March, 1922, by a curious coincidence, on the same day Mr. Montagu was compelled to resign his post as Secretary of State—for his indiscreet action in regard to the Khilafat agitation which he had done much to encourage—and Gandhi was arrested and brought to trial for sedition. He made no attempt to defend himself. At his trial he said, "I knew the consequences of my acts. I knew that I was playing with fire, and if I was set free I would still do the same."

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment, but after two years was released *unconditionally* for reasons of health. Those who released him have given him the opportunity of working to subvert British rule as he said he would.

But his spell, as a superhuman being of whom the great British Government stood in deadly fear, was broken when the Mahatma was found to be amenable to the law. So far from the general disturbance that a weak Government had made the excuse for its inaction, not a dog barked! All reasonable

Indians welcomed the tardy assertion of authority. Maharaja Sir P. C. Tagore, a distinguished Bengali, said publicly on 31st March, 1922, of Gandhi's arrest :

"If the Government had taken this step earlier, then, perhaps, a good deal of mischief would have been avoided, the thousands of ignorant or impulsive men who have been misled or duped by Gandhi would have been spared untold sufferings, and the country would have been saved from much bloodshed and wanton destruction of life and property."

Speaking at the same time of Mr. Montagu's enforced retirement, he said :

"The *only thing* [*sic*] that can be urged against him is that he adhered too long to the policy of non-interference with the apostles of sedition, who misunderstood his forbearance as a sign of weakness and proceeded from one excess to another."

Sir D. Wacha, one of the Bombay political leaders, put the case with equal force and truth. He said :

"Mr. Montagu has made the mistake of thinking that disturbing the placid contentment of the masses was an essential preliminary for their moral and material progress. . . . We may tell Mr. Montagu that the disturbance he created is being assiduously exploited by the enemies of British rule. *Of course he did not bargain for this result, but that is generally the fate of doctrinaire politicians.*"

These extracts show what "sane and moderate" Indians thought of the policy that Mr. Montagu had imposed on the Governments of Lord Chelmsford and Lord Reading.

But Mr. Montagu was only a single member of the Coalition Cabinet, all the members of which were equally responsible for the policy. One marvels, therefore, how with our free Press and vigilant Parliament such a policy could have been persisted in till our Indian Empire was almost lost.

The explanation is that though Parliament is responsible under the Reforms Act "for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples," in the two years 1920 and 1921 no opportunity was given for a general discussion of the critical state of

affairs in India. Mr. Montagu's speech in the Dyer debate, on 8th July, 1920, had created such profound alarm among many members, that on 14th July Colonel Gretton asked for a day to discuss Indian administration in general and Mr. Montagu's policy in particular. The request was refused. There were three sessions of Parliament in 1921, but in none of them was any opportunity given for a discussion on Indian policy, though Sir William Joynson-Hicks strongly pressed for a day. That is how the Coalition Government discharged its responsibility, while the foundations of British rule in India were being sapped under its eyes. Mr. Lloyd George was preoccupied with the affairs of Europe, and had not then given his attention to India; but one would have expected that the former Viceroy and Secretary of State for India in the Cabinet would have protested against the latitude allowed to Mr. Montagu in carrying out his wrecking policy.

The Press, with a few notable exceptions—the *Morning Post* throughout, and later on the *Daily Telegraph*—showed similar ignorance or apathy. It was evidently led to believe that all was going well in India and the less comment from home the better. The position was heart-breaking to those of us who had given the best years of our lives to the service of India, who saw the interests of the masses being steadily ruined, and all that we had worked for being turned to dust and ashes.

In February, 1921, I endeavoured to describe the "Growing Anarchy in India" in an article in the *Fortnightly Review*, which attracted some attention. A few days later, the *Times*, in an article on "The New Era in India," wrote of the inauguration of the Montagu-Chelmsford Scheme:

"The period of preparation for this great and unexampled experiment has not been marked by expressions of unqualified confidence on the part of Britons whose minds still linger in the nineteenth century. We prefer to believe that the best public men of India's millions will make the most of the opportunities now opening out before them, and that the trust reposed in the preponderating mass of moderate public opinion in India will not be misplaced.

We do not share the dark forebodings and predictions of

bureaucrats in retirement with whom the world has stood still. We have been hearing a great deal of the darker side of Indian politics and not enough of the more hopeful aspects. . . .

We trust that the grave danger points are passed, and that Indian politics will now move into calmer waters."

This is typical of the easy-going optimism in which the British public loves to wrap itself. It took another year for the *Times* to realise the truth.

The "bureaucrats in retirement" would have rejoiced if their "dark forebodings" had proved to be incorrect. Within a year from the opening of the new constitution, the growing paralysis of British rule, the insults to the Heir to the Throne on his visit to India, the increasing defiance of authority, and the failure of the new Ministers and Councils of the Reforms Scheme could no longer be camouflaged. Mr. Perceval Landon, a most acute and impartial observer, after several months' study of the situation on the spot, summed it up as follows (*Daily Telegraph*, 13th March, 1922) :

"As to the real success or failure of the Reforms, there can be but little discussion among those who know India. *Let us be honest.* They (the Reforms) have exalted the very men who are least qualified to act as the saviours of their country at this crisis. They have encouraged mere talk. Not one man of real capacity has been disclosed in any of the new Councils. Of any sage foresight or sense of responsibility, commensurate with the great trust reposed in the new chambers, there has been an equal lack. . . . There is in their composition and their work little to suggest even the faintest hope in that inevitable day when the rebels of India will flood the Council Chambers of India."

The truth of the description—at that early stage—of the working of the 1921 Councils is remarkable; but still more remarkable is the accurate forecast of the character of the Councils of 1924. As Mr. Landon anticipated, a decision was come to by a section of Gandhi's party, headed by Mr. C. R. Das and Mr. M. L. Nehru—both convicted of political offences—to enter the Councils with the avowed object of wrecking them and bringing the administration to a standstill.



This *sabotage* is even more difficult to deal with than "open rebellion." Meantime Gandhi, since his release, with the remnant of his followers, has been pursuing the same object outside the Councils by the methods of "non-violent non-co-operation." The "rebels of India" have indeed flooded the Council Chambers of India, and the "moderate political opinion" of the *Times*, the "sane and moderate citizens" in whom a former Viceroy placed such confidence, have neither the will nor the courage openly to oppose their nefarious designs. In fact, in the Councils and outside it, they attempt to court popularity by denouncing the British Government and its British servants as violently as the avowed extremists, while at the same time, *vis-à-vis* the British Press and public, they adopt the self-righteous pose of men loyally striving to work the reforms.

Mr. Das is reported by the Calcutta correspondent of the *Times* (1st November, 1924) as having said in the Calcutta Corporation, of which he is president, that "If he thought he could lead it to success he would join the Revolutionary Party to-morrow, but he believed it would not succeed, therefore he would not join it."

Mr. Das's candour must be disconcerting to his friends and admirers in this country.

It is now self-evident that the main agency to give effect to an almost unworkable constitutional system, while at the same time striving to maintain the essentials of good government, must be the British members of the services. But the All-India Assembly and the provincial Councils make no secret of their desire to get rid of that British element as speedily as possible. Muhamed Ali announced that the object of non-co-operation was "to drive out from India the British thieves by the same aperture they had entered as thieves." Even the Rt. Hon. S. S. Sastri—a "moderate" leader from whom better things might have been expected, on 28th February, 1923, in the Council of State, said that the British members of the service were there "on sufferance," and that, if their exclusion from certain posts on the ground that they were British was regarded as a humiliation, he would desire to see that humiliation a hundred times repeated. None of the three Indian members of the

Government present, all, by the way, lawyers, had the courage to say a word for the services which have rescued India from anarchy. Indeed, one of them, Sir T. B. Sapro, later publicly expressed his agreement with Mr. Sastri's views.

The same short-sighted and reckless spirit of racial antipathy, which is confined to the ambitious politicians and is entirely foreign to the nature of the Indian peoples, has led the All-India assembly and some of the provincial legislatures to throw out the budgets in two successive years, to refuse to vote the salaries of Ministers in two Provinces—Bengal and Central Provinces—thereby bringing the Reforms Scheme to a deadlock, and even (in the case of the Central Provinces) to reject a resolution making the wells and reservoirs constructed at the public expense, available to the "depressed" classes. This is their conception of democracy. This same Council was the first to demand the closing down of British recruitment for the services.

The climax was reached when, in September, 1924, the All-India Assembly rejected by a large majority the proposals of Lord Lee's Commission, half the members of which were Indian gentlemen, to improve the conditions of certain services so as to attract British recruits, the supply of which since the vaunted Reforms Scheme has almost entirely dried up. Some of the members, on whose loyal co-operation and sense of responsibility the Reforms Scheme was expressly based, had the audacity to say that if British recruits were not forthcoming they could obtain the services of Americans or Germans. This was at the time when, owing mainly to the depletion of the British officials and the consequent weakening of authority, communal riots were converting many of the chief cities of Northern India into a shambles, and the unfortunate sufferers were clamouring for impartial British magistrates and police officers to protect them and bring those disturbing the peace to justice.

All this was foreseen and repeatedly pointed out to those in authority when the Reforms Scheme was taking shape. But those who pointed it out were regarded as reactionaries, and their plain speaking only brought on them official disfavour.

Some were "stellenbosched," others left the service prematurely. Unfortunately there were others who might have spoken with authority and experience, but they shut their eyes at the time to the inevitable results, and blindly supported the Diarchy and other proposals which have wrecked the success of the Reforms. For a long time they continued to assert with pathetic insistence that all was going well, that the follies and excesses of the politicians installed in power were but the birth pangs of a "nation in the making." The nation is further off than ever to-day, when all the latent divisions of race, creed, and caste have, owing to the weakening of British authority, reasserted themselves with redoubled violence.

An Indian writer in a Calcutta paper (quoted in the *Daily Telegraph* of 22nd September) puts the case with admirable terseness :

"It is only the fear of a superior power that can ever stop the hatred of one community for the other. That fear has been removed in consequence of the efforts of the British Government to devolve responsibility upon others. There is nothing now to prevent us cutting one another's throats as we used to do before British supremacy established itself in India."

What a comment on the abdication, even though temporary, of those responsible "for the welfare and contentment of the Indian peoples."

Those who assisted in that abdication, being now driven to their last line of defence, feebly plead that the Reforms were after all only an experiment and that their hopes of success were based on the expectation of co-operation from Indian politicians which unfortunately (they say) has not been forthcoming. This is an ignoble argument. It has been well answered in a letter to the *Times* of 18th September, 1924, from Sir Bampfylde Fuller, formerly Lieutenant-Governor of Eastern Bengal, and one of the ablest members of the Civil Service in the present generation. He writes :

"It is difficult to sympathise with those who would excuse their past support of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms by

the plea that they expected good-will on the part of Indians (politicians?) in working this hybrid constitution. For this expectation could only be entertained in ignorance of human nature; and this in politics is the worst ignorance of all. Diarchy has proved itself to be as great a mistake as the disestablishment of Eastern Bengal; and it shows no malignance of feeling to regret that the politicians who have involved the Indian Empire in such difficulties should escape not merely unpunished but uncensured."

## CHAPTER XXI

### IS INDIA A "LOST DOMINION"?

**I**N the foregoing chapters I have endeavoured to describe India as I saw it and knew it both before and after the Reforms—India unreformed and India reformed. I should like to stop here. But public attention has recently been attracted to India by the failure of the high hopes based on the Reforms. The anonymous writer of *The Lost Dominion*, published in 1924, has depicted with brilliant insight and, on the whole, with remarkable accuracy, the various stages in the decline and fall, as he regards it, of the greatest achievement of the British race. I have been frequently asked whether I agree with his conclusion that India is "a lost Dominion." I certainly do not. But I am equally certain that if we continue the fatal policy of the last five years it soon will be. To quote what Demosthenes said to the Athenians—"The Gods alone preserve our Empire ; for we on our part are doing all we can to destroy it."

The facts related in the chapters immediately preceding have, I trust, helped to establish this conclusion. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the pitiful story. Weakness and irresolution in high places ; wrong diagnosis of the situation ; the grant of wide political power to those who were not representatives of the people and who soon proved themselves to be lacking either in the will or the capacity to make good use of it ; the shameful desertion of friends and the ignominious capitulation to enemies ; the series of ineffectual compromises when a firm, consistent policy was demanded ; the lamentable vacillations in facing open sedition or veiled rebellion ; the long series of blunders which encouraged

our enemies, caused despair to our friends, and hopelessly bewildered the great mass of "neutrals" who looked, as of yore, to their Government for guidance and support—and looked in vain.

*Indian Conditions Unfavourable to Democracy*

But in spite of our efforts to lose it, the Dominion is not yet lost. Nor need it be provided we make up our minds to discharge our responsibility—to do what we have promised the peoples of India to do, and what they look to us to do. That responsibility was once defined by John Lawrence, the great Governor of the Punjab and great Viceroy, with characteristic force and clearness:

"We are here (he wrote) by our own moral superiority, by the force of circumstances and the will of Providence. These alone constitute our charter of government, and in doing the best we can for the people we are bound by our conscience and not theirs."

That statement of policy would doubtless to-day be repudiated by the small class of Westernised Indian politicians nourished on the exotic fruits of "self-determination" and for the moment hypnotised by the catchwords of a democracy which they neither understand nor desire. But it would, I am convinced, be welcomed by many other classes in India who realise that in it lies the inspiration of that great work of pacification, civilisation, and ordered progress which in the past characterised our rule in India. It was that conception of our duty which made us abolish *Sati*, suppress human sacrifice, slavery and female infanticide, alleviate some of the worst features of the social system, e.g. child marriage, and of caste-tyranny, though these evils were then condoned or approved by Indian opinion. We abandoned that policy to follow the will-o'-the-wisp of "self-determination" which has now led us, and not only in India, into the bog of despond. Can anyone seriously argue to-day that any class in India is more contented or more prosperous as a result of the Reforms? The Indian masses are not, for,

they are suffering from the rapid deterioration of the administration. The Indian politicians certainly are not, though it was to satisfy them that we sacrificed the interests of all other classes to a rash and crude political experiment. Of all other classes it may be said generally that they find no ground for satisfaction in the Reforms *as worked*; they deplore our weakness and are bewildered at our folly.

The unpardonable mistake made by *our* politicians was to assume that the demands of the small politically-minded class (one or two millions, according to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's liberal estimate, out of 320 millions), echoing for the moment Western democratic formulæ, represented the views of the remaining 318 millions. Those still passionately adhere to their traditional ideals based on divisions of caste, race, and religion—all absolutely incompatible with the root principles of democracy. More than that, they are quick to resent any action by their Government to interfere with this traditional and stereotyped system. Even such crying social reform as the abolition of *Sati* (ninety years ago) and the raising of the age of consent to twelve years some twenty years ago, met with the strongest opposition from orthodox and, in the latter case, politically-advanced Hindus such as Tilak.

### *The Tyranny of Caste*

To-day the politicians who are so studious to conceal the wide gulf between their extreme political pretensions and their appallingly backward social organisation, especially where women and the lower castes are concerned, now and again make a pretence of releasing their women from thralldom, and of loosening the fetters which chain the 50 millions of the depressed classes in a state worse than that of the brute beasts, whose touch at least is not regarded as pollution.

But the attempts of the social reformers to give effect to their views, especially in Southern India, have been resisted with open violence by the orthodox Hindus, ready to sacrifice their own or others' lives, rather than their caste privileges. The Indian politician, even when his

motives are genuine, will effect but little by his spectacular methods and he knows it. The amelioration in the lot of the out-castes has come and is coming, slowly but surely, from other sources. Primarily from the principles of British justice based on the equality of all men before the law; next, from the influence of the British official, who, recognising the out-caste as a fellow man, will allow him to enter his Court and will personally receive his petition, while his Brahmin clerk would spurn the poor wretch from his presence or at the most condescend to receive the petition through an intermediary; and finally from the noble efforts of Christian missionaries of all denominations who have done and are doing so much to raise morally and materially these victims of a cruel social system.

Thus encouraged, the out-castes are beginning to look on themselves as entitled to certain elementary rights; they are beginning to demand, not often with success, free access to public institutions, public roads, reservoirs, etc., from which they have been hitherto debarred. But their stoutest opponents are generally the Brahmins and other literary castes who are the loudest in their demands for "democratic" institutions, and whose claims to represent the Indian "masses" are so readily swallowed by politicians and publicists here. The low-caste or out-caste Indians, numbering between them at least 120 millions, know that if British rule were removed their chains would be riveted more firmly than ever by their Brahmin masters. Hence the significant and pathetic episode at the Prince of Wales's entry to Delhi in 1921, when a deputation of hundreds of these hapless classes barred his way and begged him not to withdraw from them the protection of British rule.

But for the ordinary English politician these poor people have no existence—least of all for those members of the Socialist Party who have allied themselves with the Indian politicians of the privileged classes (chiefly Brahmins) and support their cry for Indian democracy or Indian Home Rule. Only those who can make a noise in the familiar political jargon of the West are thought worthy of a hearing. Realising this, in a Memorandum on the Reforms which I submitted to



Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford on 10th January, 1918, I quoted at the beginning Burke's famous simile :

"Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their importunate cries, while thousands of great cattle, reposed beneath the shadow of the British oak, chew their cud and are silent, pray do not imagine that those who make the noise are the only inhabitants of the field."

The quotation was, I think, apt ; but in the case *O'Dwyer v. Nair* it was made the basis of an allegation that I had compared the Indian politicians to grasshoppers ! It might with equal force be argued that I had compared the rest of the Indian peoples to cattle.

After discussing and adversely criticising the main features of their scheme, which ignored the silent hundreds of millions, I ended with the following appeal :

"Throughout, we have to keep before us the solid interests of the masses of the people. *They have not spoken yet.* Till they are in a position to speak, that is, after they have acquired such a modicum of political intelligence as will enable them to understand the broad issues, and till they know what *they* want and by what measures they propose to get it, *we* are not, in my humble opinion, entitled to commit ourselves to far-reaching and irrevocable political changes in order to silence the clamour of the advanced politicians. Of these some are out for their own personal interests, others desire to make British rule impossible, while those, and they are not a few, whose aims are honest and loyal are still lacking in political experience, in the sense of responsibility and in the right to speak for the masses."

The only result of these warnings was to cause me to be regarded by those then in authority as "hostile to Indian aspirations."

### *Racial and Sectarian Hatreds*

More than a year after I had written the Memorandum, when the papers were being prepared for submission to Parliament, I was pressed to withdraw it, probably because its publication might hurt the feelings of sensitive Indian

politicians, whom the India Office was so anxious to conciliate. I refused, and I am glad that I did—if only because my plea on behalf of the Indian masses remains on record.

But in the same Memorandum I pointed out what would be the inevitable result of the British Government abdicating its responsibilities, as proposed by the authors of the Diarchy. I wrote :

"The special quality which the Indian peoples admire in our Government is the skill with which we have induced diverse, and often hostile, races, castes, and creeds to sink their differences. . . . *Have we any guarantee that, as the British Government abdicates certain functions, the old struggles between Hindu and Mohammedan, Brahmin and non-Brahmin, Mahratta and Rajput, Sikh and Pathan, for general or local ascendancy, will not in one form or another be renewed ?*"

The old struggles, racial and religious, have been renewed more speedily and fiercely than any of us anticipated. A score of cities in India, from Kohat to Calcutta, have within the last year run red with bloodshed in sectarian strife. Only the presence of the British soldier and the British magistrate and police officer has stopped or arrested wholesale slaughter. Hundreds of lives have been lost, the destruction of property in Kohat alone is estimated at half a million sterling, the thousands of Hindu inhabitants have abandoned the town *en masse* and are still in exile in the Punjab. It is significant that wherever these outbreaks occur both parties turn at once to the British officials—now much reduced—for protection or justice, repudiating their own so-called leaders. These are, as a rule, conveniently absent when the trouble, which their violent agitation has stimulated, breaks out. But when the crisis is over, they reappear to demand an unofficial enquiry into the "repressive" measures used to restore order, or to denounce the Government for failure of its duty in allowing such outbreaks to occur, or to accuse the British officials of having secretly instigated them ! Whatever line is taken it is made to support the demand for "Home Rule" or "provincial autonomy" or "full independence," according

to the views of the speaker. Could there be a more pitiful exhibition of the incapacity, the irresponsibility, and the intellectual dishonesty of many of those who arrogantly demand that we should entrust to them the governance of 320 millions of people?

But in spite of Gandhi's twenty-one days' fast and the platitudinous resolutions of the recent "Unity" Conference at Delhi, the racial and religious hatreds remain and will continue to manifest themselves; for the seeds are sown deep in Indian soil and our weak policy has allowed them to germinate.

This failure to act in time and with decision is one of the grounds on which the author of *The Lost Dominion* bases his pessimistic conclusion.

### *The Indian Fighting Races—The Men that Count*

He begins his preface with the ominous words:

"Many are the lost possessions of England. From some she has been driven in battle; others she has abandoned through negligence; others she has surrendered as useless and noxious; some have been bartered. The case of India is, up to the present, the first and only example of the abandonment of a valuable possession on moral grounds."

Leaving aside surrender and barter as out of the question, we might still lose India: (1) by defeat in battle, or (2) by negligently abandoning it, or (3) by abandoning it on so-called moral grounds.

It can, I think, be shown that if we remain true to ourselves and our trust we need have no fear of (1), and that the relinquishment of our responsibility contemplated in (2) and (3) would be, in the words of Mr. Lloyd George, when Prime Minister, "the greatest betrayal in history."

The possibility of being driven out of India by force may be briefly examined.

I have spent most of my life in close association with the fighting races which have either in the past exercised dominion on a large scale in India or could reasonably aspire

to it in the future. I will consider them in order, beginning from the north-west.

First comes the Pathan of Afghanistan, of the tribal areas and of the North-West Frontier; by nature warlike and aggressive; a curious compound of frankness and greed, force and cunning; ever with an eye on the rich plains of Northern India which his ancestors so often raided and even ruled for centuries from Imperial Delhi. India in disorder would be his opportunity, as shown by the treacherous Afghan and tribal attacks in the 1919 disturbances. But he is to some extent held back by the knowledge that the memory of Afghan rule is still loathed over Northern India, and that even if the British were to leave, he would find in the Punjabi Mohammedan and the Sikh better fighting men than himself. He is the only external enemy to be feared, if we exclude the sinister figure of Bolshevik Russia behind him, secretly intriguing and conspiring from Moscow and Berlin, as the recent Cawnpore conspiracy case proves, with the hidden revolutionary forces in India. The Afghan by himself is a danger; backed by the Bolshevik he is a serious menace.

Next in order comes the Mohammedan of the North Punjab, to my mind the most loyal and gallant race in our Indian Empire; brave and steadfast, more than a match for the Pathan in the field, and a man whose word and sense of honour can be relied on; strictly orthodox but free from fanaticism; in every way an effective buffer against the aggressive Pathan, with whom he would only combine in the last resort, as he will in confidence admit, if that were the only means of avoiding Hindu domination. That possibility cannot, however, be dismissed. The Hindu-Muslim relations were never so strained as in the Punjab of to-day.

Proceeding south, we next meet the Sikh of the Central Punjab and the Sikh Native States; a man true to type, in valour second to none and with splendid military traditions; virile and enterprising, but often of overweening conceit, and unless firmly and tactfully handled, obstinate to the point of fanaticism. By his combination of vanity and religious feeling he is easily made, as shown in the case of the Akalis,

the dupe of more designing men, who antagonise him with the British Government for their own ends, by alleging that his religion is being attacked and thus encouraging him to fight for the restoration of the Sikh kingdom or commonwealth. For the last three years a section of the Sikhs, who had been one of our greatest assets in the War, have been the most serious menace to the peace of the Punjab. But they are at last being firmly handled, and the sturdy common-sense of the majority of the Sikhs is reasserting itself under a local government that is now showing strength and judgment. The Sikh ebullition was due to the uneasy feeling that, being in India a small minority of only 1 per cent, his national existence was threatened by the Reforms, which base political power on a mechanical enumeration of votes or skulls, regardless of history, tradition, and the power of the strong right-arm. The wilder spirits easily fell into the toils of the down-country extremists, who saw in this sturdy soldier-race a weapon for furthering their own nefarious designs. But you cannot fool people for ever. The Sikh, though slow-witted, has natural shrewdness as well as a proud tradition of comradeship in arms with the British. Once he is reassured, as he is now being, that the British Government has no designs on his religion, of which indeed it has through the agency of the Indian Army been the chief mainstay, and that it will see that his nationality is not submerged by an artificial constitutional system, he will gladly return to his natural allegiance. To put it on the lowest ground, that is the only wise course open to him; for, even with the Sikh States thrown in, he could make no long stand against the equally martial and numerically stronger races by whom he is hemmed in and who are being steadily antagonised by the pretensions and lawless excesses of the Akali Sikhs.

Coming further south, we meet the Hindu Jat (with his congeners the Ahir and Gujar) of the South-East Punjab and the United Provinces; in many ways similar to his Sikh cousin; like him, equally at home with the sword and the spade, the rifle and the ploughshare; a brave and steady soldier, but without the élan, which probably springs from

the traditions of former rule, or the self-assertiveness of the Sikh. But like the Sikh he can be easily roused to antagonism with his Mussulman neighbours by appeals to his religious feeling, especially in the matter of kine-killing; and sometimes this feeling, in a race otherwise careless of religious observances, is played upon by the Hindu reformers in furtherance of their anti-Muslim policy. The latent hatred of the Mohammedan showed itself in the eagerness with which the Jats came forward to fight the Turks. The Punjab Mohammedans went to fight in Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Egypt in a spirit of loyal duty; the Sikhs for sheer love of fighting, as summed up in Skobelev's saying: "What does it matter whom you fight against, the thing is the fight"—the spirit in which the Southern Irish came forward in the first years of the War; but the Hindu Jats rallied against their hereditary enemy as if to a crusade. The Jats, as a body, never fought against us and have never shown any inclination to do so, or to aspire to wide dominion.

Next comes the Rajputs, nearly all Hindus, and much divided socially and geographically. They lie partly in the Punjab hills from Kashmir to the Ganges, partly in the South-East Punjab and United Provinces, and hold also as rulers nearly all the great Native States of Rajputana, Kathiawar, as well as a considerable number in Central India. But in those States only a fraction of the people are Rajputs. The Rajputs represent the class which ruled almost exclusively in Aryan India before the advent of the various Muslim conquering races, Afghan, Moghul, and Persian. They are imbued with the traditions of a fighting and ruling caste; but except for a section in Oudh, which, owing to our injudicious interference with their traditional rights, took up arms against us in the Mutiny of 1857, they have been noted for their steady loyalty to British rule. They do not forget that it saved them from being swallowed up by younger and more virile races, the Mahrattas, Jats, and others, over a century ago, and their tradition is to serve loyally any strong power, whether Moghul or British, that respects their customs and protects their rights. Innately conservative, they stand for the old order, a picturesque survival of mediæval chivalry and primeval

superstition. In their hearts they regard the democratic trend of our policy with intense suspicion and alarm ; but their loyalty to the British Throne has hitherto prevented them from openly expressing their feelings. They are too divided by internal jealousies, as their past history shows, to combine even for self-protection, much less for aggression. In the cataclysm that would follow the serious weakening or disappearance of British rule, they would fight to the last like gentlemen ; but being much split up, they would be unable to hold out for long against their more virile neighbours.

Of these, the most powerful are the Mahrattas, who, as shown in Chapter IX, made a bold bid in the eighteenth century for the dominion of India when to the Moghul Emperors it had become "The Lost Dominion." Their ancestral home is in the British districts of Bombay, among which the great Sivaji's descendant still rules as Maharaja of Kohlapur. But the descendants of the Mahratta conquerors, Scindia, the Gaikwar, Holkar, and others, are now among our most powerful feudatories, and rule in Western and Central India nearly ten millions of people, among whom, however, there are but few Mahrattas. The Mahratta race consists of only some four or five millions of people and is a small minority like the Sikhs ; like them, it has martial qualities and the traditions of conquest and rule. These would soon be stimulated into action if British power were seriously shaken. But a Mahratta Confederacy is even more difficult now than a century ago, for there is now no Brahmin Peishwa of Poona to lead it—the Nana Sahib tried to do this in the 1857 Mutiny but failed—and the jealousies between the Mahratta States *inter se*, and between the Mahratta race, which is comparatively low in the Hindu social scale, and the Mahratta Brahmin with his overweening pretensions, are so marked as to render any combination most improbable, if not impossible. One or other of the great Mahratta Princes might extend his dominions among the docile unmartial races in Central or Southern India, though even there the Rajputs would contest his supremacy ; but the Mahrattas could not successfully challenge the martial races of the North. That was proved when they

met the Afghan invaders under Ahmad Shah at Panipat, near Delhi, in 1761, but were overwhelmed; and the Afghans are inferior in fighting qualities to the Punjabi Moham-medan, the Sikh, the Jat, and the hill Rajput (Dogra).

### *The Non-Fighting Races and Provinces*

I have run through the races that count, the races that can fight, for in the East the will with the power to fight is still the *ultima ratio regum*. Just as in unwarlike China since the fall of the Manchu Empire, sovereignty, general or local, follows the master of the big battalions and changes hands as the legions pass from one Tuchun to another, so in India, which has always been the prey of the strong man from without or within, the continued weakening of British power, which has in the last five years been steadily sapped, would be the signal for those martial races and perhaps others to make a bid for local or general dominion. In a few years India would be again the cockpit of Asia, as it was in the eighteenth century when we began to rescue it from anarchy, and as China is to-day.

But fortunately for us and for India none of those martial races, except perhaps the trans-border Afghans and the dwindling section of malcontent Sikhs, desires to see us go, or is in a position to take any action to drive us out. On the contrary, they desire us to stay, either because they are actively loyal to our rule, or because they dread the universal anarchy that would follow our withdrawal, ending probably in a ruthless tyranny. To put the matter on the lowest ground, their mutual racial and sectarian divisions would make any combination against us outside practical politics, *while we show we are still fit to govern*. That is the test which they apply, and their confidence in our ability to govern is being rapidly shaken. For in the Reforms Scheme and in our policy for the last five years we have in practice disregarded the men who have fought and *can fight* and considered only the men who *talk*.

In the above summary I have omitted the races and classes



who are politically the most advanced. It is from the English educated *litterati* of those unmartial classes (Brahmins, Kayasths, Baniyas, etc.) that are drawn the politically-minded Indians who dominate the Press, the platform, and the legislature in India, and who, as a result of the Diarchy, control over one-half of the field of administration. Of them as a class it may be said that they are mentally subtle, the majority being either lawyers or journalists, intellectually arrogant from their monopoly of high education, essentially urban in outlook, and, being imbued with the traditions of caste and privileges, out of touch with and rather contemptuous of the masses, skilled in dialectics and destructive criticism, and though self-confident and ambitious, lacking in the constructive capacity, strength of character, and the breadth of view essential in an administrator and a statesman; above all, jealous of the British official because he by character and training possesses qualities as a practical administrator which they generally lack, and which win for him the confidence of the masses which is denied to them. These defects may no doubt be corrected by time and experience, and there are even now brilliant exceptions. But whatever mental qualities they may now possess or hereafter develop, when it comes to physical force, on which all political power ultimately rests, they are a negligible quantity, and would be at once brushed aside by the fighting races if our military support were withdrawn.

To establish this argument it is only necessary to quote the official figures showing from what classes the 680,000 fighting-men raised in India during the Great War were drawn. I give round figures :

	Number.	Per-centage.
Pathans (British India and trans-border) . . . . .	28,000	4
Punjab Mohammedans . . . . .	170,000	25
Sikhs . . . . .	89,000	13
Jats and allied tribes (Ahirs, Gujars) . . . . .	96,000	14
Rajputs, Mers, and Dogras . . . . .	96,000	14
Mahrattas . . . . .	26,000	4
<i>Total of main Fighting Races</i> . . . . .	505,000	74

	Number.	Per-centage.
Bengalis . . . . .	6,000	1
Indian Christians . . . . .	10,000	1.5
Other Mohammedans . . . . .	40,000	6
Madras Tamils . . . . .	16,000	2
„ Telugus . . . . .	7,000	1
Brahmins . . . . .	28,000	4
All others . . . . .	68,000	10
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<i>Total of other Races</i> . . . . .	175,000	26
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Grand Total . . . . .	680,000	100

Thus the five main fighting classes, representing only one-tenth of the population, furnished about three-fourths of the combatant recruits. The remaining nine-tenths, in spite of every incentive during the four years of War, raised only one-fourth.

A comparison by provinces (including the Native States included in them) is equally instructive as bearing on the claim for Dominion Home Rule or full provincial autonomy, which postulates the will and the power of self-defence :

	Population.	Number of Recruits.
North-West Frontier . . . . .	3 millions.	32,000
Punjab . . . . .	24 „	350,000
United Provinces . . . . .	46 „	142,000
Bombay . . . . .	27 „	35,000
Bengal . . . . .	48 „	6,000
Bihar and Orissa . . . . .	38 „	8,000
Madras . . . . .	48 „	46,000
Central Provinces . . . . .	16 „	5,000
Assam . . . . .	8 „	1,000
Burma . . . . .	13 „	13,000
Ajmir . . . . .	$\frac{1}{2}$ „	8,000
Native States under Government of India . . . . .	45 „	80,000

The three great provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Central Provinces, with a population of over 100 millions, furnished between them under twenty thousand fighting men, less than many single districts of the Punjab did from a population of only half a million.

The contributions of Bombay, Madras, and Burma also show that, outside a few fighting races, these provinces are equally incapable of raising the man-power necessary for their defence. If fighting qualities be taken into account this incapacity will be even more marked. The province which, if some of its political "leaders" are to be believed, is qualified for either complete separation or Dominion Home Rule is Bengal. Assume that either of these demands were granted. On what force could it rely to maintain internal order or repel external aggression? On the British Navy and the British troops in India? Those *ex hypothesi* are to be withdrawn, for it is unthinkable that they should stay on as mercenaries to bolster up the rule of Mr. Das and his adherents. On the Indian Army? But this contains practically no Bengalis, and how long would the Punjabi Mohammedans, Sikhs, Jats, Rajputs, and Mahrattas who compose it continue to serve masters whom in their hearts they despise as soft and unwarlike? On the newly-raised Bengali Territorial Forces? These are only a few thousand strong, and there is the greatest difficulty in adding to their number. Moreover, the experience in Mesopotamia of the single Bengali battalion that, after the most patriotic efforts of many distinguished Bengali gentlemen, was raised and sent to the Front in the Great War, shows that the military authorities did not venture to employ it outside the line of communication, and that their opinion was that the men would never be of any fighting value.

The fact may be a painful one, but it must be faced, that Bengal, the richest province in India, the most advanced politically, and proud of having in Calcutta, through which hundreds of millions of British capital are invested in Indian enterprises, the second city in the British Empire, would, if our protection were withdrawn, be both on its land and sea frontiers at the mercy of any small determined body of

invaders—Gurkhas, Sikhs, Mahrattas, Jats, or Pathans. What would then be the fate of Bengal's eloquent but short-sighted politicians? Kipling, in his humorous and spirited ballad "What Happened," nearly forty years ago described the march on Calcutta of the hardy adventurers from the North, whose opportunity would come when the Arms Act was repealed, as demanded by the Bengali leaders—Mookerji and others—in the first National Congress. The ballad ends :

"With a unanimity dear to patriot hearts,  
All those fiery gentlemen out of foreign parts  
Said : 'The good old days are back—let us go to war !'  
Swaggered down the Grand Trunk Road into Bow Bazar.

What became of Mookerji? Soothly, who can say?  
Yar Mahommed only grins in a nasty way.  
Jowar Singh is reticent, Chimbhu Singh is mute;  
But the belts of all of them simply bulge with loot.

What became of Mookerji? Ask Mahommed Yar,  
Prodding Siva's sacred bull down the Bow Bazar;  
Speak to placid Nubbee Baksh—question land and sea—  
Ask the Indian Congress men—only don't ask me !"

There is many a true word spoken in jest, and in 1925 we are much nearer to the situation Kipling so vividly describes, than when he wrote the above in the 'eighties. The pity is that Mookerji and his kind fail to see that they would be the first victims of the situation which they are striving to bring about. But myopia is extraordinarily prevalent in tropical India.

Bengal is an extreme case. But it is clear from the figures quoted that only the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, and the United Provinces, which between them provide nearly 80 per cent of the Indian Army (excluding Gurkhas from Nepal) in peace and in war, could, if left to their own resources, make any real effort to maintain internal security and defend themselves. But is it to be expected that under a scheme of Dominion Home Rule and full provincial autonomy, which is the demand of our Indian "Moderates," the Pathans of the Frontier, and the Moham-

medans, Sikhs, Jats, and Rajputs of the Punjab and the United Provinces and the Native States would consent for long to defend the Frontier and police India for a Hindu Swaraj Government controlled by the politicians, chiefly Brahmins, of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay? Each would speedily "cut the painter" and attempt to set up on its own, as the provinces of China are doing to-day. Indeed, as Sir John Maynard representing the Punjab Government and one of the most ardent champions of the Reforms, recently stated in the Reforms Enquiry, provincial autonomy would mean the division of India into warring States. But in India there would be a further line of cleavage within the seceding provinces, based on racial and religious differences. The Punjab which under a strong British rule has hitherto been the shield and the spearhead of India, contributing the flower of the Indian Army and over half its strength, would be the bone of contention between Mohammedan, Hindu, and Sikh. Then would come the opportunity for which the Afghan and Frontier tribes are waiting. They would come in either as the ally of the Punjab Mohammedans, or as the *tertius* (or *quartus*) *gaudens*. The eighteenth century of India would renew itself in the twentieth.

One wonders why these probable results were not contemplated by those who framed and are carrying out a scheme of reform which, by weakening authority, has shaken the confidence of the races that count in the long run and which only takes into consideration the politically-minded classes, negligible both as regards numbers and military value.

But we may find some consolation in the fact that the politically-minded extremists, who are endeavouring to subvert our rule, though they may here and there by open alliance or secret understanding with revolutionary organisations in India and even with the Bolsheviks of Moscow, cause temporary dislocation by terrorism and murder, cannot shake our rule because they have no real force at their back. The author of *The Lost Dominion* gets to the heart of the matter in a few vivid lines :

"The eagles do not anywhere accept with much enthusiasm

the rule of parrots, and in India there must ever be reasons why the army would mistrust the rule of the literary (political) Indian."

The King-Emperor's Government will go on, with the support and good-will of 99 per cent of the Indian population, as long as it is based on a clear policy of fulfilling our responsibilities in India, and as long as we have agents there capable of discharging those responsibilities. Both of these are equally indispensable.

### *Policy of the Socialist Party towards India*

But if there is little danger of our being driven out of India by force, there is a real danger of our losing India by negligence, or abandoning our trust there through a misguided sentimentality. That danger was a very real one under the late Socialist Government. There is now a strong Government in power with a clear and sane outlook on Indian affairs. But it has to be remembered that there is also a strong Socialist opposition, in close relations with that section of Indian politicians who are striving, under the specious claims for Dominion status and provincial autonomy, to reduce British control to a mere shadow—as in Southern Ireland to-day. It is true that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in January, 1924, soon after he became Prime Minister, sent a message to an Indian newspaper that "no party in Great Britain will be cowed by threats of force or by policies designed to bring government to a standstill; if any section of the community (in India) is under the delusion that this is not so, events will speedily disappoint them." This was a wise and timely warning. But we know from experience of the Socialist party in India and elsewhere that it is not what their leader thinks and says that governs the policy and the decision. The policy and the decision are often dictated to him by the extremists of his own party.

The programme of non-co-operation in India which has been the cover for, or the inspiration of, all the subsequent seditious movements was adopted at the extremists' National

Congress at Nagpur in December, 1920. There, Gandhi made his declaration of war. He said that "before the battle with the British Government was ended, they might have to wade through seas of blood." He has done much since to fulfil his words. Lajpat Rai on the same occasion claimed the right of armed rebellion against a "bloodstained and revolting government." There, too, the Ali brothers indulged in the violent incitements which culminated eight months later in the bloody Moplah rebellion. But the astonishing thing is that not only was no notice taken by the Indian Government of these incendiary speeches, but that two Labour Members of Parliament were present throughout those proceedings, and those two (Colonel Wedgwood and Mr. Spoor) were prominent members of the late Socialist Government, and Colonel Wedgwood, at least in his speeches and his questions in Parliament, has made no secret of his sympathy with Gandhi and Lajpat Rai.

*Lord Olivier on Gandhi, Das, and the Akalis*

But the mouthpiece of the late Government on Indian policy was Lord Olivier, the Secretary of State. He made two declarations of policy in the House of Lords in February and July, 1924. It is interesting to recall what he had to say as regards the three movements, Gandhi's non-co-operation, Mr. Das's attempt to paralyse the Government in Bengal, and the Akali movement in the Punjab, which are to-day the three most formidable menaces to public security in India.

Referring to Gandhi and his unconditional release after the Socialist Government had come into power and when he had served only two out of the six years' terms of imprisonment, he said :

"I am glad, *the party that I represent are glad*, that Mr. Gandhi has been released from prison, because it is repugnant to human feeling that a man of his character should be treated as a criminal."

Lord Olivier would appear to judge Gandhi not according to the criminal acts he gloried in and undertook to repeat

when released—seducing the Indian Army from its allegiance—but on his vague professions of humanity and brotherhood, so dear to the heart of a Fabian. Gandhi for the time being is under eclipse, having after his twenty-one days' fast swallowed many of his principles, including even his beloved spinning-wheel, watered down his denunciation of "political" murder, and capitulated unconditionally to Das, who now assumes Gandhi's mantle as leader of the anti-British movement in India.

Let us take Lord Olivier's portrait of Mr. Das. On 21st July, 1924, he said in the House of Lords:

"Mr. Das appears unquestionably to have associated himself with a resolution which, although it did not go expressly so far as to approve the assassination of Mr. Day (a British merchant murdered in the streets of Calcutta by a revolutionary student; afterwards convicted and hanged), *expressed an admiration for the character and motives of the assassin which has been, and not unnaturally, interpreted as implying a commendation of his deed.* . . . Mr. Das, I believe, said (later in his paper, the *Forward*), he would maintain his opinion of the intrepid and noble character of the young man who did the murder. Whether that is an incitement to murder or not, is not for me to pronounce."

In the same speech, referring to Das's successful efforts as head of the Swaraj party to bring the administration to a deadlock, Lord Olivier said:

"In the Bengal Assembly (Council) the Swaraj Party not being able to lead or procure a majority of votes for the purpose of embarrassing the Government *organised the purchase for cash of the requisite balances of votes or of abstentions to enable them to win the narrow division, which they did. This fact is notorious.*"

One would imagine that after such an analysis of Das's methods and ideals, his character too would have been notorious. But Lord Olivier's trust in those who are the avowed enemies of the British Government is not to be lightly shaken. Having enumerated Das's misdeeds—commendation



of murder and purchase of votes, he goes on in the same speech to say that Das

“has the reputation of being a particularly *upright and scrupulous politician, second only to Gandhi himself in saintliness of character. He is unquestionably a man of high and admirable ideals* on behalf of his country which he has fairly and uncompromisingly expressed.”

Lord Olivier defines further those ideals :

“Mr. Das is one of those Indian politicians who are convinced that no advance can be made in the attainment of self-government or political liberty—*except through appeals to organised force or failing this to secret methods aiming at outrage.*”

Are approval of the murder of Englishmen, and the use of organised force or secret outrage to subvert the British Government, among the “high and admirable ideals” which the late Secretary of State for India discovers in Mr. Das?

To do Mr. Das justice, he has never given Lord Olivier or anyone else any excuse for misunderstanding him or his ideals. On 24th July, 1924, he stated to a correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* :

“The present Reforms are a sham and mere eyewash ; the only power they give to us Indians *is the power to do mischief, and that is what I am doing now* with a clear object in view. We want *independence*, that is any system of government giving us the power to build our own constitution in our own way without obstruction from any *foreign* power.”

While in November he said openly that if he thought the Revolutionary Party would succeed he would join them tomorrow. One can imagine what encouragement the public eulogy of Das and his ideals by the late Secretary of State gave to every extremist and revolutionary in India.

Fortunately Bengal revolutionaries, even with Mr. Das and his valiant supporters thrown in, will never seriously shake our position in India. They may bring about the secret

outrages and assassinations, which are the weapons of a cowardly enemy, but the rigorous measures recently but tardily taken should avert such a result if they are steadily enforced, and if they are not hastily abandoned as a concession to unscrupulous agitation as in the case of the Rowlatt Act of 1919.

In referring to the seditious Akali movement in the Punjab, the Socialist Secretary of State showed an equally dangerous sympathy with the criminals. A band of some seven thousand Akalis raised in British India under the guise of pilgrims, many of them armed, made an irruption into the Sikh State of Nábha, the Maharaja of which had recently been made to abdicate for gross maladministration, in order to show their sympathy with him and to take forcible possession of a Sikh shrine at Jaitu. The State authorities had to call out a small force of troops and police to prevent this defiance of their authority. The Akalis tried to rush the State forces, and fired the first shot. Thereupon the State troops were ordered to fire; sixteen of the attackers were killed, some of them were captured, tried, and convicted of rioting, dacoity, etc., by a Sikh Judge, and the above statement is based on his findings.

What does Lord Olivier say in the House of Lords on 26th February, 1924?

"The (Akali) band of six thousand *opened fire on the police and troops* drawn up in front of the approach (to protect State property). The result was this deplorable incident in which again State troops and police had had to *fire on a crowd of innocent and religious-minded people stirred up by a small revolutionary Committee with whom they had actually no connection whatever.*"

By this extraordinary utterance the late Secretary of State gave the "innocent and religious-minded" Akalis a charter for their seditious enterprises, and a weapon to use against the British and State authorities who were endeavouring to hold them in check.

I doubt if the long history of our dealings with India will reveal anything more perverse or more dangerous than those

public declarations. It was my fortune to listen to Lord Olivier's two speeches and I came away with a feeling of blank despair, repeating what Demosthenes said to the Athenians, as already quoted.

*Indian Extremists and the Socialist Party*

But in the camp of the enemy there was general rejoicing. The advent to power of a Socialist Government, some members of which had the closest relations with the Indian extremists, had attracted a large number of the latter to London in the summer of 1924. There was much coming and going of these folk at the India Office, and the Secretary of State doubtless learned from them what he wished to hear and what they wanted him to believe. Some of his extraordinary blunders can only be explained on that hypothesis.

As usual Mrs. Besant, who with Mr. Sastri and others professed to come on behalf of a "National Conference" to push their demand for Dominion Home Rule, was in the forefront of the picture. As usual she did not hesitate to ally herself with such Indian politicians, whatever their record or their aims, as she found here. These, with others of her following, were apparently in frequent consultation with members of the late Socialist Government, and, according to Mrs. Besant, received from them promises of support for their wrecking policy, which sent them back to India jubilant. This is shown in the extracts from an interview given by Mrs. Besant on 28th August, on her arrival in Bombay :

"I think we may fairly say we have made India a burning question in the political life of England. We found the Labour Party entirely with us, and as Mr. Smillie publicly said, the majority of the Cabinet are with us. We found the Prime Minister and the *Secretary of State* thoroughly friendly, and the latter especially had long conversations with Mr. Sastri. . . .

The great difficulty of the Government is of course that it has no majority in the House. . . . The Government will take an early opportunity of going to the country and *may* then return with a majority. *We shall then have the right to*

*claim from the Labour Party the fulfilment of its promise to give India Dominion Home Rule."*

The grave significance of the last sentence should be noted.

She then proceeds to describe how in London she and Mr. Sastri, with Lajpat Rai, Harkishan Lal, Mr. Rangachariar, Mr. K. C. Roy, and Sir K. Gupta, with occasional help from Sir Ali Imam (late Chief Minister in Hyderabad) and Sir Sankaran Nair, drew up

"the essentials of a free constitution for India. This was presented to the Secretary of State and also to the Prime Minister. If they (the Labour Party) are not in a majority [in the new Parliament] I have arranged with a number of M.P.'s, Liberals and Labour, to back such a Bill in the first session in the new year. I may say that my work has been rendered easy by the fact that I have worked for the Labour Party for these fifty years of my public life, and also that I have been a member of the Fabian Society, to which several of the Ministers belong, since 1884."

Here we have the whole scheme unfolded. There is something romantic, indeed fantastic, in this little camarilla of Fabians, Theosophists, Indian extremists who have been convicted of sedition or rebellion, Indian politicians "on the shelf" or looking for new realms to conquer, sitting down in a London drawing-room to frame a Constitution for a free India and presenting their demands to the Premier and the Secretary of State at the pistol point. One's mind goes back to the three tailors of Tooley Street. But a sense of humour is not common either in the British Fabian or in the Indian politician, and no doubt the Secretary of State took them as seriously as they took themselves.

Only one thing upset their plans—the result of the General Election. No wonder that on the eve of the election Mr. Das, the protagonist of the Swaraj Party in India, cabled to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald:

"Accept my good wishes. The success of Labour alone will mean a triumph for the forces working for true progress and real peace of the world."

Mr. Das's ideals of "true progress" and "real peace" have been described above in his own words and Lord Olivier's. The late Prime Minister must have found Lord Olivier's friends rather embarrassing. Anyhow, Das's good wishes did not help him in the election.

### *Dissensions of Indian Political Parties*

It may be argued that the Dominion Home Rule for which Mrs. Besant, Mr. Sastri, and their National Conference are working is something different from the Swaraj which Mr. Das and his supporters are striving to obtain. No Western brain could attempt to define the aims or unravel the tangle of political parties in India to-day. But the Indian mind is more at home in that labyrinth, and I quote the following description from an article in the *Nation*—an extremist journal in the Punjab :

"There is hardly any political unity to talk of. Moderates and Extremists were separate enough, but to-day even these two denominations have become as effete as the movements they represented. To-day you have the Loyalists, the Co-operators, the Oppositionists, the Obstructionists, the Swarajists, the Unionist Non-Co-operators, the Die-Hard Non-Co-operators, and the Anarchists. No shame, no disgrace, however great, can bring them on a common platform. Self-seeking egotism masquerades under the name of leadership, and patriotism for once has truly become the last resort of scoundrels. The communal riots in Mooltan, followed by similar outbreaks in Amritsar, Ajmir, and Meerut (there have been dozens more and on a greater scale since the above was written), are a vivid proof of our narrowness, our fanaticism and our intolerance. Religious leadership has drifted from the saint to the devil, and honest men and women have become easy dupes of unscrupulous machinators or impudent fanatics."

Can anyone who knows the facts doubt the substantial truth of this sombre picture of India to-day as painted by an outspoken Indian extremist. But the Indian politicians, in their eagerness to maintain the pitiful fiction of Indian unity, either shut their eyes to it altogether or at least conceal the

truth from the British politicians whom they have converted or are seeking to convert to their doctrine of Dominion Home Rule. Thus, in the interview already quoted from, Mrs. Besant holds out the olive branch to Das's Bengal Swaraj Party. She says :

"The National Convention has no programme beyond gaining Swaraj by constitutional methods. There is now really nothing to prevent—since Pundit Moti Lál Nehru (Das's colleague) has entered the Legislature and a large party of the Swaraj Party is in favour of working through the Councils—there is nothing to prevent them from working together. It is suicidal for any party desiring Swaraj to refuse co-operation with those who have the same object, and who are not prepared to resort to violence."

This is a bid for Das's support, for Das, while he condones murder for political ends and has recently compelled Gandhi to whittle down his first condemnation of it, safeguards himself by saying he will only join the revolutionary party if he thinks it likely to succeed. This attempt by Mrs. Besant to create a spurious and superficial unity among the contending Indian political factions is merely intended to throw dust in the eyes of the British public and Parliament, and to "bluff" them into granting to a "United India" demands which in a year would throw India back into the anarchy of the eighteenth century. Gandhi did for a few years succeed in uniting the Hindu and Mohammedan extremists on the common platform of hatred of the British. But the inevitable reactions were the more violent, and the fundamental racial and religious antagonisms between Hindu and Mohammedan, and between the Hindu extremists themselves, are now more deadly than ever. In January last Gandhi himself was publicly denounced by a great gathering of orthodox Hindus in Bombay for having suggested at the Congress the removal of the "untouchability" of the out-castes. It was held that this was an integral part of the Hindu faith, and one speaker went so far as to suggest that Gandhi should be lynched for attacking it.

Sir T. B. Sapru, the President of the National Convention which Mrs. Besant represented in England, is more candid than his delegate. He is reported in the *Daily Telegraph* of 15th November as having said at Calcutta on the 14th November, 1924 :

“For many years there had been no greater reason for depression than existed at present, and this not because of temporary issues, but of other and larger issues. *India was hopelessly divided by internal dissensions* and their quarrels were exploited and would continue to be exploited against all demands for constitutional advance. They must find the solution of their own problems before any Home Government would do anything for them. . . . Otherwise the less they talked of constitutional advance the better.”

This is common-sense. It is what many of us who are not hostile to a reasonable constitutional advance if and when Indian conditions justify it, have been preaching to people here and in India for years past. We have it now clearly admitted by Indian politicians themselves—Moderates and Extremists—that since the Reforms India is more hopelessly divided by racial, religious, and political antagonisms, than at any time since the advent of British rule. Surely one conclusion is obvious—the weakening of the strong central authority that alone bound the disruptive elements together has let loose all the latent warring forces. Another conclusion is equally obvious, viz. that, as Sir T. B. Sapru says, till the Indian politicians find a solution of their own problems—the ever-present racial and religious hatreds, the reconciliation of caste and social inequalities with democracy, the recognition of elementary human rights in the 50 millions of out-castes—“the less they talk of constitutional advance the better.” Indeed, it is already patent to all who are prepared to face the facts that the Indian politicians, as a body, have so far not proved themselves fit for the substantial measure of self-government already bestowed on them by the Reforms Scheme, much less for any advance. Some of us at the time had an uneasy feeling that this might prove to be the case, and therefore pressed that Parliament, after reviewing

ten years' working of the Reforms, should have power not only to "extend and modify" but also "restrict" them. I well remember how strongly Mr. Montagu opposed this suggestion, which was accepted and embodied in the Act, when pressed by me before the Joint Committee. He did not foresee that within five years the Legislative Councils of two provinces—Bengal and Central Provinces—by their perverse and irresponsible attitude would themselves bring about such a restriction. The Reforms Scheme is now in abeyance in those provinces, and it is Mr. Das's professed policy to bring about similar results in all the other provinces as early as possible. Yet Mrs. Besant sees no obstacle to joining hands with Das and his Swaraj Party, and writes and talks as if she had the Socialist Party behind her in her preposterous demand for her "free Constitution" for India.

*Anxiety of Loyal Indians and of Minorities*

Meantime the vast majority of educated Indians, who are not extremists, have been seriously alarmed by Lord Olivier's statement of policy. In addition to the despair caused to loyal Indians by his championship of Gandhi, Das, and the Akalis, the Mohammedans (a minority of 72 millions) took alarm at his letter to Mr. Satya Murthi, a Madras extremist, in which he expressed his dislike of the system of communal representation. Under the Reforms Scheme that is the only safeguard, and not a very adequate one, against the tyranny of a majority in the Legislature, which in present conditions is in its exercise of power admittedly swayed mainly by religious and racial feeling.

The apprehensions of the various minorities, as to how they will stand, when the impartial British Government withdraws its protecting hand, and the rapidly-disappearing British official is no longer there to hold the scales of justice, are real and well-founded. In October, 1924, a week before the General Election, three gentlemen from India, none of whom I had ever seen before and who were unknown to one another, came to see me on the same day, knowing that I was interested in Indian affairs.



The first was a British non-official of great influence, one of the leaders of the European community in Calcutta. He was justly alarmed on behalf of the British community by the growth of the revolutionary movement in Bengal, by Das's statement that "the anarchist movement is much more serious than the authorities realise," and by his threat that "if the Swarajist movement fails, no repression can possibly cope with the anarchy that is sure to raise its head. Violence and disorder will reign supreme."

The second visitor was a highly-educated Mohammedan of the United Provinces, closely connected with some of the Mohammedan extremists, from whom he had drawn aloof when he realised what they were heading for, and who was obsessed with the fear of Hindu domination in the United Provinces where the Hindus are in a majority of four to one.

The third was a cultured Hindu of high family in the Punjab, who was alarmed by the violent Hindu-Mohammedan tension in that province—mainly due, according to him, to the mad anti-British policy of the Hindu extremists—and who as a Hindu, was equally obsessed by the fear of Mohammedan dominance in the Punjab.

Each of the three spoke primarily of his own community. But all represented that the continuance in power of the Socialist Government with the policy outlined by Lord Olivier, would rapidly bring down whatever is still left of stable government in India.

### *Policy of the New British Government*

Fortunately the British elector has seen to that ; the danger to India of a Socialist Government has been averted. I believe that even among educated Indians 99 per cent welcome the advent to power of a strong Government. That Government, as the new Prime Minister's speeches at the Queen's Hall in October and the Guildhall in November show, is determined that there can be

"no concession to unwarrantable agitation—no toleration of the destructive methods of the extremists, if the country is

to be saved from the dangers which at present beset it," and that "if we are to do our duty to the peoples of India we must see to it that we do our duty to those who are serving us there in times of great anxiety and difficulty—the Indian Civil Service, the Police, the Engineers, and others."

In his Guildhall speech the Prime Minister repeated the assurance to the Services that action would be taken on Lord Lee's report at "a very early date." On the general policy, after reference to the Hindu-Muslim tension and the terrorist organisations in Bengal, he expressed the determination of the Home Government to support the Government of India "in suppressing crimes of that nature, by whomsoever or for whatever motive they are committed." Finally he expressed his confidence that "with steadfastness and insight a way can be found to preserve the welfare of the peoples of India and to assist their peaceful progress in the paths of economic and constitutional development, which the people of this country claim and have already done so much to foster."

In these speeches Mr. Baldwin has shown a statesmanlike grasp of the Indian situation, and there is good reason to hope that his declaration of policy will not remain a *brutum fulmen* like the "steel frame" speech of Mr. Lloyd George in August, 1922—a few months before he fell from power. India needs "steadfastness and insight." Public opinion in Britain is at last—thanks mainly to the admirable dispatches from their correspondents in India now regularly published by the leading organs of the Press—fairly well-informed as to the position of India and more alive to our responsibilities there. The British people and their representatives in Parliament can nearly always be trusted to do their duty *when they know the truth*. The present serious, but not yet desperate, situation has arisen because the facts were either not presented to them, or were misrepresented.

*Erroneous Views of English Writers on Indian Problems*

Indian problems are, at the best of times, difficult to comprehend, even by those who have spent years in that sub-continent, for it is almost impossible, and certainly most dangerous, to generalise about 320 millions of people with infinitely greater diversities of race, religion, and social conditions than are presented by all Europe.

This very complexity has made those who know most about India hesitate in expressing an opinion except as regards the locality and peoples they were in contact with. But this wise reticence of those who know furnishes the opportunity to the self-confident pedant, publicist, and politician who makes a few cursory cold-weather tours, in which he necessarily only meets and talks with a small section of the Western-educated classes in the towns and sees nothing of the real India. The Indian politicians, with whom he comes chiefly in contact, like all Orientals, are quick to read the characters of such visitors and to exploit their ignorance and credulity. Into the visitors' sympathetic ears they pour their complaints of the aloofness of the British officials (who are probably wearing themselves out in fighting famine or crime or epidemics in remote rural tracts), of the overbearing manners and material aims of the British in India (who have primarily to think of getting through the day's work in the day). These defects are contrasted with their own gentle courtesy and spiritual ideals. Stimulated by the subtle flattery which discriminates the sympathetic Englishman from home from the haughty, unsympathetic Englishman in India, the spell works. The visitor has seen nothing of rural India, has learned nothing of the administrative problems which the British official is manfully struggling to solve. But he persuades himself that *he*, and not the narrow-minded "groovy" official, understands the East and its aspirations, that *he* has even fathomed the character of a Gandhi, a Das, or a Lajpat Rai. He is fired with the desire to communicate his discovery to an expectant world, and he finds, or did find till recently, a ready audience

in the British public and British politicians who are groping for light on the dark problems of India.

Hence the many superficial books and articles on India from "highbrow" publicists, particularly since the War, which gave a partial and misleading presentation of Indian conditions, which helped the Reforms Scheme with its dangerous Diarchy through an uninformed Press and Parliament, and which for three years concealed the steady deterioration of the Indian administration under the new conditions. Hence, too, the cruel libels by these same publicists on the British in India, official and non-official, valiantly striving to do their duty; for to malign your own people is the mark of a broad mind and of a generous sympathy with the enemies of your country. We hear little to-day of those publicists and their pompous prognostications. It is better so. For blind guides are more dangerous than no guides. Their place has been taken by able correspondents of the great newspapers who, being neither cranks nor "high-brows," take the trouble to study the questions they are writing about, and present their views without any assumption of pontifical authority.

### *Erroneous Views as to Indian Public Opinion*

Another matter in which the British public are habitually misled is as regards "Indian Opinion," which is so glibly quoted by politicians here and in India. There is no such thing as Indian opinion. There is not even such a thing as Hindu or Mohammedan or Sikh opinion in regard to any matter of general political or social interest. There is an appalling diversity of opinions. Thus, among the Hindus you will ordinarily find an acute line of cleavage between Brahmin and non-Brahmin, between urban and rural, between the literate and illiterate, the orthodox and the unorthodox or less orthodox. Then even among the Brahmins further lines of cleavage are found between the orthodox and the non-orthodox, the Western-educated and Indian-educated, the social reformers and the social die-hards, the Brahmin who lives by agriculture

and the Brahmin who despises (as he generally does) agriculture and all manual labour. There is only one thing that brings together not only all Brahmins but all Hindus, and that is the sacred cow—the call of religion as embodied in cow-worship.

Mohammedans are similarly divided *inter se* according to their religious tenets. There is no love lost between the Sunni and the Shiah. Each regards the other as a heretic, like the Catholics and Protestants of Ulster, while the Wahabi despises both for their idolatrous (to him) practices. But both Sunni and Shiah regard the other Moslem sects, such as the Ahmadiyas, the Khoja followers of H.H. the Aga Khan, as almost outside the pale of Islam. I was horrified a few weeks ago to read that the Ulema (Doctors of Divinity) of a Sunni Theological College had expressed publicly their approval of the recent stoning to death at Kabul by the Amir's order of a cultured gentleman who professed the Ahmadiya quietist and pacific tenets. In February, 1925, two other members of the sect were executed for their religious opinions. "Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum!"

Religion is unfortunately the most vital, indeed the only vital, force in Indian politics to-day. Yet some fifty or sixty Indian politicians in the All-India Assembly, elected by at the most one hundred thousand votes, claim to represent 250 millions of India's diverse races, castes, and creeds. What is more, our Government in India and many of our politicians here, in their eagerness to show that we have by the Reforms established responsible Government in India, accept the claim. Surely it is time that this travesty of democracy was exposed.

#### *Erroneous Views as to the Indian Press*

A similar misconception exists here as to the Indian Press. This is also accepted as representing public opinion. It represents only a section of the urban population (which is only 6 per cent of the whole) and a small fraction of the rural people who are literate. It is entirely out of touch with the rural masses and either careless of or hostile to their interests, which are often, e.g. in the case of the Punjab Land Alienation Act, the Co-operative Credit Movement, the

Free Trade versus Protection issue, directly opposed to those of the town folk. The Indian Press claims to represent the many varying shades of native political opinion. But, with a few exceptions in the great cities, the newspapers have little solid foundation, little financial or political stability. When the word goes round from the various political caucuses, the Congress, the non-co-operators, the various so-called Constitutional organisations, the Indian Press will nearly all promptly fall into line and march to the same tune. This was made clear in the fictitious agitation against the Rowlatt Act in 1919—almost entirely a Press-organised affair, with Mahatma Gandhi pulling the strings from behind. It is manifest again to-day in the almost universal chorus of Press condemnation of the measures recently taken by the Government against the revolutionary movement in Bengal. Extremist and moderate organs of all shades have united in the parrot-like cry of "repression." Mrs. Besant, to her credit be it said, has alone stood out. This is not public opinion, it is successful "broadcasting."

There is no country in the world where the Press can be so easily bought as in India. That was shown when in April, 1919, the Afghan Foreign Minister instructed the Afghan envoy at Simla to "put excitement into the (Indian) newspapers" and not to spare money; he even indicated the organs likely to help in the campaign against the British Government. Those newspapers are still in existence, and prominent organs of "public opinion."

The Government of India brought out clearly the venality of a section of the Press in the debate which led to the passing in 1923 of the Princes' Protection Act, one object of which was to prevent the Indian Princes from being blackmailed by newspapers in British India. The All-India Assembly refused to allow the Bill to be introduced and Lord Reading had to use his emergency powers to pass it into law.

I once asked a wealthy Indian friend of mine why he continued to run a newspaper at a heavy loss. He calmly replied that it was a useful insurance, that if he had not a paper of his own, he would have to spend more on meeting demands for blackmail. He need not, however, have lost money if he had

opened his columns to the obscene advertisements on which many of the vernacular papers then flourished. In the Punjab I had the thankless task of grappling with this evil. It did not increase my popularity with much of the Press, but I did appreciate a warm message of gratitude from the educated Indian ladies of Lahore.

*Teaching of Sedition in Schools and Colleges*

Since Lord Lytton's Government nearly fifty years ago had to pass an Act to curb seditious propaganda, a section of the Press in India has been a most potent means of creating disaffection. Its efforts in this direction have for the last generation been steadily furthered by seditious propaganda in colleges and schools, especially those which are not State-aided. It is the teaching of false history and false economics, in which the British in India are habitually held up to execration as tyrants and bloodsuckers strangling "Mother India," that is mainly responsible for the spread of the revolutionary cult in the immature minds of the half-educated students and schoolboys of Bengal, the Deccan, and, to a lesser extent, in the Punjab and other provinces. Most of the Bengal outrages since 1907 have been the work of students of the type of Gopinath (the murderer of Mr. Day in Calcutta in 1924) whom Mr. Das publicly canonised. In this and other respects Bengal shows a strong resemblance to Egypt. In the Punjab rebellion of 1919 students of certain colleges and even grown-up schoolboys took a prominent part, several having been convicted of rebellion and some even of the murder of Englishmen.

These poisonous teachings are now being carried on openly even in the primary schools. The Government of the United Provinces has recently had to order the confiscation of six *Hindi Readers*, published by a Calcutta firm as text-books for schools. In rejecting the publisher's appeal against the order of confiscation, the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court (Sir Grimwood Mears) said (see *Times* of 20th November, 1924):

"The compiler of the text-books had manifestly collected all the seditious utterances he could find, page after page

containing sentiments hostile and insulting to the British Government. In the opinion of the Court the *Readers* had been compiled with the determination to corrupt the minds of *children*, and came within Section 124A (Sedition) of the Penal Code."

It is appalling to contemplate these sedulous efforts to poison the minds of children, and train them up in fanatical hatred of the power that alone gives them justice, security, and even the education which is being used as a means of perverting their minds. This systematic corruption of the young is responsible for the growth of the sedition and secret revolutionary societies, which are unfortunately so common among the Indian Intelligentsia to-day. The parents often deplore it, but family discipline is weak in India and they have not the strength to combat it. They think it is the business of Government to prevent these corrupting influences, and a weak Government in its turn shuffles its responsibility on to "sane and moderate citizens."

A conversation with most of the Indian students who have come to this country, say at Oxford or Cambridge, will show how deep the poison has worked, even where one would expect to find something of clear reasoning and accurate information. They have as a rule been brought up in blank ignorance of the truth and fed on false history and false economics. Such a training from childhood to manhood must produce a luxuriant crop of fanatics and revolutionaries. We have seen what this has led to in Egypt and what it has already led to in Bengal and other parts of India. We pride ourselves on what we have done for education in India. Is it not time that we took steps to prevent our educational system being made into a machine for the manufacture of dangerous criminals, masquerading in the guise of the "intrepid and noble" patriots whom Mr. Das is so proud of?

### *Hesitation to Face the Facts*

All these facts are generally known, better known to Indians than to us; but they are not generally stated, out of deference to Indian feeling. No one should go out of his way to hurt



the feelings of others ; and Indian politicians, while vigorous, and even reckless, in their criticism of others, are markedly sensitive to any criticism of themselves. The authorities here and in India have in recent years carried their tenderness of these susceptibilities too far. It is part of their vain policy of trying to reconcile the irreconcilable by soft words, such as Mr. Montagu's and Lord Olivier's eulogies of Gandhi and Das. These are either harmful or ridiculous. Mr. Das's reply in his paper the *Forward* to Lord Olivier's bouquets was prompt and characteristic. He wrote :

“ Lord Olivier stands already confessed that his credulity has no limits. . . . We do not know what to think of a Secretary of State who makes grave and libellous allegations affecting the reputation of men as solicitous of their honour as he is.”

The hesitation to face facts and the disposition to flatter Indian politicians are particularly marked in the annual reports, otherwise admirable, submitted to Parliament by the Government of India. The compiler echoes Lord Olivier and Mr. Montagu in his references to the “self-sacrifice” of Das, the “lofty ideals” of Gandhi ; and this tendency must obviously encourage the Indian extremists and mislead the British public. The last issue has evoked a robust protest (see *Times* of 3rd March) from Sir Campbell Rhodes, the most prominent non-official European in the Legislative Assembly.

If Indian public men claim, as they do, the same rights as public men in other countries, they must learn to dispense with their “cotton wool” wrappings, to observe the decencies and the conventions which alone make public life possible for honourable men, to stand honest criticism and face the racket in the same way as, say, the British officials in India who are the favourite target of their virulent attacks. They cannot have it both ways.

The Reforms which were intended to be the first substantial step towards responsible government have now been in force for five years. It is surely time we brushed aside the false atmosphere of cant and make-believe with which their working

has hitherto been surrounded and got down to candour and realities. Indeed the deadlock created by the Swaraj Party in Bengal and the Central Provinces has made further illusions impossible. It is a grievous mistake to think that in our dealings with Orientals we must adopt their tortuous, indirect, and procrastinating methods. We cannot hope to meet them on their own ground. Everyone who has tried it, whether at Delhi or Cairo, has failed. Let us therefore stick to our direct and frank traditions which they in their hearts understand and admire. Nearly all our difficulties in India during the last six years have been of our own creation. We have conjured up one "bogy" after another from the "vasty deep" of our own imagination and have then run away from it in fear—Gandhi, the Khilafat Movement, the Akali uprising. In the end, after they had grown to alarming proportions, we have had to grapple with them, and we are then astonished to find that the "bogy" vanishes into thin air.

The absence of frank statement and a clear policy on our part is one of the causes that has thrown Indian politics into the chaotic confusion in which they now are, and has hopelessly bewildered the 99 per cent of the people who are completely outside politics and vainly look to Government and its agents for a lead.

### *Failure of Indian Politicians to Work the Reforms*

Another cause is the absence of clear thinking and of consistent policy among Indian politicians. They have refused to face facts; they are the slaves of catchwords and empty but high-sounding formulæ, and are governed by impulse and passing emotions rather than by the cold light of reason and experience. A study of the evidence given within the last few months before the Reforms Commission at Simla by the most prominent public men in India makes one almost despair of India's political future. It might be summed up in the saying, "They don't know what they want and they won't be happy till they get it." This particularly applies to most of the Hindu witnesses. In so far as they have any policy at all, it appears to be this: "Things are in a mess: that is a result of the Diarchy. Give us

complete Dominion status and full provincial autonomy and everything will be right." Of course *they* themselves are in no way responsible for the muddle ; that is due to the Diarchy, or to autocratic Governors, or to financial and economic difficulties—to anything and anyone except to those to whom the Reforms Act looked to show a sense of responsibility and a spirit of co-operation, but who, as a rule, have shown neither the one nor the other.

But the few Mohammedan witnesses, especially from Bengal, where the Hindu Swaraj Party with the help of votes purchased for cash, as stated by Lord Olivier, have wrecked the Reforms, show a sense of reality. The Mohammedans, after all, have an appreciation of history and of facts, less common in the Hindu mentality, which tends to place facts and illusion (*maya*) on the same plane. The Mohammedans also have the traditions of rule. Though they are in a slight numerical majority in Bengal, they are inferior in education, wealth, and political strategy to the Hindus, and they realise that under a Swaraj Government, supported by British arms, they would fare badly. Hence their frank admission that rather than submit to such a fate they would prefer to revert to "autocratic" rule, or to the Morley-Minto Reforms. That feeling is undoubtedly shared not only by Mohammedans and Sikhs in other provinces, but by the great mass even of educated Hindus outside the extremist parties. But they fear to express it, for there is a system of terrorism in other provinces than Bengal, and public opinion is paralysed by moral cowardice. The unanimous opposition of the elected members in the All-India Assembly to the proposed legislation against revolutionary crime, and their equally unanimous vote (February, 1925) in favour of repealing what little is left of security legislation, are the most recent examples of this moral cowardice and political incapacity.

Bengal is politically the most advanced province in India, and a brief reference to the evidence recently given by two Bengal ex-Ministers on the working of the Reforms there is instructive.

Sir P. C. Mitter, a Hindu ex-Minister, and an able and

loyal gentleman, while condemning the Diarchy, stated that he firmly believed that the time was not yet ripe for full provincial autonomy and that it was absolutely necessary to provide for a half-way house. He based this wise conclusion largely on what he called the "immaturity, illiteracy, and gullibility" of the electorate (2 per cent of the population), and so far from wishing to extend the narrow franchise, he favoured its limitation as being too wide and tending to perpetuate sectarian differences. Anyhow he regarded it as "essential that full responsibility should not be given immediately to the voters and members of the Provincial Councils *over any single department of Government.*" He went on to make the damning admission—for a Minister—that in Bengal "the Government are unwilling or apprehensive, put it how you like, to enforce the orders of a British Court of Justice, and to take definite steps to protect its own officers."

And having said all this, at a later stage he goes on to suggest that the remedy is full provincial autonomy, with all Ministers, official and non-official, holding office at the pleasure of a Provincial Council subject to a narrower electorate!

Here we have the acme of political inconsistency. One wonders where the ideal of "responsible government" comes in. But many of us have long contended that Indian politicians only adopted that ideal to delude the British Parliament into concessions that would place in power a narrow oligarchy.

The Mohammedan ex-Minister, Mr. Fazl-ul-Hakk, once a strong supporter of the Khilafat Movement but who later honestly exposed its hollowness, was more logical and more consistent. He was of opinion that the Diarchy had never had a fair trial from the politicians, though the British officials had given him, as Minister, loyal support in his efforts to work it. He held that any further advance was, at present, impossible, as India was "a vast congeries of distinct races and communities in unequal stages of political development," so that a further advance would mean the accession to power of one particular community dominating all others less advanced. *While recognising the difficulty of going back, he stated that he would like to revert to the personal rule prior to*

*the Morley-Minto Reforms as more intelligible to and popular with the masses. He even thought the declaration of August, 1917, a mistake.* Like Sir P. C. Mitter he emphasised the ignorance of the electorate; unlike him he dwelt on the necessity of Ministers being trained for their responsibilities; and he went on to show, quoting specific instances, the methods of corruption and intimidation used by the Swaraj Party to outvote the Government in the Council by rejecting money-bills and thus bringing the administration to a deadlock.

After this conclusive evidence from two able ex-Ministers, representing different communities and different lines of thought, can there be any doubt that the Reforms Scheme has hopelessly broken down in the province where it had most chance of success? A similar breakdown has taken place in the Central Provinces and is threatened elsewhere.

### *The Policy to be Adopted*

The time has therefore come for the Home Government to define in some detail its policy towards India. It was wisely said by the late Duke of Devonshire, that men who understand their business must have a clear view of the alternative to be adopted, if at any time the scheme in hand failed. It is not clear whether the authors of the Reforms contemplated any such alternative.

The declaration of 20th August, 1917, runs as follows :

“The policy of His Majesty’s Government is (1) the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and (2) the gradual development of self-governing institutions (3) *with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government* in India as an integral part of the British Empire.”

These words appear in the Preamble of the Reforms Act of 1919 which, like the declaration, repeats that substantial measures are to be taken in this direction *at once*, that the British Parliament being responsible for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples must be the sole judge of the time and measure of any further advance, and that their

decision will be guided by the co-operation and sense of responsibility displayed by those (Indian politicians) on whom the opportunities of service have been conferred. Many, both British and Indian, thought at the time that the words underlined in (3) might well have been omitted. In 1917 it was certainly premature to assume that India would ever develop a desire or a capacity for "responsible," i.e. democratic government. Many facts then, and even more since, point the other way. The Indian politicians, then as now, have shown a strong and natural desire for an increasing share in the administration. Many of them had also evinced a vague but not unnatural desire for a "self-government" which they cannot even now agree on defining. But they had never shown any keen desire for democratic government in itself, though they found it a useful formula in their campaign to extend their power at the expense of the "bureaucratic" government—the only form known to the East.

Anyhow, the ideals in (1) and (2) of the declaration are quite laudable, though of course they are and were intended to be subordinate in practice to Parliament's general responsibility for India's well-being. The introduction of (3), the ideal of democratic institutions, was no doubt a concession to the doctrine of self-determination which as a political theory had more to recommend it in 1917 than it can claim from the experience since gained of its practical working. There was another probable reason. The resolutions passed at the Imperial War Conference of 1917 recognised the nationhood of the great Dominions—Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand. India was a party to that Conference, and it was a plausible, though not a sound, decision, savouring of Round Table suggestion, to try and link up that great congeries of races, castes, and creeds forming our Oriental Empire in the chain of the Dominions composed mainly of men of British race, with British traditions, British culture, and British representative institutions. The easiest way, on the surface, to accomplish such a miracle would be to endow India, for whom the small educated section were claiming political concessions, with some form of democratic institu-

dwindling away. Can the Indian Civil Service, for instance, be maintained by *three* British recruits annually (that was the number this year) when twenty to thirty are required to maintain even half the present strength of twelve hundred?

Meantime the men who have had the training and experience to do the work are leaving before their time in the Civil Service, police, and other departments, because they have had no guarantee for the future. Two services, the I.C.S. and the police, have now been given certain guarantees, which should help to attract and maintain the indispensable British element. But the Government of India, to meet the politicians' cry for Indianisation, have completely suspended British recruitment for some of the services most essential to future progress and most desired by the Indian masses.

In administration, as in legislation, we have sacrificed the interests of the many to those of the few, and we have succeeded in making the few only the more discontented. Even the great Indian Civil Service, of which England was so proud, is being converted from a body of first-class administrators to one of indifferent politicians. It is not happy over the change, which many think has injuriously affected its high traditions, its *esprit de corps*, and its *morale*; for vote-catching and lobbying with astute and not over-scrupulous Indian politicians do not bring out the best in men as the great field of administration does. Honest work for the Indian peoples was formerly the test of efficiency and the ground for advancement. Skill in making compromises and adjustments with Indian politicians is now taking its place.

I began this chapter by quoting the views of Lord Lawrence, the greatest Indian Civil Servant after Warren Hastings, on Britain's mission and responsibility in India. Before closing it I shall quote another survey of the same problems by another distinguished Civil Servant, Sir Auckland Colvin, once Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, and also a famous administrator in Egypt. In the *Life of* (his father) *John Russell Colvin* (Clarendon Press, 1895), who was Lieutenant-Governor of the Agra Province in the Mutiny, he wrote:

“Progress through order is the maxim of Indian adminis-

tration. To the superficial observer the disorders of 1857 (the Indian Mutiny) may seem impossible of recurrence. Everywhere the eye rests now upon railways, telegraphs, schools, municipalities, district boards, newspapers, English education. *It is what the eye does not rest upon, however, which in all organisms is vital.* Fanaticism, bigotry, poverty in high places, the pride of ancestry, pretensions of caste, love of change, lust of adventure, that Bacchic fury which blazes out so unaccountably in the East, slumber lightly beneath the sprinkling of Western soil. To these British rule has added new elements of complication, fresh groupings of bodies, more active interchange of native opinion, wider combinations, growing knowledge, the germs of strange hopes.

*The art of British government in India has hitherto been not to destroy but correct Eastern methods of administration by applying to them the discipline of Western minds.*

*Now it is the undisciplined Eastern mind which is to introduce into India Western methods of administration.* The experiment will prove of interest and, it is earnestly hoped, of value.

But the lessons of 1857 must not be forgotten. *Whatever may be hazarded with the educated minority, the real India is only to be found in the masses of the ignorant millions.*

To govern this real India, authority and justice should be in full view; but in reserve must be ample force. These are the only methods which under their own rule the masses of that country have ever respected, not even at the desire of the British Government will they readily adopt any other."

In this quotation we hear the voice of one who speaks with insight, knowledge, and authority. The views he so admirably expresses are those which many of us, more crudely, in vain endeavoured to impress on those responsible for the Reforms. They went astray because they did not understand the *real India*, and what it wants—authority, justice, and the power necessary to enforce them. They legislated only for English-educated India, a minority of less than 1 per cent, which was vocal and which they thought they understood. But events have proved that even here they were wrong. Meantime the *real India* is steadily drifting away from the justice and authority to which it was so securely moored. It realises, dimly perhaps, that a change has come over the



spirit of its rulers, a change which causes it bewilderment and unsettlement. These are showing themselves with increasing frequency in the outbursts of "fanaticism, bigotry—and Bacchic fury" foreshadowed by Sir Auckland Colvin thirty years ago. But these stirrings in the depths below are only the warnings of a general upheaval, which would sweep away not only our exotic constitutional experiments but all the solid structure of security and civilisation which we have built up by the patient labour of a century and a half. That is the situation we have to face. It can be met, not by petty political adjustments, but by broad, firm, and consistent statesmanship, based on the principle of Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858, "to administer the Government (of India) for the benefit of *all* our peoples resident therein."

That is a platform on which all loyal Indians and all honest Britons can surely unite, irrespective of party or politics. That is the test to which all constitutional schemes must be subjected. In so far as the "experiment" embodied in the present Reforms Act has failed to promote that object, it must be reconsidered and recast. Herein lies the difficulty for British politicians. We have rashly given power, which they have not made a good use of, to a small section of Indian politicians, and the experience of recent years shows that we have an unhappy tendency to compromise with those temporarily in power, and abandon the others. Mr. Birrell, who speaks with authority, thus describes it :

"It is a British characteristic, though not an amiable one, that once we are (or think ourselves) beaten, to go over in a body to the successful enemy, and too often abandon and cold-shoulder and snub both in action and in writing the suffering few who adhered to our cause in evil and difficult times."


This is a hard saying, but it certainly represents the impression created on other peoples, Eastern and Western, by our policy in recent years. It is also what has emboldened the small body of extremists in India to think that we already regard ourselves as beaten, will make terms with them on their conditions, and abandon our loyal friends. But in India the latter are still

the vast majority. To abandon them and our responsibility for the well-being of India's 320 millions would, in the words of Mr. Lloyd George, be the "greatest betrayal in history." I believe that the attitude of mind described by Mr. Birrell is not a British *characteristic*, but a passing post-War phase, which we are rapidly growing out of and shall soon look back upon as unworthy of our great past and incompatible with our ideals for the future. I have faith that British justice triumphs in the end, and that the British people and British statesmen, irrespective of party, will remain true to their trust and their mission in India.

The Dominion is *not* lost.

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




GENERAL MAP OF  
**INDIA**  
to illustrate  
"INDIA AS I KNEW IT"

Scale of Miles  
0 100 200 300 400

# MAP OF THE PUNJAB.









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